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"The Dynamics of British policy towards Sweden, 1942-1945"
Much has been written about Sweden's place in
British strategy during the first nine months of World
War II but insufficient attention has been given to what
transpired between Britain and Sweden during subsequent
stages of the war.
The extant literature about Anglo-Swedish rela-
tions during World War II is limited to published American
diplomatic papers, isolated references in British official
histories devoted to broader subjects, or Swedish works
which lack sufficient insight into British attitudes.
These earlier publications raise, but do not
consider in detail, significant questions concerning
British interests in Sweden, Britain's attitude towards
American economic warfare strategy, and Britain's declin-
ing influence as a great power.
The present work, which draws heavily from
unpublished British and American official records as well
as relevant secondary sources, is a comprehensive
examination of the political, economic and military
dimensions of British policy towards Sweden between 1942
and 1945.
It deals with such issues as London's declining
interest in economic warfare during the last years of the
war, British attitudes towards Sweden's possible inter-
vention in the war, and Anglo-American competition for
influence over Swedish military and civil aviation.
This thesis assesses the extent to which wartime
concerns such as intelligence activities and long-term
commercial interests influenced Britain's outlook toward
Sweden.
It also considers whether this outlook reflected
British perceptions of the transforming world order in
which an economically weak Britain would be confronted
with a commercially aggressive United States and a powerful
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Britain's relationship with Sweden between 1942 and
1945 is one of the least understood areas of British war-
time diolomacy. Most published English language sources
have dealt exclusively with iron ore and the various
schemes advanced by Churchill and others between September
1939 and June 1940 to curtail this trade. 1 Little atten-
tion has been given to what transpired between Britain and
Sweden after the Anglo-French expedition was withdrawn from
Narvik in June 1940. The only detailed examination, from a
British perspective, of any aspect of Anglo-Swedish
relations 2 is found in two chapters of Medlicott's official
1Thomas Munch-Petersen, The Strategy of Phoney War:
Britain, Sweden and the Iron Oreuestion 1939-1940
(Stockholm: Militärhistoriska Förlaget, 1981).
Nevakivi Jukka, The Appeal that was Never Made: The Allies,
Scandinavia and the Finnish Winter War 1939-1940 (London:
C. Hurst & Company, 1976).
David Dilks, "Great Britain arid Scandinavia in the Phoney
War," Scandinavian Journal of History, 2: 1-2 (1977).
R.A.C. Parker, "Britain, France and Scandinavia 1939-40,"
History 61: 203 (1976).
Sir Liewelyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second
World War, Vol. I (Londn: Her Majesty's Stationery Office,
1970)
T.K. Derry, The Campaign in Norway (London: H.M.S.O., 1952).
W.N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Vol. I (London:
H.M.S.O. and Longman's, 1952).
2There are a few popular works, dealing mainly with
such clandestine British activities in Sweden as blockade
running, which shall be cited later in this thesis.
6
7history of the Ministry of Economic Warfare. 3
 Many mono-
graphs, official histories, and memoirs relating to Sweden's
relations with the Great Powers throughout the war have
been published in Sweden. Most of these works explain how
Stockholm adjusted foreign and commercial policies when
Fr o.
confronted with countervailing pressuresAall belligerent
Great Powers, neighbouring states such as Finland and
Norway, and domestic opinion. 4
 Accordingly, British
diplomacy is treated as just one of several factors which
the Swedish government had to consider, and Swedish authors
often give it less attention than German intimidation
tactics when they discuss the years which followed the
collapse of Norway. Swedish works provide little insight
into the formulation of British policy, although some
mention is made of undercurrents in British opinion as
perceived by Swedish diplomats.5
3W.N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Vol. II
(London: H.M. S .0. and Longman' s, 1959).
4W.M. Carigren, Svensk utrikespolitik 1939-1945,
(Stockholm: Al]inna Förlaget, for the Royal Swedish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1973; contains details about
domestic politics which were largely cut out of the
condensed English edition, Swedish Foreign Policy during
the Second World War (translated by Arthur Spencer),
(London: Ernest Benn, 1977).
Gunnar Hägglöf, Svensk krigshandelspolitik under andi'ra
iärldskriget (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1958).
Martin Fritz, German Steel and Swedish Iron Ore 1939-1945,
Publication of the Institute of Economic History of
Gothenburg University, 29, Kungsbacka (Gothenburg, 1974).
5Erik Boheman, P vakt. Kabinettssekreterare under
andra vr1dskriget (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1964).
Gunh!ar Hagglof, Samtida vittne 1940-1945 (Stockholm:
Norstedts, 1972).
8British diplomacy towards Sweden during the later
years of the war is generally discussed within the context
of the Allies' campaign to reduce and eventually terminate
Swedish-German trade. On the basis of the extant litera-
ture of Anglo-Swedish relations, it might appear that the
cessation of Swedish exports to Germany was the sole object
of British policy towards Sweden between 1939 and 1945.
Both Medlicott and the Swedish works acknowledge that the
United States gradually came to dominate Allied policy
towards Sweden between 1942 and 1945, and that the diplo-
matic "shock tactics" 6
 employed to compel Sweden to impose
an embargo against Germany in 1944 were largely American
inspired. It is generally conceded that London disapproved
of these methods, but British reservations are often
attributed to concern over the impracticality of the
methods rather than to fundamental doubts about the desir-
ability or necessity of rupturing Swedish-German trade.
Medlicott cites "manifestations of a genuine duality of
outlook and tempo which were never completely reconciled"
in the respective British and U.S. approaches to economic
warfare, but adds that the "process of adjustment was
carried out with goodwill on both sides; no one lost sight
of the common goal."7
However, many secondary sources also indicate that
London's reservations towards U.S. proposals for terminat-
ing Swedish-German trade stemmed from more than just a
6Carlgren, op. cit., p. 200.
7W.N. Medlicott, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 46.
9divergence of opinion as to the most effective means of
conducting economic warfare, and that the British
questioned the necessity of the 'common goal.' Medlicott
intimates that, by mid-1944, London attached less impor-
tance to Swedish-German trade than did Washington, and
that the British attempted to persuade the Americans to
permit a residue of this trade for the war's duration. He
euphemistically attributes this attitude to "reasons out-
side the field of economic warfare" 8
 without further
elaboration. David Gordon and Royden Dangerfield,
officials of the M.E.W.'s American counterpart, the Foreign
Economic Administration, insinuate that London did not
wholeheartedly support, and in some cases obstructed, U.S.
policy in order to further British commercial relations
with neutral countries. 9
 They provide no examples of
British obstructionism, and their book is the only work
openly suggesting such interference. Sir Liewellyn Woodward
mentions briefly that British officials feared that a harsh
Allied policy towards neutral states such as Sweden might
undermine prospects for cordial British relations with
these nations after the war)° Woodward asserts that
Washington ignored London's reservations about U.S. propo-
sals, and that the British felt obliged to support their
8lbid., p. 494, 496.
9David L. Gordon and Royden Dangerfield, The
Hidden Weapon: The Story of Economic Warfare (New York:
Harper & Bros., 1947), p. 189.
10Woodward, op. cit., Vol. III (London: H.M.S.O.,
1971), p. 463.
10
ally's policy in order to preserve the common Allied war
effort.
Swedish officials discerned a marked difference
between the Allies' respective attitudes, in spite of
London's attempts to maintain an outward display of Anglo-
American unity. Moreover, the Swedes also recognized the
United States' preponderant influence over Allied policy
after 1942. In their memoirs, Erik Boheman 11 and Gunnar
Hägglöf 12
 contrast the unsympathetic outlook of most senior
U.S. officials with their British counterparts' apprecia-
tion of Stockholm's efforts to remain neutral in spite of
Sweden's vulnerability to German reprisals. 13
 Carigren
notes that the British questioned Washington's diplomatic
methods in 1944 out of concern for postwar imports from
Sweden but ultimately agreed to support its ally because
London did not "want to fall out with the Axnericans...in
such a relatively minor matter." 4 He also states that
11Secretary-General, Royal Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Sweden, 1938-45.
12Head of the Commercial Department, Royal Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Sweden, 1939-44.
Hereafter, this Branch of the Swedish Government shall be
referred to as the Swedish Foreign Ministry, while its
British and U.S. counterparts shall be cited as the Foreign
Office and the State Department.
13Erik Boheman, Ibid., pp. 193-9;
Gunnar Hgglöf, Diplomat: Memoirs of Swedish Envoy in
London, Paris, Berlin, Moscow, and Washington (London: The
Bodley Head, 1972), p. 170.
14Carlgren, Swedish Foreign Policy, op. cit.,
p. 200.
11
Churchill dissuaded Roosevelt from invoking sanctions
against Sweden in September 1944 because the Foreign Office
desired friendly Anglo-Swedish relations to offset the
growing Soviet influence in the Baltic.
A more detailed survey of Allied relations with
Sweden is contained in the selection of U.S. State Depart-
ment correspondence published in Foreign Relations of the
United States (F.R.U.S.))6 These documents reveal that the
United States initiated nearly all important Anglo-American
approaches to Sweden between 1942 and 1945, and that
Britain's reluctance to support Washington fully became
pronounced by the summer of 1944. Without consulting
London, Washington abruptly imposed an embargo on Sweden in
November 1944. The embargo was subsequently lifted after
the British protested the unilateral nature of the American
action and refused to support further sanctions against
Sweden unless the US, accommodated Britain's views. 17 The
embargo and London's subsequent reaction are not discussed
in the secondary works, although this U.S. action precipi-
tated Sweden's cessation of trade with Germany in January
1945.
15Ibid	 p. 203.
16Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States, Diplomatic Papers 1944, Volume IV Europe,
1966, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office; (here-




Evidently, British and American attitudes towards
Sweden were not identical. However, in the absence of a
comprehensive account of Britain's policy towards Sweden,
it is difficult to determine whether London's opposition to
the embargo was an isolated incident or a symptom of a more
fundamental difference between the Western Allies. In order
to resolve this ambiguity, Chapters Two and Five will
consist of a detailed study, based on unpublished British
and tJ.S. official sources, 18
 of how Britain formulated and
conducted its policy towards Swedish-German trade between
1942 and 1945. The origins and development of a common
Anglo-American economic warfare policy between 1942 and
1944 will be surveyed in Chapter Two. Britain's role in
Allied actions during 1944 which led to the cessation of
Swedish exports to Germany will be examined in Chapter Five.
The study will analyze Britain's attitude towards Sweden,
determine the degree to which London influenced Allied
policy, and establish whether termination of Swedish-German
trade was a 'common goal' shared mutually by London and
Washington.
'8Great Britain, Public Records Office, London.
Henceforth, Public Records Office documents will
be cited as: PRO, followed by ADM (Admiralty), AVIA (Air
Ministry - Civil Aviation), BT (Board of Trade), CAB (Cabi-
net Office) FO 371 (Foreign Office Political Correspondence)
FO 188 (Embassy and Counsellor archives - Sweden), FO 837
(Ministry of Economic Warfare), POWE (Ministry of Supply -
Iron and Steel Control), PREM (Premier's file).
United States, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
Henceforth cited as:
U.S. Department of State: Record Group 59, papers, Political
Affairs; Sweden, decimal file 858.00.
War History report of the American Legation at Stockholm,
NA.R.G. 59, 124.586/2-2096.
U.S. War Department, Operations and Plans Division,
NA.R.G. 165, OPD.
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Britain's attitude towards Swedish-German trade
cannot be understood fully unless it is considered within a
broader context which includes the political, military, and
commercial aspects of wartime Anglo-Swedish relations.
Published sources present economic warfare as the dominant
issue in Allied-Swedish diplomacy during the war. Was this
the opinion of the British officials who drafted London's
policy towards Sweden, or did they regard Swedish-German
trade as one of several issues in Anglo-Swedish relations?
The balance of this thesis will establish Sweden's place in
British policy apart from economic warfare. Chapter Three
will examine the military dimension of Anglo-Swedish rela-
tions between 1941 and 1944. The Chapter will establish
whether Britain's attitude towards Sweden's trade was
influenced by Swedish requests for Spitfire fighter air-
craft in 1941 and 1944, by a Soviet proposal that the
Allies press Sweden for air bases in Sweden, and by decep-
tion plans to confuse the Germans as to the location and
nature of the second front prior to D-Day. Carigren,
Dangerfield, and Gordon have suggested that Britain was
more concerned about long term questions such as postwar
Anglo-Swedish trade and Sweden's possible reaction to
Soviet expansion in the Baltic. The precise nature of
Sweden's place in London's plans for postwar trade, recon-
struction, and European security will be assessed in
Chapter Four. The Chapter will also establish whether
British concern over Sweden's attitude towards these long
term questions outweighed British interest in stopping
Swedish-German trade.
14
Chapter Six will examine the growth of American
influence in Swedish military and civil aviation during the
last nine months of the war, and how it affected Anglo-U.S.
relations. The United States' sale of 50 Mustang fighter
aircraft to the Swedish Air Force in February 1945, and the
subsequent bilateral transatlantic airline agreement with
Stockholm would seem inconsistent with the unsympathetic
attitude displayed by Washington towards Sweden throughout
most of the war. The American interest in Swedish aviation
will be analyzed to resolve this paradox. The U.S. Air
Force's official history also suggests a strong animosity
between British and U.S. Air officers who operated B.O.A.C.
and U.S. Army Air Transport Command courier flights to
Sweden from Scotland. The Chapter will determine to what
extent rivalry over operations to Sweden reflected wider
British fears that the Americans were attempting, during
wartime, to establish a postwar international air transport
network.
Britain's attitude towards the question of Swedish
intervention during the final months of the war will be
examined in Chapter Seven. Churchill had indicated on
various occasions throughout the conflict that he hoped
Sweden would enter the war eventually. The Foreign Office
and Chiefs of Staff generally overruled Churchill's sugges-
tions because Sweden's physical isolation prevented Britain
and the United States from supporting the Swedes
15
militarily)-9 Furthermore, the Foreign Office believed
that the formidable negotiations which would be required to
goad Stockholm to abandon neutrality would not be justified
by the negligible advantages of Sweden's intervention.
However in April 1945, Britain was pressing the Swedes to
liberate Norway. Chapter Seven will examine the military
and political circumstances which stimulated British
interest in hastening Sweden's intervention during the last
months of the war.2°
Anglo-Swedish relations during the immediate post-
war years will be surveyed in a brief epilogue in Chapter
Eight. The Chapter also will assess how British influence
in Sweden at the end of hostilities was affected by London's
wartime policy towards Sweden.
It is clear that, in terms of Anglo-Swedish rela-
tions, the 1942-1945 period was not merely an uneventful
anticlimax to the Norwegian campaign of 1940. British
attitudes were shaped by circumstances, such as the alliance
with the U.S. and Germany's eroding military strength,
which did not exist during the first months of the war.
However, it is assumed that the objectives of British
policy during this period were the same as they had been
' 9 See Chapter Three:
Sir Liewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in
the Second World War, Vol. II (London: H.M.S.O., 1971),
pp. 585-6;
Churchill, Closing the Ring (New York: Houghton
Mifflin, 1951, Bantam ed., 1962), pp. 246-7, 585-6.
20 See Chapter Seven:
Carlgren, oi. cit., p. 216;
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. I, Year of Deci-
sions (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956), p. 248.
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during the 'Phoney War' simply because London supported
Washington's campaign to curtail Swedish-German trade
between November l912 and January 1945. The evidence
suggests that the British questioned American policy and
attempted to modify U.S. proposals before agreeing to
endorse them. The extent of and motives behind this oppo-
sition remain unclear because a detailed examination of
British policy during this period is beyond the scope of
existing secondary sources.
This thesis shall analyze Anglo-Swedish relations
between 1942 and 1945 to determine Sweden's place in
Britain's wartime policy and postwar plans.
BACKGROUND
London's 'understanding' attitude towards Sweden in
1944 represented continuity rather than an abrupt departure
in British policy towards Sweden. In the First, and
throughout most of the Second World Wars, British officials
were prepared to tolerate a substantial volume of Swedish-
German trade. Except for the winter and spring of 1940,
British officials did not consider precipitate diplomatic
or military action to force the cessation of this commerce.
They believed that a demand for such an extreme concession
would only complicate Anglo-Swedish relations unnecessarily.
In 1916, Britain tightened its blockade against Sweden to
compel Stockholm to negotiate a trade agreement with the
Allies. The British did not employ the blockade as a weapon
to force Sweden to halt exports to Germany as the Americans
did during the Second World War. London was disturbed by
17
Sweden's blatant pro-German behaviour during the first
years of World War One, but never desired the complete
cessation of Swedish exports to Germany even though they
rose sharply between 1914 and 1916.21 Rather, the blockade
was intended to curtail the transhipment of contraband via
Swedish ports and oblige the Swedish government to agree
to British regulation of its transatlantic trade and
grant economic concessions equivalent to those which had
been given Germany. 22 The Ministry of Blockade rejected
American proposals that the Allies should press Sweden to
cease ore exports in late 1917 because London was anxious
to charter 500,000 tons of Swedish shipping to reinforce
Italy. In tripartite trade negotiations during the winter
of 1917-18, Britain allowed the Americans to press the
Swedes for drastic exports reductions so that British
demands would appear moderate by comparison. 23 Sweden was
1913, Germany and Britain received	 and
21.9% of Sweden's exports respectively. By 1915, Germany's
share had risen to 36.9%, while Britain's had declined to
25.1%. Steven Koblik, Sweden the Neutral Victor: Sweden
and the Western Powers 1917-1918 (Lund: Lärmedelaförlagen,
1972), p. 222.
22When the British first sought an agreement with
Stockholm, they were concerned mainly with obtaining
improved transit facilities for western freight destined
for Russia via Sweden. The Swedes had permitted only a small
volume of this traffic and shipments were often impounded
or delayed. The Bolshevik Revolution had obviated this
requirement when serious Allied-Swedish negotiations were
convened in December 1917.
A.C. Bell, A History of the Blockade of Germany (London: for
official use only, 1937; H.M.S.O., 1960), p. 337.
23 Koblik, op. cit., p. 192.
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eventually forced to reduce iron ore exports to Germany
from 5 million tons to 3.5 million tons, which roughly
corresponded to the prewar levels, and to the amount which
was then being exported to Britain. However, Swedish-
German trade connexions remained intact when World War I
ended.
ASCENDANCE AND ECLIPSE OF ECONOMIC WARFARE 1939-1940
Sweden's iron ore exports to Germany attracted more
attention in London during the late 1930's than they had
during World War I. In the interwar period, many British
officials were confident that, in a future conflict with
Germany, economic warfare could weaken the German war effort
decisively. This concept was attractive to British civil
servants and politicians who were anxious to avoid a repiti-
tion of the horrors of 1914-18. They placed an exaggerated
credence in the blockade's contribution to Germany's defeat
in 1918, and felt that, in future, Britain could offset its
military weakness by exploiting its sea power to blockade
Germany and induce the European neutrals to curtail their
commerce with the Reich.
Although the British government began blockade
planning in the mid-l930's, the objectives and methods of
economic warfare were ill-defined and often based on faulty
assumptions when World War II broke out. London's intelli-
gence about the production, shipment, and consumption of
19
Swedish non ore was limited and, in some cases, wrong.24
Most British officials concerned with economic
warfare believed that Germany would be vulnerable to
commodity shortages since the Reich depended upon imports.
They assumed that Germany's weak currency would prevent the
Germans from accumulating an adequate stockpile during
peacetime. German war production would be crippled if the
blockade disrupted traffic in a specific import or
"Achilles heel." 25 The Industrial Intelligence Centre, one
of the M.E.W.'s precursors, believed that Germany would be
vulnerable to a stoppage of ore imports from Sweden.
Germany was Sweden's most important customer and Swedish
ores accounted for the largest share of German imports. In
June 1937, an I.I.C. memorandum argued that: "were Sweden
alone to refuse to supply Germany with iron ore, German
industry would come to a stop in a very short time; pos-
sibly measurable in weeks." 26 However, other government
departments believed that they had found their own
"Achilles heel", such as Rumanian oil. After the outbreak
of the war, the competing departments vied for influence
with the War Cabinet, whose members had not participated
24 Patrick Salmon, "British Plans for Economic War-
fare against Germany, 1937-1939: The Problem of Swedish
Iron Ore," Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 16 (1981),
pp. 53, 56-7.
F.H. Hinsley, E.E. Thomas, C.F.G. Ransom, and
R.C. Knight, British Intelligence in the Second World War,
Vol. I (London: H.M.S.O., 1979), pp. 61-7.
25Medlicott, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 47.
26 Salmon, op. cit., p. 59.
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in the detailed discussions about future blockade policy.
In October 1939, the War Cabinet concluded that an oil
shortage would be most critical to Germany, and established
a special committee to determine means of disrupting
Rumanian oil exports. 27 A similar organization was not
established for Swedish ore. Winston Churchill, First Lord
of the Admiralty, was concerned about Swedish-German trade
and, shortly after assuming office, began considering various
schemes to stop ore shipments. 28	Apart from Churchill,
British policy towards Sweden was largely the province of
inexperienced junior officials of the M.E.W. Until the
Russo-Finnish 'winter war' seized the War Cabinet's atten-
tion in December.
The I.I.C. and other interested departments con-
sidered proposals for 'direct action' against Swedish
exports by such means as sabotage, labour unrest, wholesale
purchases of ore to pre-empt its shipment to Germany,
offers of military assistance to counter Swedish fears of
Germany, 29 and British military action against the mines
and transport facilities. However, most of these sugges-
tions were rejected because of their impracticality, or
deferred until British interest in Swedish ore became more
27 Ibid., p. 67.
28Munch-Petersen, op. cit., p. 42.
W.S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (New York:
Houghton & Mifflin, 1948; Bantam Books edition, 1961),
pp. 476-9.
29Salmon, op. cit., pp. 63-7.
Munch-Petersen, op. cit., pp. 32-33.
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active in December 1939. Unable to interfere directly with
Swedish ore shipments, London sought to persuade the Swedes
to curtail this trade voluntarily. Negotiations in London
during the Autumn of 1939 between the M.E.W. and a Swedish
delegation headed by Boheman and banker Marcus Wallenburg
resulted in the War Trade Agreement, a document which would
determine much of Britain's policy towards Swedish trade
until Washington pressed for a revised agreement in 1943.
The W.T.A.'s provisions for iron ore were largely
framed around Swedish rather than British conditions. The
Swedes, who had formulated much of their policy towards
the belligerents in the spring of 1939, recognized that
they would have to placate London by limiting exports and
accepting British contraband regulations or face a recur-
rence of the privations of 1916-18. However, Germany was a
more immediate and menacing neighbour. 3 ° Berlin had already
warned Sweden that it would not tolerate a major reduction
in ore exports. Stockholm anticipated that the British
would press for export quotas which were well below prewar
levels. Therefore, the Swedes sought to conclude an agree-
ment with London first so that they could have a more
articulate bargaining strategy when negotiating with the
Germans. 31 Although the Swedish Foreign Ministry had
expected that Boheman would have to accept lower export
30Carlgren (Spencer ed.), op. cit., pp. 12-13.
Fritz, op. cit., p. 110.
31Munch-Petersen, op. cit., pp. 45-46.
Boheman, op. cit., p. 80.
22
quotas, he was given wide discretion to negotiate the most
favourable terms possible. However, Boheman insisted
throughout his stay in London that Sweden's vulnerability
to German reprisals prevented Stockholm from accepting
anything short of "normal" prewar quotas. 32 The M.E.W.
had hoped to encourage Boheman to concede more but its
bargaining tactics, appeals to Sweden's democratic
sympathies, followed by threats to "cripple Swedish trade"
were ineffective. 33 By mid-October, the Ministry decided
to settle for the Swedish terms since a 'normal trade'
ceiling for Swedish exports was preferable to no agreement
with Stockholm. 34 Further Anglo-Swedish discussions
regarding British imports from Sweden, ship chartering, and
32Munch-Petersen, op. cit., pp. 48-50.
33Boheman, op. cit., p. 85.
Munch-Petersen, op. cit., p. 50.
34 'Normal' was considered to be exports to Germany
as of 1939. London believed this meant 9 million tons.
However, the Agreement defined 'Germany' to include all
territory occupied by or incorporated into the Reich. The
inclusion of prewar exports to Czechoslovakia and Poland
would increase therefore Swedish exports to 'Greater
Germany' to 10.5 million tons, Gunnar Hgg1öf, Svensk
krigshandelspolitik, op. cit., p. 84. This inherent
ambiguity in the War Trade Agreement would cause an
acrimonious dispute between Stockholm and the Western Allies
at the end of 1943, when it was discovered that the Swedes
had shipped, during 1943, 10.25 million tons to Germany,
after promising to limit their trade to strictly 'normal'
levels. Stockholm informed London that exports had actually
fallen short of the 'normal trade' ceiling. G.H. Villiers
indignantly responded, "The Swedes are trying to get away
with a fast one," minute, 16 January 1944, F.O. 837/907.
See also, Chapter Two.
23
wartime payments could not proceed until the impasse with
Boheman had been overcome. Moreover, it would be difficult
to induce other neutrals to conclude similar agreements if
the Anglo-Swedish negotiations were deadlocked indefinitely.
London accepted Boheman's terms on the understanding
that Stockholm would honour his verbal assurances that the
Swedes would curtail ore exports by 'administrative methods,'
such as closing mines and railways for repairs, and
conscripting miners for military service. Boheman and most
British officials assumed that the Royal Navy would
interrupt shipping from Narvik, where most ore from northern
Sweden was exported during winter when Lule, Sweden's
principal ore port, became ice-bound. The shipping disrup-
tion would provide Stockholm with a plausible answer to any
German approaches about Sweden's diminishing exports.
London felt that the 'gentlemen's agreement' was an
unsatisfactory solution to the iron ore question, but
believed it would serve as a temporary expedient until
Allied military fortunes improved sufficiently to counter
Swedish fears of Germany.35
It remains unclear whether Stockholm was prepared
to honour Boheman's verbal assurances. Ore production
declined between February and April 1940 once large numbers
of miners had been called to military service. 36 However,
it is possible that they were drafted to reinforce units
along the Finnish border as part of the general mobiliza-
35Munch-Petersen, op. cit., p. 52.
36 Ibid., pp. 55-56.
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tion during the Russo-Finnish conflict when the Swedish
army reached its peak active strength in World War II.37
The 'gentlemen's agreement' did not prevent the Swedes
from succumbing to German demands in December 1939 for
increased exports during 1940. The Swedes agreed to ship
10 million tons, after the German Navy violated Sweden's
four mile territorial limit, in late November, by laying a
minefield three miles from the Swedish coast in the only
deep channel in the Sound. 38 Once the agreement had been
concluded, Stockholm did not prevent the Germans from
placing orders with mining companies totalling 11 million
tons. Moreover, Stockholm did not want to offend Berlin
through recalcitrance over iron ore once hostilities had
broken out in Finland. Consequently, Sweden was faced
with the dilemma of conflicting commitments to London and
Berlin. The Swedes' dilemma was resolved in June 1940
when the Wehrmacht occupied Norway and overran Western
Europe. Germany then held an even stronger grip over
Sweden economically and psychologically, while British
influence became minimal. Berlin placed additional orders
for iron ore and other Swedish goods such as high-grade
steels. Swedish miners were released from the army in the
summer of 1940, and mining and transport facilities were
37Börje Furtenbach, "Sweden during the Second World
War: Armament and Preparedness," Revue Internationale
d'Histoire Militaire, Vol. VII: 1, No. 26 (1967), p. 90.
38Berlin also offered supplies during the negotia-
tions, notably sufficient coal and coke from Poland to
satisfy all of Sweden's requirements. Fritz, op. cit.,
p. 111.
25
expanded. A record 1.1 million tons were shipped from
Lule in July l940.
The British expected Stockholm to abrogate the War
Trade Agreement during the summer of 1940. However, the
Swedes informed London that they intended to honour the
spirit, if not necessarily the letter, of the Agreement in
return for the institution of safe-conduct shipping between
Sweden and the Americas. After some deliberation, the
British accepted the sincerity of the Swedish argument and
agreed to allow the 'Gothenberg traffic' to sail through
the blockade. By early 1942, Hershell Johnson, U.S.
minister to Sweden, reported, that the "British believe
Sweden in general has loyally enforced restrictions on
exports to Axis countries." 40 The British belief was
fostered partly by the fact that Swedish shipments to
Germany did not grow by the same proportions as they had
during the first years of World War I. This limitation was
due not so much to Swedish efforts to obstruct this trade
as to fluctuating German consumption patterns, and by the
fact that the Germans could draw from other sources in
Europe. The British were not fully aware of the extent of
Swedish-German trade until American pressure forced
Stockholm to allow Allied experts access to trade statis-
tics in early 1943. However by 1943, economic warfare no
longer played a major role in British policy, and the
39Fritz, op. cit., p. 117.
40F.R.U.S., 1942, Vol. III, op. cit., p. 333.
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M.E.W. was primarily concerned with the collection of
economic intelligence and with monitoring the remaining
neutrals' adherence to contraband-control arrangements. The
Ministry behaved more cautiously towards Sweden during the
later stages of the war than it had during September and
October 1939. It was cognisant of Swedish attitudes, and
was easily swayed by Boheman's arguments. When negotiating,
at American insistence, for greater Swedish collaboration
with the Allies between 1943-45, the M.E.W. was reluctant
to press Allied demands strongly out of fear that Stockholm
might abrogate existing agreements. The Ministry was
willing to accept partial concessions from the Swedes in the
belief that these were the best possible bargain under the
circumstances. The M.E.W. was confident that Allied air
and naval attacks on German shipping, pre-emptive purchases
of Swedish exports such as ball bearings, and Swedish
'administrative measures' would accomplish what the
Americans desired, while sparing Sweden from possible German
reprisals.
Throughout most of the war, British policy towards
Swedish-German trade was formulated mainly around 'indirect'
methods such as the War Trade Agreement. British desire
for 'direct action' against this commerce, such as sabotage
or military intervention, did not continue after the spring
of 1940. Interest in actively curtailing or stopping
Sweden's ore exports during the winter of 1939-40 stemmed
from a variety of motives which were peculiar to the
'Phoney War' period. The War Cabinet, Chamberlain in
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particular, continued to hope that Berlin would capitulate
if the Allies struck "a real hard punch in the stomach"
through economic rather than military means. 41 Swedish iron
ore exports assumed a new significance to the War Cabinet
after the outbreak of the Russo-Finnish 'Winter War'
turned Scandinavia into a theatre of war. The Allies now
had an opportunity to interfere directly with these exports
on the pretexts of assisting Finnish resistance or defending
Norway and Sweden from possible Soviet or German aggres-
sion. 42 However, no direct action against the ore trade
was actually executed during the 'Winter War', apart from
an abortive attempt to sabotage the harbour installations
at Oxelsund, an iron ore port in central Sweden. Through-
out late December, Churchill pressed for immediate naval
intercession in Norwegian waters, through which the entire
Narvik traffic travelled. However, he was overruled by the
War Cabinet, who were reluctant to foster American ill
feeling towards Britain by violating Norwegian neutrality.
Instead, the War Cabinet, with French approval, decided to
offer military assistance to Sweden and Norway. If Stock-
holm and Oslo accepted, Allied forces could enter Scandi-
navia legally, and would then be able to occupy the
Lapland mines and railways.
41Munch-Petersen, op. cit., p. 88. R.A.C. Parker,
"Britain, France, and Scandinavia," History, Vol. 61,
No. 203 (October 1976), pp. 370-1.
42David Dilks, "Great Britain and Scandinavia,"
The Scandinavian Journal of History, 2: 1977, p. 34.
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In making Swedish and Norwegian collaboration a pre-
requisite for intervention, London's plan for 'direct
action' failed to take account of Swedish and Norwegian
anxiety to avoid political or military entanglements with
the Great Powers. The Swedish Cabinet had forced Rickard
Sandier to resign as Foreign Minister in December for
43pressing for more active Swedish assistance to Finaind.
Stockholm and Oslo believed the presence of Allied troops
would hasten rather than deter a German invasion. The
Swedes did not want their country to become a 'battle-
field', 44 and doubted the effectiveness of Britain's
armed forces. Stockholm preferred to help resolve the
'Winter War' by offering good offices to expedite a Russo-
Finnish peace. London abandoned its intervention plans
when the 'Winter War' ended on 13 March. British officials
recognized that they could not stop ore exports but merely
impede them by disrupting shipping. As the opportunity for
direct action passed, high level interest iron ore waned.
When the War Cabinet decided to mine the Norwegian leads on
8 April, it did so more out of a desire to satisfy public
demand for a more assertive policy and to stimulate popular
support, in France, for Premier Paul Reynaud's government.45
43Munch-Petersen, op. cit., pp. 59-61.
Erik Lönnroth, "Sweden's Ambiguous Neutrality,"
Scandinavian Journal of History, Vol. 2, 1977, pp. 98-99.
44Munch-Petersen, op. cit., pp. 114.
45Parker, 2P. cit., pp. 383-4.
Franois Bdarida, "France, Britain, and the
Nordic Countries," Scandinavian Journal of History, 2: 1977,
pp. 23-4.
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British behaviour during the 'Winter War' had a
profound and unexpected consequence. Hitler had not con-
templated invading Norway until he became aware in mid-
December that Britain was considering intervention. 46 He
had believed that German intimidation of Oslo and Stockholm
would ensure continued ore exports. Moreover, he considered
an operation in the North an unnecessary and possibly
dangerous diversion from the Western front buildup. Hitler
ordered the Oberkomrnando der Wehrmacht staff to study the
feasibility of occupying Norway in December, but did not
order serious preparations for this action, operation
WesrUbung,to proceed until 19 February, the day after the
Altmark incident. This violation of Norwegian neutrality,
in Altenfjord, by H.M.S. Cossack to free 299 British seamen
who were imprisoned aboard the Aitmark, convinced Hitler
that the British would exploit any pretext to gain a foot-
hold in Norway. He and Grand Admiral Raeder feared that
unless Germany pre-empted the British in the North, the
Allies could disrupt, possibly stop, ore imports from
Sweden, and secure bases in Norway which would enable them
to outflank Germany. The secret preparations for
Wessrübung were not abandoned when the 'Winter War' ended.
Hitler believed that London would find another excuse to
intervene in the North and desired an operation which
"would anticipate English action against Scandinavia and
46Norman Rich, Hitler's War Aims (New York:
W.W. Norton, 1973), p. 140.
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the Baltic."47
On the morning of 9 April, the German Navy imposed
a blockade on Sweden in the Skagerak as German troops
landed in Denmark 48 and at Oslo and five other points
along the Norwegian coast. Denmark capitulated without
resistance, but the Norwegian government and King fled
Oslo, which was occupied by noon, and Norwegian forces
fought the invaders in central and northern Norway until
June. London responded to a Norwegian appeal for assistance
by landing troops in central Norway on 19 April, to liberate
Trondheim and check advancing German reinforcements from
the south, and by despatching another force to Narvik. The
Cabinet began to consider withdrawing Allied units from
central Norway on 23 April, as the assault on Trondheim was
hampered by faulty logistics, poor liaison with local
Norwegian units, and by superior German air and armour
tactics. The prospects for success at Narvik were more
promising since the 4000-man isolated German garrison could
by supported only by air or through Sweden. The Royal Navy
47	 ,H.R. Trevor-Roper (ed.), Hitler s War Directives
1939-1945 (London: Pan Books, 1964, 1966), p. 61.
48The 0KW had concluded, after tentative staff
studies during the preceding winter, that an invasion of
Sweden would impede Weserübung, and decided that intirnida-
tion would be sufficient to 'preserve' Swedish neutrality.
Carl-Axel Gemzell, "Tysk militär planlagging under det andra
vldskriget: fall Sverige," Scandia Band 41, 1975, 2,
pp. 212-215.
For more detailed studies of the Norwegian
campaign, see Earl F. Ziemke, The German Northern Theatre
of Operations 1940-1945, (Wash., D.C.: Dep't of the Army,
1959), Pamphlet No. 20-271; and T.K. Derry, The Campaign in
Norway (London: H.M.S.O., 1952).
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secured control of Narvik harbour after two spectacular
naval battles on 10 and 13 April, but instead of taking
advantage of this victory by landing immediately at Narvik,
the British decided to advance overland on the town. Narvik
was not captured by Allied troops until 28 May, the second
day of the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force
from France. Churchill's concern over the defence of
Britain overrode any interest in further action in Norway.
The last troops were withdrawn on 8 June, and the German
troops, who had retreated to the Swedish frontier,
reoccupied Narvik for the duration of the war.
The Norwegian campaign revived briefly British
interest in disrupting militarily Swedish ore exports.
During mid-April, London hoped the successful outcome of
the operation around Trondheim would induce the Swedes, who
had refrained steadfastly from formal or unofficial inter-
vention in Norway, to join the Allies. 49 Once Sweden had
done so, or was attacked by the Germans, Allied troops
could reinforce Swedish defences in central Sweden while
another force from Narvik could occupy the ore fields. By
May, Britain's remaining options for action against Swedish
exports had been reduced to a quick raid from Narvik to
49As the War Cabinet was considering the evacuation
from central Norway, C) Harry Sporborg, of the M.E.W.,
suggested to the Foreign Office that "It seems fairly clear
that Sweden will not take initiative about entering the war
unless forced to do so....It should be our object to provoke
Germany into an attack on Sweden," and that operations
around Trondheim should be conducted with "the most
decisive energy so to be ready in time" to embroil Sweden
in the war before Lule became ice free. Sporborg, 23 April
1940 minute, FO 371/24858/N55l8.
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demolish the mines, with Swedish consent, or operation
Paul, an air raid against shipping in Lule& harbour by
carrier based aircraft. Neither scheme was executed
because Britain's limited military and naval resources
were required urgently elsewhere.
LEGACY OF WESIERUBUNG: ANGLO-SWEDISH RELATIONS 1940-42
During the period between the collapse of Norway
and the United States' entry into the war, political
rather than economic issues dominated Anglo-Swedish rela-
tions. The strategic value of Swedish iron ore exports
became academic once Germany was able to exploit the iron
mines of France and Luxembourg, and import ore from Spain
and Spanish Morocco. Moreover, British officials had
assumed, during the early spring of 1940, that it would be
"only a matter of time" before Sweden increased exports to
Germany in order to obtain essential imports, such as coal,
which could no longer be obtained from the West. 5 ° In the
months immediately following France's surrender, Stockholm
appeared to many British officials to be unduly willing to
accommodate German demands. During the summer of 1940, the
Swedes did not make concessions or even symbolic gestures
to Britain to offset their growing deference to Germany.
British doubts about Sweden's resolve to remain neutral
were exemplified by banker and M.E.W. official Sir Charles
50	 H. Sporborg, 23 April 1940, FO 371/24858/
N55l8.
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Hambro's exclamation: "The Swedes have sold their souls
to the Germans."5'
The Swedish government refused to accredit the
Royal Norwegian government's charge d'affaires in Stockholm
as Norway's minister to Sweden.
In January 1940, the Swedes ordered aircraft and
aero engines from the United States, but President
Roosevelt impounded these machines before they could be
delivered to prevent their possible capture by the Germans.5'
In July, Victor Mallet, the British minister, suggested
that Stockholm relinquish these machines to Britain as a
gesture of 'even handedness.' Stockholm rebuffed this
suggestion. In August, the Berliner Zeitung published an
article by Gunnar Hägglöf stating that Sweden welcomed the
commercial opportunities which the industrialization of a
be.nsum
"widened __________ in eastern Europe would create.
Sweden's most controversial concession of the war
was the transit agreement of 8 July 1940, which enabled
Germany to transport troops and materiel on Swedish rail-
roads between Germany and Trondheim and Narvik. During
April, Stockholm resisted German demands for transits to
reinforce Narvik. However in June, the Swedish government,
51Hägglöf, Sarntida vittne, op. cit., p. 88.
52Ulf Olsson, The Creation of a Modern Arms
Industry, 1939-1974 (Gothenburg: Institute of Economic
History, Gothenburg University, 1977), p. 30.
53J. Micheson - M.E.W., 12 August 1940 memorandum
E.W. (ES) No. 233, FO 371/24857/N6295.
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whose representatives were subjected to intense pressure
from Gring and Ribbentrop to allow such traffic, decided
to negotiate with Berlin.'54 The Swedish attitude on the
transit question stemmed from uncertainty over Britain's
ability or resolve to continue the war, anxiety over
Germany's intentions towards Sweden, and an awareness that
Sweden's defences were no match for German air-supported
assault tactics. On 14 May, Prime Minister Hansson wrote
in his diary, "Rumour has it that today is fixed for the
attack." 55 In early July, the British legation in Stock-
holm burned its files, and prepared to place British
interests under the protection of the U.S. legation in the
event of an invasion. 56 The Swedes attempted to minimize
the military value of the traffic by stipulating in the
transit agreement that the number of troops destined for
Norway would have to be balanced by the number returning to
Germany on leave, and that each ad hoc journey through
Sweden would have to be approved by Stockholm. However, the
Germans regularly pressed the Swedes to increase quotas, and
54Munch-Petersen, op. cit., pp. 240-1, 243-4;
Carlgren.
55cecil Parrot, The Tightrope (London: Faber &
Faber, 1975), p. 154.
56War History Report of the American Legation at
Stockholm, p. 7, enclosed in Johnson - Stettinius, 20 Feb-
ruary 1946, despatch 6694, (washington, D.C.: National
Archives Record Group 59, U.S. Department of State, decimal
file 124.58612-2046.)
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on occasion ignored the restrictions on the quantity and
type of materiel in transit. Between July 1940 and October
1941, 670,000 soldiers had tr4velled between Norway and
Germany via Sweden. 57 On 25-27 June 1941, an entire
division destined for the assault on northern Russia were
allowed to pass from Norway to Finland, 58 after an intense
debate within the Swedish government which culminated in a
threat by King Gustav V to abdicate if Germany's demand for
this special transit was not accepted. Stockholm made
other transit related concessions shortly after the
beginning of Operation Barbarossa, such as including German
troopships in Swedish coastal convoys, laying a minefield
off Rland to hinder Soviet submarines, and allowing German
courier aircraft to fly to Finland over Swedish territory.59
In addition, German and Finnish military vehicles were
repaired in Sweden by Swedish mechanics. 6 ° The transit
arrangements continued until Allied pressure and adverse
Swedish public opinion forced Stockholm to withdraw the
most blatant vestiges of these concessions in 1943.61 The
57Carlgren, op. cit., p. 125.
58 Boheman, op. cit., pp. 156-60.
59U.S. Department of State, Documents on German
Foreign Policy, Series D, Vol. XII, 1941 (Washington:
G.P.O., 1964), p. 118.
60Foreign Office, Memorandum of Grievances Against




remaining traffic, consisting of mail and non-military
freight, was terminated in September 1944.62
Stockholm's willingness to facilitate convoys and
Finnish transits was not motivated entirely by concern
over German intentions. Russia had been Sweden's rival
in the Baltic, and most Swedes feared the U.S.S.R. as much
if not more than Germany. Swedish Foreign Minister,
Christian Gunther, laughlingly remarked that "Some luck
might come our way" 63
 upon first learning of the prepara-
tions for Barbarossa in February 1941. Even Swedes who
sympathized with Britain, such as Marcus Wallenberg, were
strongly anti-Russian. 64
 Moreover, there was widespread
Swedish sympathy for Finland which was once part of the
Swedish empire and had a large population of Swedish descent.
Most Swedes hoped that the Wehrmacht and the Red Army would
exhaust each other on the Eastern front. The Foreign
Office believed that this attitude was a major impediment
to British diplomacy since the Swedes would be reluctant
to assist Russia's allies. The Swedes became less openly
Russophobic in 1943 as a result of Russian victories and
an intensive propaganda campaign conducted by the British
legation on Russia's behalf. However, arprehension
of Russia's long-term motives remained ingrained in the
62Chapter Five.
63Cecil Parrott, op. cit., p. 177.
64Mallet - Sargent, 10 December 1941 letter,
FO 371/29700/N7364.
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Swedish outlook in 1944.65
The transit traffic would assume strategic signifi-
cance to British officials in 1942, when Norwegian based
U-boats and surface warships threatened the Arctic convoys
to Russia. 66
 During 1940 and 1941, London was concerned
largely with the political implications of the traffic and
other Swedish concessions. Stockholm had deferred to
German pressure at Norway's expense, thereby allowing the
Germans to consolidate control over Sweden's occupied
neighbour and one of Britain's vanquished allies. While
Sweden remained officially neutral, Swedish behaviour led
many officials in London to conclude that Sweden was being
incorporated rapidly into Germany's continental system.
Although some concessions had been expected, the British
hoped that Stockholm would make a more vigourous effort to
resist German demands and made at least a pretence of
remaining impartial. The British were also disturbed by
indications that the Swedes had little confidence in the
prospect of an ultimate Allied victory. Just after learn-
ing of Hägglöf's proposal for increased Swedish trade in
August 1940, J.M. Addis of the Foreign Office's Northern
Department minuted, "This is further evidence that the
Swedish government have accepted German domination as
65U5 Department of State, Foreign Relations of
the United States, diplomatic papers 1944, Volume IV




permanent. They will try to adapt their economy as quickly
and thoroughly as possible to the new conditions. In this
connexion it is impossible to describe Sweden as resisting
German pressure step by step."67
London reacted to Stockholm's behaviour during the
summer of 1940 by extending the blockade of German occupied
Europe to include Sweden. Sweden's trade with the United
States and Latin America effectively came to a halt, apart
from some limited and circuitlous shipments via Petsamo on
Finland's Arctic coast and Vladivostok, the Pacific
terminus of the trans-Siberian railway. 68 The Swedes were
anxious to resume direct transatlantic communications in
order to procure imports, such as oil and rubber, which
were scarce in Europe and could not be obtained in suff i-
cient quantity from the Germans. The Swedes attempted
unsuccessfully to persuade London to permit a safe conduct
traffic through the blockade during the autumn of 1940.
British officials were unwilling to consider the Swedish
approaches while the Swedes appeared to be continuing what
Lord Halifax described as their "downward career towards
complete subservience to Germany."69
Addis, 22 August 1940 minute, FO 371/24857/
N6295.
68Hägg15f, op. cit., pp. 89-90.
69Parrott, op. cit., p. 159.
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However, Anglo-Swedish relations improved slightly
after Stockholm chartered to the Ministry of War Transport
600,000 tons of shipping - virtually all of the Swedish
vessels which had been outside of the Baltic when the
Germans blockaded the skagerak in April. 70 London agreed,
in December, to institute the 'Gothenburg traffic', after
the Swedes had agreed to observe the British contraband
regulations and had implied, vaguely, that they would
continue to observe the War Trade Agreement. By mid-1941,
the principles which would govern British policy towards
Sweden throughout the rest of the war had been established.
A meeting of interested government departments which was
held at the Foreign Office on 21 August 1941 concluded
that: "...as ou interests demanded that we should maintain
friendly relations with Sweden,...it was not advisable for
us to threaten retaliation in any form."71
The volume of goods shipped via the Gothenburg
traffic was small in comparison with the level of Swedish-
German trade, but it gave Sweden a commercial outlet
outside of Europe. 72 By mid-1941, the M.E.W. concluded
70W.N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Vol. I
(London: H.M.S.O. & Longmans, 1952) pp. 618-620, 627-31.
71Medlicott, Vol. ii, op. cit., p. 175.
7212% of Swedish exports were shipped outside of
German occupied Europe, Medlicott, Vol. II, op. cit. Over-
seas exports in 1941 amounted to 120,000 tons, valued at
115,000,000 kroner ($27,400,000), while 206,367 tons
(190,000,000 roner - $45,200,000) were imported. D.J.
Payton-Smith, Oil: A Study of Wartime Policy and Adminis-
tration (London: H.M.S.O., 1971), p. 154.
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that the traffic served Britain's interests as well as
Sweden's since it curbed Swedish dependence on Germany. It
enabled the Swedes to import from Latin America and the
United States limited quantities of foodstuffs, textiles,
rubber, and oil to augment Sweden's rationing and import-
substitution programmes. Furthermore, both the Foreign
Office and Mallet believed that Britian could hasten a
gradual stiffening in Stockholm's attitude towards Germany
if London accommodated some of the Swedish requests for
supplies. The Gothenburg traffic would induce pro-British
Swedes, such as Boheman and Hägglöf to show less deference
to German pressure. Moreover, supplies afforded the
British a means of demonstrating gratitude or approval for
any sympathetic action on Sweden's part. For example, the
M.E.W. decided, in February 1941, to let the Swedish Navy
receive 10,000 tons of oil after five blockade runners
sailed from Gothenburg to England with a cargo of ball
bearings and ball bearing machinery to bolster Britain's
limited bearing production for aircraft. "The importance
of Swedish cooperation in the safe arrival of the five
ships containing ball bearings seems to deserve some
reward..." 73
 Fuel and lubricating oil for the Swedish Navy
and Air Force were virtually unobtainable from Germany, and
could not be synthesized. The Swedes intended to reserve
sufficient fuel to sustain military operations for at least
73J.E. Coulson, M.E.W. - E.O. Coote, F.O., 15
February 1941, FO 371/29657/N620.
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two months. 74 Although the British Chiefs of Staff doubted
the effectiveness of Sweden's defences, London sought
to reinforce Swedish confidence so that Stockholm would be
less susceptible to German pressure. As Britain could not
support Sweden militarily, London could only furnish
supplies, encourage the Swedes to strengthen defences, and
persuade them that they had sufficient force to deter a
German invasion. 75 Further, B.O.A.C. and the Swedish
airlines, A.B.A., which were fueled by the Swedish Air
Force, were the only means of transport between Sweden and
Britain.
The Gothenburg traffic constituted a link between
Sweden and the West but provided London with little
leverage over Swedish policy. In many respects, the
Gothenburg traffic hampered British diplomacy with Sweden.
London exercised control over what Sweden could import
from overseas and, in December 1941, was able to obtain a
Swedish agreement not to re-export Western goods to Finland
in return for increased import quotas. 76 However, this
power was undermined by Germany's power to close the
74Mal1et - Halifax, 23 December 1940, Despatch 460,
FO 37l/28657/N93.
75Chapter Three.
76Hàgglôf, op. cit., p. 119.
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Gothenburg traffic at will. 77 London could not ask
Stockholm to withdraw earlier concessions to Germany since
the Swedes would only respond that such action would
provoke the Germans to blockade Gothenburg. The British
believed that threats to disrupt the traffic or withhold
Swedish imports would "hurt our interests, possibly as
much as those of Sweden.. ,,78 For the duration of the war,
the British government, particularly the M.E.W., was
reluctant to invoke such sanctions against Sweden out of
concern that the Swedes would become recalcitrant towards
Allied proposals. Even in mid-1944, Dingle Foot, the
Parliamentary Secretary	 of the M.E.W., feared that
Allied interference with the Gothenburg traffic might
drive the Swedes into closer collaboration with Germany.
The British preferred to rely upon diplomacy. In August
1941, the Foreign Office and other interested departments
of the British government concluded that "our object should
be to seek equal treatment with Germany in so far as possi-
ble and at the same time by friendly representations to
stiffen Swedish resistance to German demands."8°
77Berlin did agree to allow the traffic in
February 1941, and closed it on three occasions: April to
July 1941, January to May 1943, October 1943 to January
1944. These closures were imposed when the Germans sought
increased concessions from Stockholm, and were also intended
to deter British blockade-running from Gothenburg.
78Medlicott, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 176.
79Chapters Tzo, Four and Five.
80Medlicott, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 176.
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What interests did Britian have in Sweden after the
fall of Norway? How could the Swedes be expected to treat
London and Berlin equally when they were isolated from the
West, economically dependent upon Germany, and apprehensive
of German intentions? What concessions to Britain could
offset the thousands of German troops and materiel which
crossed Sweden each month and the shipments to Germany
which, in 1941, accounted for 88% of Sweden's exports?81
Did British 'friendly representations' and a more
'understanding' style of diplomacy strengthen London's
influence in Stockholm?
Sweden was an important base for resistance,
propaganda, and espionage operations in Northern Europe.
Resistance leaders and distinguished defectors from
occupied nations, such as Niels Bohr, the Danish nuclear
physicist, were flown to Britain after escaping to Sweden.
Extensive Swedish-based resistance activities were not
conducted until 1943, when Stockholm adopted a more accom-
modating attitude towards refugees, gun-running, and the
formation of Norwegian and Danish paramilitary units in
Sweden. 82 The British valued Sweden as a source of intel-
ligence about Germany, northern Europe, and prior to
Barbarossa, the tJ.S.S.R. 83 Mallet, Colonel Sutton-Pratt,
81Ibid, p. 454.
82Richard Petrow, The Bitter Years (New York:
William Morrow & Co., Inc., 1974), pp. 225-6.
83Mallet - Collier, 18 March 1941 Despatch 112/3/41,
FO 371/29684/N1106.
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and Captain Denham, the military and naval attachs, and
Special Operations Executive officers collected most of
their information from refugees, S.O.E. operatives in
occupied territory, and sympathetic Swedes. As the German
occupation authorities in Denmark neglected to monitor or
cut communications links with Sweden, a group of Danish
staff officers occasionally conversed with the British
legation in Stockholm directly by telephone. 84 The Lega-
tion's Press Reading Room employed emigrs to glean useful
information from European newspapers. 85 The British also
relied heavily on contacts with Swedes for the bulk of
their intelligence about Germany.
Sweden's agile diplomacy and military deployment
required foreknowledge of the belligerents' intentions. By
virtue of Sweden's neutrality and extensive commercial
connexions in Europe, some Swedes, such as banker and trade
delegate Jacob Wallenburg and King Gustav's nephew, Count
Bernadotte, of the Swedish Red Cross, had access to the
senior levels of the German government, business and party
hierarchy. 86 In some instances, German generals and
diplomats freely imparted confidential details, such as
84MRD Foot, Resistance (London: Paladin E.O.,
1978), p. 274.
85 Parrot, op. cit., p. 150-70 passim.
86Bernadotte - Johnson, 13 May 1943 letter, Hershell
V. Johnson Papers 1943-45, Harry S. Truman Library,
Independence, )4o.; Charles Witing, The Spymasters: The Story
of Anglo-American Intelligence Operations within Nazi
Germany 1934-1945 (New York: Saturday Review Press!
E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1976), pp. 59-60, 172-8.
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plans for Barbarossa, to their Swedish counterparts.
Bernadotte enjoyed considerable respect from the Nazi
hierarchy, notably Heinrich Himmler, who attempted to nego-
tiate a separate peace with the Western Allies through
Bernadotte in 1945. Through these connexions, Stockholm
gained insight, which was denied to the Allies, into the
German idiosyncracies and strategic outlook. Moreover,
Sweden's intelligence and police agencies accumulated
concrete data through sophisticated wire-tapping, wireless
interception, and decyphering techniques. The mail and
telecommunications of virtually all foreign missions and
legations in Sweden were monitored closely. 87 The German
army used the Swedish telegraph system to communicate with
its units in Norway and Finland. Swedish cryptologists
broke several German military codes, enabling Swedish
military intelligence to exploit this cable traffic
extensively.
British access to Swedish intelligence depended
largely upon the outlook of individual Swedes. Some senior
Swedish authorities, such as General Th6rnell, the Commander
in Chief of the Armed Forces, and General Adlerkruz, Chief
of the General Staff's intelligence service, were friendly
with Lieutenant-General von Uthmann, the German military
87Sweden's cryptologic bureau employed 500 crypt-
analysts in 1941, and 1000 by 1945. On one occasion,
Gunther took a week-end hunting trip to give the Foreign
Ministry time to prepare a response to a note which it knew
the German minister was about to deliver, David Kahn, The
Codebreakers (London: Sphere books ed., 1977), pp. 262-3;
Boheman, op. cit., pp. 152-3.
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attache, but cool towards Col. Sutton-Pratt, 88 his British
counterpart. Admiral Tamm, the Commander in Chief of the
navy was convinced Germany would win the war, and much of
the Swedish naval staff was pro-German. 89 Most Swedish
officers and civil servants did not sympathize, openly,
with Germany but, as in the case of Foreign Minister
Gunther, feared that they would offend the Germans if they
deviated from a 'correct' attitude towards the British.
But some Swedes were prepared to cooperate with the British
unofficially. Major T3rnberg, Chief of Staff to the Head
of the Swedish Secret Service, informed Denham, through
the Norwegian military attache, that the Bismarck had
been sighted in the Kattegat by the Swedish cruiser
Gotland on 20 May 1941. Törnberg and other Swedish
officers also surreptitiously conveyed decyphered messages
to Denham. 9 ° Mallet reported that Boheman and Marcus
Wallenburg were "so often astonishingly open with me in
discussing subjects which would be 'dynamite' if the
Germans got to know of it." 9 ' In June 1941, Boheman
informed Sir Stafford Cripps, the British Ambassador to the
U.S.S.R., that Russia would be invaded in a couple of
88 Sutton-Pratt - Mallet, enclosed in Mallet - Eden,
13 October 1943 despatch S22(218/6/43), FO 37l/37072/N6l20.
89Denham - O.N.I, enclosed in Mallet - Eden, 19
October 1943 despatch S22, FO 371/37072/N6120.
90Patrick Beesley, Very Special Intelligence
(London: Sphere Books ed., 1978), pp. 111-12, 175-6.




weeks.	 Boheman's and Wall burg's helpfulness was sincere,
but undoubtedly their disclosures were calculated also to
cultivate British goodwill. Their attitudes in unofficial
conversations led Mallet to believe that British influence
in Sweden was stronger than it really was: "I know both men
extremely well...they are the real formulators of policy
in all matters concerning England and have.. .increasing
influence over Gunther." 93 Intelligence from Sweden was
often too general to have much operational value and often
served merely to substantiate what London had learned from
other sources. 94 However, the fact that some influential
Swedes were willing to convey this information impressed
Mallet, the strongest advocate for 'understanding' towards
Sweden.
In addition to its value as a 'listening post' in
Europe, Sweden was also a minor source of materiel for
British aircraft, tank, and ammunition production. Large
orders for steel, ball bearings, precision tools, and
600,000 tons of a special grade of iron ore used in produc-
ing aircraft metals were made with Swedish firms in the
winter of 1939-40 to augment Britain's limited manufacturing
92The Swedish Cabinet also informed the U.S.
Embassy in Moscow about Barbarossa on 24 March, and warned
London on 7 June that the invasion would begin on 15 June
1941. Hinsley, op. cit., pp. 478,480.
letter.
93Mallet - Sargent, op. cit., 10 December 1941
94Hinsley, op. cit., p. 333.
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capacity for these products. 95 Most of these orders had
not been filled when Germany occupied Norway. While it
was virtually impossible to ship bulk cargoes, such as
ore to Britain, circuitously, some consignments of ball
bearings were shipped through agents in Montevideo. A few
shipments were made via the Persian Gulf until Barbarossa
severed Swedish trade with Russia. 96 To expedite delivery
of the remaining stocks in Sweden, London accepted a
proposal advanced by George Binney, a Ministry of Supply
official in Stockholm, to employ Norwegian ships which had
been laid up in Swedish ports since April 1940 as blockade
runners. On 23 January 1941, six Norwegian freighters,
which the Royal Norwegian government transferred to
Britain, departed Gothenburg with 25,000 tons of cargo,
valued at £l,OOO,OOO.	 Their safe arrival in Britain was
due to secret preparation, with the connivance of a few
Swedish officials, favourable weather, and poor German
intelligence. The cargoes included ball bearing machinery
and steel which enabled the British to establish a new
bearing factory in England.
The success of this exploit, Operation Rubble,
spurred the Ministry of Supply to place further orders with
95Herbert Morrison - Churchill, 31 May 1940,
POWE 5/63; W. Hornby, Factories and Plant (London: H.M.S.O.,
1958), p. 375.
96Addis, 20 February 1941 minute, FO 371/29657/
N465.
97George Binney, 22 June 1942, Most Secret Report
on Operation Performance, M051534, ADM 199/592.
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SKF, the Swedish ball bearing monopoly, in April 1941.
Ten additional ships were transferred from the Norwegians
in September in preparation for Operation Performance
during the following winter. However, Berlin exerted
considerable pressure on Stockholm to prevent a repetition
of Rubble. Ribbentrop warned Arvid Richert, the Swedish
minister to Germany, that the Germans would regard further
British sailings from Gothenburg as "an expression of a
completely hostile attitude on the part of Sweden." 98 The
British responded by admonishing Stockholm to allow the
vessels to sail as a demonstration of Sweden's independence,
its adherence to international law, and as a gesture of
even-handedness towards Britain. In October, the Germans
initiated litigation in the Swedish courts to prevent the
ships' departure. The ships' owners, who remained in
Norway, asked the authorities in Gothenburg to arrest the
blockade runners on the grounds that the government-in-
exile could not lawfully transfer the vessels to Britain.
Berlin attempted to influence the outcome of the case by
issuing threats. London responded by offering the Swedes
an additional 4,500 tons of aviation fuel as a quid pro quo
for the ships' freedom. 99 In November, the Swedish
government introduced in the Riksdag a proposal to amend
the neutrality laws which would expand Stockholm's power
98Carlgren, op. cit., p. 122.
99Col. Hollis, Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee
- Churchill, 16 November 1941 minute 133, CAB 120/694.
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to intern belligerent vessels,' 00 although a court in
Gothenburg had ruled in favour of the Allies. The arrest
of the blockade runners was finally lifted when the
Swedish Supreme Court overturned the Government's action,
and decided, in March 1942, that the government-in-exile
had the right under Norwegian law to requisition and dis-
pose of the ships.101
The ships departed Gothenburg on 1 April 1942
without the element of surprise that the Rubble vessels
had enjoyed. on 30 March, Churchill had asked the Chiefs
of Staff if it was "worth while" proceeding with
Performance after the project had attracted considerable
publicity in Sweden and Germany) 02 The Chiefs insisted
that the cargoes were vital to Britain's war effort. More-
over, they believed that it was possible for the vessels,
which had been surreptitiously armed with light anti-
aircraft weapons, to elude German naval patrols at night,
and rendezvous with British warships before the Luftwaffe
100Ralph Barker, The Blockade Busters (New York:
W.W. Norton & Co., 1977), p. 95; Sir 0. Sargent, 6 November
1941 minute of conversation with Wallenburg, FO 371/
29676/N6475.
'°'Stig Jägerski6ld, "The Immunity of State-owned
Vessels in Swedish Judicial Practise during World War II,"
American Journal of International Law, No. 42 (1948),
p. 604.
102Churchill - Admiral, Sir Dudley Pound, 30 March
1942 personal minute M-112/2, CAB 120/694.
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could intercept them the following day. 103
 However,
German warships were waiting outside of Sweden's territorial
waters, and six blockade runners were captured or scuttled.
Two ships reached England with 20.5% of the total cargo,
while the two largest ships, the Dicto and Lionel, returned
to Gothenburg with 45% of the total cargo)° 4 The Swedes
arrested these two vessels after learning that they had
been armed prior to their departure, and expelled two
members of the British legation who had smuggled the
weapons on board the blockade runners.
Sweden's behaviour towards the Norwegian ships was
the most contentious issue in Anglo-Swedish relations in
1941-2. Whereas London accepted Sweden's commercial and
transit concessions to Berlin, the British believed that
the Swedes were obliged to permit blockade running to of f-
set their extensive trade with Germany. Unhindered com-
merce between Gothenburg and Britain demonstrated Sweden's
103Hollis - Churchill, 31 March 1942 minute, CAB
120/694. In a meeting at the Foreign Office during January,
Harnbro asserted that British aircraft production would be
"delayed several months" if the cargoes did not arrive,
and that they would be "infinitely more important to H.M.G.
than increased Swedish exports to Germany would be to the
latter country." Hambro, 12 January 1942 memorandum,
ADM 199/952.
65% - 98% of the bearings required for aircraft produc-
tion were obtained from Sweden; 100 tons of bearings could
cover 75% of the airframe work for 1200 Lancaster bombers.
Production for the navy's new torpedo bomber, the Barracuda,
and engines for Mosquitos being built in Canada would be
delayed as much as 12 months if roller bearings did not
arrive from Sweden. A Cecil Hampshire, On Hazardous Service
(London: William Kimber, 1974), p. 161.
104 Binney, op. cit.
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even-handedness and adherence to international law.
Concerted Allied pressure to secure the departure of the
Dicto and Lionel in the winter of 1942-43 would be the
first initiative of the Anglo-U.S. 'common front' towards
Sweden. It would also be the last major Allied diplomatic
action to be purely British inspired.'05
Stockholm's behaviour over the Norwegian ships in
late 1941 underlined the weakness of British influence in
Sweden. In spite of their previous concessions to Berlin,
the Swedes had grown more apprehensive of Germany as a
consequence of a 'war of nerves' which the Germans waged
against Swedish morale between October 1941 and March
1942.106 In the first months of the war, Hitler, Rosenberg
and other leading Nazis assumed that the Swedes would
identify with German efforts to establish Nordic domination
of Europe and eventually join the new order. However, the
Swedes refused to become associated politically with
Germany, and refused German offers to sign the Anti-
Commintern Pact in the spring and summer of 1941. Stockholm
refused transits for additional divisions, and also
rejected a German proposal that Swedish 'volunteers',
along the lines of Spain's Blue Division, should serve on
the Eastern front. Berlin was incensed also by Swedish
press criticism of German policy and by favourable coverage
of Allied military exploits in liberal newspapers, such as
105Chapter Two.
106Hagglöf, op. cit., p. 103.
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the Göteborgs Handeistidning. Gunther had persuaded the
government to adopt measures to prevent Outspoken news-
papers from offending the Germans in 1940.107 In some
instances, the Government confiscated controversial issues,
but mainly admonished the press to avoid the appearance of
an Allied bias by not publishing "derogatory statements
which cast a slur on the actions of foreign armed forces,
unless fully confirmed..."° 8 However, many liberal and
socialist papers began to condemn both German occupation
policy and Stockholm's transit concessions in mid 1941,
after a number of Norwegian trade unionists were incarce-
rated or executed. Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Goebbels were
dismayed that Stockholm did not suppress the press'
"unneutral behaviour,'409 with sufficient thoroughness and
vigour. Berlin began to suspect that Swedish newspaper
editorials reflected government opinion. Goebbels wrote
in his diary that Sweden was a "Germanic renegade...a state
which has no right to existence anyway."° Furthermore,
these doubts about Swedish sympathies gave Hitler anxieties
107Carlgren, op. cit., p. 85.
108	 ,,	 ,,Sten Dehlgren, The Press, in Sweden, Wartime
Survey, 'ed. and published in Sweden with the Assistance of
Public Authorities," (New York: The American-Swedish News
Exchange, Inc., 1943), p. 194.
'° 9Mallet - F.O., 13 January 1942 despatch 21,
FO 371/33067/N368.
110	 .Louis P. Lochner (ed.), The Goebbels Diaries
(New York: Doubleday, Garden City, 1948; Award Books,
1971), p. 65.
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about Stockholm's possible behaviour if hostilities were
resumed in Scandinavia. Throughout most of the war, Hitler
was convinced that the British would launch a second front
or a major diversion in Norway. In late 1942, he told
Admiral Raeder that Norway "is the zone of destiny."111
Hitler's attitude was reinforced by British commando raids
along the coast of Norway and in the Lofoten Islands in
1941. Whereas London encouraged the Swedes to rearm to
strengthen Swedish resistance to German pressure, Berlin
sought assurance that Sweden would repel militarily a
British incursion in Scandinavia.
The 'war of nerves' was waged against Sweden to
ensure that Stockholm conformed with Berlin's wishes in a
number of areas: the Norwegian ships, German demands for
large quantities of winter clothing, 112
 and for additional
Swedish credits to Germany during trade negotiations in
late 1941, as well as increased Swedish military prepared-
ness along the Norwegian frontier. Germany concentrated
an intense propaganda campaign against Sweden in the form
of invasion rumours. German agents spread lurid gossip in
Switzerland and Spain which was reported and exaggerated
by American newspapers and news agencies and subsequently
111William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the
Third Reich (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Crest
edition, 1962), p. 1194.
112Mallet - F.O., 11 November 1941 telegram 674,
FO 371/29676/N6543.
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republished in the Swedish press. 113 Throughout January
and February 1942, the Swedish government received a large
number of confidential warnings of an impending German
invasion from "friends of Sweden in Germany" in "which
certain influential Germans close to Hitler were pressing
for an early invasion of Sweden." 14
 The Swiss military
attache informed the Swedes that Swiss intelligence had
learned that Britain was attempting to provoke a German
invasion of Sweden to upset Germany's spring offensive
against Russia.115
There was little foundation to these rumours. The
Germans, who were coping with unanticipated setbacks on the
Eastern front, such as severe weather and the Soviet
counter-attk, did not plan to attack Sweden during the
winter of 1941-42. However, Swedish anxieties over Berlin's
intentions grew during the first months of 1942. German
psychological pressure on Sweden intensified in January.
The Swedish legation in Berlin informed Stockholm about
Hitler's belief that the British would land in Norway and
that "certain influential Germans close to Hitler" 116
 were
113H. Howard, British Press Reading Bureau, Stock-
holm, memorandum enclosed in Mallet - F.O., 18 March 1942
telegram 166 Empax, FO 37l/33067/Nl462.
114Mallet - F.O., 5 March 1942 telegram 163,
FO 371/33067/N1250 F.R.U.S., 1942, p. cit., pp. 329-330.
115CF.A Warner - C.P. Reusch (Norwegian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs), 7 March 1942 letter, FO 371/33067/N706.
116 Ibid.
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pressing for an early invasion of Sweden. The Swedes
feared that divisions which were concentrated in German
and Polish ports for the spring offensive against
Leningrad were also being positioned for an assault
against Sweden.
The 'war of nerves', especially in its early stages
in the autumn of 1941, accentuated Swedish fears, which
did not diminish entirely until after the Allied invasion
of Normandy in June 1944. Hershell Johnson observed, when
presenting his credentials as the new U.S. minister on
12 December 1941, that King Gustav was in an "utterly
defeatist state of mind." 117 On 28 October, Mallet
reported that
recent German successes in Russia have created
a feeling of pessimism...not so much that Great
Britain can ever be defeated, but rather than
the war is likely to become a stalemate...from
the Swedish point of view this prospect of
indefinite hostilities portends that German
pressure [on Sweden] will get worse.118
In September, Boheman unofficially approached
Mallet to ask London if it was prepared to assist Sweden
in the event of a German invasion. 119 The British Chiefs
of Staff were aware that the Swedes had prepared plans for
the occupation of Trondheim to establish a route to Sweden
for Allied supplies and reinforcements. However, the
117War History Report, op. cit., p. 9.
118Mallet - Eden, 28 October 1941 despatch 453,
FO 371/29700/N62786.
119J.M.A. Gwyer, Grand Strategy, Vol. III (part I),
London: H.M.S..O., 1964), p. 205.
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British lacked adequate forces and material to launch
another assault against Trondheim, let alone assist
Sweden. 12 ° Moreover, both the Chiefs of Staff and the
Foreign Office believed that the Swedish government would
never agree discussions between the British and Swedish
staffs for fear that such a liaison would provoke a
German invasion. 121 Boheman's remarks were vague, and
were made without the approval of his government. Mallet
was instructed to press him for details about Sweden's
defence plans and for a commitment to hold staff talks.
Further discussions about British aid lapsed by mid-October.
London's reaction to Boheman's enquiry probably influenced
Stockholm's behaviour during the winter of 1941-42. After
a meeting with Mallet in mid-October, Boheman concluded
that,
The only advantage, in purely material terms,
we had gained from our good relations with the
Western Powers was the Gotenburg traffic...we
could also be pretty sure that if, because of
the Norwegian ships or for other reasons, we
came into conflict with Germany, we might
certainly count on British and American sympathy.
But apart from such sympathy, support would
most likely consist of friendly advice to blow
up our mines in the North.122
____ p. 206; see also Chapter Three.
121Warner, 10 November 1941 minute, FO 371/29700/
N6286.
122Carlgren, op. cit., p. 124.
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Swedes remained cautious towards Germany throughout
late 1941 and January 1942. The Swedish government was
reluctant to bolster Sweden's 150,000 man army for fear
that the Germans would see this as a 'provocative' gesture.
Stockholm eventually reacted when Germany intensified the
'war of nerves' in early 1942. In mid-February, King Gustav
sent Hitler a personal message asserting that Sweden
intended to remain neutral and would resist an invasion.
Swedish diplomats candidly reassured German officials that
Sweden would fight any Allied force which infringed upon
Swedish territory. 123 Stockholm called up 100,000
reservists in late February to lend creditability to its
reassurances. The government officially presented this
partial mobilization as a routine exercise. However,
sizeable formations were deployed along the Norwegian
frontier, the Narvik-Lule railway, and at the fortress at
Boden, near the northern ore fields to suggest that Swedes
were on the alert against a possible advance from Trondheim
or Narvik. 124 The Swedes also informed the Germans that
their contacts in the Norwegian government in London did
not believe the British were planning to invade Norway
during 1942.
Relations between Berlin and Stockholm improved
markedly in the weeks following the Swedish mobilization.
By early March, Swedes spoke of the 'war of nerves' in the
123 1bid., p. 128., F.R.U.S., op. cit., p. 334.
124Warner - Reusch, op. cit.
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past tense during conversations with Mallet. On 14 March,
Stockholm received a message from Hitler thanking King
Gustav for his reassurances and promising to respect
Sweden's neutrality. The Germans did not protest the
Swedish Supreme Court's ruling on the Norwegian ships.
Invasion rumours became less plausible to the Swedes once
it became apparent that most German military formations
were being assembled for deployment in Russia. Field
Marshal List stopped in Stockholm on 18 March 1942, while
en route to Norway, and congratulated General Thrne1l on
Sweden's defence preparations.' 25
 List also assured the
Swede that Germany did not intend to invade Sweden, and
that future German transits through Sweden would remain
within the limits established by Stockholm.
SUMMARY
Britain exercised minimal influence over Sweden's
foreign policy during the first years of World War II. The
Swedes were motivated primarily by fear of Germany, which
was an immediate and menacing neighbour even before the
Wehrmacht occupied Norway and Denmark. As British naval
and military power did not extend to the Baltic, London
lacked Berlin's ability to intimidate the Swedes and could
not effectively reassure the Swedes when they were
subjected to German pressure. Britain was physically
remote from Sweden, and the Swedes doubted that the British
125Mallet - F.O., 18 March 1942, Telegram 202,
F037l/33067/N1464.
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would be capable or inclined to help repel a German inva-
sion of Sweden. Sweden's security and economic interests
necessitated compliance with the most insistent German
demands. Accommodation with London was necessary to ensure
Swedish access to transatlantic commodity sources. However,
the Swedes could make do without most imports from the West
for prolonged periods, whereas they could not sustain their
economy without German coal, and could not afford to offend
Germany. Consequently, British control over Swedish
overseas trade was a weak bargaining counter during the war
trade negotiations in 1939, and afforded even less in-
fluence over Swedish policy by early 1941, when the
Gothenburg traffic was instituted. The War Trade Agreement
was the only major accomplishment of British policy during
the early war years, but it did not commit Sweden to reduce
drastically ore exports as the M.E.W. had intended.
During the Phoney War and the Norwegian campaign,
British policy towards Sweden was active. London attempted
to disrupt or terminate Swedish iron ore exports to Germany
through war trade negotiations, plans to sabotage, occupy,
or bombard the ore fields and port facilities, entreaties
to Sweden for Allied-Swedish military collaboration, and
mining Norwegian waters. By June 1940, the iron ore trade
ceased to be the principal issue in Anglo-Swedish relations
because Britain was unable to interfere with it. Moreover,
economic warfare had lost much of its attraction once
British officials were confronted with the task of prosecut-
ing the war and of ensuring Britain's security without a
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continental ally. British interest in Sweden gravitated
towards Stockholm's political behaviour. London could
no longer expect Sweden to placate Britain
at Germany's expense, once Britain had become incapable of
preventing Stockholm from granting generous concessions to
Germany. By instituting the Gothenburg traffic, London
tacitly acquiesced to increased Swedish-German trade and
German military transits across Swedish territory. The
British could hope only to discourage Stockholm from
becoming a German satellite by demonstrating their 'under-
standing' of Sweden's precarious relationship with Germany,
and their 'appreciation' of friendly gestures such as the
charter of Swedish shipping. London was prepared to
countenance a degree of Swedish-German collaboration
providing the Swedes gave the British 'equal treatment,'
which meant essentially non-interference with blockade
running and espionage operations. This 'understanding'
attitude was motivated partly by Britain's requirements for
ball bearings and intelligence, and by the belief, fostered
by Mallet's conversations with Boheman and Wallenburg, that
a strongly Anglophil lobby in the Swedish government
would dissuade their more intimidated colleagues from
complete subserviance to Berlin.
British attitudes and methods of dealing with
Sweden in 1941 would remain largely unchanged for the dura-
tion of the war. Three years of negotiating with the
Swedes led British officials to conclude that the Swedes
were reluctant to act boldly towards Germany, and London
62
continued to believe this until after the Allies had
landed in France in 1944. The British believed that
threats were an ineffective way to enforce demands and that
the Allies could expect only limited and piecemeal conces-
sions from Stockholm. By 1942, these British assumptions
would be challenged by the Americans, whose collaboration
with London would change the direction and intensity of
Allied-Swedish relations. Until the end of 1944, many
officials of the Foreign Office and M.E.W. would question
the necessity and wisdom of this alteration.
CHAPTER TWO
THE ASCENDANCE OF WASHINGTON AND
ECONOMIC WARFARE IN ALLIED POLICY, 1942-44
Nineteen Forty-two was a watershed year in Anglo-
Swedish relations. The United States' entry into the war
resulted in a more assertive Allied policy towards Sweden
than what Britain had conducted after the fall of Norway.
The Anglo-American alliance strengthened Britain's bargain-
ing position. American belligerence did not undermine
Germany's domination of Europe immediately, but the addition
of the United States' military and economic power to the
Allied war effort gave credibility to London's contention
that this domination was temporary. Although the Allies
had suffered severe losses in Asia and at sea, they had
also won several decisive battles which had arrested and
reversed Axis expansion in North Africa, Russia, and the
Pacific by the end of the year. These victories demon-
strated to the neutrals that the Axis powers were not
omnipotent.
The American entry into the war also complicated
Britain's relations with Stockholm and curtailed London's
freedom to conduct diplomacy with the Swedes. The supplies
which Sweden was allowed to import from the Western
Hemisphere in return for adherence to the War Trade
Agreement and subsequent arrangements with London were now
subject to U.S. wartime controls. The Swedes had to seek
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American approval to obtain these imports. The United
States was not a party to existing Anglo-Swedish arrange-
ments and therefore was not obliged to furnish these
supplies, most of which were required for the United
States' expanded war effort. Many officials in the U.S.
State, War, and Navy Departments believed that economic
warfare could help to shorten the war in Europe. They
reasoned that the neutrals should receive supplies from
the United States and Latin American only in return for a
substantial concession to the Allies such as suspending
trade with Germany. By virtue of the United States'
political and economic influence in Latin America, American
commodity controls applied to all of Sweden's principal
sources of imports such as rubber and oil. Sweden's
transatlantic commerce virtually came to a halt while
American officials formulated an economic warfare policy
during 1942.
In the autumn of 1942, Britain was compelled to
accommodate Washington's views about Swedish-German trade
in order to induce U.S. officials to allow the Swedes
limited access to American supplies. This concession
committed the British to support U.S. proposals which they
privately questioned in order to maintain an Anglo-
American 'common front' towards Sweden. Washington
desired prompt Swedish economic sanctions against Germany
and believed that the Allies should impose an embargo on
Sweden if these were not forthcoming. London felt that
Allied demands should be limited to those which the Swedes
were likely to concede without fear of German retaliation.
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The British understood that Sweden's economy depended
heavily upon trade with Germany and that the Swedish
Government was nervous of German economic and military
reprisals. Moreover, British officials did not share
their American counterparts' concern over Swedish exports
to Germany. London was prepared to allow Swedish-German
trade to continue roughly within the terms established
under the War Trade Agreement.
London sought to exploit the Allies' combined
bargaining power to redress what the British perceived as
a pro-German bias in Swedish foreign policy. Two memo-
randa 1 from Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Lord
Selborne, the Minister of Economic Warfare, which were
prepared to brief Churchill in October 1942, reflect their
departments' concern with Sweden's military and political
rather than economic utility to Germany. Eden's note
stressed the Foreign Office's desire to force Sweden to
withdraw its transit concessions and stop German freighters
from joining Swedish coastal convoys. Selborne emphasized
the M.E.W.'S displeasure with Sweden's "unneutral" attitude
towards blockade running and the internment of the Dicto
and Lionel after operation Performance. 2 Neither brief
indicates a desire to curtail Swedish exports to Germany,
nor do the Foreign Office and M.E.W. files for 1942 reveal
any deep concern with the value of this trade.
'Foreign Office brief for Prime Minister, 14 October
1942, PREM 3/417/1.
Selborne - Churchill, 13 October 1942 brief,
PREM 3/417/1.
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This Chapter shall examine how the creation of an
Anglo-U.S. 'common front' towards Sweden caused Swedish-
German trade to become the predominant issue in Anglo-
Swedish relations after 1942.
IMPACT OF PEARL HARBOR
Shipments of supplies from the Western Hemisphere
to Sweden became haphazard shortly after the United States
entered the war. The British government had granted the
Swedes larger quotas for certain commodities in late
194l, and had agreed to increase the number of ships
plying the Gothenburg traffic from four to five each month.
However, the Swedes found that the American supply authori-
ties were refusing to grant export permits for most
consignments to Sweden from the United States and Latin
America. The Ministry of Economic Warfare endeavoured to
furnish the Swedes with small quantities from Britain's
own stocks, and also promised to intercede on Sweden's
behalf to expedite the resumption of their transatlantic
trade. 4
 The Ministry also cautioned the Swedes that most
products had become scarce as a consequence of the
expanding American war effort and the spreading war in
the Far East. The U.S. War and Navy Departments exerted
considerable influence over the supply authorities to
3Chapter One.
4 Gunnar Hägglöf, Svensk krigshandelpolitik under
andra världskriget (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1958), p. 213.
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reserve commodities for military use. An official of the
British Embassy in Washington remarked that "the present
tendency is to grab everything for the U.S. armed forces."5
In certain instances, their actions were justified.
Rubber became extremely scarce after the Japanese overran
plantations In Malaya and Indonesia. In other cases, the
restrictions were unnecessary. There was no shortage of
oil, which was produced copiously in the Americas and was
so plentiful as to cause storage problems in such
Caribbean oil ports as Tampico.
Stockholm's difficulty in obtaining American
supplies was due also to the organization, attitudes, and
procedures of the wartime U.S. bureaucracy. A junior
official of the M.E.W. described the American method of
government in a minute after a visit to Washington in
1944: "The Government set-up in Washington is cumbersome
with its many departments all wanting a finger in each
other's pie." 6 Throughout his thirteen-year presidency,
Franklin Roosevelt never clearly defined the boundaries
of responsibility for his cabinet and advisors. He
allowed, and in some cases encouraged, departments and
agencies to compete with each other for influence over
policy, and to duplicate functions which originally had
been conferred on other branches of the government.
5R. Marris to Sir Charles Hambro, 1 August 1942
telegram 3735 ARFAR, FO 371/33054/N3970.
Seeboim, minute, 3 August 1944, FO 837/1118.
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Roosevelt allowed some officials to usurp the authority of
others because their opinions paralleled his own. During
the war, he thought that Secretary of State Cordell Hull's
views on international relations were 'Wilsonian' and
outdated. Roosevelt therefore tended to ignore the State
Department, relying instead upon his advisors, Harry
Hopkins, Admiral Leahy, Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau,
and himself to conduct diplomacy with the Allies and to
prepare plans for the postwar settlement. The State
Department's circumscribed authority was encroached upon
further by ad hoc agencies, such as Nelson Rockefeller's
Office of Inter-American Affairs, and by inter-departmental
boards which determined the allocation of supplies. The
Board of Economic Warfare, and its successor, the Foreign
Economic Administration, had been established to compile
statistics on enemy trade and to coordinate the respective
economic warfare policies of the State, War, Navy, and
Treasury Departments. However, to then Assistant Secretary
of State, Dean Acheson, the weekly meetings between the
representatives frequently degenerated into "shouting
matches" which failed to resolve the issues under discus-
sion. 7 Decisions regarding the allocation of supplies to
Sweden were often delayed for months as a consequence of
this bureaucratic rivalry.
American attitudes towards Sweden in 1942 ranged
from suspicion to open hostility. In American eyes,
7Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years
at the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969),
pp. 40-41.
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Sweden was sympathetic towards, and possibly covertly
supportive of, Germany. Many Americans contended that
Allied trade with Sweden was tantamount to "trading with
the enemy." 8 These suppositions stemmed largely from
ignorance of Sweden's circumstances. Moreover, in having
been shocked into an energetic war effort by the raid on
Pearl Harbor, Americans questioned the motives of those
states who remained neutral in what they had decried prior
to 7 December 1941 as 'Europe's war.'
Throughout the war, the State Department felt
obliged to accommodate public opinion in order to sustain
and possibly to enhance its influence within the govern-
ment. However, it was also anxious to harmonize
Washington's policy towards with that of the more experi-
enced and knowledgeable British Foreign Office. 9 Sweden
maintained only a small legation in Washington which
dealt mainly with routine matters such as visas and
inheritances. Similarly, the U.S. legation in Stockholm
and consulate in Gothenburg had a combined staff of ten.
The legation did not even own an official residence for
the U.S. Minister. 10 Shortly after Washington declared
war, the State Department directed the new minister to
8 lbid., p. 48; David L. Gordon and Royden Danger-
field, The Hidden Weapon: The Story of Economic Warfare
(New York: Harper Brothers, 1947), p. 188.
9R. Higgs, 8 January 1942 memorandum, "Neutral
Sweden and the belligerents in the Third Year of War,"
National Archives, Washington, D.C., Record Group 59 papers,
State Department, Political Affairs: Sweden 858.00.
Stockholm, 20	 RGS9124586/2096
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Sweden, Hershell V. Johnson, to prepare a comprehensive
study of Swedish attitudes towards the war and Sweden's
willingness and ability to oppose a German invasion. In
the summer, Johnson despatched several reports to
Washington which paralleled British arguments in favour of
resuming Allied shipments to Sweden. 11 He emphasized
Sweden's strong democratic institutions, the absence of
widespread pro-Nazi sympathies, the Swedes' dependence
upon imports from Germany, their deep-rooted Russophobia,
and extensive defense preparations. Johnson recommended
that Washington provide supplies to the Swedes in order
to strengthen their morale and resistance to German
pressure. The State Department accepted Johnson's advice
but was unable to act upon it. The War and Navy Depart-
ments ultimately controlled supplies through their
representatives on the various commodity allocation
boards. Both Departments placed greater credence in their
own judgment and economic warfare doctrines than in the
reasoned and documented arguments advanced by Johnson and
the British.
Under Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, who
became Secretary of the Navy in 1944, did not dispute
British arguments that the Swedes had not violated the
War Trade Agreement. However, he contended that Sweden
would agree to a total trade embargo on Germany if the
Allies were to apply sufficient pressure. He considered
11Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States 1942, Vol. III (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1961), p. 333.
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himself anexpert on economic warfare, and Captain Puleston,
his advisor on neutral trade questions, was also a
biographer of Admiral Mahan. Forrestal believed that the
United States should take the lead in forming Allied policy
towards Sweden because the British were too inept and
cautious. Dingle Foot, Parliamentary Secretary for
Economic Warfare, had conferred with senior U.S. officials
in Washington during June 1944 and later described
Forrestal's disdain for British methods in a letter to
Ma 11 e t:
He has made it clear on various occasions
that in his view the British have almost
entirely failed in this war to exert economic
pressure as it should be exerted and that we
have in fact been guilty of throwing away
the advantage given us by sea power.12
While Forrestal furnished support to counter any
opposition from the State Department, Under Secre-
tary of War Robert Patterson in most cases was the instiga-
tor of the measures directed against Sweden. Patterson
believed that the diversion of resources to supply neutrals
prevented the Americans from conducting a total war effort.
He also felt that Sweden's trade with Germany proved that
the Swedes were not sympathetic to the Allies. His simplis-
tic views remained unchanged throughout the war. Many Ameri-
cans likened Patterson to Oliver Cromwell in his moralistic
attitudes and his refusal to entertain contrary opinions.13
12Foot - Mallet, 30 June 1944 letter, FO 837/916.
13Acheson, op. cit.
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Erik Boheman, Secretary General of the Swedish Foreign
Ministry, travelled to Washington in October 1942 to
resolve Sweden's supply problems. When he visited
Patterson, he discovered that the Under Secretary was more
intent on haranguing him as to when Sweden was "going to
stop Hitler" than in listening to Boheman's case for more
supplies. 14
 Patterson also declared that the United
States sought to "hit the Germans on their swollen
heads. ,,15
When Dingle Foot visited Washington, he presented
Patterson with statistics demonstrating a marked decline
in Swedish exports between October 1943 and June 1944, but
"this made no impression at all." 6
 Patterson argued that
Sweden's economy was virtually an appendage of Germany's.
He declared that the German war effort would be weakened
seriously if an Allied embargo on Sweden were to bring
Swedish production to a halt.
The United Nations are making a large
contribution to Sweden's economy.. .without
receiving anything approaching commensu-
rate return. The Swedes are making an
indispensable contribution to the Axis...
a complete blockade of Sweden by the United
Nations could reduce the Swedish capa-
bilities for the manufacture and export of
capital items to Germany.17
14Erik Boheman, P vakt Kabinettssekreterare under
andra väldskriget (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1964), p. 206.
' 5 lbid., p. 207.
- Mallet, 2P cit.
17Patterson to Brigadier General Hayes A. Kroner,
Chief Military Intelligence Services, 25 June 1942 minute
of telephone conversation, NA/R.G. 165, OPD.836 (6-25-42).
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When London began to accommodate American views in
the summer of 1942, it was not fully aware of these
inflexible attitudes and their influence on U.S. policy.
British officials did not comprehend the extent of the
Undersecretaries' intentions until the middle of 1944, by
which time the Anglo-American 'common front' towards
Sweden had become an extension of Patterson's and
Forrestal's plan to blockade Germany completely.
OIL FOR SWEDEN, 1942
On 2 April 1942, the Swedish government urged the
British to press the Americans to resume oil shipments.
The Swedes also asked London to increase Sweden's annual
oil import quota from 60,000 tons to 120,000. The Swedes
desired additional fuel so that the air force and navy
could conduct more extensive reconnaisarice and training
operations without depleting Sweden's strategic fuel
reserve. Although the Germans had relented on their 'war
of nerves' against Sweden, Stockholm was anxious to
bolster Sweden's defences.
Privately, the British Government accepted the
Swedish request in principle. An interdepartmental meet-
ing held at the Admiralty in March concluded that additional
supplies should be used only as a bargaining counter to
obtain significant concessions from the Swedes. The
Chiefs of Staff ruled that the quantity of oil was insuf-
ficient to prolong Swedish resistance to German invasion,
and would not strengthen the Wehrmacht's capabilities if it
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were seized by the Germans. However, the Chiefs, in
concurrence with the Foreign Office and M.E.W., also
decided that the oil might bolster Swedish confidence in
dealing with Berlin, and in turn, make the Swedes more
amenable to Allied wishes. Nevertheless, the British de-
liberated for more than two months on what quid 	 quos to
obtain from Sweden. During one inconclusive interdepart-
mental meeting in late May, a War Office official expressed
surprise over Stockholm's anxiety to obtain a "negligible"
quantity of oil, but proposed that the British "should
obtain all the quid
	 guos we could," since the Swedes'
desire seemed genuine. 18
 Christopher Warner, of the
Foreign Office, overruled this argument by pointing out
that Britain could not press the Swedes "too far" over the
oil:
If we allowed them to realize that we
thought this oil would make no difference
to their ability to stand up to the Germans,
they might give up all hope of doing so.19
The British finally agreed upon the demands to
present to Sweden. London was concerned primarily with
military traffic across Sweden. The Chiefs of Staff were
anxious to prevent the Germans from reinforcing naval
bases in Norway which threatened the Arctic convoys to
Russia. The Admiralty possessed evidence that mines and
18Lt Col. McLeod, 29 May 1942, minute of meeting
at Foreign Office, FO 371/33090/N2827.
19C.F.A. Warner, 29 May 1942, minute of meeting at
Foreign Office, FO 371/33090/N2827.
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naval technicians had reached Narvik via Sweden instead of
by sea. The British services sought to limit military
traffic across Sweden so that the Germans would become
dependent upon shipping, which would be subject to the
"increased attention of Coastal Command." 2 ° The Chiefs,
Foreign Office, and M.E.W. therefore agreed to ask Stockholm
to limit German traffic to Norway and Finland in return
for the ii.21 The Swedes would be pressed to monitor
this traffic closely, and to furnish the British with
detailed statistics concerning their transit arrangements
with Germany. London also planned to ask Stockholm not to
expel the two British legation officials who had been
responsible for arming the blockade runners in January.22
The British regarded the proposed oil agreement
as an ad hoc arrangement unrelated to Swedish efforts to
obtain other supplies from the Americas. London intended
to resolve Sweden's general supply problem in separate
negotiations once the oil question had been resolved.
Although the British were determined to "drive a hard
bargain" 23 in return for the oil, they did not expect the
Swedes to concede all demands. London was willing to give
20Col. Spraggett, 29 May 1942, minute of meeting
at Foreign Office, FO 371/33090/N2827.
21Minutes of meeting held at Foreign Office, 8 June
1942, FO 371/33090/N2981.
22MEW. - British Embassy, Washington, 13 June
1942 telegram 389 ARFAR, FO 371/33090/N3163.
23 Sir C. Hambro, 28 June 1942 minute, FO 371/
33 09 0/N2 595
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Sweden the oil eventually even if the statistics on German
traffic proved to be less acceptable than London hoped for.
The primary object of the negotiations would be to deter-
mine the extent of Sweden's willingness to accommodate the
Allies in return for supplies. More sweeping demands
could be made after the Swedes had become less concerned
about possible German reprisals. The M.E.W. was confident
that Sweden would honour any compromise that might be
reached on the oil question. G.H. Villiers and Col.
Sporborg of the M.E.W. maintained that "experience has
shown us that a guarantee by the Swedish government was in
fact valuable, as they did in fact stick to their
guarantees. ,,24
American cooperation was crucial to the British
plan. The Swedes probably would not accept Britain's
terms if the Americans were unwilling to export the oil.
The State Department informally agreed that additional oil
would help strengthen Sweden's morale. 25 However, the
Department did not intervene forcefully on Sweden's behalf
with supply bureaucracies in Washington. Throughout the
summer of 1942, the British attempted to expedite an
American decision by arguing that Sweden was essentially
sympathetic to the Allies and was an important source of
intelligence. The State Department responded by insisting
that Britain would have to amend its proposal to include
24Villiers, 28 May 1942 minute, op. cit.
25F.R.U.S., 1942, op. cit., pp. 338-40.
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demands for Swedish trade statistics and the curtailment
of exports to Germany. The Department followed these
demands with others which London considered unreasonable.
For example, London was disturbed when the State
Department insisted that Sweden must resume exports to
Brazil and Uruguay, who had servered relations with the
Axis, or cease trade with Argentina, one of the few Latin
American states which continued to recognize Germany by
mid-1942. 26 Sweden needed export markets in the Western
Hemisphere to obtain hard currency to purchase imports
from the west. Berlin's conditions for the Gothenburg
traffic prevented Sweden from trading with the Allies or
nations which discriminated against Germany. Argentina
became Sweden's sole transatlantic market after most other
Latin American states either had joined the Allies or had
broken relations with the Axis to demonstrate the region's
'Hemispheric' solidarity with the United States. Most
U.S. officials regarded Argentina as an obstacle to a
continent wide t flemispheric bloc' because of its neutrality,
its traditional anti-Americanism, and its government's
fascist sympathies. 27 Moreover, Argentina was widely
believed to be a haven for Axis spies and fifth columnists.
Washington therefore believed that Sweden should recognize
26 Sir R. Campbell, Br. charge, Washington - Eden,
25 July 1942 telegram 3679, FO 371/33054/N4182.
F.R.U.S. 1942 Volume III, op. cit., p. 363.
Lloyd Mecham, The United States and Inter-
American Security 1889-1960 (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1967), p. 212.
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the existence of this 'bloc' by reversing its 'unfriendly'
decision to export exclusively to Argentina. 28 In
contrast, the British, who traded heavily with Argentina
themselves, felt that Sweden's discrimination against
pro-Allied states in South America was outweighed by the
value of Swedish shipping chartered to Britain. 29 Swedish
exports to Argentina remained a contentious issue between
Washington and Stockholm throughout the war, but did not
impinge upon Britain's diplomacy with Sweden.
The British thought that the American proposals
stemmed from confusion within the U.S. government, and
from the State Department's desire to postpone indefinitely
a confrontation with the service departments. London
feared that further delays would diminish Sweden's
willingness to accommodate the Allies. During the summer,
Sweden resisted German demands for credits to purchase more
Swedish exports. 3 ° Villiers stressed M.E.W. anxiety about
the Swedish supply problem:
The present position of uncertainty.. .is
intolerable for the Swedes. The War Trade
Agreement does, in our view, benefit our
war effort considerably. The Swedes too,
are entitled to certain benefits, which
they claim with some justice not to be
receiving.. .we should be interested in
28Campbell - Eden, op. cit.
29MEW - Campbell, 28 July 1942 telegram 4540
ARFAR FO 371/33054/N4182.
30Mallet - M.E.W., 10 August 1942 despatch 72,
FO 371/33054/N4179.
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preventing the present benevolent neutrality
of Sweden...from turning into veiled hostility,
as in the last war. It is up to us to avert
this danger.31
By September, the Foreign Office and M.E.W. had
prepared a detailed brief by which they hoped to convince
Washington of Sweden's value to the Allied war effort.
The brief stressed Britain's dependence on Swedish ball
bearings, citing confidential statistics of British tank
and aircraft production. These statistics were potentially
damaging to British prestige in the United States since
they revealed critical inadequacies in Britain's economy.
The fact that Britain required bearings from Sweden was
embarrassing. The Chiefs of Staff were anxious to prevent
this information from being "bandied about Washington in
an interdepartmental war." 32 The Foreign Office there-
fore, informed General Eisenhower of Sweden's economic
importance to Britain, and asked him to convey this informa-
tion discreetly to the highest U.S. authorities.
Eisenhower's intercession prompted the U.S.
government to agree, in mid-September, to negotiate with
Sweden on the oil question. However, the Americans
remained undecided on the question of Swedish supplies and
appropriate quid pro quos. It is possible that Washington
31G.H. Villiers, 11 June 1942 minute, FO 371/33090/
N2981; J.S. Sornmers Cocks, 21 September 1942 minute,
FO 371/33095/N4769.
32Major General R.H. Dewing, Senior British
representative, U.S. Army European Theatre of Operations
(Headquarters) to H. Sporbourg, M.E.W., 8 September 1942,
FO 371/33091/N4665.
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agreed to negotiate with the Swedes to avoid appearing
totally insensitive towards British concerns.
Boheman travelled to London in early October to
expedite an agreement with the British government and
economic warfare specialists of the U.S. Embassy. The
negotiations were to be based on an Anglo-American memo-
randum of 18 September which demanded: ceilings on the
volume of German traffic across Sweden, exclusion of
German ships from Swedish convoys, and the provision of
Sweden's monthly trade statistics to the Allies. Before
Boheman was despatched on his plenipotentiary mission,
Swedish Foreign Minister Ginther told Mallet that the
demands were not an "insuperable obstacle" to an agreement
being reached between Sweden and the Allies. 33 Boheman
hoped to secure a comprehensive agreement guaranteeing
quotas for all Swedish imports from the West. However,
the British were unwilling to discuss Sweden's general
supply problems, and confined negotiations largely to the
transit traffic and other 'unneutral' Swedish concessions
to the Germans. Boheman found that he had to spend much
of his time in London defending Sweden's previous actions
during the war. 34
 Boheman informed Eden on 9 October that
although Sweden was prepared in principle to stop the
transit traffic, it was reluctant to act until the threat
33Mallet - Cadogan, 25 September 1942 letter,
FO 371/33092/N5112.
34Boheman, op. cit., p. 193.
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of German reprisals receded. He admitted that the German
army was heavily engaged in Russia but contended that
Sweden's defences, the Air Force in particulaz, were
inadequate. 35 Eden informed Churchill that although "the
Swedes dare not have a showdown with the Germans," 36 it
seemed likely that Boheman would accept eventually most of
the Allied demands.
Boheman lunched with Churchill on 15 October. The
M.E.W. had briefed Churchill on the background of the
blockade running question. Lord Selborne informed the
Prime Minister that the S.O.E. intended to employ the
Dicto and Lionel, two ships which had returned to Gothenburg
during operation Performance in another blockade running
attempt during the coming winter. Selborne advised
Churchill to impress upon Boheman that the Swedes would
"create a situation which might have most serious
consequences for their country" if they refused to allow the
ships to leave Gothenburg. 37 Eden gave Churchill a
memorandum prepared by Major Desmond Morton listing
Sweden's 'unneutral' activities over the previous two
years. Churchill briefly mentioned the salient points of
the Foreign Office brief when he met Boheman. The Swede
pleaded force majeure, and described Sweden's military
35Eden - Mallet, 9 October 1942 despatch 107,
PREM 3/417/1.
36 Eden - Churchill, op. cit.
37Selborne - Churchill, op. cit.
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plans for countering a German invasion. Churchill told
Boheman that Britain would despatch a force to Trondheim
to assist the Swedes. However, he added that Britian
valued Sweden as an independent neutral, and remarked that
the Swedes were wise in avoiding a conflict with Berlin.
Churchill put the memorandum aside, stating "you may be
right, but why should we discuss such a disagreeable
subject?" 38 He later informed Boheman that "I think I
understand your attitude and your policy. You must arm and
prepare yourselves for the worst, but on the other hand,
do not be foolhardy. We do not want another victim."39
Churchill never mentioned the blockade runners.
Churchill's remarks seem uncharacteristic of his
usually critical attitude towards Sweden during the war.
He often described the Swedes as "selfish" and undeserving
of Allied assistance. 4 ° There is no official record of
the conversation, and Churchill did not inform Eden of
what transpired during the luncheon. It is possible that
his discussion with Boheman about a hypothetical invasion
of Sweden caused him to lose interest in such mundane
questions as the transit traffic. Perhaps the discussion
rekindled his earlier interest in promoting a British
invasion of Norway. He mentioned that he wanted Sweden to
assume a leading role in a Scandinavian bloc after the
38
Boheman, op. cit., p. 194.
39Ibid.
40 See Chapters Five and Eight.
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war. 41
 As Churchill was currently advocating establishment
of regional security blocs in postwar Europe, 42
 it is not
unlikely that he became preoccupied with this scheme during
the course of his conversation with Boheman.
Churchill's remarks were well received in Stockholm.
Mallet reported that Gunther was pleased that Churchill
"appeared to understand so completely the Swedish posi-
tion." 43
 The Swedes grew more satisfied with London's
attitude when Boheman and the M.E.W. reached a tentative
agreement in mid-October. Although Boheman contended that
German pressure might prevent Sweden from complying fully
with Allied demands, he agreed that Sweden would limit
German freight in transit to 200,000 tons, and restrict
the traffic to 225,000 double journeys per year. During
the negotiations, the British had pressed Boheman to
promise that Sweden would enforce more rigourously the
'normal trade' structures under the 1939 War Trade Agree-
ment. London was aware that Sweden's exports to Germany
had grown over the past year, but did not know by how much.
However, the M.EW. accepted Boheman's arguments that
Sweden could not afford to affront the Germans, and that
the increased exports enabled Sweden to obtain howitzers
Carigren, Swedish Foreign Policy during the
Second World War (London: Ernest Benn, 1977), p. 137.
42See Chapter Four.
43Ma1let - Foreign Office, 23 October 1942 despatch
503, FO 371/33065/N5522. Swedish accounts of the Chequers
meeting surprised many officials of the Foreign Office, who
were unaware of what had transpired. Warner minuted, "I
wonder if the P.M. is really as uncritical of the Swedes as
M. Boheman suggested," 30 October 1942, FO 371/33065/N5522.
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and machine guns from Germany. It also decided not to
press the convoy question since Stockholm had been
excluding troop transports from coastal convoys since
September, and would probably impose further prohibitions
in the future. Villiers minuted that Boheman had conceded
the "really important questions" and that Sweden was
therefore entitled to receive increased oil imports.44
However, Boheman's talks in London did not hasten
the resumption of Sweden's oil imports. The American
negotiators were not authorized to conclude an agreement
with Boheman since their government had yet to establish a
policy towards Sweden. 45
 In late October, Boheman travelled
to Washington to explain Sweden's problems. Although he was
received cordially by Roosevelt, William Donovan, head of
the O.S.S., and senior members of the State and Treasury
Departments, Boheman was unable to expedite an American
decision. Most U.S. officials conceded that Sweden was
basically sympathetic to the Allies, and that circumstances
had forced Stockholm into compliance with Berlin. Whereas
the British believed that these circumstances dictated
that the Allies furnish supplies to strengthen Swedish
morale, many Americans concluded that Sweden should be
blockaded because the Swedes were incapable of defying
44Villiers, 7 October 1942 minute, FO 837/878.
45Sporbourg to Warner, 11 November 1942 letter,
FO 371/33092/
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Germany. 46 On 5 November, a subcommittee of the Board of
Economic Warfare issued a list of demands which it had
been drafting since June. The desideratta were accepted by
the Board in mid-November and would serve as the basis for
the 1943 War Trade Agreement. The Board's 'November
resolution' asked Sweden to reduce trade with Germany,
eliminate credits to Germany and its satellites, reduce
German traffic across Swedish territory to the "maximum
attainable," assist British efforts to import ball
bearings, furnish trade statistics, charter to the United
States 21 ships lying outside the Baltic which had not been
chartered to Britain in l94O. 	 In return for Swedish
acceptance, the Allies would give favourable consideration
of Sweden's requests for imports. Sweden would stop pur-
chasing goods on the open market in Latin America. Allied
supply agencies would furnish the requisite materials from
their own commodity pools after Allied requirements had
been met.
The 'Resolution' called for a realignment of
Sweden's foreign policy beyond what Stockholm had envisaged
in September. Although Boheman lacked authority to conclude
a comprehensive trade agreement with the Allies, he
realized that he would have to reach a modus vivendi with the
Americans for Sweden to have any hope of receiving imports
46Admiral D. Leahy, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
to Milo Perkins, Administrator, Board of Economic Warfare,
11 November 1942 letter, R.G. 165, OPD 009 EXPORT (11-14-42).
47Medlicott, op. cit., p. 204.
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from the West. However, negotiations in Washington made
little progress during November. Boheman's discussions
with Acheson and other State Department officials often
became embroiled on the question of exports to Argentina.
The British agreed that a new war trade agreement
was necessary to settle Allied differences with Sweden.
However, they also recognized that it would take months
before both sides could agree on all conditions. 48
 London
was anxious to resume oil shipments to Sweden immediately.
The Ministry of Supply and Special Operations Executive
planned to sail the Dicto and Lionel from Gothenburg during
the dark days of late December and early January. The
Admiralty intended to transfer light anti-aircraft guns to
the ships from fast motor gunboats which would meet and
escort the ships once they left Swedish waters. The
Admiralty believed 'operation Cabaret,' as this breakout
scheme was named, had a "fifty-fifty chance of success."49
'Operation Cabaret' was supported by Oliver Lyttelton, the
Minister of Production, who asserted that the ships' cargoes
were "vital" to Britain's war production, and "should be
brought to England if humanly possible." 5 ° The Swedes
48Warner - Villiers, 28 October 1942 letter,
FO 837/897.
49Eden-Churchill, 3 January 1943 minute, PM 4/43/24.
Churchill minuted, "I should have thought it was as hope-
less as the last time," 1 January 1943, PM 42/324;
FO 371/33094/N6558.
50Lyttleton - H.V. Alexander, 31 July 1942 letter,
FO 371/33092/N5836.
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steadfastly rebuffed several informal British requests
to release the ships throughout 1942, and London believed
they would remain intransigent if the Allies did not
resolve the supplied dilemma. "The Swedes seem somewhat
despondent at the moment and we all feel it would be quite
useless to go to Stockholm and ask for permission for
Cabaret unless we can get the oil agreement through
first." 5 ' The Foreign Office sought to use the oil ship-
ments to persuade the Swedes to allow the ships to depart.
It wanted oil exports to resume in November or early
December so that at least two tankers would have arrived in
Sweden before Mallet demanded that the Swedes release the
blockade runners. Britain would threaten to terminate oil
deliveries if the Swedes refused to comply immediately.52
The British had informed the State Department of
Cabaret on several occasions during early November
but failed to expedite a Swedish-American accord over oil.
Eden therefore prompted Churchill to ask Roosevelt, on
12 November, to order the resumption of oil exports to
facilitate operation Cabaret. 	 Churchill pledged his
government's "full support" for future U.S. initiatives
towards Sweden in return for Roosevelt's assistance.53
51Sporbourg to Warner, 4 November 1942 minute,
FO 371/33092/N56.
52 Ibid.; Eden to Churchill, 12 November 1942,
FO 371/33092/N583.
53Churchill - Roosevelt, 13 November 1942 draft
telegram 7040, FO 371/33092/N5836.
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As a consequence of Churchill's message, London was
committed to an Anglo-American 'common front' towards
Sweden. Although London would balk at some U.S. proposals
by 1944, the Americans were able eventually to secure
support from the British who felt obliged to honour
Churchill's guarantee.
On 1 December, Roosevelt accommodated Churchill's
request and issued a Presidential Order allowing two
Swedish tankers to leave U.S. waters with 30,000 tons of
oil in return for the recent charter of 21 Swedish ships to
the United States. 54
 Boheman remained in Washington to
haggle over other aspects of the 'November resolution,' in
order to secure a more favourable basis for future war
trade negotiations. The British planned to initiate
Cabaret after Bohernan had returned to Stockholm, so that
he could brief the Swedish cabinet on the prevailing
Allied attitudes towards Sweden before the cabinet recessed
for the Christmas holidays. The State Department therefore
reached a modus vivendi with Boheman even though he had not
accepted every American demand. The Department did not
inform Boheman of Cabaret, or of the pressure tactics
which London planned to employ, because he had been intran-
sigent when the subject was raised during October and
November.
54F.R.U.S. 1942, Vol. III, pp. 359-60;
Acheson, op. cit., p. 51.
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On 21 December, Mallet presented an aide mmoire to
Gunther asserting that Sweden's refusal to let the two
ships leave Gothenburg violated international law. The
note warned the Swedes that further exports would be with-
held unless the ships cleared within a fortnight.55
Gunther protested that Sweden was acting within its rights
since the British had violated Swedish neutrality by arming
the ships. Gunther informed Mallet that the Germans would
probably suspend the Gothenburg traffic and increase naval
patrols off the Swedish coast if Sweden were to accept the
British demand. Moreover, he said that Stockholm had
assured the Germans that it would inform Berlin if the ships
were allowed to sail. In later meetings, Gunther tried to
persuade Mallet that Hitler would probably assume that a
major Swedish concession to the Allies was a prelude to
Allied landings in Norway or Denmark. He stressed that
Hitler would regard an Allied landing in Norway as a
"pistol at the heart of Germany," and would withdraw forces
,,56frcn Russia to maintain the position nearer home.
The Foreign Office was incensed by Gunther's
reaction to the note, and urged Washington to exert "maximum
pressure" on the Swedes. 57 The State Department was
55Mallet - Eden, 26 December 1942 despatch 930,
FO 371/33094/N6552.
56Mallet - Eden, 5 January 1943 despatch, 3,
FO 371/37067/N257.
57F.O. - Washington, 6 January 1943 telegram 116,
FO 371/37066/N96. Eden - Churchill, 27 December 1942 minute,
FO 37l/33094/N6558.
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confused by Britain's attitude on this question. The
British had previously taken pains to persuade Washington
that the Allies could not expect Sweden to yield sweeping
concessions at this early stage of the war. Moreover, the
Department had come to share this view and had waged a
difficult struggle with the service departments to obtain
B.E.W. approval to furnish supplies to Sweden. It prodded
Boheman to reduce trade with Germany and Argentina because
it believed that commercial concessions would not provoke
German reprisals. However, the Department could not
understand why the British wanted to cut off supplies if
the Swedes refused to accommodate them on a prestige laden
issue. 58
 In spite of these misgivings, the Department
instructed the American legation in Stockholm to support
Mallet' s representations.
Allied approaches to Sweden during the weeks
following Mallet's 'ultimatum' insisted that Sweden was
militarily and diplomatically strong enough to "assert its
rights as a neutral." 59 The Americans insisted that
"Sweden has never been in a stronger position to resist
Germany." They maintained that Sweden's ability to with-
hold iron ore exports provided Stockholm with a "potent
weapon" to counter German pressure. They implied that
58Halifax - M.E.W., 5 December 1942 telegram 5104
ARFAR FO 371/33054/N4693.
59J. Greene, 8 January 1943, transcript of conversa-
tion with Staf fan S6derblom, head of the Political Depart-
ment, Swedish Foreign Ministry, FO 37l/37067/N257.
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Sweden would be given favourable terms in the forthcoming
war trade discussions if the ships were to be released.
British rhetoric emphasized Germany's recent loss at
Stalingrad, and maintained that Sweden was no longer
endangered by the Germans. Warner implored Björn Prytz,
the Swedish minister, that the changing fortunes of war
obliged Sweden to redress "the balance which had for so
long been heavily weighed down on the side of Germany."6°
He warned that the Allies would cut off Sweden's oil imports
if the Lionel and Dicto did not sail. Warner also implied
that the impetus behind retaliatory sanctions would come
from Washington and not London. Non-compliance "would make
a very bad impression and strengthen the hands of those,
e.g., in the United States, who had been in favour of
'treating Sweden rough'."
London combined diplomatic pressure with a propa-
ganda campaign conducted by Peter Tennant, the press
attache in Stockholm. Tennant encouraged pro-Allied news-
papers, such as the Göteborgs Handelstidnin to publish
anti-German editorials and to criticize the Swedish
government's seeming deference to Germany. Tennant's
office also furnished these papers with details concerning
Stockholm's concessions to Berlin which the government
had previously withheld from the press. 61 It also insti-
60Warner, 8 January 1943, minute of conversation
with Prytz, FO 371/37067/N160.
61Mallet - Eden, 20 February 1943, despatch 165,
FO 371/37073/N6895. Johnson - Hull, 5 April 1943 telegram
1068-70, 1090-91, April 5-6, R.G. 59/858.00.633.
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gated a whispering campaign against the government amongst
influential circles in the governing Social Democratic
party and the trade unions.
Public opinion within Sweden made a greater
impression upon the Swedish government than did Allied or
German rhetoric. The government believed that the press
would accuse it of placing Germany's interests above
Sweden's if the Allies were to suspend the Gothenburg
traffic. 62 Therefore, Boheman informed Mallet on 8 January
1943 that the Dicta and the Lionel would be free to depart
after 15 January if the Allies accepted the London
agreement of 14 October as the basis for future war trade
negotiations. The Foreign Office was incensed by
Stockholm's attempt to barter the ships' fate in return
for more favourable conditions, and informed Washington
that the Swedes had "no right to bargain." 63 However, the
Americans were prepared to reassure the Swedes. An
American aide-mémoire of 15 January stated that Washington
did not contemplate "the introduction of further demands...
which have not already been discussed with M. Boheman
either in London or in Washington." 64 Two hours after
receiving this message, the Swedes informed Mallet that the
ships could sail immediately.
62Carlgren, op. cit., pp. 141-42; Boheman, op. cit.
pp. 226-8.
63Medlicott, op. cit., p. 458.
64 U.5. Government aide-mmoire, 15 January 1943,
enclosed in Mallet - Foreign Office, 19 January 1943,
despatch 49, FO 371/37068/N662.
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However, the ships made only one abortive attempt
to break through the blockade. Stockholm informed Berlin
on 14 January that the ships would be cleared. Although
Berlin threatened periodically to close the Gothenburg
traffic if the ships were allowed to sail, the Germans
intimated that they would not interfere with the traffic
if the Swedes granted additional credits, increased military
transit facilities, and other concessions. However, the
Swedes refused to accept these terms during trade negotia-
tions which were being held in Berlin. The Germans
retaliated by stopping the Gothenburg traffic on 15 January,
and despatched small warships to patrol the Skagerak. The
Lionel and Dicto sailed from Gothenburg on 17 January but
anchored in nearby Hakefjord on the 18th to await
Admiralty intelligence regarding the German patrols. The
Swedes were now anxious for the ships to leave so that they
could persuade the Germans to reopen the Gothenburg
traffic. However, the Admiralty postponed the breakout
after it learned that three large German destroyers had
arrived at Kristiansand in southern Norway for
"manoeuvers." 65
 The Admiralty ordered the ships to remain
ready to sail in hopes that the Germans would tire of
waiting for a breakout and relax their patrols. Operation
Cabaret was abandoned in mid-February because the days
were lengthening and the small warships which were to
65Ralph Barker, Blockade Busters (New York:
W.W. Norton, 1976), p. 148.
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escort the Dicto and Lionel had been damaged during a
North Sea gale and required a refit. 66 On 7 March 1943,
Mallet informed Boheman that the Dicto and Lionel would
be laid up at the small port of Lysekil. Their cargoes
were transported eventually to Britain by aircraft and
fast motor boats. Berlin reopened the Gothenburg traffic
on 7 May, after it was satisfied that the blockade runners
would not sail.
Operation Cabaret had not achieved any tangible
results, but the Foreign Office regarded it as a political
success. Allied pressure had forced the Swedes to
recognize Britain's 'legal right' to sail the ships from
Gothenburg. By clearing the ships, Stockholm had placed
its willingness to help the Allies above its fear of
German sanctions. The Foreign Office was pleased also
with other actions which indicated a sterner Swedish
attitude towards Germany. The Swedes had rejected German
economic demands in January. Prime Minister Hansson
delivered a speech on 18 January which emphatically warned
Germany not to interfere in Sweden's affairs. 67 The
Foreign Office observed that Soviet successes at Stalingrad
and elsewhere were well received by the Swedish public,
although the government was "slightly nervous" because of
66Admiral Tovey, Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet to
Secretary of the Admiralty, 28 April 1943 despatch 632/
HF13/26, ADM 199/660.
67Johnson - Hull, 5 February 1943, despatch 1390,
R.G.	 59/858.641.
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Sweden's "inherent fear of the Soviet Union." 68 Commander
Lundquist, Sweden's Director of Combined Intelligence, met
Admiralty officials during a visit to London who found his
attitude towards the belligerents "entirely satisfactory."69
The Northern Department informed Eden on 10 February that
it was "fairly satisfied with this development" in Swedish
policy. However, it also maintained that since the Swedes
still "owe us many favours we should avoid giving the
appearance of running after them or congratulating them in
any way on their 'audacity'." 70 The British therefore
planned to assume an inflexible attitude towards Sweden
during the forthcoming war trade negotiations, although
privately they had few complaints with Sweden's current
behaviour.
The Americans drew different conclusions from
operation Cabaret.	 The State Department observed that
the Swedes were less inclined to haggle and responded more
readily to pressure than did Boheman during the London and
Washington negotiations. Britain's proposal to stop oil
shipments had weakened the force of earlier British argu-
ments in favour of supplying Sweden. In future, the
Department would take a more jaundiced view of London's
68Nutting, 2 February 1943 minute, FO 371/37068/
N591.
69Northern Department - Eden, 10 February 1943,
Brief for Secretary of State Regarding Sweden's Stance
towards Germany, FO 371/37098/N879.
70Ibid.
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advice, and would be less willing to oppose the War
Department's economic warfare policy.
The War Department believed that the Swedes'
eventual decision to release the blockade runners was
less significant than the fact that they had done so only
after several weeks of intense Allied pressure. Moreover,
they had given Germany an opportunity to intercept the
ships. Patterson argued that the Dicto and Lionel episode
demonstrated that Stockholm's fear of Germany outweighed
any private inclinations on the part of Swedish officials
to accommodate the Allies. He maintained that Germany
could overrun Sweden in
a matter of days.... Their [the Swedes]
realization of this plus the present economic
necessity is the reason they are providing
war supplies for Hitler. The difference be-
tween Sweden and the countries occupied by
Hitler's armies...is only a difference by
degree.71
Patterson revived his earlier proposals for a blockade of
Sweden. Stockholm's behaviour during late December and
early January served to strengthen his influence in
Washington.
By April 1943, London had become disturbed by
Washington's stiffening attitude towards Sweden. The
British were anxious to resume oil shipments to Sweden
once the Germans had re-opened the Gothenburg traffic in
order to refurbish the Stockholm-Scotland air service's
71Patterson, 13 February 1943 memorandum, R.G. 165,
OPD/009/EXPORT (2-13-43).
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fuel supplies. The Americans agreed to export oil in May,
after the British had insisted that the air service was
needed to transport ball bearings to Britain. 72 However,
Washington reserved the right to suspend oil deliveries
if the Swedes proved recalcitrant during the war trade
negotiations. Anthony Nutting, of the Northern Department,
summed up Foreign Office exasperation with Washington's
behaviour: "It seems to be our fate to encounter American
tiresomeness at every turn in getting oil into Sweden,
despite our having impressed upon them the vital necessity
for the maintenance of air communications."73
THE 1943 WAR TRADE AGREEMENT
On 9 May 1943, a Swedish delegation, which included
Gunnar Hägglöf, the diplomat who had negotiated commercial
questions with the Germans, and banker Marcus Wallenburg,
who had attended previous Anglo-Swedish trade talks,
arrived in London for six weeks war trade negotiations.
The Swedes had hoped that the agreement would settle the
erratic supply problems of the previous year and establish
higher import quotas for Sweden. Stockholm expected the
Allies to press for economic concessions in return, but
believed these would entail essentially the more rigourous
72Halifax - Foreign Office, 29 May 1943 telegram
2477, FO 371/37068/N3218.
73Nutting, 4 April 1943 minute, FO 371/37073/
N27072.
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enforcement of the export ceilings allowed under the 1939
agreement, and the reduction of German transits to 1940
levels. However, the Allies insisted that Sweden refuse
further credits to Germany, reduce iron ore exports to
Germany and occupied Europe in 1944 from the 1939 ceiling
of 9.5 million tons to 7.5 million, limit exports of
forest products and machinery to 75 percent of the 1942
volume, restrict the shipment of ball bearings, steel,
chemicals, and 38 other products, and that the Swedes
'do their utmost' to refuse additional German orders for
these goods. The Allies demanded that the Swedes fix the
price of iron ore exports to a ratio of two tons of
German coal for each ton of ore. The Allies hoped that this
measure would cause a further reduction of Swedish exports
because ore shipments would become more expensive when
German coal prices rose as a consequence of war damage to
mining and transportation facilities.
The Allies proposed that Sweden reduce its exports
to 'Axis Europe' during the second half of 1943 even though
the Germans had already contracted for these goods. The
British included a clause in the proposed agreement
prohibiting export of ships and weapons. London hoped
that this provision would prevent the Swedes from deliver-
ing twelve trawlers which were being built in Sweden for
German interests and which the Admiralty believed could be
converted into minesweepers or harbour defense vessels.74
74M.E.W. - Mallet, 7 June 1943 telegram 445 ARFAR,
FO 371/37106/N3425.
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London did not believe that Stockholm could justify this
transaction as part of its 'normal trade' since Sweden
previously had exported only one trawler to Germany in
1938.
In addition to these primarily economic proposals,
the Allies demanded suspension of the 'leave' and war
material traffic on Swedish railways and the prohibition
of German ships in Swedish convoys. 75 They offered the
Swedes few concrete incentives to accept these terms.
Apart from a commitment to furnish 120,000 tons of oil,
most of Sweden's import quotas or 'basic rations' remained
unchanged, and some imports such as meat were reduced
drastically, or in the case of rubber imports eliminated
entirely.
The Americans were largely responsible for formulat-
ing these demands. The State Department adopted a less
accommodating attitude towards the Swedes to accommodate
Patterson's indignation over Stockholm's handling of the
Dicto and Lionel issue. The Department believed that
Swedish pleas of force majeure were now less justified than
in the autumn of 1942 because of German losses in North
Africa and Russia. 76 Therefore the Swedes could be
expected to make greater concessions to the Allies than
those which had been discussed tentatively with Boheman.
75Amended minutes, meeting chaired by Sir 0.
Sargent, 7 May 1943, FO 37l/37106/N2801.
76Halif ax - Foreign Office, 16 March 1943 draft
telegram, FO 115/3951.
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Moreover, the Americans believed that larger export
reductions were necessary to offset previous "violations"
of the 1939 War Trade Agreement. A delegation of Allied
economic investigators travelled to Sweden in January and
learned that Swedish exports since 1940 had exceeded
"normal trade levels." 77 In addition, the Americans were
disturbed by the abnormally high volume of iron ore exports
during January. 78 Swedish-German trade agreements
stipulated higher ore export quotas than the "normal
trade" figures established under the 1939 Anglo-Swedish
agreement. In previous years, Stockholm held the actual
export volume below the level which the Germans expected
by means of 'administrative measures', such as conscripting
miners, closing railways for repairs, or closing the ore
port of Lule&, which was usually ice-bound in winter.
However, the Swedes lacked a pretext for closing the port
until late January 1943 because unusually mild weather
prevented ice forming in the Gulf of Bothnia.
On the whole, the British shared most of the
American views although they were unsure of Sweden's
willingness to accept all proposals. London agreed that
the Swedes should curtail some commerce with Germany, but
feared that the Swedes would balk at the prospect of
77Halifax - M.E.W., 15 March 1943 telegram 12, 39,
FO 115/3950.
780re exports from Swedish ports in January 1943
amounted to 535,000 tons, more than double the monthly
volume for the preceding five Januaries. Mitcheson - M.E.W.,
15 February 1943 telegram 87 ARFAR, FO 837/895.
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realigning radically their relations with Germany.
Ironically, the British were prepared to defer the military
transits proposal in order tor make the economic proposals
seem less onerous to the Swedes. 79 The War Office was not
overly concerned about German troop traffic across Sweden,
and the Admiralty only wanted to curb the traffic in
supplies and munitions destined to reinforce naval installa-
tions in Norway. Both departments wanted Stockholm to
restrict the volume of troops and supplies transported
across Sweden rather than prohibit this traffic entirely.
In March, the M.E.W. suggested that the Americans
abandon the transit demands tem porarily. However, the
State Department responded by proposing an alternative
demand that the Swedish authorities fingerprint all German
soldiers crossing Sweden. 8 ° The British found this
proposal utterly impracticable, and agreed to include the
original transit demands in the War Trade negotiations.
The Swedish delegation found little room for
bargaining during the negotiations. They were unable to
be evasive about the extent of Swedish-German trade since
the Allies possessed comprehensive information about their
trade. During the talks, the British negotiators adopted
a stern and unyielding attitude. Lord Selborne, the
Minister of Economic Warfare, opened the session on 10 May
79Medlicott, op. cit., p. 463.
Collins - Lord Drogheada (M.E.W.), 23 March
1943 minute, FO 837/895.
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with a speech stating that in spite of the Swedes' well-
known regard for the Allies, "there is a feeling in this
country that we get all the sympathy while the Germans
get all the goods." 81
 The Swedish negotiators were also
hampered by poor communications with Stockholm which
inhibited full consultation with their government. Häggl6f
was obliged therefore to act on his own judgement. He
reasoned that although Sweden would gain little in return
for curtailing trade with Germany, compromise with the
Allies might improve Sweden's standing with the United
States. 82
 By mid-June, the Swedish delegation accepted
most of the Allied trade reduction proposals for 1944, but
was intransigent on certain questions such as trade
restrictions for 1943 and trawler exports. The Swedish
government was alarmed by the extent of the Allied demands83
and recalled the delegation on 19 June. Before departing
from London, the Swedes accepted a draft agreement and
declaration terminating the transits ad referendum to the
three governments concerned. If ratified, the documents
would be in force between 1 October 1943 and 31 December
1944.
81Minister's Opening statement to Swedish Delega-
tion, 10 May 1943, FO 837/895.
82Hagglof, o._cit., pp. 259-61.
83Boheman described the economic clauses of the
agreement as a "thoroughly bad bargain for Sweden,"
Mallet - Foreign Office, 27 May 1943 telegram 446, FO 371/
37l06/N3196; Boheman, op. cit., pp. 234-6.
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The Allies waited nearly three months while the
Swedish government deliberated on whether to accept the
draft agreement or press for better terms. Stockholm was
willing to terminate the German transits. 84 A substantial
body of the Swedish press and public had condemned the
government for allowing German military traffic across
Sweden since 1940. Moreover, the traffic had prevented a
rapprochement between Stockholm and the Norwegian govern-
ment-in-exile. Events in Europe, such as the fall of
Mussolini, and German losses in Russia and Italy, were
making the traffic an embarrassment to Sweden. But
Stockholm considered the transits to be a separate issue
from the proposed war trade agreement because the Swedish
government wanted to appear as if it were acting on its
own initiative rather than in deference to Allied pressure.85
In order to terminate the transits before 1 October,
Stockholm informed Berlin on 5 August that it would
prohibit German war material and troops across Sweden on
15 and 20 August respectively. The Swedes assured London
that they would terminate German oil shipments to Norway,
and would attempt to limit transits of 'non-war materials'
such as food, mails, building materials, etc. to less than
the 120,000 tons which London was willing to allow.
84 Before the London negotiations opened, Mallet
reported that Boheman had intimated that Sweden was
prepared to end troop transits within a few months,
Mallet - F.O., 7 May 1943 telegram 350, FO 371/37106/
N2515.
85Carlgren, op. cit., p. 152; Mallet - F.O.,
19 July 1943 telegram 571, FO 371/37l07/N4220.
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The Foreign Office believed it had "good cause
to feel satisfied" 86 with Sweden's prompt suspension of
most of the transits. The Admiralty estimated that the
Germans would be forced to divert 60,000 tons of addi-
tional shipping from the iron ore trade to transport troops
and equipment to northern Norway. The Swedes also agreed
to stop repairing German and Finnish military vehicles
which had been withdrawn to Sweden from the Finnish front.
Most British officials believed that the Swedes had helped
the Allied war effort materially by terminating the
transits, and had also helped to further undermine Germany's
prestige among other neutrals. Thirty-three years later,
Sir Anthony Nutting described the transit concessions as
the "greatest accomplishment" of wartime Allied diplomacy
87
with Sweden.
In spite of its willingness to accommodate the
Allies on the transit question, the Swedish government was
reluctant to accept their economic terms. Gunther and
Hansson believed that Swedish compliance might provoke
German reprisals, such as the closure of the Gothenburg
traffic, or possibly an invasion. Sweden's economy would
be severely weakened by curtailed exports to Germany.
Germany was Sweden's principal trading partner and sole
86Warner - Arkadi Sobolev, USSR Embassy, London,
21 August 1943 letter, FO 371/37107.
87Sir Anthony Nutting, 6 June 1976, interview at
his home, London, England.
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source of coal and coke. Sweden's supply of coal and
other raw materials would be insufficient to sustain its
industries if the war continued for more than 18 months.88
The proposed war trade agreement gave Sweden nothing in
return for this sacrifice, apart from an increase oil
quota and an Allied guarantee to continue the Gothenburg
traffic. Many Swedish cabinet members believed Sweden's
immediate economic requirements were more important than
good long term relations with the Allies. Hansson thought
the "outcome of the war was not clear," 89 and that Sweden
should remain cautious towards Germany.
Hägglôf and Wallenburg eventually persuaded
Hansson that it was necessary to accommodate the Allies in
order to prevent the U.S. service departments from gaining
greater influence over American policy. 90 Washington
unwittingly added credence to the arguments by temporarily
delaying oil shipments during July. 91 Hansson unsuccess-
fully tried to satisfy the Allies by proposing that Sweden
issue a declaration of principle which would announce its
intention to curb exports, without formally committing
88Boheman, op. cit., pp. 238-41.
89Carlgren, op. cit., p. 152.
90Hägglöf, op. cit., pp. 268-71.
91Halifax - M.E.W., 29 July 1943 telegram 2424
ARFAR, FO 37l/37065/N4367.
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itself to the Allied terms. 92 However the Allies insisted
that Stockholm adhere to the text of the draft agreement
which Hggl6f signed in London. The Swedes finally con-
ceded and Bjrn Prytz, the Swedish minister in London,
concluded the agreement through an exchange of notes with
Selborne and John Winant, U.S. ambassador to Britain, on
23 September.
In addition to the terms which Hágglöf had
informally accepted in London, the agreement incorporated
some conditions which were left unresolved when he had been
recalled in June. Sweden would curb exports during the
remaining months of 1943. The United States would permit
Swedish exports to Argentina, provided that they were
limited to such items as woodpulp and newsprint.
Tripartite Joint Standing Commissions would be established
in Washington, London, and Stockholm to monitor Sweden's
compliance with the agreement, to consider ad hoc Swedish
requests for supplies, and to review proposals to modify
the agreement. Britain was unable to persuade Sweden to
stop delivery of the trawlers, since Sweden maintained
that these vessels had been ordered in 1942 and thus were
not covered under the new agreement. The trawlers were
delivered to Germany in 1944, and British intelligence
reported that the craft were being employed as coastal
93
escorts and anti-aircraft ships in Hamburg harbour.
92Mitcheson - G.H. Villiers, 10 August 1943
confidential letter, JM/MS 139/8/43, FO 837/901.
93Medlicott, op. cit., p. 470 n.
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The M.E.W., on the whole, was impressed with
Sweden's apparent willingness to comply with Allied wishes.
Spain and Portugal rejected Allied proposals that they
curtail wolf ram and other ore exports to Germany even
though this commerce had been virtually non-existent.94
Sweden, by contrast, had consented to reduce its staple
iron ore trade to quotas well below prewar levels.
Parliamentary Secretary for Economic Warfare Dingle
Foot felt Sweden deserved greater understanding from the
Allies in return for its behaviour during the summer of
1943. In a letter to Winant, he surmised that the Swedish
government must have encountered similar domestic opposi-
tion to what the British and American governments would
have expected when lowering tariffs: "It is not difficult
to imagine what your industrialists or ours would have
said if you or we had agreed to sacrifice a third of
American or British export trade for a period of some
18 months."95
Foot believed that Sweden would honour the agree-
ment, and he maintained that the Allies would be acting in
bad faith if they were to apply sanctions or threats to
obtain concessions in the future. He insisted that the
Allies should compensate Sweden for lost trade as a quid
pro quo for further export reductions. Foot thought that
94G.H. Villiers - F.K. Roberts, F.O., 2 March 1944,
FO 837/907.
95Foot - Winant, 24 May 1944, FO 837/916;
F.R.U.S., Vol. IV, 1944 (Washington: G.P.O., 1966), p. 551.
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the Allies could both undermine Germany's war effort and
foster Swedish goodwill through pre-emptive purchases of
goods normally destined for Germany. After the Swedes had
agreed to accept fewer German orders for manufactured
products, the M.E.W. purchased 1 million pounds worth of
ball bearings, and promised to buy an equivalent amount
in the future. Foot was confident that these purchases
would prevent the Germans obtaining sufficient bearings
from Sweden to alleviate shortages resulting from American
air raids on Schweinfurt and other ball bearing centres.96
Foot also believed that the Allies could reduce further
Germany's imports, without pressing Sweden for further
trade restrictions, by disrupting Germany's transport
system. Coastal Command aircraft and small naval units
had been attacking German convoys in the North Sea since
April. 97 A number of Swedish vessels under charter to
Germany for transport of ore from Narvik and coal to Sweden
had been damaged in these attacks. 98
 The Germans
preferred to route most of this trade through Rotterdam,
which had better rail connections with the Ruhr mills and
Saar coalfields than did Bremen or Emden. However by late
August, Swedish shipowners refused to allow their ships to
96 Foot, 28 October 1943 minute, FO 371/37107/
N6490. See also Chapter Five.
97 s. Roskill, The War at Sea 1939-1945, Vol. Ill,
Part I, (London: H.M.S.O., 1960), p. 91.
98 Fourteen Swedish ships had been lost in the
Baltic and North Seas between January and July 1943, U.S.
Office of Naval Intelligence, 10 August 1943, Report:
Swedish Shipping Summary July 1943, OP-16-FT, S9-43,
FO 115/3946.
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sail for Rotterdam. The Germans were obliged to divert
the ore traffic to Emden and Bremen, whose port and rail
facilities, the M.E.W. believed, were "stretched to the
limit" by added German shipping activities resulting from
the cancellation of Swedish transports and by the devastat-
ing British air raid on Hamburg. 99 Swedish ships were
forced to wait nearly two weeks to discharge their cargoes,
which accumulated at these ports due to insufficient rail
transport to the Ruhr. Moreover, the raid on Hamburg
prompted some Swedish shipowners to withdraw their vessels
from the German trade entirely.
The Foreign Office took a more jaundiced view of
Sweden's behaviour than did Foot, since the Swedes had
refused to stop the trawler sale to Germany. The Northern
Department was especially annoyed when Foot made only a
mild protest to the Swedish legation about Sweden's
supplying of equipment to repair the Knaben molybdenum
mines in Norway which had been heavily bombed by the R.A.F.
Nutting minuted acidly, "nothing will shake Mr. Foot in his
belief that the action of the Swedes in signing the recent
economic agreement with us and the Americans has wiped the
Swedish slate clean and he has put them up top among the
neutrals for affording such enormous assistance to the
99M.E.W., Intelligence Weekly, Secret report 83,
16 September 1943; M.E.W., Intelligence Weekly, Secret
report 82, 9 September 1943; M.E.W., Intelligence Weekly,
Secret report 79, 19 August 1943, FO 935/77.
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Allies' Sl00
However, the Foreign Office continued to accept
Foot's advice in adopting policy towards Sweden since most
of its members were largely uninterested in economic ques-
tions. Moreover, it was pleased with many political
measures which Stockholm had taken during the second half
of 1943. The Swedes resumed relations with the Royal
Norwegian government. They agreed to equip and train
9,500 Norwegian and 3,000 Danish refugees in Sweden as a
paramilitary'police force' which would return to their
homelands to restore order following a German collapse.101
Stockholm intervened unsuccessfully with Nazi authorities
to prevent the deportation of 500 Danish Jews and incarcera-
tion of 1,200 dissident Norwegian students and teachers.
During October, the Swedish Red Cross arranged a Prisoner-
of-War exchange between Britain and Germany at Gothenburg
in which more than 4,000 British and Canadian P.O.W.'s
were repatriated aboard the Swedish liner, Drottinholm
and Canadian Pacific's Empress of Russia.'02
Although London had few complaints about Swedish
policy during the Autumn of 1943, some British officials
observed that the U.S. service departments remained critical
100Nutting, 4 November 1943 minute, FO 371/37107/
N6 490.
101Carlgren, op. cit., pp. 158-161.
102G. Young, Outposts of Peace (London: The Right
Book Club, 1945), p. 122; R. Turner, The Pacific Empresses
(Victoria, B.C.: Sono Nis Press, 1981), pp. 237-8.
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of Sweden and continued to insist that the Allies press
for additional concessions from Sweden. In November, the
Americans proposed that all future Swedish requests for
ad hoc supply consignments be addressed to the Washington
rather than London Joint Standing Commission. John
Mitcheson, the British commercial counsellor in Stockholm,
advised the M.E.W. to refuse this proposal because the
Americans would be enabled to decide unilaterally supply
questions before the British had a chance to act. However,
the Ministry ignored Mitcheson's warning and accepted the
American proposal because they thought that Washington
would probably forward the agenda and minutes of the J.S.C.
meeting to London, and it was "unlikely that any decision
would be made without British agreement." 103
 By assenting
to this seemingly innocuous proposal, Britain enabled
Patterson to gain the initiative over the British, and his
opponents in Washington, in determining Allied policy.
During 1944, he would demonstrate that he had no qualms
against unilateral action, and used this latent threat to
compel the State Department and London to endorse his
plans for the elimination of Swedish-German trade.
Shortly after the War Trade Agreement had been
concluded, Washington began to question Sweden's willing-
ness to curtail exports to Germany. Marcus Wallenburg had
already informed Mitcheson in August that Sweden would
103L.H. Collins, M.E.W. to Sir 0. Mahon, Board of
Trade, 9 December 1943, FO 837/903.
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have considerable difficulty in withholding exports to
Germany because most exports were contracted for under
existing agreements with Berlin. 104 In addition, German
coal deliveries increased during the summer as an induce-
ment for correspondingly larger ore exports. Swedish ore
shipments between May and August 1943 averaged 1.1 million
tons a month, the highest volume of the war)° 5 Mitcheson
assumed that the Swedes were taking advantage of the hiatus
before ratifying the Agreement to enlarge their coal
reserves in the event that Sweden's imports were cut off
for the duration of the war. 106 Between October and
December, the Allies regularly pressed Stockholm to ensure
that ore exports did not exceed the 9.9 million ton ceiling
established under the 1939 Agreement. Boheman repeatedly
assured Mallet and Johnson that 'administrative measures',
such as the conscription of port and railway workers,
would restrict exports during the last months of 1943.
Shipments to Germany did drop from 1.3 million tons in
September to 593,737 tons in December, 107 but total ore
exports for 1943 reached the wartime annual record of
10,241,737 tons. The Americans suspected that Stockholm
had misled the Allies deliberately. The State Department
104Mitcheson to Villiers, 10 August 1943 letter
JM/MS 139/8/43, FO 837/901.
' 05Enemy Branch, M.E.W., 28 July 1944, Notes on
Economic Intelligence. FO 935/942.
106Mitcheson - M.E.W., 17 December 1943 despatch
CC1754. FO 371/43450/N8035.
107Mitcheson - M.E.W., 18 December 1943 despatch
CC1756, FO 837/903.
113
instigated an Anglo-American aide-mmoire, demanding that
Sweden deduct 1943's excess 357,000 tons from 1944's quota,
and that exports during the first six months be limited to
400,000 tons per quarter. The Swedes refused to impose
further trade restrictions. Furthermore, they insisted
that "trade with Germany" included exports to Hungary,
France, the Low Countries, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
Under these criteria, Sweden's exports to Germany alone
amounted to 498,373 tons below "normal trade" levels.'08
After some argument with Mallet, Bohernan revised the defini-
tion of 'Germany' to include only the Reich, Czechoslovakia,
Poland ? and Danzig. He conceded that Sweden had exceeded
'normal trade' by 86,000 tons.
London was affronted by the Swedish excuse. Ten
million tons had always been understood to be the ceiling
for iron ore exports during Anglo-Swedish talks in previous
years. 109 As a matter of principle, the Foreign Office
and M.E.W. wanted Stockholm to admit that Sweden had
exceeded this ceiling. However, the M.E.W. did not believe
that the Swedes had acted in bad faith, or would
deliberately attempt to contravene the tripartite agreement
in the future. Publicly, both departments maintained that
they were not disturbed by Sweden's behaviour. Dingle Foot
informed the House of Commons on 25 January 1944 that
Vol. IV., 1944, pp. 462-5.
Milne, M.E.W., 14 January 1944 minute,
FO 837/907.
114
Sweden's commercial policy "is in our point of view very
satisfactory," 11 ° after the Express and Conservative M.P.,
Sir Archibald Southeby, alleged that Sweden flagrantly
violated the War Trade Agreement. Between November 1943
and January 1944, the Swedes had been negotiating a new
trade treaty with Berlin. The Germans initially attempted
to use pressure, such as closing the Gothenburg traffic
between 29 October and January, to force the Swedes to
renege on their agreement with the Allies. When harsh
tactics failed to induce the Swedes to grant additional
credits for 1944, Berlin made generous offers of coal and
military equipment. The Swedes refused to violate their
agreement with the Allies, since Germany's declining
military fortunes and developing commodity shortages gave
a hollow ring to their threats and promises. By the time
a new Swedish-German agreement was reached in January,
the Germans settled for 7.5 million tons of iron ore and
were grateful for any supply assurances from Sweden.111
The M.E.W. believed that the outcome of these negotiations,
rather than the 1943 export surplus was the true reflection
of Sweden's attitude towards the Allies. Most officials
assumed that the Swedes had either made a last minute bid
110Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 27 January 1944,
15th series, Vol. 396, pp. 525-6.
111Martin Fritz, German Steel and Swedish Iron Ore,
(Gothenburg: Institute of Economic History, 1974), p. 122.
Sven-Olof Olsson, German Coal and Swedish Fuel (Gothenburg
Institute of Econoiiiic History, 1975), p. 175. Hägglöf,
op. cit., pp. 268-75.
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to stockpile German coal before the 1944 restrictions came
into force, or that the 'administrative measures' had not
been fully effective. G.H. Villiers, head of the neutral
trade section of the M.E.W., summed up, "It seems difficult
to credit the Swedes, who assuredly are not stupid, with
such crass stupidity as to risk losing their oil and other
basic rations, and incurring the wrath of the victorious
Allies. ff112
However, American officials remained indignant
over both the trade surplus and the Swedish reaction to
the Allied notes. The War and Navy Departments insisted
upon an oil embargo. 113 The Foreign Office "greatly
deplored this new attack by the U.S. service departments"
whose "cure" was teworse than the disease." 114 Although
London agreed that there was "some cause for dissatisfac-
tion", it did not wish to stop Sweden's oil imports, which
were about to resume with the reopening of the Gothenburg
traffic in mid-January. The Air Ministry was anxious to
replenish Sweden's fuel stocks because B.O.A.C. was carry-
ing increasingly larger volumes of ball bearings and
passengers from Stockholm to Britain.
112Villiers, 25 February 1944 minute, FO 837/907.
113 Stimson (Secretary of War) - Perkins (Administra-
tor, Foreign Economic Administration), 24 January 1944
letter, R.G. 165, OPD EXPORT (1-28-44).
114M.E.W. - Halifax, 19 January 1944 telegram 140
ARFAR, FO 837/908.
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The State Department attempted to reconcile the
British and the u.s. service departments by pressing the
Foreign Office to issue an Anglo-American aide-mmoire
demanding Sweden's public apology and unequivocal explana-
tion of its behaviour, as well as definite assurances that
exports between January and July would not exceed 2,000,000
tons) 5 Neither the British government nor Johnson
believed that the proposed note should be issued. They
argued that Sweden was under extreme duress from Germany
and in no position to make a public gesture or cut exports
to an extremely low figure. The Foreign Office agreed to
deliver the note, but delayed its issue from late January
until 17 March while making ostensible technical refine-
ments to the text.
London grew even less interested in pressing
Stockholm on the question of iron ore exports after Mark
Turner, an economic intelligence specialist in the M.E.W.,
submitted a paper arguing that Swedish ore deliveries
would be only marginally valuable to the German war effort
during 1944:116 The German steel industry lacked
sufficient manganese to oxidise the molten ores, as a
consequence of the Red Army's reconquest of the Nickopol
mines in the Ukraine on 8 February 1944. Without adequate
manganese, German steel production would decline from 1943's
Vol. IV, 1944, pp. 467-9.
116Turner, The Significance to the Enemy of
Swedish Iron Ore, 1 March 1944, FO 837/907.
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output of 35 million tons to 20-27 million tons during
1944.117 As Swedish ores contributed towards approxi-
mately 10% of annual German steel output, Turner estimated
that the Germans could achieve maximum output even if
forced to rely only upon ores from Lorraine and Luxembourg.
Moreover, these ores would be easier to haul to the Ruhr
than imports from Sweden which were accumulating at north
German ports due to transport bottlenecks and labour
shortages. He acknowledged that Germany imported about
1 million tons of low-phosphorus ores, which required less
refining than the high-phosphorus ores from Lorraine.
However, Turner maintained that the loss of Swedish imports
would be "more of an inconvenience than a disaster,"118
since the manganese shortage, and the bottlenecks in the
northern ports, had created surplus blast furnace capacity
which could be used to process larger quantities of low-
grade ores.
Many technical experts in the Neutral Trade and
Enemy branches of the M.E.W. did not share Turner's views.
Derrick Wood contended that Speer's reorganization of
Germany's industries could enable the Germans to conserve
their manganese stocks for nearly two years through careful
factory procedure, and by substituting other metals as
117However, Reichsminister Albert Speer estimated
that it would be possible for Germany to conserve existing
manganese stocks for 18 months. A. Speer, Inside the Third
Reich (New York: Avon Books, 1971), p. 410.
118Turner, op. cit.
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alloys. Wood also observed that the Germans had deverted
additional shipping to speed up iron ore deliveries in
late 1943 . 119 Other officials argued that if Berlin did
not value Swedish iron ore, it could re-employ the thou-
sands of workers who were currently engaged in mining the
Silesian coalfields and transporting the coal which was
Germany's quid pro quo for the Swedish ore. Although the
Germans would probably have experienced difficulty in
meeting their own coal requirements during 1944, they
offered to increase Sweden's coal quota if Stockholm would
disregard the War Trade Agreement. Moreover, Swedish iron
ore was preferred over Lorraine ores because it required
less coal and coke to smelt.'2°
Foot and Villiers paid scant attention to these
arguments. Villiers endorsed Turner's paper almost as
soon as he received it. The paper shaped the M.E.W.'s
attitude towards Swedish-German ore trade for the remainder
of the war. Villiers informed the Foreign Office on 2 March,
"our experts tell me that for the next twelve months
Germany's steel production would not be affected in quantity
or quality if no iron were received from Sweden at all."121
119Wood, 25 January 1944, Germany's 1943 Swedish
Ore Shipment Programme, FO 837/907.
120E. Radice, 26 January 1944 minute; G. Garstang,
5 February 1944 minute, FO 837/907.
121Villiers - F.K. Roberts (F.O.), 2 March 1944
letter, FO 837/907.
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J.E. Galsworthy, of the Foreign Office, minuted that the
M.E.W. was "no longer interested in iron ore...only keeping
up with the Americans for the sake of the united front...
certainly seems to be academic now." 22 Villiers believed
Turner's conclusions might persuade the Americans to adopt
a less bellicose attitude towards Sweden. He minuted on
3 March, "The implications of this paper are obvious,"
and despatched several copies to the British Embassy in
Washington with instructions to "see that it falls under
the right eyes" in the U.S. government)23
Turner's paper, however, failed to produce the
reaction which Villiers expected from American officials,
who continued to maintain that Swedish exports could still
materially prolong the war. At Washington's insistence,
Mallet and Johnson delivered the aide-mmoire to Ginther on
17 March. Gunther replied, on 6 April, that Sweden had
observed the tripartite agreement "on all essential points",
and asserted that the volume of exports might have been
higher in late 1943 if the 'administrative measures' had
not been taken.'24
London hoped that the negative response to the
aide-mmoire would dissuade the Americans from mounting
122Galsworthy, 13 March 1944 minute, FO 371/43450/
N1709.
123Villiers, 3 March 1944 minute, FO 837/907.
124 F.R.U.S., Vol. Iv, 1944, pp. 491-2; Cordell
Hull, Memoirs, Vol. II (London: fodder & Stoughton, 1948),
p. 1347.
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further pressure over what had become an unimportant
issue. The State Department, having taken account of the
British opinions and Johnson's reservations about the note,
did not initiate any new protests over 1943's exports. Hover
Patterson responded unilaterally by impounding 4,000 tons
of 'Navy Special' aviation fuel which were being loaded on
a Swedish tanker in the Caribbean. 125 The Air Ministry and
the R.A.F. delegation in Washington were surprised by this
sudden action. The Washington J.S.C. had received a
Swedish request for this special oil shipment in February
without informing the British. Consequently, London had
been unable to prepare a brief in support of the Swedish
request. The Air Ministry feared that the sanction threat-
ened B.O.A.C. service to Sweden. Patterson responded to
initial British representations by asserting that the
American air forces were experiencing a serious fuel
shortage. However, the R.A.F. delegation discovered that
current production of 'Navy Special' at Tampico, Mexico
would exceed military demand and storage capacity for the
following three months. Air Marshal Sir William Welsh
confronted Patterson with this evidence, and Patterson
reluctantly admitted that he had ordered the oil embargo
to punish Sweden for its misdeeds) 26 British representa-
125Patterson - U.S. Munitions Assignment Board,
5 April 1944 memorandum, FO 115/4028.
126Air Marshal Sir William Welsh - Air Ministry,
19 April 1944 telegram MARCUS 3067, FO 115/4028; J. Dent
(British Embassy) - Air Commodore Lyford (R.A.F. Delegation),
FO 115/4028.
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tions to the State Department and other authorities corn-
pelled Patterson to rescind his order on 18 April, and
the oil was finally shipped to Sweden in early May.
The brief oil embargo did not create any serious
repercussions in Allied-Swedish relations. However, it
underlined Patterson's power to determine Allied policy
towards Sweden. The M.E.W. would continue to fear that
future British dealings with Sweden would be complicated
by similar unilateral actions.
SUMMARY
This Chapter has examined how British policy
towards Sweden evolved out of a 'holding action' to contain
German influence into a campaign to reduce Sweden's
assistance to Germany. In 1942, London intended to exploit
Sweden's desire for western imports as a means of goading
Sweden to resist German pressure. The British only sought
to obtain a Swedish agreement not to increase the volume
of German military transits above current levels, and to
give clearance to the Dicto and Lionel. U.S. control over
supplies obliged London to support American proposals to
reduce drastically Swedish exports to Germany. By autumn
1943, most of Britain's long-standing differences with
Sweden had been resolved, and British officials became
more 'understanding' towards the Swedes. Although the
British would seek further curtailment of such critical
elements of Swedish-German trade as ball bearings in 1944,
they were willing to allow a substantial proportion of this
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trade. The American service departments, on the other hand,
believed that this trade was prolonging the war, and that
its continuance symbolized Sweden's mercenary attitude
towards the war. By late 1944, Washington imposed an
embargo on Sweden to force the cessation of what remained
of this trade. Britain formally protested this action
and refused to support further sanctions against Sweden.
The climax and conclusion of the Allies' campaign
against Swedish-German trade during 1944 will be dealt with
in Chapter Five. It is now necessary to examine what
issues outside the realm of economic warfare figured in
Anglo-Swedish relations between 1941 and 1944 and establish
their significance to Britain's overall policy towards
Sweden. Chapter Three will determine to what extent
military strategy influenced London's attitude towards
Sweden. Chapter Four will consider Sweden's place in
British plans for the postwar order.
CHAPTER THREE
GRAND STRATEGY, SPITFIRES, DECEPTIONS
AND SWEDEN
194 1-1944
British officials' attention and energies were
devoted increasingly to economic warfare when dealing
with Sweden during 1943 and 1944. However unlike many of
their American counterparts, they were not concerned
exclusively with Swedish exports to Germany. Prior to the
United States' entry into the war, much of Britain's
policy towards Sweden had been directed towards enhancing
British influence in Sweden and to developing a closer
liaison between the British and Swedish armed services.
This political/military dimension remained in Anglo-Swedish
relations after the Western Allies' joint policy towards
Sweden became dominated by a single issue.
SWEDEN IN BRITISH STRATEGY 1941-43
The possibility of bringing Sweden into the war
was raised first in 1941, in connexion with proposals to
liberate northern Norway. The Chiefs of Staff believed
that an invasion of Norway was not feasible without Swedish
assistance. Norway's mountainous coastline, extreme
climate, sinuous fjords, and rough offshore seas deprived
Pt*cEj
the British of suitable landing beaches while
the German garrisons. To retake Norway, the British
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invasion force would have to be large, highly specialized,
and well supported by naval and air covering forces.
Swedish intervention would diminish these obstacles. The
Swedish Army could enable British troops to disembark in
Norway with relative safety by capturing ports such as
Trondheim prior to an Allied invasion.' Without Swedish
help, the Allies would have to conduct difficult and
costly landings on the Norwegian coast, and trek over-
land to reach major centres or expose their ships to air
attack while navigating the fjords. However, the C.O.S.
and Foreign Office treated the question of possible
Swedish collaboration as hypothetical. As the Swedes had
failed in intervene in Finland or Norway in 1940, it
seemed unlikely that they would act against the Germans
unless attacked by Germany.
In spite of their reservations, the Chiefs
were obliged to reconsider renewing hostilities in Norway
during the autumn of 1941. On 18 July, Stalin urged
Churchill to open a second front in France or Norway to
divert German attention from the Russian front. 2 Churchill
replied two days later that Britain lacked sufficient
troops or landing craft to invade either country, but
addedthat the Royal Navy planned a number of raids along
1J.H.A. Gwyer, Grand Strategy, Vol. III (Part I)
(London: H.M.S.O., 1964), p. 204.
Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. III:
The Grand Alliance (New York: Houghton Miff un, 1950,
Bantam, 1962), pp. 324-5.
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the Norwegian coast during the autumn. The Prime Minister
subsequently reconsidered and concluded that an operation
in northern Norway was feasible and could benefit the
Allies profoundly if prosecuted successfully. In his
memoirs, he maintained that "the Germans had got these
vital points by the North Cape very cheaply. They might
also be regained at a small cost compared with the scale
which the war had now attained." 3 An invasion of
northern Norway was a preferable alternative to a costly
frontal assault in France because the Norwegian mountains
would hinder the reinforcement of German garrisons before
Allied troops captured key positions. Furthermore,
Allied occupation of the North Cape would secure the
Arctic convoys from air and submarine attacks. He also
asserted that "we could begin to roll the map of Hitler's
Europe down from the top."4
When German forces appeared to be advancing on
Murmansk in August 1941, Churchill pressed the Chiefs to
despatch a force of four divisions to northern Norway during
January or February 1942. He maintained that winter
darkness and poor weather would prevent the Germans from
exploiting their air superiority in Norway. The C.O.S.
responded that the winter conditons would hinder the
British invaders far more than the German defenders.
3w.s. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. IV:
The Hinge of Fate (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1950,
Bantam, 1962), p. 282.
4 lbid., p. 304.
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Winter storms prevented landings on the Norwegian coast.
British carrier aircraft, which would have to support
landing forces, were numerically and operationally inferior
to the Luftwaffe's fighters in Norway which were equipped
for winter flying. Moreover, only three brigades and one
mountain regiment could be spared from other more urgent
duties. These units would not be up to their established
5
strength until the spring of 1942.
Boheman's unofficial approach for British
military assistance in October 19416 prompted the C.O.S.
to reconsider their conclusions about a Norwegian campaign.
They were aware that the Swedish General Staff had
developed contingency plans for occupying Trondheim to
establish a supply route to the West if the Germans
attacked Sweden. The Chiefs briefly contemplated an
operation in which two Swedish divisions would advance on
Trondheim in a pincer movement to block German reinforce-
ments from northern and southern Norway. Two British
brigade groups would land on the Norwegian coast and join
the northern Swedish division. The combined Anglo-Swedish
force would capture Trondheim and prepare the port to
receive troops and materiel. 7 However, the vagueness of
Boheman's subsequent talks with Mallet and his refusal
5Gwyer, op. cit., p. 204.
6 Chapter One.
7 lbid., p. 205.
127
to divulge details of Sweden's staff plans presented no
opening for more substantial discussions between Swedish
and British officials. Furthermore, he had acted without
the knowledge of the Swedish Cabinet, many of whom
staunchly opposed close liaison with London for fear of
provoking Germany. Without prior staff discussions,
London could not coordinate preparations with Stockholm
until the Germans had invaded Sweden and reinforced their
positions in Norway to prevent the British from supporting
the Swedes. 8
 Churchill continued to maintain that "the
attitude of Sweden would be powerfully affected" by a
British landing in Norway but conceded that Britain lacked
sufficient resources to mount such an operation. 9
 He
would lobby for a Norwegian campaign when the American
service chiefs were contemplating an invasion of France in
1942. These proposals received little serious attention
from the British Chiefs, and Churchill relented after the
Americans agreed to landings in French North Africa as an
alternative to an early second front.
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE SWEDISH AIR FORCE 1941-4 3
Although London did not expect Sweden to intervene
voluntarily in the war, the Foreign Office encouraged
closer contacts between the British and Swedish services.
____ p. 206.
9Churchill, Vol. III. op. cit., p. 392.
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Recurrent Swedish anxieties over possible German reprisals
were a major impediment to Allied policy towards Sweden.
Nutting and other officials were exasperated by the
Swedish government's tendency to "create the atmosphere of
impending crisis which the Swedes love to do given the
slightest opportunity." 10
 London furnished supplies to
bolster Swedish confidence in their defences. During
1943 and 1944, the Foreign Office endeavoured to goad the
Swedes into admitting that a German invasion was highly
improbable and that their defences were adequate."
Shortly after Allied pressure had overcome Stockholm's
reluctance to allow the Dicto and Lionel to leave
Gothenburg in early 1943, the Ministry of Information
introduced a propaganda programme to convince the Swedes
that they could resist a German invasion.' 2
 The M.O.I.
10A. Nutting, 20 January 1943 minute, FO 371/37072/
N4l5.
111n June 1942, the British military attache in
Stockholm concluded that Sweden could be conquered in two
weeks, but only if the Germans deployed more than 12
divisions, heavily supported by air forces, which was
unlikely as long as the U.S.S.R. remained in the war.
Sweden's 650,000 man army and 85,000 man militia and Home
Guard formations could continue guerilla resistance
indefinitely.
Cal. Sutton-Pratt to War Office, enclosed Mallet - F.O.,
2 June 1942 telegram 408, CAB 120/694.
By late 1943, the Chiefs of Staff concluded
that the Germans would have to divert 20-30 divisions
from other fronts in order to overrun Sweden rapidly.
Brigadier L.C. Hollis, Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee
to C.F.A. Warner, 19 September 1943 minute, FO 371/37098/
N254.
12Ministry of Information, Paper No. 120, Overseas
Planning Committee: Plan of Propaganda to Sweden,
25 February 1943, FO 371/37075/NllO9.
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directed radio and printed media to congratulate the
Swedes for rearming, to praise the quality of Swedish
weapons such as the Bofors gun, and to make flattering
references to the military skills of Swedes "past and
present:' British officials were advised to inject
similar comments into formal and unofficial conversations
with Swedes. It also proposed a scheme to exchange army,
navy, and air force training films with the Swedes to
stimulate correspondence between the British and Swedish
services.
The British legation enjoyed cordial relations with
the Swedish Air Force. Unlike its sister services, the
Swedish Air Force was openly sympathetic to the Allies.
This was largely because of the attitudes of Generals
Friis and 
Nordtnski6ld, who were responsible for its
reorganization and expansion in the late 1930's and early
1940's. Nordnskiold, who succeeded Friis as Commander-
A
in-Chief in 1943, admired the Royal Air Force and modelled
the Swedish Air Force's training and discipline after it)3
Nordinskiöld's outlook ingratiated him with the British
legation, who enthusiastically sought to accommodate
his requests for more information about the R.A.F.'s
organization and procedures. Mallet described Nordt€nski31d
as "a man of the highest character and a burning sense of
13Group Captain R.S. Maycock, 13 September 1943
memorandum enclosed in Mallet to Eden, despatch 522,
19 October 1943, FO 371/37072/N6120.
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right and wrong...he remained our best friend in the
Swedish armed services throughout the war."'4
The Air Force was the weakest Swedish service.
It was formed from the Army's and Navy's air arms
in 1926, but the Swedish government's commitment to the
League of Nations and disarmament forced it to remain a
small force of four squadrons equipped with obsolete air-
craft such as the Nieuport 23. The Swedish government
took tentative steps to expand the Air Force, along with
the other services, when war became more imminent in the
late 1930's. Sweden had a small aircraft industry: the
Swedish Air Board's workshops at Bronuna airport, near
Stockholm, and a private firm, Svenska Aeroplan
Aktiebolaget (SAAB), which was founded in 1936. Because of
small productive capacity and limited experience, Sweden's
aircraft factories produced foreign aircraft under
licence, such as the Junkers JtJ-86 bomber and the Northrop
8A-1 reconnaissance bomber.' 5
 They would also manufacture
Swedish designed dive bombers, such as the SAAB-17, and the
J-21 and J-22 fighters by the middle of the war. Most of
these aircraft were designed before the war and were
powered by heavy and slow engines patterned after obsole-
scent American models. In 1939, the Swedish Air Force
' 4 Sir Victor Mallet, unpublished manuscript,
Churchill College Library, Cambridge, pp. 115-6.
15Paul A. Thornpson,''lygvapnet is Fifty: The
Swedish Air Force in its Jubilee Year Surveyed," Air
Pictorial, August 1976, Vol. 38, No. 8, p. 229.
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consisted of 12 squadrons equipped with 140 aircraft of
which only 50 bombers and 30 fighters were suitable for
combat. 16 Stockholm sought to overcome this deficiency by
acquiring 55 Gloster Gladiator bi-plane fighters from
Britain in early 1940, and 150 Caprioni bombers and Fiat
fighters from Italy in 1941.17
The British Air Staff was aware of the Swedish Air
Force's difficulties and disposition towards the Allies
when it received two emissaries with a secret message from
Nordnski5ld in November 1941. Besides enumerating the Air
Force's shortages in aircraft, parts, and fuel, Nord*nskiöld
offered to furnish aerodromes to the R.A.F. in the event of
a German invasion of Sweden, and asked how many squadrons
could be despatched. 18 During their meeting with Air
Vice Marshal Dickson, the Air Staff's director of plans,
Colonels Häggl5f and Ljungdahl also proposed that Swedish
pilots could receive training in Britain. They stressed
that Nordnski6ld was anxious to obtain a concrete British
assurance of support or an offer to sell fighter aircraft
to Sweden so that he could persuade Edvin Sköld, Sweden's
16Bôrje Furtenbach, "Sweden during the Second
World War: Armament and Preparedness," Revue Internationale
d'Histoire Militaire,pp. 74-93, 1967, No. 26 (Vol. VII),
pp. 75-81.
17ulf Olsson, The Creation of a Modern Arms
Industry 1939-1974 (Gothenburg: Institute of Economic
History, Gothenburg University, 1977), pp. 51-52.
Ministry of Economic Warfare, Summary of Economic
Developments No. 119, 29 December 1941, FO 935/75/L./612.
18Air Commodore Dickson, record of interview with
Colonels Hägglôf and Ljungdahl, 1 November 1941,
FO 371/29700/N6286.
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Defence minister, to agree to hold discussions between the
British and Swedish air staffs. They also implored Dickson
to be discreet about Nordnski6ld's offer, since the
Defence Ministry and the Army and Navy had to endorse his
request for materiel but were unaware of his offer of
aerodromes. 19
Air Chief Marshal Portal and the other Chiefs of
Staff were willing to encourage Nordinski6ld: "The small
countries have usually refused any military collaboration
with us and then when they are threatened their cry for
help comes too late...Moreover we might obtain considerable
benefits from secret discussions with Sweden." 2 ° The air
staff was in favour of training Swedish pilots, increasing
Sweden's oil ration, and persuading the U.S. Government to
release a number of Vultee fighters that Sweden had
purchased in 1940 but had been impounded by Presidential
order after the fall of Norway. 21
 The Foreign Office was
less sanguine about the Swedish approach than was the Air
Staff. Warner intimated that the Swedish government might
have dispatched the Colonels to London to cultivate British
sympathy prior to trade negotiations between Marcus
Wallenburg and the M.E.W. which were about to begin during
19Ibid.
Hollis to Cadogan, 4 November 1941 letter,
FO 37l/29700/N6286.
iiollis - Churchill, 16 November 1941 minute 133,
CAB 120/694.
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the following month. 22 Cadogan advised the Chiefs of Staff
to be cautious and avoid making commitments to the Swedish
Colonels since Nordinskiold's offer lacked official4
support and probably did not reflect the outlook of the
€
Swedish government or of Nordinsk&ôld's military and naval
colleagues. It was unlikely that Stockholm would agree to
staff talks since "the present government...from its
behaviour in the matter of the Norwegian ships and opera-
tion Performance seems to be insidiously heading for
appeasement." 23
 Moreover, staff discussions which
excluded the Swedish Army and Navy would be of little
value. The Air Force was weak, and the Army would be the
only Swedish service to play an important role in Norway.
However, Eden believed that "the Swedes shouldn't be turned
down flat," but should be told that assistance would be
conditional upon "what Sweden can do for Britain."24
Cadogan therefore suggested that the Chiefs attempt to
sustain Nordinski6ld's interest by offering to intercede
in Washington on the Swedish Air Force's behalf, and to
tell the Colonels that London would expedite shipments of
oil, rubber, and other 'strategic' materials.
Nor4nskild did not pursue this initial approach
with subsequent contacts with London after Hgg1öf and
22Warner, 3 November 1941 minute, FO 371/31083/
N6286.
23Cadogan - Hollis, 12 November 1941 letter,
FO 371/29700/N6286.
24Eden, 8 November 1941 minute, FO 371/29700/N6572.
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Ljungdahl returned to Sweden. It appears that the British
government did not consider collaboration between the
British and Swedish air forces seriously until the
question was revived in the spring of 1943. British and
U.S. service attachs periodically attempted to persuade
Swedish officers to divulge details of Sweden's staff
plans. Some junior officers occasionally gave the attachs
elaborate descriptions of Sweden's shortages of modern
aircraft. A Swedish naval staff officer told Commander
W.L. Heiberg, U.S.N., in early February 1942, that Sweden
would require 500 fighters and 500 bom'3ers in the event of
a German invasion. 25 He admitted that the figure was
exaggerated but contended that half that number would be
inadequate. Hershell Johnson concluded that the Swedish
figures were "meaningless without some information as to the
practical use the Swedes would make of them.. .and other
information which is now held in secrecy by the Swedes and
which could only be obtained from them."26
Nord!nskic1d revived his earlier approach to the
British in earnest by offering the R.A.F. Swedish
facilities in the spring of 1943. On 8 April, Air Vice
Marshal Charles Medhurst, the Assistant Chief of Air Staff
(Plans) interviewed Major Cervell, the newly appointed
Swedish air attache to Britain, and Nordenskiöld's emissary.
25Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942,
Vol. III, pp. 331-2.
26 Ibid., pp. 344-5.
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Cervell first stressed that his conversation with Medhurst
was not intended to initiate formal discussions between the
British and Swedish staffs, but rather would lead instead
to personal discussions between the British Air Staff and
Nordenskiöld, who had become Commander-in-Chief designate
of the Swedish Air Force. The air attache stated that his
superior hoped that Britain might provide fifteen fighter
squadrons at the outbreak of hostilities between Germany
and Sweden, and possibly some bomber squadrons at a later
date. Cervell had instructions to disclose Sweden's air
defence plans, all details pertaining to the Swedish Air
Force's secret air bases, and mobilization procedures,
provided the British were prepared to consider seriously a
plan of assistance to Sweden.27
Medhurst had been instructed by the Foreign Office
to interview Major Cervell to merely ascertain the content
of Nordenskiöld's message. The Air Ministry, however,
was in favour of making further contacts with the Swedish
Air Force. Medhurst informed the Foreign Office that "our
feeling in the Air Ministry is that there would be little
harm in developing conversations without committing us
definitely in any way...to assist Sweden if she were
attacked by Germany." 28 For the purpose of negotiating
with the Swedes, Medhurst believed that the British should
prepare a rough plan for despatching aircraft to Sweden.
27Air Vice Marshal C.E.H. Medhurst to Warner,
10 April 1943 letter, FO 371/37098/N2179.
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He stated that there would be a large number of American
fighters based in Britain when the United States' Eighth
Air Force was brought up to strength by autumn 1943, and
suggested that some of these could be diverted to Sweden.
Medhurst felt that it was unnecessary to include the
Americans in the discussions with the Swedes as
...the assumptions we could make would be on
the basis of a given number of squadrons of
unspecified nationality to fit into Sweden's
general plan of defence. Once we have
reached agreement on some such outline plan,
we might then consider discussing with
General Andrews [U.S. Army Air Corps] what
arrangements, if any, he might be prepared
to make to assist Sweden.29
The Foreign Office was sceptical of the intentions
behind Nordenskild's message. Warner observed that the
timing of Nordenskiöld's current approach was "curiously
similar" to the one of November 1941 in that his first
message was issued on the eve of Anglo-Swedish import quota
negotiations, and the latter just before the British and
United States governments were about to enter negotiations
for a new war trade agreement with Sweden. 3 ° William
Cavendish-Bentinck, political advisor to the Foreign
Office suspected that the Swedes were attempting to "curry
favour with us" so that the Chiefs of Staff would support
Swedish requests for generous import quotas:
29Ibid. W. Cavendish-Eentinck minuted on 14 April
1943 that "we shall end by having more fighter aircraft in
this country than we shall know what to do with."
FO 371/37098/N2179.
30Warner, 12 April 1943 minute, FO 371/37098/N2179.
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I have a feeling that Major Cervell is
on a fishing expedition rather like the
Swedish Director of Combined Intelligence,
Commodore Landquist, who recently visited
this country, and that, whilst we may get
a little information out of the Swedes
regarding their plans for defense, secret
aerodromes, etc., they will not go any
further. 31
The Foreign Office did not believe there was any real
prospect of Germany attacking Sweden except in the event
of an Allied invasion of Norway. Cavendish-Bentinck
doubted if Germany even possessed the resources to attack
Sweden in the latter eventuality. However, Warner also
conceded that the Swedes were gradually becoming more
resistant to Germany's economic and political demands,
and less prone to "always interpret their neutral obliga-
tions in favour of the Germans and to our detrement."32
Tentative conversations with Swedish Air Force officials
might help to cultivate better relations with Stockholm
and could conceivably lead to some sort of liaison with
the Swedish armed services.
The Foreign Office therefore approved of continued
discussions between Medhurst and Cervell on a strictly
personal and informal basis. Medhurst was advised not to
31Cavendish-Bentinck minute, op. cit. Commodore
Landquist had a congenial discussion with members of the
Admiralty during his visit to London in February 1943, but
he had not disclosed any information of strategic
importance.
32Warner, 12 April 1943 minute, op. cit.
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disclose any substantial information to the Swedish officer,
as it could possibly be leaked to Germany, even though
London had received favourable accounts of General
Nordenskiöld. 33 The Foreign Office instructed Medhurst to
inform Cervell that the British were willing to enter into
detailed discussions with the Swedes if they turned over
their general plan of strategy and not just the Air Force's
plans. Warner told Medhurst that
it would be interesting to get confirmation
to our conjecture that the reason for the
nature of this approach is that the Swedish
government and the Swedish military and naval
staffs would still not be ready for staff
conversations with us.34
The Foreign Office also believed that the Americans and
Russians should not be informed, at least during the
initial stages of any discussions which might take place
between the Air Staff and the Swedes, as both parties
would probably seek representation in the talks which
would "frighten the Swedes off altogether."35
During his conversations with Medhurst in late
April and early May 1943, Cervell disclosed the Swedish
Air Force's defence plan, along with a very brief outline
of an overall plan for all three armed services. Major
33warner to Medhurst, 18 April 1943 letter
FO 37l/37098/N2179.
34Ibid.
355ir O.G. Sargent, 14 April 1943 minute; A. Eden,
17 April 1943 note, FO 371/37098/N2179.
139
Cervell was unable to report to General Nordenskiöld
immediately because the Swedish airline service to Britain
was suspended temporarily after a Swedish civil airliner
had been attacked by the Luftwaffe over Norway in May. He
did not telegraph his report to Nordenskiöld for fear that
other Swedes, and the Germans, might discover the nature
of his mission in London. 36 The Swedish Air Force chief
did not learn of the British attitude towards his proposal
until Cervell returned to Stockholm on a special British
courier flight in mid-summer.
Cervell's inconclusive mission did not dampen
Nordinskiöld's desire to obtain Allied aircraft. General
Nordinski6ld approached Sköld and insisted that it would
be impossible to defend southern Sweden without a large
force of modern fighter aircraft. Nordenski6ld stressed
that the Germans might be prompted to attack Sweden in order
to obtain additional locations to base fighter squadrons for
use against Allied bombing raids on northern Germany. 37 As
the British appeared reluctant to commit R.A.F. squadrons
to Sweden without some form of official collaboration
between the Swedish and British defense authorities, Sk5ld
instructed Nordenskiöld to ascertain if London would be
36A Nutting to Warner, 24 May 1943 minute,
FO 37l/37098/N2179.
37Air Vice Marshal D. Colyer (Assistant Chief of
Air Staff) to Air Chief Marshal Sir C. Portal (Chief of
Air Staff), 18 September 1943 memorandum of meeting with
Major Cervell. FO 371/37098/N5564.
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prepared to supply fighters to Sweden on a strictly
commercial basis.
Major Cervell returned to London and visited Air
Vice Marshal Colyer, Medhurst's successor as Assistant
Chief of Air Staff for plans on 18 September 1943. The
Major informed Colyer that he was instructed to negotiate
the purchase of two hundred Spitfires by Sweden. He
stated that the Swedish Air Force sought the latest model
of Spitfires and would definitely not consider accepting
inferior aircraft such as Hurricanes or older Spitfires.38
Although weather would not permit the delivery of a large
number of fighters to Sweden before March 1944, the Swedes
wanted to receive a few samples as soon as possible in
order to familiarize pilots and ground crew with the
operation and maintenance of the aircraft. Cervell
informed Colyer that Sweden only had sufficient 100-octane
fuel to operate 200 Spitfires under combat conditions for a
fortnight, but as a result of the recently negotiated
Anglo-American-Swedish war trade agreement, Sweden was
receiving large shipments of 87-octane which the Swedes
might use for training purposes. As in the case of his
previous visit to London, Cervell's approach was unofficial.
Nordenskiöld and Sköld did not consult their government
before he was despatched to Britain. Cervell insisted that
Sweden was becoming more resistant to German pressure, and
intimated that the Swedes might terminate their iron ore
38Ibid
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exports to Germany if they felt sufficiently secure against
a German attack. 39
 Before departing, Cervell also told
Colyer that the Swedish Air Force believed that the United
States and Britain were the only two possible sources for
large numbers of fighters, and in Colyer's words, "they
infinitely preferred to buy them from us." 40
 Colyer
replied that he would consult other military and civil
officials to establish whether Britain could accommodate
the Swedish request but warned the Swede that owing to
Allied operational requirements, two hundred Spitfires
could not be made "available at once off-the-peg."41
Cervell's request prompted Air Chief Marshal Sir
Charles Portal, the Chief of Air Staff, to consider using
Spitfires as a bargaining counter in future economic and
political negotiations with Stockholm. Portal instructed
Colyer to ascertain whether the Foreign Office would be
willing to offer Spitfires in return for the cessation of
Swedish ore exports to Germany. The Foreign Office replied
that Cervell's claim that Sweden might refuse to export
iron ore to Germany seemed highly improbable since Sweden's
imports of German coal was of considerably more value to
39Ibid.
40A. Nutting, 19 September 1943 minute of conver-
sation between Colyer and Warner. FO 371/37095/N5564.
41Colyer to Portal, op. cit.
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the Swedes than anything they could obtain from the
Allies. 42 Moreover, it would be difficult to supply
Sweden with an adequate volume of aviation fuel to operate
Spitfires. London expected that the Germans would close
the Gothenburg traffic during the autumn of 1943, in
anticipation of another blockade running attempt, or in
retaliation for Sweden's economic concessions to the
Allies, which were to take effect on 1, October. Unless
the Allies were to establish a direct link with Sweden
through Norway, whose liberation was not imminent, the
Allies would have to deliver oil to the Swedes by air or
by clandestine fast motor boat. Both methods would be
highly difficult and dangerous undertakings, but the
Foreign Office suggested that Colyer consult the Admiralty
regarding their feasibility.43
Colyer believed that Nordinskiöld's approach was
intended to "draw us out a bit more" in order to deter-
mine if "it would be worthwhile" asking the Swedish
cabinet, army, and navy to disclose Sweden's overall
defence plans to the Allies. In Colyer's opinion, General
Nordenskiöld would drop the matter if the British flatly
refused to consider selling aircraft to Sweden. 44 The
Foreign Office agreed that the Swedish Air Force should





I must be entirely discouraged from believing that it could
obtain Spitfires. Although there appeared to be little
prospect of gaining substantial concessions from the
Swedes immediately, "there are presumably various ways in
which the Swedes could help us operationally which might
1,45be worth the bargain.	 Even if the Swedes refused to
strike such a bargain with the British, the Foreign Office
suggested that the Air Ministry should inform them that it
would, in principle, supply Sweden with aircraft if the
Swedes were prepared to enter into staff discussions.
Our aim should be to draw the Swedes into dis-
cussions which might lead to their eventually
agreeing to come in on the side of the Allies,
or at least to provide us with all the opera-
tional facilities we may require, regardless
of their obligations of neutrality towards
Germany. 46
Colyer and the Foreign Office agreed that the Chiefs of
Staff Committee should be consulted before further action
was taken on this issue, in order to determine if Britain
could afford to give aircraft to a neutral country, and
to establish what advantages could be gained from such a
transaction.
Before the British government was able to devise
a policy on supplying fighters to Sweden, an untimely
interview between Sir Archibald Sinclair, the Secretary of
State for Air, and Björn Prytz, the Swedish minister to
45warner to Colyer, op. cit.
461b1d
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Britain, and Major Cervell, on 24 September appeared to
close the door to any further Anglo-Swedish negotiations.
Sinclair had forgotten a cabinet ruling which obliged him
to obtain Foreign Office approval before agreeing to
receive foreign delegations and, consequently, he was
unaware of what had already transpired between Cervell and
the British Air Staff, and did not know that the Foreign
Office favoured using Spitfires as a bargaining ploy with
the Swedes. 47 Prytz presented Sinclair with a request for
200 Spitfire Ix's, and suggested that through accommodating
this request, Britain could establish a leading position in
the Swedish aircraft market. 48 Major Cervell added that
the Swedish air staff did not insist upon obtaining the
most modern fighter, the Spitf ire XIII, but would be
"quite content with the Spitfire IX," which was the Royal
Air Force's standard fighter at the time. 49 Sinclair
replied that while he personally favoured the "greatest
possible flow of trade between Sweden and this country, I
could in the meantime only regard Spitfires as weapons of
47Sir A. Sinclair to A. Eden (Foreign Secretary),
24 September 1943 Secret letter, FO 371/37098/N5566.
Eden later minuted, on 26 September 1943, "clearly there
was no harm in this - I am only glad demand was made of
Sir A.S. and not of me!"
48 Sinclair to Eden, op. cit.
49Sinclair later informed the Foreign Office that
he did not tell cervell that no more than two Fighter
Command Squadrons would ever be equipped with Type XIII
Spitfires. Colyer to Warner, 26 October 1943 letter,
FO 371/37133/N6228.
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war against Germany." 50
 He explained that the Spitfire IX
had become the "backbone of the Fighter Command squadrons,"
and that Britain could not afford to divert any of these
aircraft from combat purposes. 51
 The Air Minister added,
however, that production of these aircraft might increase
by the time that "there was any such change in the policy
of the Swedish government as would make it possible to
consider the supply of modern types of aircraft to
Sweden." 52
 Prytz explained that the Swedish air staff was
anxious to obtain modern fighters because it feared that
the Germans might move against Sweden in the near future.
Sinclair agreed that this contingency was possible but in
such an eventuality, Prytz would have to discuss the
Spitfire question with Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden rather
than the Air Ministry. Prytz accepted Sinclair's argument
and withdrew the request for 200 Spitfire IX's.
When the Northern Department received a brief
summary of Sinclair's conversation with Prytz and Cervell,
it concluded that the Air Minister had firmly rejected the
Swedes' proposal. 53
 The Foreign Office informed Colyer,
who did not know what had transpired during the discussion.
50Sinclair to Eden, op. cit.
51Colyer to Warner, op. cit.
was a pity that the Air Minister turned
Cervell down flat," Warner, 25 September 1943 minute,
FO 371/37098/5566.
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Colyer assumed from Sinclair's letter that "the door had
been slammed on the Swedes," and informed Major Cervell on
28 September that the "Spitfire deal was off," and that any
further Swedish approaches would have to be made to the
Foreign Office on a government to government basis.54
The initial reaction in the Foreign Office to
Sinclair's and Colyer's discussions with the Swedes was
summed up by E.O. Cote of the Northern Department: "The
Air Ministry seems to have made a complete muddle of
this." 55 By mid-October however, the Air Ministry's posi-
tion became clearer when the Foreign Office received a more
complete record of Sir Archibald's remarks which indicated
that he had not completely spurned the Swedes, but had
merely attached more formal conditions to any transaction
which the Swedes might wish to make in the future. Warner
minuted, "if this is a correct account of what passed, it
would seem that we are keeping the Swedes satisfactorily
in play." 56 The Air Minister had "rammed home to the
Swedes" that London was prepared in principle to sell
Spitfires to Sweden provided that the Swedish government
formally requested the British government for aircraft, and
that Sweden was prepared to become a belligerent or give
54A. Nutting, Minute of conversation with Colyer,
16 October 1943, FO 37l/37133/N6228.
55E.O. Cote, 10 October 1943 minute, FO 371/37098/
5566.
56Warner to Colyer, 21 October 1943 letter,
FO 371/37133/N6228.
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significant military concessions to the Allies. 57 Major
Cervell evidently had not been totally discouraged by his
previous discussions for he made further visits to the Air
Ministry to enquire if Britain would provide a smaller
number of aircraft than the 200 he had originally
requested.58
In November, the Swedish air attache also informed
the Air Ministry that he intended to discuss Sweden's
aircraft requirements with the United States air attach
in London. The Foreign Office instructed the British
embassy in Washington on 28 October to advise the Americans
to employ similar tactics to those used by the British if
approached by the Swedes. Some British officials feared
that Colonel Turner, the U.S. air attache, might strongly
endorse a Swedish request for fighters. He was half
Swedish and had recently spent more than a month in Stock-
holm, where he had probably discussed the question with
General Nordenskild. 59 Therefore, Air Commodore Beaumont,
a liaison officer at the Air Ministry, spoke with Turner on
15 November to explain Britain's current policy towards
the Swedish Air Force. Beaumont later told Major Cervell
that he had emphasized Britain's position to the U.S. Air
57Nutting, 16 October 1943, op. cit.
58Warner, 17 November 1943 minute, FO 371/37133/
7662.
59Colyer to Warner, 16 November 1943 letter,
FO 371/37133/7668.
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attach& but that the Air Ministry had no objection to
Swedes discussing the question with American authorities.60
In late November, the Foreign Office was satisfied to learn
that the State Department and U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
had agreed to give evasive answers to Swedish enquiries
concerning aircraft. 61 Nutting was confident that
Washington's concurrence would ensure a coordinated policy
between the two governments on this question, and would
prevent the Americans from promising fighters to the
Swedes before London had determined what, if any, conces-
sions it wanted from Sweden in return.62
MOSCOW AND TEHERAN: BASES IN SWEDEN?
The Foreign Office regarded the vague prospect of
Spitfires as an inducement for future concessions from
Stockholm. But London could not establish an appropriate
quid	 for the aircraft. The Soviets would suggest
a strategic role for Sweden which the British had not
envisaged. The Russian proposal was considered unrealistic
but it would spur London into examining other useful con-
tributions which Sweden might furnish to the Allied war
effort.
60Air Commodore F. Beaumont to Air Vice Marshal
Colyer, 15, November 1943, FO 371/37133/7662.
61State Department to British mbassy, Washington,
23 November 1943 memorandum 858.248195, FO 115/3568. Foreign
Office to British embassy,	 28 November 1943 telegram
7968, FO 115/3568.
62Nutting, 27 November 1943 minute, FO 371/37133/
7662.
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During the first meeting of the Moscow Foreign
Ministers Conference on 19 October 1943, Molotov
obliquely proposed that Swedish assistance might shorten
the war. Stalin added substance to Molotov's remark in a
meeting with Eden two nights later. He alluded to Portu-
gal's recent agreement to grant Britain air bases in the
Azores to attack ri-boats as an example of what the Allies
could gain from neutrals if they applied sufficient
pressure. He suggested that Britain should press Sweden
for similar facilities for bombing Germany, exclaiming
that, "We shed our blood while Sweden got rich. Was that
just?" 63
 Stalin contended that Sweden was not endangered
by Germany and suggested that Washington threaten to
blockade Sweden if Swedish compliance was not forthcoming.
Eden replied that Sweden was already blockaded, and that
the supplies which it received from the West were specific
quid	 guos for 'services rendered', such as reduced
trade with Germany. When the Swedish question was dis-
cussed later between the three Allied foreign ministers,
Eden informed Molotov that Swedes would probably not agree
to provide bases without some defense guarantee from the
63Eden to Churchill, 22 October 1943 telegram 55
SPACE. FO 371/37098/N6222; Eden to Churchill, 19 October
1943 telegram 43 SPACE, CAB 122/914; Sir Liewellyn
Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War,




 Eden added that the Swedes were anxious about
the status of Finland after the war. He suggested that
Stockholm might prove to be more accommodating if the
Russians were to guarantee Finland's independence and
economic well-being and restore Finland's 1939 boundaries.
Molotov replied that the Finnish aspect of the Swedish
question "presented a complication which he had not
previously considered."65
In London, the Chiefs of Staff approved of Eden's
evasive response to the Soviet proposal. Bases in
Sweden were unnecessary because British and American
bombers could already attack all major targets in Germany
from existing aerodromes in England or Italy, where
complete support facilities had recently been established.
Swedish bases would require additional troops for base
defense, and massive supply airlifts to remain operational.
In the Chiefs' opinion, Russia might be the only Allied
power which would have any need for Swedish bases and be
in a position to support them, via Finland. This, however,
would only be possible once the Finns had ceased fighting
Russia, and turned against Germany as a co-belligerent of
the Allies. They advised Eden to remain evasive and
64 Eden to Churchill, 21 October 1943, Telegram 21
SPACE, PREM 3/417/2. Hull to Roosevelt, 21 October 1943
telegram ALUSNA 192114, enclosed in memorandum for General
Marshall, U.S. Chief of Staff, 23 October 1943, U.S. War
Department decimal files R.G. 165/OPDO91/334.8.
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elaborate on the impracticality of the Soviet proposal.66
Washington's reaction was similar to London's.
The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff were opposed to
pressing Sweden for bases because the Allies could not
afford to divert any manpower and supplies from their
preparations for operation Overlord. 67 However,
Roosevelt added that the question might be reconsidered
at some date after the cross-channel invasion.
Molotov expressed disappointment with the
negative Allied attitude although he claimed that the
U.S.S.R. did not require Swedish bases. The Western
delegates in Moscow discerned that even though the Soviets
were vague as to what they expected from Sweden, they
evidently were anxious to have Sweden and other neutrals
embroiled in the war. U.S. Ambassador Averell Harriman
attributed this anxiety to "the primitive view that they
have suffered and bled to destroy Hitler and see no
reason why the Turks [and to a lesser degree, the Swedes]
should not do the same if it can help to shorten the
66Chiefs of Staff Committee, 22 October 1943
minute COS (43) 257th meeting (0) point (C) Sweden, CAB
122/914.
Churchill added, in his telegram to Eden, that
Swedish belligerency would be desirable if the Swedes
agreed to join the Allies at a later stage of the war,
voluntarily. Churchill, Closing the Ring, op. cit.,
pp. 246-7. Churchill to Eden, 20 October 1943, Telegram
1663 EXTRA PREM 3/417/2. Foreign Office to Sir Achibald
Clark-Kerr (U.K. ambassador to U.S.S.R), 23 October 1943,
Telegram 115 EXTRA CAB 120/694.
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States: The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran 1943
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 121.
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war." 68 The Russians believed that while the neutrals'
contribution to the Allies might not be militarily signif i-
cant, their entry into the war would cause the Germans to
feel more isolated and demoralized. Churchill had antici-
pated how the Soviets would respond if the Western Allies
did not appear to take their proposal for Swedish bases
seriously. In order to prevent this question from
becoming a source of discord during the forthcoming
Teheran Conference between Roosevelt, Stalin, and himself
in late November, Churchill advised Eden not to reject
the proposal altogether:
The Russians shouldn't be put into a
position of arguing for this and simply
making difficulties. We should in
principle make the difficulties manifest
themselves as they certainly will do in
the discussion of ways and means. They
may well be overcome or put in their
proper place and proportion. Anyhow we 69
ought not to begin by crabbing everything.
As a gesture to Russian sensibilities, Eden and Hull agreed
in principle, during the final session of the Foreign
Ministers Conference on 31 October, to recommend that
British, American, and Soviet authorities conduct further
68 Ibid., p. 153. The Soviets were apparently more
anxious to bring Turkey into the war than Sweden, since
they believed that Turkish belligerency would relieve
pressure on the Eastern front.
69Churchill to Eden, 25 October 1943 telegram 132
EXTPA, FO 37l/37098/N6222; Churchill, Closing the Ring,
op. cit., p. 247.
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studies on securing some sort of military collaboration
from Sweden.7°
In light of what transpired at the Moscow Confer-
ence, the Foreign Office believed that the British
government should prepare some 'positive proposals' to
satisfy the Russians. Although the question of obtaining
air bases from the Swedes was "clearly not worth pursuing,"
it seemed possible that the Chiefs of Staff might think of
other "facilities of an operational kind" in Sweden
which would not be as difficult to establish and would
not necessitate giving fighter protection to the Swedes
as a quid pro 2.71 The Chiefs of Staff were therefore
asked on 19 November 1943 to consider "what if anything we
could usefully ask the Swedes to give us in the way of
operational facilities," and to direct the Joint Planning
Staff (JPS) to prepare quickly a paper on the subject, so
that the Foreign Office could have something to "give to
the Russians in the next day or two" before the Teheran
conference convened. 72
70Eden to Churchill, 29 October 1943 telegram 121
SPACE, FO 371/37080/N6376; Conferences at Cairo and
Tehran, op. cit., pp. 127, 136.
715ir A. Cadogan to Prime Minister, 5 November
1943 minute (PM/43/386) PREM 3/417/2.
72Chief s of Staff Committee, 19 November 1943 minute
COS (43) 283rd meeting (0); Warner to Major-General Hollis,
Secretary, Chief of Staffs Committee, 15 November 1943
letter (N6376/1/G) contained in COS memorandum (43)716(0),
17 November 1943. CAB 119/109) Initially, the Chiefs of
Staff thought that Sweden might be useful as a base for sup-
plying Polish resistance groups, but this proposal was not
included in the final JPS paper, probably to avoid offending
the Russians, who had broken with the Polish government-in-
exile in London, who held the Russians responsible for the
Katyn forest massacre.
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The Joint Planning Staff's report was completed by
23 November. Among other things, the JPS recommended that
a diplomatic approach should be made to Sweden to demand
the following concessions:
1. Permission for British personnel to install
and operate meterological stations and
navigational aids to improve the accuracy of
Allied raids on German cities;
2. Permission for Allied civil and military air-
craft to land on Swedish military airfields
out of range of German fighters;
3. Permission for damaged Allied military air-
craft to refuel or make minor repairs in
Sweden without being interned;
4. Substitution of the current system by which
Sweden repatriated equal numbers of interned
Allied and German aircrews in favour of
returning all Allied airmen and permitting
special military flights to transport them to
Britain;
5. The establishment of British manned wireless
interception stations to monitor German signals
in Poland and the Balkans, and to receive
clandestine messages from prisoner-of-war
camps in Europe;
6. Agreement to allow some 4000 exiled Norwegian
military personnel to travel to Britain;
7. Full disclosure of Sweden's intelligence
concerning Germany. 73
However, Stalin did not raise the question of
Swedish bases during the Teheran conference. The Soviets
73War Cabinet, Joint Planning Staff, Report JP (43)
405 (Final) Sweden: Operational Facilities other than Air
Bases, 23 November 1943, Chiefs of Staff Committee to
"SEXTANT", telegram GRAND 189, 24 November 1943, CAB 119/
109. Chiefs of Staff Committee to Combined Chiefs of
Staff, 26 November 1943 memorandum CCS416, Requirements
for Operational Facilities from Sweden, CAB 122/914;
Chiefs of Staff Committee 24 November 1943 minute 12 COS
(43) 287th meeting, CAB 119/109.
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seemed to be more interested in pressing the Western
Allies to bring Turkey into the war, and in finding a
suitable means for securing an armistice with Finland.
During a discussion about Finland, Churchill remarked that
he attached great importance "to Finland's being out of
the war and Sweden's being in" 74 by the spring of 1944.
Stalin agreed but no further conversation about Sweden
ensued from Churchill's chance comment.
Although the JPS's proposals had lost their origi-
nal purpose, the British services, the Air Ministry in
particular, continued to examine the question of obtaining
facilities in Sweden during the winter of 1943-44. In
late January 1944, the JPS produced a short list of the
three types of facilities which should be sought
immediately from Sweden: navigational aids, meteorological
information, and wireless interception stations for
monitoring radio signals from German fighters. William
Montague-Pollock, counsellor at the British legation in
Stockholm advised the JPS that an informal diplomatic
approach might persuade the Swedes to agree to this
equipment being installed on the premises of the legation
and its consulates in Gothenburg, Malm6, and other Swedish
cities. As the Swedes were already providing weather
reports to the Germans, Montague-Pollock felt it would be
reasonable to expect the Swedish government to accept a
Cairo and Teheran Conferences, op. cit.
p. 212.
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request to furnish such information to the British lega-
75t].on.
However, General Sir Stewart Menzies, the head of
MI-6, advised the Chiefs of Staff to defer action on the
J.P.S. proposal. The presence of British technicians in
Sweden might raise German suspicions as to their purpose
and prompt Berlin to change their codes. Furthermore, the
large volume of messages emanating from Germany's air
defences would overwork and delay Ultra decoding clerks
and thereby render intelligence from Sweden useless for
operational purposes. 	 He therefore suggested that inter-
ception stations should be established only for gathering
intelligence of long-term significance.76
The Foreign Office believed that any request for,
operational facilities should be postponed until after the
Allies had secured a ball bearing embargo from Sweden.77
J.E. Galsworthy minuted on 30 March 1944 that "our view is
that we should go all out for ball-bearings (which are our
main target) and not clutter up the plate with other
demands.. .we should not drag in operational questions."78
The British did make a token demand for a few operational
75War Cabinet, Joint Planning Staff, 24 January 1944
report JP (44) 24 (FINAL) Sweden: Immediate Requirements,
CAB 119/109. Major General Hollis to Churchill, 27,
January 1944, minute, CAB 120.
to Major Ôeneral Hollis, 31 January 1944
letter C/5526. CAB 119/109.
77 See Chapter Five.
78 Galsworthy, minute, 30 March 1944, FO 371/43520/
N1811.
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facilities during early April, but this was only for the
purpose of furthering the Allied deception plans, which
shall now be examined.
DECEPTIONS AND BALL BEARINGS
Although the Allies were unprepared to undertake a
major operation in Scandinavia during the spring and
summer of 1944, they to convince the Germans that they
intended to do so in late May to prevent the withdrawal
of 18 German divisions from Norway and Denmark to
Normandy. As with other subterfuges to divert German
attention away from Normandy in anticipation of attacks
on the Pas de Calais, the South of France, and the Eastern
Mediterranean, plan Fortitude North was conducted between
March and May to suggest that the Allies were preparing
to launch an amphibious assault against Norway. To create
this deception, 28 officers and 344 enlisted personnel,
who comprised the Anglo-American Fourth Army in Scotland,
endeavoured to create the illusion that their force
consisted of at least three corps and accompanying support
units, and was conducting intensive amphibious and mountain
warfare exercises in Scotland, Northern Ireland, and
Iceland.
On 10 February, the Chiefs of Staff sanctioned a
diplomatic deception, code named Graffham to give credence
79Charles Cruikshank, Deception in World War II
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 99-104, 115,
120-123.
158
to this illusory threat against Norway. Graffham required
the British legation in Stockholm to press the Swedish
government, during April 1944, to provide the Allies with
certain facilities, information, and privileges in the
hope that the Germans would believe that the Allies
needed these concessions to consolidate their position in
Scandinavia once they had landed in Norway. Graffham
incorporated some of the demands originally proposed by
the JPS in November 1943, such as landing, refueling,
and repair rights for Allied aircraft on Swedish military
airfields, as well as permission for Allied reconnaissance
flights over the Swedish-Norwegian border, and permission
for an Allied railways expert to study rail transport
between Norway and Sweden. 8 ° For deceptive purposes, it
was more important that the Germans be aware that these
demands were being made than it was for the Swedes to
actually accept them. Although it was assumed that the
Swedes would reject most of these demands out of hand,
and would inform the Germans about their discussions with
the British, the London Controlling Section, which
devised the various Allied deception plans, felt that a
80Cruikshank, op. cit., pp. 126-26. Sir A. Clark-
Kerr (U.K. ambassador to USSR) to A. Vyshinkski (Assistant
Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR) 16 March 1944
letter. FO 181/989.
One bizarre aspect of Graffham concerned the
large British purchases of Norwegian bonds on the Stockholm
stock exchange during May 1944 to give the impression that
investors sensed the liberation of Norway was close at
hand. Two important Norwegian securities rose by nearly
20% between 9th and 15th May. Cruikshank, op. cit.,
p. 136.
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conspicuous display of diplomatic activity in Stockholm
would continue to stimulate German suspicions. The staff
of the British legation was expanded by additional members
who were to "assume a certain air of mystery," frequent
visits were to be paid to the Ministries of Foreign
Affairs and Defence on "no matter what business," and
wireless traffic between London and Stockholm was to be
increased by the transmission of false messages and by
lengthening the text of genuine telegrams.81
Graffham proceeded in earnest in early April, after
Mallet had returned from a trip to London to consult with
the Foreign Office and L.C.S., and to receive his knight-
hood. He was supported by his Soviet and U.S. colleagues,
although the U.S. government was more interested in the
ball bearing negotiations and questioned the necessity for
the deception. 82
 The Allied ministers pressed Boheman
repeatedly for permission to allow Allied reconnaissance
flights over Sweden's border with Norway and for approval
for discussions between the Swedish national railways and
a British transport official. Gtlnther refused to permit
the reconnaissance flights, but Boheman reassured Mallet
unofficially that Swedish anti-aircraft gunners would fire
only token warning shots at Allied aircraft. 83 The Swedes
81Ibid.; Sir Vjctor Mallet, Memoirs, unpublished
manuscript, Churchill College Library, Cambridge, p. 147.
82Cruikshank, op. cit., p. 112.
____ 
p. 131; Eden to Clark-Kerr, 27 March 1944
telegram, FO 181/989.
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were uncertain as to why the Allies would want to study
Sweden's railway system but agreed to allow the transport
expert, Brigadier Manton, to visit Stockholm in the hopes
that he might reveal the Allies' intentions. However,
Manton's discussions with Swedish railway executives
proved no more enlightening than Mallet and Johnson's
representations.
London decided to postpone issuing some of the
stronger representations for aircraft landing rights and
radar facilities in mid-April because it feared they might
undermine the M.E.W.'s efforts to secure an embargo on
ball bearing exports to Germany. 84
 The Foreign Office
persuaded the L.C.S. that it would "strike a note of
unreality" and arouse "German suspicions as to our real
motives" if demands for a bearing embargo and operational
facilities were asserted simultaneously. 85 Mallet and
Johnson reported that the Swedes were greatly disturbed by
the earlier demands and by Washington's strident attitude
on the economic questions.86 Swedish anxieties were
exacerbated by the uncertainty which prevailed throughout
Europe prior to the Allied offensives in the West and East.
Stockholm assumed that German troops might enter Sweden
while retreating from a Soviet advance in Finland. The
84 Chapter Five.
85Clark-Kerr to Vyshinski, 6 May 1944 letter,
FO 181/989.
86Edento Clark-Kerr, 1 May 1944 telegram 1316,
FO 181/989; Mallet to Foot, 18 April 1944 letter 211/50/44,
FO 371/43452/N2534.
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deception plans reinforced a growing Swedish belief that
the Western Allies would strike against Norway or Denmark
to coincide with the Soviet offensive. Boheman told
Mallet that the Germans had taken increased security
measures in Scandinavia, such as closing the Danish-
Swedish border, intensifying naval patrols in the
Skagerak, and by despatching one infantry division to
Norway and three regiments to Denmark. 87 Swedish customs
officers confiscated a large consignment of ordinance
maps of Sweden during a routine inspection of a German
railway wagon destined for Norway.88
Widespread Swedish speculation about a possible
allied assault in Scandinavia produced similar attitudes
to those which had prevailed during the "war of nerves"
in late 1941. The Swedes were apprehensive of Germany's
reaction to the rumours generated by Graffham. Fears that
the Germans might attempt to occupy Sweden in order to
secure their supply route to Norway were revived. Captain
Denham, the British naval attache reported that uncertainty
caused the occasional "reaction of nerves." 89 In one
instance, a Swedish admiral who was in charge of coastal
defences at Gothenburg believed that the Royal Navy was
about to enter the Skagerak and, "in a state of jitters",
87Malletto F.O., 28 April 1944 telegram 499,
FO 371/43452/N2604.
1944, Vol. IV (Washington: G.P.O., 1966),
p. 514.
89Denham to Director of Naval Intelligence, 12 June
1944, telegram 121501, CAB 119/109.
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sunk his block ships on the night of 30 April. Moreover,
Graffham prompted the Swedish government to behave more
cautiously towards Berlin. Stockholm did not inform the
Germans of the demands which Mallet and Johnson had made
in April, as the L.C.S. had expected. The Swedish govern-
ment enforced security measures rigourously to prevent any
'leakage' to the Germans.9°
Graffham undoubtedly made a strong impression on
the Swedes. Its effects threatened to undermine London's
past efforts to discourage their fear of Germany.9'
Concern over a German invasion provided the Swedish govern-
ment and S.K.F. with an excuse for rejecting Allied demands
for a ball bearing embargo on Germany. In order to dispel
Swedish anxieties, the Foreign Office decided to disconti-
nue Graffham-related diplomatic pressure for the duration
of the ball bearing negotiations which began in early May.
Throughout May and early June, the British legation's
efforts to continue the deception were limited to such
activities as transmitting bogus telegrams for the benefit
of German wireless interceptors. Mallet and Group Captain
90Mallet to Foreign Office, 26 April 1944 telegram
393, FO 371/43452/N2369.
915ir A. Noble of the Central Department minuted on
2 May: "It is inconceivable that the German General Staff
should be prepared to accept the unprofitable diversion of
effort involved in an attack on Sweden. We may hope that
Hitler will insist on indulging in such madness, but I
fear we shall be disappointed.",
Noble, 2 May 1944, minute, FO 371/43452/N2604.
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Maycock also met members of the Swedish air staff frequently
to solicit details of Sweden's air bases and to press for
the wholesale repatriation of Allied servicemen who were
interned in Sweden. 92
After 6 June 1944, London introduced two more
deceptions, Fortitude North II and Royal Flush to maintain
the latent threat against Norway while the Overlord forces
were strengthening their beachhead and attempting to
break out from the invasion area. Under Fortitude North
II, four Allied divisions were kept in readiness under
General Andrew Thorne, Commander in Chief, Scottish Command
for an assault against Norway in the event of a German
withdrawal. Real, rather than imaginary, units were
employed because the Royal Norwegian government had
persuaded General Eisenhower to despatch an Allied expedi-
tion to Norway to restore its authority in Norway in the
event of a German evacuation. 93 Double agents would
inform Berlin about the military preparations in Scotland,
while Allied diplomats and visiting V.I.P.'s in Stockholm
would 'leak' purportedly confidential details of the
impending 'invasion' of Scandinavia. Copies of fictitious
staff plans were circulated in the Foreign Office to help
the diplomats fabricate plausible rumours. One bogus
"Top Secret" memorandum from General Ismay of 5 August
92See Chapter Six.
93Chiefsof Staff Committee, 19 July 1944 minute,
COS (44) 241st meeting (0), Plans for the Occupation of
Northern Norway, CAB 79/78.
164
1944 stated that four British and one U.S. infantry
divisions, along with one mountain-trained infantry divi-
1 
sion would land in central Norway to capture Stavenger and
airfields in order to establish bases to support further
operations, while a smaller Norwegian contingent would
capture the principal ports in northern Norway. 94
 The
'plans' were vague as to the date of this operation so
that Berlin would conclude that Allied intentions were
contingent upon German strength in Norway.
Royal Flush, which supplanted Graffham after the
invasion of France, entailed further diplomatic charades
during June and July. On 9 June, Mallet pressed Boheman
for a formal assurance that Sweden would resist any German
infringement of its territory if Finnish-based German
troops attempted to cross Sweden to help repel an Allied
invasion of Norway. The L.C.S. had proposed that the
Allied ministers approach the Swedish government on 'D+lO'
(16 June) with a request that it agree immediately to
initiate talks between the Allied and Swedish staffs.5
The Joint Planning Staff doubted that the Swedes would
accept this proposal since recent speeches by GUnther,
94General Ismay to Eden, Allied Intentions in
Scandinavia, "Top Secret" memorandum enclosed in Lt.
Colonel R.E.L. Wingate to A. Haigh, 5 August 1944,
FO 37l/43509/N4808.	 The only actual units under General
Thorne's command were one British and two U.S. divisions
which were under strength, Joint Planning Staff, 15 July
1944 report JP (44) 164 (REVISED) (FINAL), CAB 122/1300
95Colonel J.M. Bevan, Controlling Officer, L.C.S.,
11 June 1944, paper L.C.S. (44) 16, CAB 119/109.
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Sk51d, and Prime Minister Hansson reiterated their govern-
ment's intention to remain neutral.96
SUMMARY
The question of Sweden's possible intervention was
not central to Anglo-Swedish relations between 1941 and
1944. The Chiefs of Staff and Foreign Office assumed
that the Swedes would remain neutral unless German
invaders brought the war to Sweden. Accordingly, London
did not contemplate action in Norway which would require
Swedish assistance, nor did they desire bases in Sweden
since these would be difficult to defend and maintain as
long as the Germans occupied Norway. Senior Air Staff
officers were willing to accommodate General Nordinskiöld's
early approaches for fighters in 1941 and 1943, but
gradually lost interest as the Foreign Office's insistence
upon receiving Sweden's complete defence plans inhibited
further discussion about aircraft. The Foreign Office
wanted to keep an offer to sell aircraft 'in reserve' as
an incentive for some Swedish concessions in the future,
although it did not know what quid pro quo would warrant
such a transaction. The Foreign Office's attitude during
subsequent encounters between the Swedish air staff and
the British legation in 1944 would discourage the Swedes,
96Denham to D.N.I., 12 June 1944, op. cit.;
Mallet - Foreign Office, 15 July 1944 telegram,
FO 371/43500/N4880.
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who ultimately purchased fighters and other aircraft from
the United States.97
Sweden's only strategic value was as an unwitting
participant in the Graffham and Royal Flush deceptions
between late March and July 1944. While the London
Controlling Section was stage managing these charades, the
Foreign Office and Ministry of Economic Warfare were
negotiating economic concessions from Stockholm, and
dissuading the Americans from employing 'battering ram'
tactics against the Swedes. 98 On 11 June, Colonel John
Bevan, Controlling Officer for the deceptions, advised the
Foreign Office that "any contribution which can be made
now towards assisting the present Overlord battle by means
of deception should have preference over economic restric-
tions which can only assist the war situation some months
hence." 99	Further economic pressure against Sweden
would "give the enemy every reason to hope that the Allies
did not expect to bring the war in the West to a
victorious conclusion in the next few months and thereby
encourage him to continue the conflict." The Foreign
Office and M.E.W. agreed with Bevan's reasoning since it
seemed to provide a justifiable premise for refusing to






Sweden. London continued to cite the deception when
drafting economic warfare policy with the Americans until
late August, when it became apparent that this argument
was beginning to "wear a bit thin." 00 To the Foreign
Office and M.E.W., the deceptions were largely a justifica-
tion rather than a motive for relenting economic warfare
pressure against Sweden. They were more concerned with
long range questions affecting Britain's recovery from
the war. The following chapter shall examine these issues
to determine how they influenced London's reaction to
Washington's policy towards Sweden in 1944.
I
'°°John Dent, British Embassy, Washington, to Group
Captain Birley, Joint Staff Mission, 13 September 1944
letter, CAB 122/915. COS to JSM, 22 August 1944 telegram
COS (W) 264, CAB 119/109.
CHAPTER FOUR
WARTIME REALITIES AND POSTWAR VISIONS
London valued U.S. assistance to Britain's war
effort and was anxious to secure U.S. help in restoring
international stability after the war. Under these cir-
cuinstances, one would assume that the British would have
been more rather than less willing to endorse Washington's
economic warfare campaign towards a neutral power. How-
ever, Britain's attitude towards Washington's proposals
is understandable if London believed that close associa-
tion with an unreasonable U.S. policy would undermine an
equally important interest in Sweden. Apart from
intelligence and deceptions, the exigencies which had
necessitated cordial Anglo-Swedish relations earlier in
the war were less important in 1944. Ball bearing
imports were no longer indespensible to British armaments
production, since the machinery which had been smuggled
out of Sweden between 1941 and 1943 enabled the British
to expand their own bearing production considerably.1
The dangers of Sweden joining the Axis or failing to
resist a German invasion were virtually non-existent. If
Sweden's goodwill was not essential to Britain's war
1 "Report on Swedish Trade", War Cabinet Official
Committee on Supplies in Liberated and Conquered Areas,
paper SLAO (44) 106, 28 June 1944, FO 837/9l7/T13/1/12.
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effort, one must conclude that the British government
was concerned with what it felt were important postwar
interests. This Chapter shall examine the nature and
scope of London's postwar plans concerning Sweden, and
how the British hoped to realize them.
"BULL HEADED" AMERICANS
Regardless of what concrete motives London might
have had for questioning U.S. policy, it should be
observed that much of the British attitude was generated
by irritation over the American's single-minded pursuit
of a Swedish trade embargo. In late July, Nutting
minuted that the Americans "certainly are bull-headed
folk!", when he learned that the Americans were pressing
Stockholm for formal assurances to limit iron ore exports
for the rest of the year, although they were preparing to
demand, within a fortnight, that Sweden terminate all
exports immediately. 2
British officials found Washington's assertiveness
especially disturbing in the light of American disinterest
in or ignorance of the salient facts of Sweden's
relationship with the belligerent powers. During a visit
to Washington in May, Dingle Foot found Under Secretary of
War Patterson to be "wholly ignorant of the facts"3
2A. Nutting, 26 July 1944 minute, FO 371/43464/
N4509.
3Foot to Selborne, 3 June 1944, FO 837/916.
170
concerning Sweden's adherence to the War Trade Agreement.
When Foot showed him Swedish trade statistics (which were
confirmed by S.O.E. and M.E.W. reports), Patterson
retorted that the "figures must have been faked," and
elaborated that "a few healthy blacklists...would have a
salutary effect" on the Swedes.4
The Foreign Office could no longer rely upon the
State Department to restrain the War and Navy Departments
by the spring of 1944. According to his memoirs, Dean
Acheson, then Assistant Secretary of State for Economic
Affairs, persuaded Cordell Hull that the State Department's
influence and prestige within the U.S. government would
be strengthened if it took a more forceful line towards
the European neutrals. By doing so, the Department would be
seen by the American public, during an election year, to be
contributing actively towards the Allied war effort. In a
radio address of 7 April 1944, Hull read a strident warning
to the neutrals which Acheson had prepared: The U.S.
government could
no longer acquiesce to the neutrals drawing
upon the resources of the Allied world when
they contributed to the strength of its
enemies...by sending the Germans the essen-
tial ingredients of the steel that killed our
soldiers or by permitting highly skilled
workers and factories to supply products
which no longer issud from the smoking ruins
of German factories.
4 Foot to Selborne, 14 June 1944, FO 837/916.
5Department of State Bulletin, April 15, 1944
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944), p. 35;
Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: Norton,
1969), p. 56.
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The speech was popularly acclaimed and widely quoted in the
American press. Subsequently, the State Department pre-
ferred to present all of its demands to the Swedish
government in formal diplomatic notes, copies of which were
distributed to U.S. newspapers and elaborated upon by Hull
or a Department spokesman at weekly press conferences. In
June, Acheson jubilantly told Foot that "before the speech"
the State Department's prestige was "down in the basement,
but now it is up on the roof." 6
 This practice disturbed
the British, who felt that it provoked Swedish intran-
sigence towards Allied proposals. Swedish negotiators
would be obliged to be recalcitrant out of deference to
public resentment towards Allied meddling in Swedish
affairs. The State Department's 'public relations' type
of diplomacy contrasted sharply with the Foreign Office's
and Ministry of Economic Warfare's practice of restricting
publicity about sensitive issues. Public statements which
were critical of Sweden's behaviour were discouraged, and
the Foreign Office tried to prevent members of Parliament
from asking provocative questions concerning Sweden's
supposed collaboration with Germany. 7 As the State
Department was conducting diplomacy partly to impress the
to Selborne, 8 June 1944, FO 837/916.
7Sir Archibald Southeby, Conservative M.P. Epsom,
was a strong parliamentary critic of Sweden. In one
instance, J. Galsworthy minuted that "we must silence this
talkative baronet," when Southeby presented a written
question concerning the extent of German investment in
Swedish industry, 24 May 1944, FO 371/43453/N3l50.
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American public, its motivation for imposing sanctions
against Sweden was coming to resemble the simplistic
reasoning of the American public. In late August, Lord
Halifax informed Eden that whereas the War Department
believed that the cessation of Swedish exports would
shorten the war, the State Department's attitude appeared
to be "extremely woolly." 8
 In his opinion, the State
Department was interested mainly in forcing Sweden to
publicly "repent for past sins." Halifax reported that
the Department did not even have a definite idea as to how
Sweden was to demonstrate this change of heart. Eden
replied hotly: "it would be mad for us to adopt a policy
of sanctions and compulsion now because of vague American
feelings of indignation..."9
The British also resented the manner in which the
U.S. acted as the dominant power in Allied relations with
the neutrals. They believed that economic warfare policy
should be formulated and implemented through the mutual
consent of London and Washington. Lord Selborne informed
the War Cabinet, on 16 April, that the U.S. government had
decided to "cash in" on improved Allied military fortunes
by reducing drastically neutral exports to Germany.
Selborne did not question the desirability of this aim but
8Halifax to Foreign Office, 5 September 1944
telegram 1880, CAB 122/915.




Our divergence of views is as to the extent
to which in 'cashing in', we can ignore any
agreements [with the neutrals]..., the differ-
ent national characteristics and political
structure of those countries, the advice of
our diplomatic representatives, our own supply
requirements,...the risk of ill considered
action resulting in much greater supplies
reaching the enemy than at present.lO
Selborne was also concerned by Washington's
behaviour towards other neutrals in 1944.11 The Americans
had suspended Spain's oil imports in January in order to
force Madrid to terminate all wolf ram exports to Germany,
and subsequently pressed London to support further U.S.
initiatives towards Spain. 12 The British feared that the
American attitude would prompt the Spaniards to withhold
Spain's considerable exports to Britain as well as to
Germany and undermine London's efforts to induce the Franco
regime to expel German spies from Spanish territory and to
withdraw the 'Blue Division' from Russia) 3 The British
10Selborne, 17 April 1944, Anglo American Differ-
ences over Blockade Measures, War Cabinet Memorandum W.P.
(44) 206, CAB 66/49.
11Ibid
12Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy
in the Second World War, Vol. IV (London: H.M.S.O., 1975),
p. 26; Canton Hayes, Wartime Mission in Spain 1942-1945
(New York: Macmillan, 1945), pp. 183-201; Herbert Feis,
The Spanish Story (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948),
pp. 256-258; Acheson, op. cit., p. 54.
Templewood, Ambassador on a Special
Mission (London: Colliers, 1946), pp. 25-26.
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and U.S. governments had similar differences over Portugal's
wolfram exports)-4
 The Americans' insistence upon Britain
joining a United Nations embargo of Argentina to generate
domestic unrest against the Argentine junta was especially
disturbing to British officials, who believed such action
was unnecessary and could threaten Britain's chances of
securing a long term meat contract from Buenos Aires.'5
In 1944, many British officials, particularly in
the Ministry of Economic Warfare, were frustrated by
Britain's diminishing freedom of action towards the
neutrals. In the week following Hull's radio address,
Lord Selborne warned the war cabinet:
We are, it seems to me, in danger of being
dragged round Europe at the heels of the
United States and made to pursue, in the
name of economic warfare, a policy which
will probably fail to achieve its objects;
will redound to our discredit; and will in
the end make it difficult for us to
negotiate further agreements, since people
will cease to believe that we shall honour
our word in spirit as well as in letter.'6
What British plans concerning Sweden were threat-
ened by U.S. pressure to terminate Swedish-German trade?
14 Selborne, op. cit.; Woodward, op. cit., p. 71.
15Elisabeth Barker, Churchill and Eden at War
(London: Macmillan, 1978), p. 202; Robert M. Hathaway,
Ambiguous Partnership Britain and America 1944-1947 (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1981), pp. 77-80; David
Green, The Containment of Latin America: A History of the
Myths and Realities of the Good Neighbour Policy (Chicago:
Quadrangle, 1971), p. 161.
16 Selborne, op. cit.
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COMMERCE: WARTIME ARRANGEMENTS, POSTWAR DIVIDENDS
London's interest in maintaining cordial relations
with Sweden was motivated primarily by long term economic
concerns. The Ministries of Supply, War Transport,
Economic Warfare, the Treasury and Board of Trade regarded
Sweden as an asset for postwar reconstruction and as a
potential rival in postwar trade. By the spring of 1944,
these departments exerted considerable pressure on the
Foreign Office to initiate negotiations with Stockholm
with a view towards resuscitating Anglo-Swedish trade and
preparing for the postwar reconstruction of Britain and
Europe. Industrial interests such as the Sheffield
Chamber of Commerce, were anxious to resume pre-war
imports as soon as direct transport with Sweden was
possible. These lobbies pressed the Ministry of Economic
Warfare for permission to place orders with Swedish
suppliers. 17 The British hoped to induce the Swedes into
arrangements which would help restore Britain to its place
as a major economic power. London felt that the value of
securing postwar concessions from Sweden outweighed the
temporary advantages which might accrue from the cessation
of Swedish-German trade. The British regarded the American
preoccupation with economic warfare to be at best a
17 sheffied Chamber of Commerce to Ministry of
Economic Warfare, 11 March 1944, FO 837/907/T13/302;
see also, 10-page list of"Finished Goods required by
U.K. from Neutral Sources," prepared by Ministry of Supply,
19 May 1944, FO 371/409l1/U5932.
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nuisance, and at worst a threat to the impending Anglo-
Swedish negotiations.
The German occupation of Norway and blockade in
the Skagerak isolated Britain from its principal source of
timber and wood pulp. During the war, Britain was forced
to import these commodities from the United States, Canada,
and Newfoundland under the Lend-Lease Programme. However,
North American supplies of forest products amounted to
only approximately 2% of Britain's pre-war imports from
Sweden, Norway, and Finland, owing to the North American
countries' own wartime requirements. The Ministry of
Supply feared that with the termination of Lend-Lease at
the end of the war in Europe, these supplies would become
very expensive or unobtainable due to growing shortages
in North America. Sweden, on the other hand, had large
stocks of forest products available for immediate postwar
export, and possessed a large merchant fleet which could
transport these supplies to Britain at a lower cost than
could transatlantic shippers.18
In January 1943, Sir Charles Hambro, the merchant
banker and official of the Ministry of Economic Warfare
and S.O.E., proposed that Britain purchase immediately
large stocks of Swedish timber and pulp for postwar
delivery. Hambro argued that the proposed purchases
would have immense propaganda value in Sweden which would
encourage the Swedes to be less compliant with German
18Ministry of Supply, report on Timber Requirements,
25 January 1944, CAB 110/220.
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demands. The Foreign Office rejected his proposal, how-
ever. It thought it would be bad tactics, in view of the
impending tripartite negotiations, "to run after Sweden
in this way at this stage." 19 Anthony Nutting minuted:
"I understand from M.E.W. that Sweden knows perfectly well
that after the war we shall have to buy timber from her
and she would therefore treat this proposal as much more
of a demonstration of sympathy than we should wish."2°
By 1944, Sweden's trade with Germany was diminishing, and
it was no longer necessary to appear unsympathetic towards
the Swedes in order to reduce their deference to German
interests. The economic departments had completed a full
desiderata of Britain's postwar requirements from Sweden
in January 1944, and were anxious to initiate discussions
with Stockholm as soon as possible.
Britain required reconstruction materials urgently.
The Ministry of Supply intended to place orders in
Sweden for large volumes of timber and other building
materials to rebuild Britain's bomb-damaged homes and
industries, and to repair railways, mines, and port
facilities which had deteriorated during the war. Britain's
initial order for the first postwar year included: 125,000
tons of pit props, 650,000 tons of softwood boards, and
25 million square feet of plywood. The Ministry of Housing




sought to obtain 40,000 prefabricated wooden houses, from
Sweden which could be erected in one day each, as an
interim measure to alleviate Britain's acute housing
shortage. The Ministry of Supply also planned to negotiate
the purchase of up to l million tons of iron ore and 360
long tons of wood pulp from Sweden.21
London anticipated that its balance of trade with
Sweden after the war would be heavily in Sweden's favour.
Once the fighting in Europe ended, Sweden could resume
exporting immediately, whereas Britain would still be
waging war against Japan. Britain would require from one
to two years to convert its wartime industrial production
to a peacetime basis. The Treasury therefore insisted
that supply-purchase negotiations with Sweden be postponed
until the Bank of England negotiated a new payments
agreement with the Swedish central bank (Riksbank).22
Under the existing payments agreement, made at the
beginning of the war all British transactions with Sweden
were conducted in gold. These transactions largely
covered the charter of Swedish shipping to the British
Ministry of War Transport, compensation for vessels sunk
while on charter, ball bearing imports, special
steels, and precision tools throughout the war, and
21 "Report on Swedish Trade," SLAO (44) 106,
op. cit.
22R. Fraser (Board of Trade) minute on meeting
with Dingle Foot, 16 July 1943, PRO BT 11, 1654.
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1,421,000 tons of iron ore imported before the German
invasion of Scandinavia. 23 The Treasury calculated that by
September 1944, when the existing agreement was due to
expire, Britain would owe Sweden £50 million in gold. The
Treasury was anxious to avoid a further drain of Britain's
meager gold and foreign currency reserves, and proposed a
new agreement by which the Riksbank would hold an unlimited
amount of sterling against a Swedish loan to Britain cover-
ing all of Britain's purchases from Sweden. Sir David
Whaley of the Treasury explained to Christopher Warner,
Head of the Foreign Office's treasury department, that
the proposed payments agreement "would enable us to buy
goods from the Swedes with their own money...," thereby
helping Britain to "deal with our adverse balance of
,,24payments.
London hoped that over the longer term inter-
national confidence in sterling would be bolstered by the
Swedish undertaking to hold large amounts of sterling,
leading eventually to a revived sterling monetary union.
Moreover sterling balances in the Riksbank would encourage
the Swedes to buy more of their imports from the United
Kingdom and other members of the sterling bloc.
Hurstfield, The Control of Raw Materials
(London: H.M.S.O., 1953), pp. 180, 194-5.
24 Sir S.D. Whaley (Treasury) to Lord Drogheda
(Director-General Ministry of Economic Warfare) and C.F.A.
Warner (Head, Northern Department Foreign Office) 19 May
1944 letter F. 1607/011/2 PRO fo 371/43491/N3156.
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The Treasury pointed out that Britain could hardly
expect a satisfactory outcome to the impending payments
negotiations if the Allies continued to press Sweden to
cut off its trade with Germany. During the ball bearing
negotiations, Allied representations to Sweden argued
that Swedish credits to Germany constituted 'un-neutral'
behaviour, and must be terminated or Sweden would be
treated as a de facto ally of Germany after the war.
Whaley informed Warner that the Treasury felt that the
payments negotiations should be postponed until the war
progressed further, when Sweden would withdraw concessions
to Germany on its own initiative. The Treasury expected
that increased Allied economic pressure would only cause
the Swedes to "strengthen their scruples of neutrality"25
when Britain approached them for a loan. The Swedes would
rebuff any such approach with the argument that to extend
credit to Britain while suspending Germany's credit would
be contrary to the spirit of strict neutrality which the
Allies were admonishing Sweden to observe. However, the
payments negotiations could not be postponed indefinitely:
During the spring and early summer of 1944, the Swedish
legation in London was actively selling goods, ranging
from timber to machinery to X-ray equipment, on easy-
credit terms, to governments-in-exile in London. The
Netherlands government, for example, was attempting to
place large orders with Sweden for timber and reconstruc-
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tion materials. 26 The Board of Trade feared that if
these governments were to conclude commercial agreements
with Sweden, Britain would be unable to obtain as great a
volume of supplies from the Swedes as hoped.
London also hoped to gain sufficient influence
over the Swedish economy to prevent undue Swedish competi-
tion in postwar world trade. The war had brought substan-
tial austerity to the Swedish consumer. However, the
Swedish government and businesses ingeniously exploited
Sweden's enforced isolation from world trade to reorganize
its economic structure, to expand Swedish industrial
capacity, and to upgrade its transport system. Sweden,
along with Switzerland, another neutral with a sophisti-
cated economy, had become "the two richest nations...with
their industry in a perfect position immediately to supply
the demands of reconstruction." 26 Anthony Nutting
minuted that he felt the Swedes were preparing to "muscle
in on the commercial opportunities which the post-war
world will offer." 28 Economist Barbara Ward, upon return-
ing from a visit to Sweden in March 1943 to research an
Mitcheson (Commercial Counsellor, British
legation, Stockholm) to L.H. Collins, (Ministry of Economic
Warfare) 30 June 1944, despatch CC 258, PRO BT 25/15 RC 156;
Ministry of Economic Warfare to Washington, 19 July 1944,
telegram No. 1659 Arfar PRO BT 25/15.
27Alan S. Milward, War, Economy and Society, 1939-
1945 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1977), p. 328.
Nutting, 3 December 1943 minute, PRO
FO 371/37124/N3048.
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article for the Economist, reported in a letter to C.F.A.
Warner that she had been impressed by the number of
Swedish business firms preparing for postwar trade,
"confident that having been immune to war, they could
,,29have a big competitive advantage in world markets.
"Swedish firms had not incurred war damage and were in a
sound financial condition." 3 ° Swedish firms maintained
commercial contacts in Axis, Allied, and neutral territory,
and would be able to exploit these connexions to renew
trade after the war.
This attitude was openly supported by the Swedish
government. In a speech to the General Exporters Associa-
tion in Stockholm on 12 April 1943, Foreign Minister
GUnther declared that Sweden's wartime neutrality had
enhanced rather than prejudiced its postwar trade prospects.
He stressed that Sweden strove to maintain friendly and
peaceful terms with "all free nations." Commerce, rather
than politics, was the basis for Sweden's relations with
foreign powers. GUnther asserted that "A state of prepared-
ness in the field of exports was the best state of
preparedness for peace....Our neutrality policy aims at
creating the best possible political prerequisite for
this."31
Ward to C.F.A. Warner, 27 April 1943 letter,
PRO FO 371/37124/N258l.
30Ibid.
3l	 GUnther, 12 April 1943 speech, Swedish Home
Service broadcast, wireless intercept translation,
FO 371/37ll8/N2262.
183
Sweden's competitive capacity was strengthened as
a consequence of the war. The Swedish government issued
massive orders for defence materials, and subsidies to
enterprises producing synthetic substitutes for scarce
commodities, in order to satisfy Sweden's pressing defence
requirements. Increased government spending led to more
efficient manufacturing methods and innovative products
which could be immediately sold in the postwar export
markets. For example, the firm producing prefabricated
houses expected to "flood at least a million units into
Europe during the first year after hostilities ended."32
Aided by government loans which were not due for five
years, Swedish businesses made good use of their enforced
wartime idleness to greatly expand and upgrade their
factories.
For example, the war gave Swedish shipowners an
opportunity to modernize and expand their fleets of
steamers and sailing ships. Most of these vessels were
laid up in Gothenburg or Malmö harbours, while the rest
were chartered to Britain. London compensated the ship-
owners for ships that had been lost to enemy action while
on charter. This compensation enabled the shipowners to
replace sunken and obsolescent vessels with new larger
motorships. During 1943, the Swedish merchant navy grew
32Ward to Warner, op. cit.
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from 1,396,999 tons to 1,423,800 gross tons33
Mallet discerned the possible beginning of an
earnest Swedish sales campaign when he reported Gunnar
Hägglöf's departure for London to become the Swedish
minister to the Netherlands government in late November
1943. Mallet surmised that Hägg13f, whom he described as
"unusually quick-witted for a Swede" was assigned to this
"nominal sinecure" in London to promote Swedish exports
and to study long term economic trends in Allied coun-
tries. 34 "When the time comes for Sweden to make some form
of contribution towards postwar reconstruction, Mr. Hggthf
will certainly be heard of."
In her letter to Warner, Ward took a rather dim
view of Swedish economic morality: "it would be very
demoralizing to Sweden's neighbours and above all for
Sweden itself," if the Swedes were to "exploit the
economic advantage it had gained from neutrality." She
suggested that Sweden should be restricted from conducting
independent export trade immediately after the war, and
prevented from using its buying power to obtain overseas
commodities "until Europe's basic needs" were satisfied.35
33 Ibid.; see also, J. Mitcheson to Ministry of
Economic Warfare, 4 February 1944 despatch No. CC 149
PRO FO 371/43476/N911; also, "Holding a Course: Sweden
turns Adverse Wartime Conditions to Profit by Building a
Merchant Fleet," Business Week, 1 July 1944, pp. 113-14.
34Mallet to Eden, 27 November 1943 despatch No.
617, PRO FO 837/899/T13/1.
35ward to Warner, op. cit.
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Ward's attitude was similar to the outlook of
the Norwegian government-in-exile which was expressed in
a four page brief to the Foreign Office of 13 October
1943. The brief, accompanied by a 22-page despatch from
Lawrence Collier, the strongly anti-Swedish British
ambassador to Norway and head of the Northern Department
during the "Phoney War", proposed that the Allies curtail
neutral trade drastically after the war.36
Norway had been a timber exporter before the war. The
Norwegians feared that Sweden might monopolize this trade
after the war if the Swedes were allowed to export freely
while Norway was still recovering from the German occupa-
tion.
The Foreign Office's attitude towards postwar
Swedish trade harmonized with the arguments advanced by
Ward and the Norwegian government. However, it was less
concerned with Norwegian resentment towards Swedish
prosperity than with the wider questions concerning post-
war world commerce. Economists expected that commodities
would remain scarce and expensive in the years following
Germany's surrender. The British government, and to a
lesser extent the United States government, wished to
control international trade through the United Nations'
bureaucracies, to ensure orderly and uniform global
recovery. London desired a regulated rather than a
36 L Collier to Foreign Office, 13 October 1943
despatch PRO FO 371/38467/US089.
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laisser-faire system of world markets, to prevent the more
affluent powers from taking advantage of Europe's and
especially Britain's financial weakness in what was
expected to be a scramble for raw materials. 37 The
British government hoped that, with American co-operation,
the Allies could maintain their wartime commodity controls
in order to provide the basic needs and reconstruction
materials for the liberated and Axis countries of Europe.
Such controls would also enable Britain to obtain overseas
supplies which it could not purchase in a free market
system.
Thus, the Foreign Office believed it was essential
to Britain's interest to enlist Sweden into the Allies'
postwar economic pool:
We shall run the risk in the case of Sweden, who
possesses both the money and the ships, of
losing control over world markets. It is of the
greatest importance to prevent the neutrals from
buying in world markets which we do not control,
i.e., Latin America, some Middle Eastern
nations, in order to stop prices rocketing and a
general scramble for materials in short supply.38
If Sweden were to trade freely with foreign suppliers,
other countries might follow suit. Those countries lacking
37J.E. Coulson (Economic and Reconstruction
Department Foreign Office) 5 May 1943 minute, PRO FO 371/
37l24/N258l; Sir F. Leith-Ross (chief economic advisor to
H.M. Government) to J.E. Coulson, 31 May 1943, PRO FO 371/
37l24/N3048; A Lincoln (Foreign Office) to Lord Drogheda,
19 July 1944 letter PRO FO 37l/40946/UE14O.
38 G. Hall (Foreign Office) to D. Foot, 1 August
1944 letter, PRO FO 371/43492/N4825.
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sufficient funds to compete with Sweden, such as Spain,
might arrange barter transactions, or supplier-loans to
obtain needed materials, which would be especially harmful
to Britain's postwar trading position.
The Swedish government, together with trade union
and business circles, expressed a keen interest in supply-
ing humanitarian aid, as well as reconstruction aid,
through the Swedish Red Cross to war-shattered European
nations, especially to Sweden's Nordic neighbours, for
whom most Swedes felt particular sympathy. As early as
1941, Stockholm had expressed a desire to assist European
relief and had asked London for additional supplies to
build up a reserve for this purpose. The reserve stocks
would be stored in the U.S.A. and would be shipped to
Sweden at the end of the war. The British rejected this
proposal, but encouraged the Swedes to develop a relief
programme and to consult with Allied reconstruction
officials. 39
 By 1943, Sweden had prepared what Gunnar
Hgg1öf has called "a sort of minor Marshall plan to help
neighbour countries." 40
 After consulting UNRRA and other
Allied officials during the summer of 1943, the Swedes
decided to organize their own relief organization, since
the Allies would not allow Sweden a free hand in adminis-
39M.E.W. to Stockholm, 10 July 1941 telegram 385
ARFAR, FO 371/29693/N3993.
40G. Hägglbf, "A Test of Neutrality in Sweden in
the Second World War," International Affairs, Vol. 36,
No. 2, April 1960, p. 165.
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tering relief projects. The Swedish Riksdag had voted
100 million kroner to purchase supplies at the end of the
war for foreign aid. Sweden undertook a certain amount
of relief work in Norway and Greece, while hostilities
41
were still in progress.	 London expected Sweden to
place much more of its economy at the disposal of the
United Nations. The Swedes would assist the reconstruc-
tion of Europe, for prosecution of the war against Japan,
and for Britain's own postwar recovery, by participating
in UNRRA, the United Nations relief and recovery organiza-
tion, and the United Nations shipping pool. Under the
proposed UNRRA programme, Sweden would postpone much of
its peacetime trade for an indeterminate period, during
which time UNRRA authorities would direct Sweden's import
and export trade. Sweden would be unable to purchase
freely on world markets. It would have to restrict con-
sumption of such commodities as coal, petroleum, and
foodstuffs, which would be rationed from an UNRRA commodity
pooi by Allied supply authorities. Moreover, the Swedes
would be expected to donate any available exportable
surpluses in Sweden to the UNRRA pooi (such as excess
stocks of grain and coal remaining from Sweden's domestic
wartime rationing) for distribution to war-torn
countries. 42
41Mallet to Eden, 23 November 1943 Despatch No.
454 PRO FO 371/43492/N5024.
42A. Lincoln (Economic and Reconstruction Depart-
ment, Foreign Office), 26 July 1944, PRO FO 371/43492/
N4 464.
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London also wanted the Swedes to join the United
Nations shipping pool. The Allies anticipated an acute
shortage of merchant shipping when the war in Europe
ended. The addition of Swedish ships to the pool would
enable the Allies to employ Swedish tonnage to carry
reconstruction materials, to repatriate Allied troops
from Europe, and to serve as military transports in the
war against Japan. This arrangement would curtail much
independent Swedish trade, since Swedish vessels would be
administered by the United Nations, who would assign
lower priorities to Swedish requirements. Moreover
Swedish vessels would operate at charter rates well below
those prevailing under normal peacetime conditions.43
How could London expect Sweden to enter into these
postwar arrangements which did not necessarily work to
Sweden's economic advantage? Britain was in a very weak
position to ask the Swedes to voluntarily restrict their
trade, while simultaneously financing Britain's purchase
of Swedish goods. Britain was part of a coalition which
appeared to be determined to stifle what remained of
Sweden's foreign trade. What incentives was London
prepared to offer the Swedes in return for their acceptance
of these sweeping economic concessions?
The Foreign Office and the Ministry of Economic
Warfare concluded that the Swedes were anxious about the
43 R. Law (Foreign Office) to H. Dalton (Board of
Trade), 21 June 1944 letter. PRO FO 371/40911/135885.
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continuation of wartime supplies. Britain would have to
provide a satisfactory quid a
	
in order to reach any
agreement concerning either the cessation of exports to
Germany, or postwar issues. Most British officials
assumed that Britain itself would be a major recipient of
UNRRA relief, owing to its foreign exchange shortages and
deficiencies of such important domestically produced
supplies as coal. Britain's bargaining counters were
meagre, the main one being an offer to allow Sweden to
continue receiving basic ration quotas for the duration of
the war, and for 90 days following the cessation of
hostilities. However, as the flow of basic rations
depended upon American concurrence, the Foreign Office
recognized that Britain could not offer this quid pro quo
until Washington was satisfied that Sweden had stopped
supporting the German war effort.44
Coal would be Sweden's most pressing postwar
requirement. 45 Throughout most of the war, Germany made
a concerted effort to supply about 65% of Sweden's prewar
coal supplies, in order to ensure continued Swedish ore
deliveries. By mid-1944, Germany's coal production and
distribution system was beginning to break down. In
44 L.H. Collins (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to
Sir George Mahon (Board of Trade), 29 June 1944 letter
PRO BT 11,196; R. Tout, 16 July 1943, minute, PRO BT
11, 2196.
45Mitcheson to Ministry of Economic Warfare, 16
June 1944, despatch No. 358, PRO BT 25/15/RG 156/3.
191
addition, German coal supplies to Sweden began to dwindle,
as a consequence of Sweden's declining ore exports. Coal
made up three-quarters of Sweden's industrial fuel needs
before the war, and industrial coal consumption had
declined from 5,138 million tons in 1938 to 2,057 million
tons in 1944.46 Conversion to substitute fuels produced
from wood enabled some industries to reduce their depend-
ence on coal to about 40% by 1944. This was an
unsatisfactory expedient, since wood fuels were less energy
efficient than coal, and used up wood stocks which could
otherwise be processed into exportable products. Sweden
had carefully husbanded coal supplies against a time
when Germany might terminate its exports in retaliation
for a total cessation of Swedish trade. However, this
stockpile would provide only short-term relief. Sweden
needed a large infusion of coal in order to resume
peacetime commercial activity.
The British government planned to offer 1 million
tons of coal from Poland and Silesia after the war as its
"trump card" 47 in the proposed negotiations with Sweden.
Olsson, The Creation of a Modern Arms
Industry, 1939-1974 (Gothenburg: Institute Economic History,
Gothenburg University, 1977). Sweden's total coal and
coke imports had declined from 6,341,000 tons in 1939 to
5 million in 1943 to 3.9 million tons in 1944.
Sven-Olof Olsson, German Coal and Swedish Fuel 1939-1945,
(Gothenburg: Institute of Economic History, Gothenburg
University, 1973) Table 67, pp. 322-9.
Enemy Branch, M.E.W., Economic Intelligence Summary, 13,
January 1945, FO 935/143.
47A. Lincoln, 26 July 1944 minute, PRO FO 371/
434 92/N4464.
192
London recognized that this "trump card" was a weak quid
pro quo for Swedish participation in the reconstruction
schemes, but felt it could not afford a better offer.
The Ministry of Fuel and Power advised the Foreign Office
that Britain's own coal deficiency would be critical, due
to labour shortages and the dilapidated condition of
British mines. Some of Britain's own coal requirements
would have to be furnished from German and Polish sources.
The Ministry therefore insisted that any proposed coal
guarantee to Sweden should not exceed one million tons.
The question of how much coal Britain should offer
to Sweden became a matter of contention within the British
government during July 1944. Parliamentary Secretary
of the Ministry of Economic Warfare Dingle Foot proposed
that Britain should assure Sweden of 3 to 4 million tons
of coal after the war. In early July, Gunnar Hägglöf
intimated in a conversation with Foot and Winfield
Riefler, of the United States Embassy, that Sweden might
be prepared to sever all commercial relations with Germany,
if the Allies were to guarantee postwar supplies of coal
and coke as compensation for economic dislocations arising
48
out of German retaliation to the Swedish measure.
Häggl5f's remarks struck the Ministry of Economic
Warfare as a reasonable way of satisfying the Americans
without engendering Swedish ill-will towards the Allies.
48 D Foot, 5 July 1944, record of conversation
between Foot, Riefler, and Hägglöf, PRO FO 371/43454/N4288.
Foot toflall, (F.O.) 25, July 1944, Top Secret
Letter, Tl3/292, FO 837/917.
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The Ministry felt obliged to ensure continued supplies to
the neutrals, in return for their adherence to war trade
agreements. It believed that the Allies should compen-
sate Sweden substantially if Stockholm ceased trading with
Germany voluntarily. On 18 May 1944, Lord Selborne
informed Richard Law, Minister of State of the Foreign
Office, that he feared that Washington might feel no
further obligation to supply the neutrals once they
severed their commerce with Germany. Selborne warned that
Britain's chances of obtaining postwar supplies from
Sweden would be damaged if the Allies followed this course
of action, which would be considered an act of bad faith
by the Swedes who would become impoverished by the belli-
49gerents.	 After consulting the Board of Trade and
Ministry of Fuel and Power, the Foreign Office opposed
Foot's proposal since it would prematurely discard
Britain's "trump card" in negotiating with Sweden.5°
Foreign Office economic specialist J.E. Coulson minuted on
27 July;
We have continually during the war had to
make, owing to the weakness of our position
or for direct military gains, bargains which
will have a thoroughly bad bearing in the
future. Now that the war seems to be coming
to a close, we must exercise the greatest
care to reduce such bargains to a minimum.5'
49selborne to Law, 18 May 1944 letter, PRO FO 371/
40542/U4 534.
50A. Lincoln, 26 July 1944 minute, PRO FO 371/
43492/N4464.
51J. Coulson, 27 July 1944 minute, PRO FO 371/
43492/N4825.
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In early August, the Ministry of Economic Warfare's
proposal was presented directly to Churchill for resolu-
tion. Both the Foreign Office and the Ministry of
Economic Warfare regarded the matter as "extremely urgent."
Instead of circulating their memoranda for the War
Cabinet's consideration and judgment, they approached
Churchill in his capacity of Minister of Defence, to
decide between the merits of "the short term advantages of
guaranteeing supplies of coal, etc. against the long term
economic disadvantages." 52
 The Foreign Office finally
overruled Foot's proposal by arguing that Sweden's fuel
supplies should be sharply restricted after the war because
the Swedes were potential trade rivals. In its brief of
9 August for the Prime Minister, prepared by Anthony
Nutting, the Foreign Office bluntly stated its opposition
to generously supplying the Swedes:
Sweden will in some fields of trade be one
of our most dangerous competitors, and we
must be careful not to assist Swedish industry
to capture our markets, by providing suff i-
dent fuel to enable it to work at full
capacity at a time when our own industry is
still mobilised for war. Supplies...must be
used to ensure that Swedish trade is not
conducted to our disadvantage.53
There is no record of Churchill's response to the brief,
but it probably achieved its purpose since further discus-
52Nutting to R.J. Shackle (Board of Trade),
5 August 1944, PRO FO 37l/43492/N4825.
53Nutting, 9 August 1944, brief for Prime Minister
PRO FO 371/43492/N4934.
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sion of Foot's proposal does not appear in Foreign or
Cabinet Office files for 1944.
Nutting's prediction that Sweden would be one of
Britain's "most dangerous" postwar competitors might have
been hyperbole to counter Foot's proposal, but many British
officials anticipated keen Anglo-Swedish commercial
rivalry in European markets. In a speech to the Bristol
Aeroplane Cainpany's employees on 23 November 1944, Harcourt
Johnstone, Parliamentary Secretary of the Department of
Overseas Trade, warned that "We shall meet very skillful
competition in engineering from Sweden, as well as from
larger countries." 54
 However, it would be difficult to
"sell cheap" against Swedish competitors since British
industrial output was more costly, owing to expensive
commodities and shipping costs. 55 Britain would have to
expand exports by 50% over prewar volumes in order to
recover financially from the war. Most of this expansion
would take place in Europe, which would no longer be
dominated by Germany, and was the only major market where
the Americans had not made substantial inroads. While
discussing the 'Morganthau Plan' for 'pastoralizing'
Germany with Stalin at the Kremlin on 17 October 1944,
Churchill expressed British commercial intentions in
Europe:
54 H. Johnstone, MP, 23 November 1944, extract
from speech, FO 954/22 part 1.
55Ibid.
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Why shouldn't Britain make the things
needed by Europe...? After this war
Britain would be the only great debtor
nation.. .She would have to make every
effort to increase her exports to buy
food. Russia's intentions to take away
Germany machinery was in harmony with
Great Britain's intentions to fill the ga
left by Germany. This was only justice.5
The British government therefore planned to stifle Swedish
competition by restricting Sweden's imports and by
exerting pressure on Sweden's prospective customers. The
War Cabinet Official Committee on Supply Questions in
Liberated and Conquered Areas report on Swedish trade
stated:
The United Kingdom and Empire production of
certain goods of which Sweden was an important
pre-war exporter, e.g., ferro-alloys, and
ball bearings, has increased considerably
during the war. It is therefore possible
that it would be damaging to the United
Kingdom exporting interests if the liberated
territories are encouraged to look to Sweden
as a supplier of such goods.57
The British government hoped to receive American
diplomatic support for its various postwar negotiations
with Stockholm. It especially hoped that Washington
would provide financial incentives for the proposed
Anglo-Swedish timber agreement or offer increased relief
supplies, such as foodstuffs or a small shipment of coal,
to induce Stockholm to join UNRRA and the Shipping Pool.
U.S. officials also scorned the "dangerous inequities of
56 Sir A. Clark Kerr, British ambassador to the
U.S.S.R., 17 October 1944, record of meeting at the
Kremlin, FO 800/414, Vol. 5.
57 "Report on Swedish Trade," War Cabinet Official
Committee on Supplies in Liberated and Conquered Areas
paper SLAO (44) 106, 28 June 1944 FO 837/917/T13/1/12.
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neutrals cleaning up in postwar Europe," but the Americans
were slower than the British to formulate plans to under-
mine postwar neutral trade. 58
 In late 1944, an inter-
departmental committee advanced a scheme for limiting
neutral imports which resembled those advanced by Barbara
Ward and others in 1943.
	 Some U.S. business interests
lobbied their government to remove trade restrictions
after the war so that they could exploit new business
opportunities. The State Department was interested in
enlisting Swedish membership in the Shipping Pool to
alleviate a shipping shortage in the Pacific, and in
securing Stockholm's participation in the "Safehaven" pro-
gramme - Treasury Secretary Morganthau's scheme to recover
Nazi war loot. The Department was indifferent towards
London's overtures for an Anglo-American common front in
negotiating tJNRRA and other postwar questions. The
Americans insisted that these negotiations should be post-
poned until after Sweden had ceased exporting to Germany.
In view of Washington's attitude, Eden decided to defer
the payments and timber negotiations with Sweden since he
feared that the Americans might accuse London of placing
its own economic interests ahead of economic warfare.
58DL. Gordon and R. Dangerfield, The Hidden
Weapon: The Story of Economic Warfare (New York: Harper &
Bros., 1947), p. 218.
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NORDIC BLOC OR WESTERN BLOC?
Sweden's place in Britain's postwar plans was
mainly related to economic questions. Did the Foreign
Office envisage a new political relationship with Sweden
after the war? Did it hope to entice Stockholm away
from neutrality and towards closer cooperation with
Britain and the smaller Allies? During the war, the
Swedes advanced proposals for a neutral union consisting
of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland. How did this
proposal relate to London's view of the postwar order and
how did the British respond to it?
In accordance with the Atlantic Charter, the
Foreign Office had begun to consider, in 1942, schemes for
a postwar world security organization which would replace
the League of Nations. Eden also recognized the need for
an organization to deal with European security in addition
to a general body for settling world-wide problems.
Britain could not harmonize immediate relations with the
governments-in-exile nor could it bolster morale in
occupied countries without a definite programme for the
future. 59
 However, the Foreign Office did not begin to
examine seriously proposals for ensuring European stability
until mid-1944. Despite Eden's desire for a coherent
British policy towards Europe, many members of the Foreign
Office questioned the necessity for long-range planning
595ir Liwellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy
in the Second World War, Vol. V London: H.M.S.O., 1976),
p. 9.
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and preferred to deal with immediate questions. Sir Orme
Sargent pointedly declared on 28 June 1944: "I am not in
the least interested in crystal-gazing or entering into a
competition with the editor of Old More's Almanack...
Foreign policy has to be modified and adopted according
to changing circumstances." 60 London's failure to develop
a consistent policy towards postwar Europe was not
entirely due to the Foreign Office's procrastination.
The Foreign Office had established a Reconstruction
Department, under Gladwyn Jebb, to prepare studies and
position papers presenting various policy options. However,
while other government bodies, such as the Board of Trade,
could formulate plans according to concrete data concerning
Britain's basic needs, the Foreign Office had to consider
domestic and foreign political views carefully. Eden and
the Foreign Office also had to contend with Churchill's
tendency to view Roosevelt, Stalin, and himself as the
arbiters of Europe and his mercurial alternative proposals
of Anglo-U.S. collaboration or Anglo-Soviet collaboration,
depending on how close he felt to either Allied leader at
any given time. Since the Foreign Office believed U.S.
participation in the world organization to be vital to
postwar stability, it felt obliged to take into account
the conflicting attitudes of Roosevelt, the State Depart-
60Sir O.G. Sargent, 28 June 1944 minute, FO 371/
4074l/A/U6254; Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 118.
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ment, Congress, and the U.S. public. It also had to allay
Soviet suspicions that the Western powers were preparing a
postwar coalition against the U.S.S.R. London and Moscow
concluded a twenty-year alliance in July 1941. The treaty
did not address postwar problems and was mainly intended
to sanction the wartime coalition against Germany. The
Foreign Office, and Eden in particular, hoped that it would
ensure postwar Anglo-Soviet cooperation. The Foreign
Office believed that the Russians did not harbour aggres-
sive designs on Europe, and that they were willing to
maintain peace if Britain demonstrated good faith towards
Moscow. Consequently, Eden felt compelled to defer
serious consideration of postwar European security system
in the interests of securing a general concensus with
Moscow and Washington to ensure that they joined the world
organization.
In 1942, the Norwegian government in exile had
approached the Foreign Office with proposals for an
'Atlantic' security system for 'keeping Germany down.'61
Trygve Lie, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, asserted that
Norway had common diplomatic, economic, and ideological
interests with Britain and the United States which should
be protected by "binding and committing military agreements
in the defense of the Northern Atlantic." 62 The Norwegian
61Woodward, Vol. V, op. cit., p. 8. L. Collier
(British Ambassador to Norway) to Eden, 6 June 1942
despatch 27, FO 37l/32808/N3004.
62Nils Morten Udgaard, Great Power Politics and
Norwegian Foreign Policy (Oslo: Universitetsfollaget,
1973), pp. 25-26.
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declaration prompted the Dutch and Belgians to propose
similar defense arrangements for Western Europe. All
three governments pressed for the Foreign Office's views
so that more detailed coordinated planning could be
initiated.
The Foreign Office favoured certain aspects of the
Norwegian, Dutch, and Belgian proposals. If adopted, the
defense arrangement would commit the United States to "a
definite undertaking" to maintain the peace in postwar
Europe. 63 Moreover, Eden was attracted by the political
implications of the Norwegian proposal which "presupposes
the abandonment of the conception of neutrality and might
be developed into one of the cornerstones of a future
international policing organization." 64
 However, the
Foreign Office decided to postpone further discussion
about 'Atlantic' bases because the Ministerial Committee
on Reconstruction Problems maintained that it would be
unable to evaluate the military aspects of the proposal
until the outcome of the war had become more certain.
Furthermore, the Foreign Office was aware that most members
of the U.S. government, apart from Hull and Under Secretary
of State Sumner Welles, opposed the proposal on the
grounds that it revived the concept of spheres of influence
in Europe and would detract from world security. In July
63Eden to Halifax, draft despatch, annex to Eden
to War Cabinet, 22 October 1942 memorandum; Post War
Atlantic Bases, WP (42) 480, CAB 66/30.
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1942, John Foster Dulles, the influential Republican
spokesman, told Eden that the United States would not
support an arrangement which appeared to convert the
Western European states into British satellites. 65
 The
British offered no comments or suggestions to their smaller
Allies, apart from taking "grateful note of the generous
offer to postwar bases."66
In March 1944, the Belgian and Dutch governments
pressed the Foreign Office to give more serious considera-
tion to the formation of a security bloc in Western
Europe. Henri Spaak, the Belgian Foreign Minister warned
the British that the Soviet-Czechoslovak mutual assistance
treaty of 12 December 1943 portended the creation of a
de facto Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe. 67
 However, this
approach received as little official British encouragement
as Lie's proposals had in 1941.
Members of the Foreign Office assumed that Britain
would enjoy close ties with the Western European Allies
after the war. However, they were uncertain as to
the nature of this relationship and its place in an
European order dominated by two, possibly three Great
Powers. Eden privately stated that the great powers would
occupy the same position at the end of the Second World War
65Udgaard, op. cit., p. 50.
66 Eden to War Cabinet, op. cit.
67Woodward, Vol. V., op. cit., p. 182.
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as in 1815, with Stalin in place of Tsar Alexander. Sargent
concurred, and sent Eden a letter citing that although some
of the "players" were different, the "dramatis personnae"
would be the same as at the end of the Napoleonic Wars.68
According to Sargent, Russia would play the same part as
"Power A", numerically the strongest power in Europe,
"although it is not really sure whether it wanted to play
the part." The United States would take Britain's former
role as "Power B", the victorious non-European power, whose
strength stemmed from commerce and industry, and who hoped
to avoid European commitments in order to exploit trade
in the rest of the world. Britain would assume Austria's
former role as "Power C",
the victorious European power which because
it suspects A's policy and fears B's lack of
participation, wants to see the prewar system
restored and stabilized under some system
which it will be able to control...to prevent
any one Great Power from dominating Europe....
The Power C will inevitably be the champion
of the smaller European states.69
Sargent advised Eden to study Metternich's policy
to understand how to manipulate a postwar 'Concert of
Europe.' "Metternich's description of his programme in
1815 was 'Monarchy and Legitimacy' whereas ours will be
68 Sargent - Eden, 20 December 1943 letter, FO 800/




'Democracy and Independence' but the objective is the same
in both cases."
Other officials stated the case for collective
security in more serious terms. John Wheeler-Bennet
maintained that a British-led bloc in Europe was vital to
Britain's defence. In a personal paper, of 10 April 1944,
for the Joint Staff Mission in Washington, he argued that:
Never again can Britain's security be
jeopardized by the blind adherence of
Belgium or Holland to the myth of neutrality -
nor the well-intentioned but misguided belief
of the Scandinavian Powers in the principle
of unilateral and exemplary disarmament. iO
The Foreign Office had no plans for transforming
these sentiments into policy. Eden was reluctant to
promote detailed preparations for a British-led bloc in
Western Europe, fearing that such activity would alienate
Washington and prompt Moscow to create a similar organiza-
tion in Eastern Europe. If Europe was divided into
spheres of influence, Britain would be denied influence in
Eastern Europe. The Soviets might attempt to rehabilitate
Germany as an ally against the West.
Although an undercurrent of concern towards
Moscow's intentions appears in the Foreign Office's
correspondence during the spring and summer of 1944, most
officials were sanguine about the prospects for Anglo-
Soviet cooperation after the war. Eden informed Parlia-
70J.W. Wheeler-Bennett, 10 April 1944, The Future
of British Policy in Europe enclosed in W. Adams, J.S.M.,
to Field Marshall Sir John Diii, 26 April 1944,
CAB 122/1559.
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ment on 25 May that suspicion of Russia was a "relic of
our recent past" which was largely due to "ignorance"
which could be overcome through exercising the "greatest
frankness and understanding on both sides in all our
dealings." 71 In August, Warner minuted that although some
evidence suggested Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe,
he believed the Russians would cooperate fully with
Britain. He cited that Stalin had told Sir Archibald
Clark-Kerr, "apparently spontaneously" that Poland must be
allied with the West as well as Russia after the war, and
that the Soviets would not promote communism in Germany.72
Many British officials believed that Russia would require
twenty years to recover from the war, and lacked the
resources to attack the West. The Soviets appeared
anxious to secure imports from the West. This economic
dependence would strengthen Moscow's desire for peaceful
cooperation. The Russians would be mainly concerned with
preventing Germany or any other power from threatening
its security in the future. Any British proposal for a
Western Alliance would have to be formulated in terms
which would not create the impression that Britain wanted
a coalition against Russia. 73 Stalin had told Eden in
71Eden, 25 May 1944, passage of speech during




72Warner, 11 August 1944 minute, FO 371/40741/Al
73F.K. Roberts, 26 May 1944 minute, FO 371/40740/
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1941 that he would not oppose British bases in France or
Northwestern Europe, and wished for a postwar international
force to control the Kiel Canal so that Germany would not
be able to close the Baltic. 74
 The Foreign Office
believed that a British led 'Western Regional Security
Group' would not offend the Soviets, if it were established
under the auspices of the World Organization and functioned
as a means to 'keep Germany down.'
Foreign Office representatives in the interdepart-
mental Post-Hostilities Planning Staff therefore proposed
that Britain should organize, with American and Soviet
approval, a collection of armed Western European states to
act as a police force to control Germany. Apart from
measures to prevent German rearmament, such as economic
sanctions, Britain would have to maintain a large air force,
while the Western Europeans would be required to support
substantial land forces on the continent. France would be
74 1n May 1944, the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff
drafted a proposal for a U.N. military base in Denmark near
the Kiel Canal, which would protect the Baltic and dis-
courage Germany from rearming. The U.N. garrison would be
a division, composed of battalions contributed by Britain,
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden (if the Swedes joined the
United Nations). The Foreign Office rejected the plan
because neither Sweden nor Denmark were members of the
U.N., and Russia might insist upon basing troops in Denmark,
Since Denmark would assume responsibility for the Canal,
Egypt might demand that the Suez Canal be similarly 'inter-
nationalized.' Post-Hostilities Planning Sub-Committee,
12 May 1944, P.H.P. (44) (0) (Draft);
Warner, 20 May 1944 minute, F.K. Roberts, 23 May 1944,
FO 371/40740/U438l
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revived as a major power and would provide the bulk of
the forces on the continent. The military representatives
insisted that plans for a Western bloc should also
provide for the contingency of a possible breakup of the
world organization, and the Anglo-Soviet-U.S. alliance,
after the war. They argued that a Western Security Group
should be organized to provide Britain with a defence in
depth in the event of a war with Russia. The group's
existence would strengthen London's diplomatic stance
vis-a-vis Moscow. Gladwyn Jebb, the head of the Post-
Hostilities Planning (P.H.P.) Staff informed the Foreign
Office that the Chiefs of Staff believed that the need
for a large air force was not apparent "if we contemplate
solely a disarmed Germany," but would be essential "so
long as the Soviet Union maintains a powerful offensive
bomber fleet."75
The armed services' recommendations were heavily
criticized by the Foreign Office, some of whose members
did not regard Russia as a serious threat to postwar
peace. They inferred that the proposals stemmed from the
services' ingrained fear of the 'Bolshevik Bogey', which
had been reinforced by poor relations between Soviet
authorities and the British military mission in the
U.S.S.R. Those officials who did regard Russia as a
formidable foe were andous to prevent discord with Moscow,
75Jebb-Cadogan, 7 June 1944 minute, FO 371/
40741A/06283.
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and therefore sought to prevent any discussion concerning
future Anglo-Soviet discord. The Foreign Office pressed
the P.H.P. to expunge the proposals from the
report, but Jebb insisted that the question of security
against Russia was just as valid as security against
Germany. The Chiefs of Staff also favoured the proposals:
We realise that we must on no account
antagonise Russia by giving the appearance
of building up the Western European bloc
against her, and for this reason the
immediate object of a Western European
Group must be the keeping down of Germany;
but we also feel that the more remote,
but more dangerous, possibility of a 	 76hostile Russia...must not be lost sight of..."
The Foreign Office felt it should make some effort
to accommodate the Chief's opinions, so that they would
not regard it as being an "ostrich" towards the U.S.S.R.
as it had once been towards Germany. It also tried to
convince the military planners and the Chiefs to, in
Warner's words, "appear to like the Russians however
annoying they might be." 77 In spite of these attempts,
the Foreign Office was unable to reconcile its differences
with the Chiefs of Staff or the military planners. In the
late summer, the P.H.P. prepared a paper, which was
endorsed by the Chiefs but condemned by the Foreign Office,
76Comments by the Chiefs of Staff on Policy towards
Western Europe, 28 July 1944, FO 37l/40741A/U6793.
77Warner, 20 September 1944 minute, FO 37l/40741A/
U7618.
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that proposed that a rearmed Germany, or at least the
western portion of it, should defend Western Europe
against the U.S.S.R.78 The P.H.P. concluded, in its
final report of 9 November, that the Soviet Union would
be fully recovered from the war by 1955, and that Russia
could seriously threaten British, European, and overseas
interests. Although Russia's strength would oblige
Britain to strive for friendly relations with Moscow, the
planners stressed the need for a Western European bloc to
provide a buffer in the event of Anglo-Soviet hostilities.
The planners believed that the inclusion of Sweden and
other neutrals in this bloc would be "desirable."79
Sweden's principal value to British defence would be as a
location for air bases to intercept Soviet bombers and
missiles. The Foreign Office reacted to the planner's
report by preparing their own papers to "scotch the
'Russian bogey' thesis."8°
The Foreign Office did not attempt to resolve the
interdepartmental differences over the proposed Western
Security Group. The Belgian and Dutch attitude towards
Hostilities Planning Staff, 15 September
1944, Security in Western Europe and the North Atlantic,
P.H.P. (44) 17(0) (Revised Draft); Eden described it as a
"terrible paper however it is looked at," 28 September
1944 minute, FO 371/4O74lA/U7618.
79Post-Hostilities Planning Staff, 9 November 1944,
Security in Western Europe and the North Atlantic, P.H.P.
(44) 27(0) (Final), FO 371/40741B/U8181.
80Jebb, 18 December 1944 minute, FO 371/40741B/
U8523.
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Soviet expansion was widely known in Britain and abroad
and had become embarrassing to the Foreign Office by late
1944. Churchill maintained that the small states of
Western Europe were too weak to defend themselves and
would constitute a "liability" to Britain. 81 He argued
that continued cooperation with Moscow would ensure
Britain's security better than would an inadequate
alliance. The British delegations did not encounter any
Soviet or U.S. opposition when they proposed a clause in
the United Nations charter which would permit regional
security organizations. However, articles in the Russian
press and remarks by Soviet diplomats indicated that
Moscow suspected that Britain was attempting to organize
an anti-Soviet coalition in Europe. The Foreign Office
instructed Pmbassador Clark-Kerr to inform Molotov on
28 November that London had not considered Spaak's propo-
sals for a Western bloc. This representation did not
allay Russian suspicions. In late December, D. Malguine,
the second secretary of the Soviet legation in Stockholm,
told Gordon Knox, the U.S. press attache, that London was
pursuing a "tortuous policy" towards the U.S.S.R.82
He added that Britain had fought Russia in the past, and
Moscow viewed current discussion about a 'Western bloc'
as a move towards future confrontation.
81Woodward, Vol. V., op. cit., p. 182.
- Johnson, 27 December 1944 memorandum,
Hershell V. Johnson papers, op. cit.
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The Swedes were also concerned about the security
of small states in postwar Europe. Unlike the Royal
Norwegian government, which had denounced neutrality as
a "bankrupt" principle, 83 Stockholm maintained that the
Nordic states could only ensure their sovereignty in a
future conflict by organizing a neutral bloc.84
Many circles in Sweden described Lie's renuncia-
tion of neutrality and his advocacy of an Atlantic
Alliance as "myopic." 85 Although Germany had invaded
neutral Norway and Denmark in 1940, most Swedes continued
to believe that Scandinavia would become a battleground
between the great powers if a Nordic state abandoned
neutrality and supported one belligerent against another.
As with the traditional isolationists in the United States,
these Swedes feared that an external alliance would only
draw Scandinavia into a conflict which was irrelevant to
the region. Boheman told Lie in October 1942 that the
Swedish Government was "fundamentally and unilaterally
opposed" to Sweden's or Norway's alliance with any non-
Scandinavian power. 86 This had been the essence of the
Swedish-Norwegian agreement of August 1914. Stockholm
83Udgaard, op. cit., p. 25.
84Malletto Eden, 30 April 1942 despatch 223, FO 371/
33062/N239l.
86 Eden to Mallet, 10 November 1942 despatch 220,
FO 37l/32808/N5559.
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hoped that this principle could be embodied in a 'Nordic
bloc' led by Sweden and including Norway, Denmark,
Finland, and possibly Iceland. The Scandinavian and
Finnish foreign ministers met periodically during the
inter-war years to try to coordinate foreign and economic
policies. In the late 1930's, Prime Minister Hansson pro-
posed a Scandinavian defence union, and by the end of the
Russo-Finnish war, this scheme had been revised to include
Finland as well. By 1942, many journalists and academics
envisaged a heavily armed Nordic bloc with a common
foreign, defence, and economic policy. This bloc would
eschew involvement in European politics and concentrate
on matters which immediately concerned its members in the
Baltic. Some Swedes even advocated the integration of
Nordic economic and political institutions into a
Zoilverein system. 87
The Nordic bloc concept was widely popular in
Sweden, even amongst Swedes who sympathized with the
Allies. This popularity was due to widespread Swedish
assumptions about the postwar world order. Whereas
the Norwegians and the British wanted an arrangement
to prevent Germany from disturbing the peace in the
future, the Swedes believed that the U.S.S.R
to Hull, 23 July 1942 telegram 1912,
U.S. legation, Stockholm report, "A Nordic Union?"
enclosed in Greene (Charge in Sweden) to Hull, 14 October
1942 despatch 1061, National Archives, R.G. 59, 858.00.
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would be the main threat to postwar stability. Even the
normally pro-Allied newspaper, Sozialdemokraten, argued
that Britain would ultimately have to form a entente with
Germany. 88
 In December 1942, Mallet summarized this
Swedish fear, "On the assumption that Germany will be
powerless for many years to come after the war..., if a
showdown occurred between Russia and ourselves, Russia's
first move might very well be an attack on Scandinavia."89
On 6 July 1942, the Foreign Office rejected the
concept of a postwar Nordic bloc as "unacceptable and
generally impractable." 9 ° A report by G.M. Gathorne-Hardy,
of the Political Intelligence Department, examined all
aspects of Scandinavian cooperation and formed the basis
of the Foreign Office's policy towards the Swedish
proposals. Gathorne-Hardy stated that although Swedes,
Norwegians, and Danes had a strong cultural affinity for
each other, previous attempts by Scandinavian rulers to
create a total or partial union in the region "have been
uniformly disappointing in their results." 91 According
88L. Collier (British Ambassador to Norway) to
Eden, 6 June 1942 despatch 27, FO 37l/32808/W3004.
89Mallet to Warner, 5 December 1942 letter 141/29/
42, FO 371/32808/N6368.
90Warner, 7 July 1942 minute, FO 371/32808/N3523.
91G.M. Gathorne-Hardy, 6 July 1942, Possibilities
of a Post War Northern Bloc, enclosed in Eden to Mallet,
22 July 1942 despatch 137 FO 371/32808/N3523.
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to Gathorne-Hardy, most Norwegians harboured deep resent-
ment towards Denmark and Sweden as a legacy of Norway's
union with the Danish Crown (1397-1814), and subsequently
with the Swedish Crown (1814-1905). Linguistically and
ethnically, Finland had nothing in common with the Scandi-
navian states. Only the Swedes felt any large degree of
sympathy towards Finland, and this was largely because a
substantial number of Swedes lived in southern Finland.
The Nordic states' economies were competitive rather than
complementary. Norway, Sweden, and Denmark earned a sub-
stantial income from ship chartering, and Norway, Sweden,
and Finland were major producers of timber and wood pulp.
Denmark was a major exporter of foodstuffs, but had been
unable to sell these goods to other Scandinavian countries
who protected their own farmers with price supports and
import quotas. The Scandinavian states lacked the popula-
tion and other requisites to form an effective military
deterrent to invasion. Moreover, the region held several
areas which were strategically critical to any belligerent's
northern defences. Norway's fjords afforded naval bases
from which such a power could threaten shipping in the
North Sea and the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans. Denmark com-
manded the entrance to the Baltic, Finland the approaches
to Leningrad. Norway's and Denmark's main strategic inter-
est lay in maintaining good relations with Britain, the
dominant sea power. Finland's main concern was protection
from Russia. Gathorne-Hardy maintained that Oslo would
probably not enter into an alliance to defend Finland
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against the U.S.S.R. - Britain's ally. Sweden lacked
its neighbours' strategic attributes. An aggressor,
such as Germany, could freely obtain Sweden's raw materials
through commercial and diplomatic methods without resorting
to war. "...even the hostile occupation of all her
[Sweden's] neighbours need not necessarily put an end to
her own enjoyment of the advantages of neutrality."
Sweden would be the only beneficiary of a neutral Nordic
bloc since it would provide Sweden "with a shock absorber
on every flank."92
Stockholm's Nordic vision was at odds with British
interests because it mitigated against any future
collaboration between Britain and Norway and Denmark.
Swedish pronouncements also encouraged "neutral minded-
ness" amongst Norwegians and Danes who did not support
Lie's proposal. Furthermore, the Nordic bloc concept
prompted Swedes to "cling to outworn, unworkable ideas of
neutrality and isolation, blinds them to the realities of
the new situation and prevents them from drawing the
conclusion we want them to draw in the shape of postwar
cooperation with Britain and the U.S." 93 However, the
Foreign Office decided that no active propaganda should
be conducted against the Swedish prorosals, since the
Nordic idea "enhanced Swedish sympathy for Norway in her
92Ibid
93Ministry of Information and political Warfare
Executive, 10 October 1942 Directive FP.85/749, Handling
of the subject of "Scandinavian Unity or Nordic Union" in
British propaganda, FO 371/32808/N5606.
216
present plight." 94 British officials in Stockholm were
instructed to evade discussion of the Nordic bloc if at
all possible. If 'cornered' by Swedes, they were advised
to avoid saying anything which would discourage Swedish
sympathy with Norway and Denmark, and not to criticize
the Nordic bloc, openly.
Ironically, Churchill favoured the Nordic bloc
Scheme, in spite of Foreign Office policy and his own nega-
tive attitude towards Sweden and the neutrals in general.
He told Boheman in October 1942 that he expected Sweden
to lead a confederation of Scandinavian states after the
war. 95 Churchill was attracted to the concept because of
its possible application throughout Europe. Churchill
did not always share Eden's sanguine outlook towards
Soviet cooperation in a 'Four Power' security organization,
We cannot...tell what sort of a Russia
and what kind of a Russian demands we
shall have to face. It would be a
measureless disaster if Russian barbarism
overlaid the culture and independence of
the ancient states of Europe.96
In a minute to Eden of 21 October 1942, Churchill
suggested a Council of Europe to buttress against Soviet
94Ibid.
95W.M. Carlgren, Swedish Foreign Policy During
the Second World War, English trans., Ernest Spencer,
(London: Ernest Benn, 1977), p. 137.
Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. IV,
The Hinge of Fate (New York: Houghton Miff un, 1950;
Bantam Books, 1962), p. 488.
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influence and to promote greater harmony on the
continent. Within the council, smaller states would
promote their interests and contribute to their common
defence by forming regional confederations such as the
Scandinavian, Balkan, and Danubian blocs. The Foreign
Office did favour closer collaboration between Poland and
Czechoslovakia in one instance, and between Greece and
Jugoslavia in another, which were regarded as 'feasible'
arrangements unlike the scheme advanced by Sweden.
Churchill's opinions did not alter the Foreign Office
policy towards the Nordic bloc. He did not press Eden to
seriously study the issues which were set forth in his
minute: "It would be easy to dilate upon these themes.
Unhappily the war has prior claim on your attention and
"97
on mine.
Churchill revived his advocacy of regional confed-
erations after a clandestine visit to Turkey in January
1943 to persuade the Turks to enter the war. He offered
them the leadership in a postwar Balkan confederation if
they were to join the Allies. He reiterated his earlier
Council of Europe proposals in a memorandum to Attlee on
1st February and publicly in a speech on 21st March.98
Churchill expanded on his concept during a luncheon in
Washington on 20 May 1943, with Vice-President Wallace,
97Ibid.
98Churchill to Attlee, 1 February 1943 telegram
Strategem C/6 FO 954/22 part 1; Barker, op. cit., p. 207.
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Secretary of War Stimson, and Welles. He stressed that he
hoped postwar Europe would include a strong France, and
confederations of small powers such as the Scandinavian
states. 99 When asked if this system would include
neutrals, or just members of the United Nations, Churchill
remarked that the neutrals should be induced to join the
Allies before the end of the war. He thought that all
possible means of persuasion should be employed to secure
this provided that it "could be done with safety to the
nations concerned." As an example, Churchill mentioned
that the Allies should help build up Turkey's forces to
the point where the Turks could intervene "at the right
moment." He also believed that intervention would morally
benefit the neutrals. "When the United Nations had
brought the guilty nations to the bar of justice, I can
see little but an ineffective and inglorious role for
those who might remain neutral until the end."10°
The Swedes interpreted Churchill's remarks as
101
official approval for their proposal.	 At the end of
March, Edvin Sk6ld, Sweden's defence minister announced
that other Nordic states would be welcome to join a post-
99Record, Conversation during luncheon at British
Embassy, Washington, 22 May 1943, FO 954/22 part 1.
1001bid.
101 1n the spring of 1942, Stafford Cripps had
informally proposed a Scandinavian bloc. A leading
article in the Economist advocated a Swedish led bloc, to
counterbalance Germany and the U.S.S.R. Many Swedes inferred
from these statements that London sympathized with their
proposals.
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war organization which would coordinate its members'
defences but would not infringe upon their domestic or
foreign policies. Apart from the Polish government, which
hoped to form an alliance with Czechoslovakia, most
foreign reaction to Sköld's announcement was negative. The
Royal Norwegian government was still firmly opposed to
postwar collaboration with Sweden and Finland)02
Churchill's remarks did not prompt the Foreign Office to
reconsider its policy towards the 'Nordic bloc.' In March,
it instructed the Ministry of Information and Political
Warfare Executive that British propaganda should expound
on the theme that small state unions were an anachronism
and that the Nordic Powers had no "common strategic or
economic interests. 103 For example, Finland was allied
with Germany against Russia, which was on the same side
as Norway. The Americans did not support Churchill's
proposals on regional blocs. Roosevelt's advisor, Harry
Hopkins, advised Churchill to abandon the scheme because
isolationists in Congress might regard the regional blocs
as a revival of 'spheres of influence' diplomacy, and
compel his Government to abandon Europe. 104 The Soviet
102Udgaard, p. 38.
103Nutting to D.A. Routh, P.W.E., 12 March 1943,
FO 371/37075/N1109.
104 Barker, op. cit., p. 208.
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Union was the strongest opponent of small state confeder-
ations. Molotov had denounced Swedish proposals for a
Nordic Defence Union in the early spring of 1940. In the
summer of 1942, Moscow condemned Polish-Czech collabora-
tion and other Eastern European alliances. In the early
summer of 1943, the Russians warned Stockholm against
organizing a Nordic bloc which might be directed against
the Soviet Union. At the Allied Foreign Ministers
Conference at Moscow in October 1943, Molotov presented a
paper criticising regional blocs as reminiscent of the
105
prewar cordon sanitaire	 against the U.S.S.R., which
would be detrimental to the peaceful development of
Europe. Eden and Hull did not voice any strong objections
to Molotov's statement and Izvestia published an editorial
proclaiming Anglo-American support for Moscow's policy
towards the small powers. A month later at the Teheran
Conference, Stalin reiterated Molotov's argument and was
supported by Roosevelt. Churchill reluctantly endorsed
his allies' position while expressing reservations towards
a Europe divided into disunited small powers.
' 05Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943,
Vol. 1. The Conferences at Moscow and Teheran, p. 639,
762-3.
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SWEDEN AND THE U.S.S.R.
By 1944, British observers noted that Swedish
interest in a postwar Nordic bloc appeared to have waned.
William Montagu-Pollock, the British charge in Stockholm
reported that Swedes were beginning to prefer the concept
of Swedish cooperation with the world at large to member-
ship in an isolationist regional bloc. 106 The Swedish
Foreign Ministry concluded in mid 1943 that such a confe-
deration was unfeasible since Norway and Finland were un-
likely to join jt2° 7 The Royal Norwegian government had
denounced Sweden's proposals and Finland would probably
become absorbed within a Soviet sphere of influence.
Stockholm thus developed its foreign policy on the basis
of immediate reality. It improved relations with the
Norwegian government by allowing Norwegian exiles to
organize paramilitary units In Sweden. The Swedes offered
to mediate a Russo-Finnish truce. They believed Helsinki
would obtain more favourable Soviet peace terms if the
Finns withdrew from the war before the Red Army crushed
Finnish resistance completely.108
106Montagu-Pollock to Eden, 22 June 1944 despatch
357, FO 837/913.
Mclure, U.S. Legation to Johnson, 12 July
1943 memorandum, Hershell V. Johnson Papers, Harry S.
Truman Library.
108Carlgren, op. cit., p. 182; Boheman, op. cit.,
p. 224.
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The Swedes were willing to participate In inter-
national organizations which were concerned with non-
political questions such as relief. They were not prepared
to join the United Nations, however, since its membership
was restricted to allies against the Axis. Moreover,
Stockholm did not intend to renounce its neutrality to
join a successor to the League of Nations. Many Swedes
doubted that the postwar World Organization would prove a
better stabilizing force in European afairs than its
predecessor. In mid-1944, many Swedish journalists and
politicians were beginning to fear that the Western Allies
and Russia would divide Europe into distinct spheres of
influence. The initial collaboration between the victo-
rious Allies would degenerate into rivalry for strategic
and ideological interests. They felt Britain was weakened
to the point where it would be unable to play a decisive
role in international affairs.'° 9
 Sweden expected Russia
to dominate Eastern Europe, and exert overwhelming
influence over the rest of the continent through its
military strength in the East and the growth of Communist
parties in the West.° The United States was the only
power strong enough to counter Soviet influence, but its
109Ministry of Information, Overseas Planning
Committee, 20 October 1944, Sweden's Attitude towards the
Allies (U.K. in particular), FO 371/43490/N7110.
1 °Foreign Office to Eden, 6 October 1944, Sundry
Issues of Scandinavia vis--vis Growing Soviet Power,
FO 371/43213/N6163.
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postwar aims were uncertain. Swedish observers assumed
Washington would revert to prewar isolationism. Some
believed it would be a mistake for Sweden to orient its
trade exclusively with the United States and other
Western nations. Gunnar Myrdal, noted economist, socialist
member of parliament, and chairman of the State Postwar
Economic Planning Commission, warned that the West would
be impoverished after the war. In a book, yarning For
Fredsoptimism (Beware of Peace Optimism), which was widely
read and discussed during the summer of 1944, Myrdal
predicted that the U.S.A.'s prosperous wartime economy
would be transformed into depression, and that it would be
unable to employ 15 million demobilized veterans) 11 An
American depression would weaken other countries' efforts
to recover from the war. Myrdal advised that Sweden's
economy should become independent of American connexions
in order to avoid being drawn into the forthcoming depres-
sion. Influential Swedes argued that Sweden should walk a
diplomatic tightrope between Russia and the West after the
war, as it had done between Germany and the Allies during
the war. Prime Minister Hansson informed an American
journalist, "It is obvious that commercially and politi-
cally Sweden must have and should have close and cordial
relations with the U.S.S.R."112
111G.N. Lamming (Commercial Department, H.M. Lega-
tion, Stockholm) to Foreign Office, 4 September 1944
despatch 522, enclosing summary and translation of yarning
For Fredsoptimism, FO 371/43464/N5582.
112John F. Scott, 29 Nov. 1944, record of conversa-
tion, Hershell V. Johnson papers.
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By mid-1944, some British circles became concerned
that the U.S.S.R. might draw Sweden into a postwar Soviet
sphere of influence, while the Western Allies were
preoccupied with pressing the Swedes to eliminate what
remained of their commerce with Germany. In the earlier
war years, the Foreign Office assumed that popular Russo-
phobia, strengthened by Swedish sympathies for
Finland, might lead Sweden to bolster the German war
economy, in order to stop Soviet power from engulfing
the Baltic. 113
 To this end, the British government directed
propaganda to Sweden depicting the Soviet Union as a
freedom loving country, which was valiantly fighting the
Nazi war machine, and harboured no malice towards small
democracies like Sweden. In late 1943, Peter Tennant, the
British press attache in Stockholm, reported that British
propaganda had been "highly successful" in reducing
Russophobia amongst the Swedish public, and had inspired
widespread admiration for the Red Army's fighting
qualities. 114
 In the summer of 1944, the British legatiort
in Stockholm reported that many Swedish government off i-
cials and businessmen had developed a more accommodating
" 3British legation, Stockholm to Ministry of
Information, 1 April 1943 letter, PRO FO 371/37075;
Ministry of Information paper #120, "Plan of Propaganda to
Sweden," 25 February 1943, PRO FO 371/37075/N1l09.
4 In June, Tennant reported that the Soviet
documentary, "Stalingrad," was well received by Swedish
cinema audiences and the Swedish press, who were particu-




Improved Russo-Swedish relations would offer
Swedish traders the prospect of large-scale exports of
capital goods and reconstruction materiels to Russia, in
return for commodities, such as coal and oil, which might
be difficult to obtain from British and American sources.
In May 1944, Mallet warned London that strengthened
Soviet-Swedish ties could lead to a complete re-orientation
of Swedish trade in favour of Russia once surface transport
became possible after German evacuation of Finland and
the Eastern Baltic. 115 Mallet advised the Foriegn Office
that although the Swedes did not want to be absorbed into
a Soviet sphere of influence, Stockholm might conclude
that there was no other recourse if the British and
Americans were to invoke sanctions which would deny
Swedish access to more desirable markets in the West.
Limited Russian-Swedish trade had already begun
in early 1944. The Scotland-Stockholm air route was
extended to Russia in order to transport ball bearings
purchased by Britain on Moscow's behalf for Soviet arma-
ments production. The Soviet government was not party to
the 1943 War Trade Agreement, and was therefore not
obliged to support Anglo-American pressure tactics. Nutting
assumed that the Russian desire to maintain these imports
15Mallet to Eden, 12 May 1944 despatch #534,
PRO FO 371/43502/N2919. Mallet to Chancery, 12 May 1944
minute, PRO FO 188/453.
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might cause Moscow to " queer our pitch" 116
 by demonstrat-
ing a lack of enthusiasm for the Western Allies' economic
warfare policy. Whereas the Soviet government had derided
Sweden's neutrality in 1943, during 1944 Moscow refrained
from criticizing Sweden's trade with Germany. Alexandria
Kollontai, the Soviet minister and dean of the Stockholm
diplomatic corps, who was working closely with the Swedes
in securing a Finnish armistice, deplored American and
British behaviour during the ball bearing negotiations.
Mallet assumed that Kollontai had advised her government
to avoid association with the Western Allies' pressure
tactics for the sake of the peace negotiations with Finland,
as well as for the prospect of furthering Soviet trade.117
In June, C.R. Wheeler, an official of the Ministry of
Supply's Iron and Steel Control, informed Warner that
Hägglöf had told him of Russian negotiations for tools and
machinery which, according to Mme. Kollontai, could be
worth 100 million kroner. 118
 Warner felt that Hggthf's
remark was probably a "clever tractical move by the Swedes"
to encourage Britain and America to take a more moderate
line towards Sweden. Warner replied that he would be
116Nutting, 14 April 1944 minute, PRO FO 371/
43491/N2l47.
117	 .Mallet to Eden, 28 July 1944, Confidential
report of heads of missions, PRO FO 371/43498; Mallet to
Ministry of Economic Warfare, 22 May 1944 telegram No. 487
Arfar, PRO FO 371/43453/N3150.
118Wheeler to Warner, 30 May 1944 letter, PRO FO
371/43487/N3362.
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"greatly surprised" if the Swedes entered into large-scale
trade with the Russians and doubted if the Swedes would
"want to be entirely at their mercy. 119 However,
Finland's withdrawal from the war and the Swedish Commu-
nists' gain in September's general elections gave greater
credence to these vague suspicions about Soviet intentions.
The Russians appeared to be negotiating in earnest for
Swedish exports, while giving only half-hearted support
to the Anglo-American economic warfare measures.
The prospect of growing Soviet influence gave the
Foreign Office some cause to fear that further British
association with U.S. tactics might weaken Britain's
interests in Sweden. Eden informed Halifax on 10 September,
"the Russians are not at one with us." He feared American
inspired actions to rupture Swedish-German trade might
give the Soviets an opportunity to further their influence
in Sweden at the Western Allies' expense. 12 ° The Foreign
Office however observed that Moscow's attitude towards
Scandinavia had been "correct," and there were "no overt
signs of a desire to interfere unduly in these
countries." 2 ' The Soviets acknowledged that Norway fell
119Warner, 5 June 1944 minute, PRO FO 371/43487/
N3362.




within the Anglo-American sphere of influence. Moscow did
not openly encourage the Swedish Communist party to under-
mine the Swedish government. The Foreign Office concluded
that in spite of the Communists' improved standing in the
Riksdag, Communism was unlikely to grow in Sweden unless
there was massive unemployment after the war. Consequently,
British diplomacy and propaganda avoided the question of
Soviet influence in Sweden. Instead, the Ministry of
Information expanded upon the themes of Britain's prewar
commercial importance to Sweden, Britain's unflagging
total war effort, its determination to preserve the
Commonwealth and Empire after the war, and the similarities
between the Beveridge plan and Sweden's own social welfare
programmes.122
SUMMARY
By the Spring of 1944, Lord Selbourne and other
officials were apprehensive that continued British associa-
tion with Washington's strident diplomacy towards Sweden
was becoming a liability. Increasingly, American policy
was being formulated according to the prejudices of the
U.S. service departments and the American public. The
Americans were unreceptive to British advice and less
willing to accommodate British interests, while insisting
upon London's full support for their own proposals. The
122Overseas Planning Committee, 20 October 1944,
paper 544, Plan of Propaganda to Sweden; Projection of the
British Empire, first revision of aims and objectives.
FO 371/43490/Nub.
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British officials feared that Britain's long term influence
over Sweden and other neutrals would diminish drastically
if it became apparent that Britain had become a junior
partner. Although the Foreign Office was unwilling to
commit itself to any scheme for European security until
after the war, its members believed that Britain would play
a leading role in shaping and maintaining the postwar order
in Europe. Britain could hardly assume the role of
Metternich's Austria if its prestige among the liberated
Allies and neutrals was lowered to that of Franz Josef's
crumbling empire. Britain required prestige and friendly
relations with Sweden to offset its weak bargaining power
when negotiating a complex assortment of postwar commercial
questions with Stockholm. The Ministries of Supply,
Housing, and War Transport regarded Sweden as Britain's
most important source for urgently required reconstruction
materials and shipping. The Treasury sought to arrange
financing for renewed Anglo-Swedish trade and initiate
sterling's recovery as a major currency. The Foreign
Office was anxious to enlist Sweden in international
recovery schemes to prevent the Swedes from competing in
world markets once the blockade and other wartime con-
straints upon free trade had been lifted. British of f i-
dais were anxious to secure all of these arrangements
before the cessation of hostilities, but Washington's
continued preoccupation with economic warfare threatened
to undermine Anglo-Swedish trade negotiations. The
Swedes would either reject the British proposals or
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would insist upon an exorbitant quid p quo if London
approached Stockholm for postwar concessions while the
Allies were pressing for the cessation of Swedish-German
trade. Moreover, Anglo-Swedish discussions about postwar
trade would antagonize the Americans. London was obliged
therefore to defer these negotiations until Washington was
satisfied with Sweden's behaviour. It was in Britain's
interest to mediate a compromise between the United States
and Sweden, but given the prevailing attitudes in
Washington and Stockholm, the chances for such a solution
were unfavourable during the spring and summer of 1944.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC WARFARE
APRIL 1944 - JANUARY 1945
Although British officials were less interested
than were their U.S. counterparts in economic warfare,
throughout 1944 much of the attention of the Foreign
Office and M.E.W. was absorbed by issues relating to
Swedish-German trade. Washington relentlessly intensified
pressure for the curtailment of Swedish exports until
Stockholm terminated this commerce entirely on 1 July 1944.
Although British officials felt obliged to accommodate the
Americans, much of their efforts were devoted to persuading
U.S. officials to adopt a more moderate policy towards
Sweden which London could support without compromising long
term British interests. The British were concerned by
unpredictable American behaviour, such as Patterson's
unilateral oil embargo, 1 and by the State Department's
growing deference to the service departments. The Foreign
Office was anxious to remain 'in step' with the Americans
in order to prevent them from acting unilaterally in the
future as this would demonstrate the duality of the Allied





THE BALL BEARING IMBROGLIO, APRIL - JUNE 1944
Sweden's ball and roller bearing exports to
Germany was the dominant issue in Allied-Swedish relations
during the spring of 1944. The M.E.W. believed that
bearings, unlike Swedish iron ore, were critical to the
outcome of the war and agreed with Washington that Germany's
bearing imports should be curtailed as much as possible.
The British and U.S. air staffs maintained that the
elimination of Germany's bearing supplies was a prerequisite
to achieving Allied air supremacy over Europe before the
impending invasion of Normandy. The air staffs thought of
bearings as the "indispensible link" in German aircraft and
tank production. 2 The U.S. Eight Air Force conducted
intensive and costly raids on Schweinfurt (where 52% of
Germany's bearings were produced) and other manufacturing
centres between August and October 1943, and again during
January and April 1944. In March 1944, the Ministry of
Economic Warfare estimated that the attacks had reduced
bearing production to 70% of the pre-attack level of 9.1
million bearings per month. The Allies wanted to deprive
Germany of alternative bearing supplies from Sweden.
Imports from Sweden contributed 7.5% to 10% of German
industry's total bearing consumption. The 1943 War Trade
Agreement obliged Sweden to reduce ball and roller bearing
2Chiefs of Staff Committee, 5 March 1944 memorandum
by Sir Charles Portal, Chief of Air Staff, "Export of
Swedish Ball Bearings to Germany," COS (44)227 (0) CAB 80/81;
Ministry of Economic Warfare, 6 January 1944, Secret Report
on Ball Bearings, FO 837/905.
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exports from 60 million kroner in 1943 to 24.4 million
kroner in 1944. In late summer 1943, Britain purchased
£1 million (17 million Kr.) worth of bearings from S.K.F.,
the Swedish ball bearing monopoly. Britain also promised
to place additional large orders with the firm in 1944.
The M.E.W. had asked the Ministry of Supply to make these
purchases to compensate S.K.F. for lost business with
Germany as well as to preempt output which would otherwise
have been shipped to Germany. Stockholm was obliged to
adhere to these terms when it renegotiated its annual
trade agreement with Berlin. In early 1944, the Swedes
informed the Allies that only half of the total export
quota for 1944 would be shipped before June, and that
monthly shipments would be limited to one-twelfth during
the rest of the year.3
In March 1944, the Allied air staffs were convinced
that the M.E.W.'s transactions with S.K.F. were ineffective.
In spite of the export reductions in 1944, the proportion
of Sweden's contribution to Germany's overall bearing
supply was the same as in 1943. The Germans had cancelled
orders for less essential bearings in favour of small to
medium sized ones (less than 62 millimetres in diameter)
which were suited to airframe and aero engine construction.
A U.S. intelligence report indicated that S.K.F. enabled
Germany to satisfy 70% of its requirements for 7 major
3Martin Fritz, "Swedish Ball Bearings and the
German War Economy," Scandinavian Economic History Review,
Volume XXIII, #1, 1975, p. 19.
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types of airframe bearings, which amounted to 22% of
Germany's overall airframe bearing needs. Air Chief
Marshal Portal, Chief of Air Staff, insisted that the M.E.W.
and Foreign Office take steps to prevent further Swedish
exports:
The urgent desire of the Germans to take
the most of their monthly quota of Swedish
bearings in the form of these "special"
airframe and aero engine bearings is evidence
of the success of our attacks in curtailing
their own production of these essential types.
But the Swedes' ability and willingness to
satisfy them in this respect may appreciably
postpone the effect which our air attacks on
Germany's ball bearing plants will have on
production of war equipment, unless firm and
immediate action is taken to stop this leak.4
Portal pressed Lord Selborne, who was also the director of
the Special Operations Executive, to devise a plan to
disrupt S.K.F. production through sabotage. Selborne
rejected the suggestion because the S.K.F. works in
Gothenburg were too widely dispersed for a strategically
planted bomb to upset its entire operations. Moreover,
Selborne reasoned that Sweden's effective security service
would discover and arrest an S.O.E. sabotage ring before
4Portal, memorandum, op. cit. Allied military
officials believed the bombings to be more destructive of
German armaments production than was actually the case.
The Speer Ministry dispersed and reconstructed bearing
factories quickly, enabling bearing output to resume at
pre-raid levels. Alan Milward, The German Economy at War
(London: The Athlone Press, 1965) pp. 186-194. Moreover, SKF
had increased shipments of ball bearing steel, which had not
been included in the War Trade Agreement, to its German
subsidiary, VKF, in late 1943 and 1944; Martin Fritz,
op. cit., pp. 23-25.
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it could accomplish its mission.5
Selborne agreed that something should be done to
reduce this commerce sharply. However, he argued any
Allied effort to coerce Sweden on this point would be
ineffective, and might provoke Stockholm into abrogating
or not bothering to enforce the War Trade Agreement.6
The M.E.W. was aware of the Swedish Air Force's
desire to obtain modern fighters, and Dingle Foot believed
that a generous offer of Spitfires might induce the Swedes
to curtail bearing exports. During a discussion about
ball bearings on 27 February, HägglBf had asked Foot if
Britain was willing to supply aircraft to Sweden. Although
Hgglcf stressed that his enquiry was unrelated to the
ball bearing question, Foot and the Foreign Office inferred
that "obviously it is connected in the Swedish mind."7
William Cavendish-Bentinck of the Foreign Office assumed
that the Air Ministry might be prepared to furnish the
Swedes with Spitfire Mark V's, which were approaching
5Selborne to Chiefs of Staff Committee, 8 March
1944 COS(44) 285(0) CAB 119/109. On 13 May 1944, Swedish
police arrested "B", an SKF shipping clerk who supplied the
O.S.S. with statistics concerning exports to Germany
between December 1943 and May 1944. "History of O.S.S.
operations in Sweden," National Archives R.G. 319,
Records of Army Staff PLO 3147 TS (16 December 1949),
Folder No. 2 (Washinqton, D.C.: General Services Adminis-
tration, 1974).
6Medlicott, op. cit., p. 481; J. Galsworthy, 30
April 1944, minute of conversation with Foot and Air Vice
Marshal Collier, FO 37l/43452/N2661.
7Nutting, 4 March 1944 minute, FO 371/43450/N1247.
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obsolescence, if a sufficient number were being withdrawn
from operations or if the production of new Mark V's was
feasible. On 8 March, Lord Selborne asked the Chiefs of
Staff to relinquish Spitfires for possible transfer to
Sweden. Selborne argued that an offer of 200 pitfires as
"bait" would be a more successful method of curbing Swedish
bearing exports than sabotaging the SKF works. 8 The
Foreign Office strongly endorsed Selborne's argument,
noting that "We can think of no other offer to the Swedes
which would be likely to achieve this [restriction of
bearing exports] other than the acceptance of their
request for Spitfires (or possibly some other type of
aircraft)". 9 Portal agreed with Selborne's argument and
added that the "bait" would "fit in well" with the
Graffham deception. 1° He believed that production bottle-
necks and Overlord requirements precluded the immediate
supply of fighters to Sweden, but felt that Fighter Command
might be able to spare an initial installment of 25
Spitfires. Portal and other members of the Air Staff
believed that London would have to "enlist American aid" to
8Cavendish-Bentinck, 6 March 1944 minute,
FO 371/43520/N1543.
9 Selborneto Hollis, 8 March 1944 memorandum COS (44)
235 (0), CAB 119/109.
10Portal, 11 March 1944 minute, COS (44) 83 meeting,
CAB 114/109.
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supply sufficient aircraft to Sweden if Stockholm agreed
to strike a bargain with the M.E.W.11
On 13 March, Foot informed Hgglöf that London was
willing to deliver an unspecified number of fighter air-
craft in the future, provided that the Swedish government
agreed to reduce SKF's export drastically during the next
three to four months. Hägglöf doubted that Stockholm would
accept the British proposal, but remarked that he hoped
that the British would remain willing to supply Spitfires
regardless of Sweden's attitude towards the ball bearing
question) 2
 Upon receiving Stockholm's reply at the end
of the month, Hgg1f informed Foot that the Swedish govern-
ment believed that its neutrality would be compromised if
it broke its trade commitments to Berlin, which were
within the limits established by the War Trade Agreement,
in return for British aircraft: "The Swedish authorities
do not find it possible to justify such a breach."13
As the "bait" did not lure the Swedish government to
limit bearing exports, the M.E.W. quickly decided to enter
into direct negotiations with S.K.F. Hagglof informed
Foot and Winfield Riefler, the U.S. embassy's economic
warfare specialist, that the Swedish-German trade agreement
of January 1944 obliged the Swedish government to ensure
12Foot, 13 March 1944 minute, FO 371/43520/N1581.
13F,R.U.S. 1944, Vol. IV, op. cit., p. 481; M.E.W.
to Stockholm, 31 March 1944 telegram 330 ARFAR, FO 837/914.
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that S.K.F. honoured its contracts with Berlin, but added
that under Swedish law the government could not compel
S.K.F. to comply with the trade agreement. 14 Hägglöf's
remark led Foot and Riefler to infer that while the
Swedish government was anxious to avoid difficulties with
Berlin, it would not prevent the Allies from persuading
S.K.F. to curtail bearincr shipments. They hoped that the
ball bearing question could be resolved promptly without
rancour if it was treated strictly as a commercial matter
between the Allies and S.K.F. rather than as a contentious
problem in Allied-Swedish relations. Mallet was confident
that the Allies could easily negotiate a discreet under-
standing with S.K.F. through the good offices of Marcus
Wallenburg, whose bank held a large bloc of S.K.F. shares
and whose brother was one of the company's directors.
The M.E.W. and U.S. Embassy were anxious to
approach S.K.F. immediately, as Häggl8f had stated that a
German delegation was due to visit Gothenburg in late
April to persuade the company to increase deliveries to
Germany. On 3 April, the M.E.W. proposed, with Riefler's
concurrence, that Mallet and Johnson ask S.K.F. to refuse
further German orders and to suspend deliveries for three
months. In return for these concessions, the Allies
would compensate the company with large purchases during
1944 and 1945.15 Moreover, S.K.F. would be allowed to
op. cit., p. 482.
15 Ibid., p. 484.
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fulfill all existing contracts with Germany during
the last half of 1944. London also suggested that the
U.S.S.R. should support the Allied negotiations, on the
understanding that future Soviet transactions would depend
upon how the company responded to the Anglo-American
approach. If S.K.F. accepted the Allied terms, the
British government would furnish Spitfires to the Swedish
Air Force to ensure that Stockholm would not adopt "more
than a 'formal' position in carrying out its commitments
vis--vis ball bearings to the Germans." 16 General Spaatz,
Commander of U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, strongly
endorsed the British proposals and supported Riefler in
requesting that Washington furnish at least $20,000,000
to cover the pre-emptive purchases.
Before Washington had time to consider London's
proposal, it received information which created suspicion
that S.K.F. and possibly the Swedish government were
deceiving the Allies as to the degree of Swedish-German
collaboration. Shortly after the conclusion of the
Swedish-German trade negotiations in January, the Swedes
informed the Allies that bearing exports in 1944 would be
worth 21 million kr., or 14,500,000 reichmarks. In March,
Häggl5f informed Foot that his government had miscalculated
the conversion rate, and that exports would actually be
valued at 24,361,000 Kr. 17 The M.E.W. did not believe that
17
Hagglöf to Foot, 27 March 1944 memorandum,
FO 837/914.
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the Swedes could have made such an error, since the
official exchange rate of 59.5 RM,/lOO Kr. had been in
effect since 1941. At the beginning of April, it received
through a "secret source" a paper which was purportedly
part of the Swedish-German commercial agreement. The
document stipulated that Sweden would ship 18 million R.M.
worth of bearings to Germany in 1944.18 At the official
rate of exchange, bearing exports would amount to
30,250,000 Kr., thereby exceeding the War Trade Agreement
ceiling of 29.3 million Kr. for the whole of "Axis
Europe." 19
 John Mitcheson, the British commercial counsellor
in Stockholm, confronted Swedish officials with the discre-
pancy between Hägglöf's statistics and the original figures.
The Swedes explained that these were a typographical error
caused by pencilled marginal calculations of the official
exchange rates versus the clearing rate on the original
draft of the Swedish-German agreement. They insisted that
the ball bearing quota was 14.5 and not 18 million R.M.
Mallet advised London to accept the Swedish explanation,
and not to press the matter further. He related that when
Mitcheson had made caustic remarks over their error, the
VillierstoMallet, 3 April 1944 letter,
FO 837/911.
19G. Collins, 1 April 1944 minute, FO 837/914.
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Swedes were "very ashamed and positively grovelled."20
London was still prepared to bargain with S.K.F.
in spite of the Swedes' possible duplicity. Washington was
not. Senior officials in the War Department were incensed
over statistics contained in the secret report. Secretary
of War Henry Stimson exclaimed in a letter to Secretary of
State Hull:
I am surprised and outraged by the figures
shown. It simply means that the Swedes are
actively and knowingly assisting Germany to
produce these most vital implements of war
and to offset the effects of our bombardment...
I respectfully suggest that the time has
passed for words and that we should resort to
some of the forms of pressure which we have to
prevent the active support of Germany by
Sweden. 21
The State Department rejected the British proposal
for direct negotiations with SKF out of hand. Instead it
called for a formal Anglo-American dmarche to the Swedish
government demanding the immediate termination of all
bearing exports to Germany. If the Swedes fully complied,
the United States would compensate them, if not, the U.S.
would 'blacklist' SKF from conducting business with Allied
countries and apply other sanctions against Sweden. 22
 The
State Department argued that it did not favour the British
20MallettoVilliers, 11 April 1944 letter, FO 837/
911. The Swedish explanation was probably true. Phillip
Kessler, a German bearing expert informed Reichminister
Speer on 6 April 1944, that imports from Sweden were valued
at 14.5 million R.M. Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frank-
land, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945,
Volume IV, annexes and appendices, (London: H.M.S.O., 1961),
Appendix 31, p. 320.
21StimsontoHull, 9 April 1944 letter, National
Archives, R.G. 165 OPD TS(10AP44).
________ 1944, Vol. IV, pp. 485-8.
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proposals because SKF's Managing Director Harald
Hamberg's "uncooperative attitude" towards the Allies
necessitated pressure upon the Swedish government to compel
SKF to accept the Allied demands. 23
 The proposed dmarche
was supported by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and
President Roosevelt. 24
 American military and public at
large tended to be emotional on the question of ball
bearings, due to the heavy losses which the Eighth Air
Force suffered in the second Schweinfurt raid, which had
cost 60 B-17's, as well as severe damage to 138 other
bombers, out of a force of 300 aircraft. 25
 The popularity
of Hull's radio address of 9 April induced the Department
to adopt a more bellicose attitude in order to demonstrate
to both the American public and the U.S. government that it
26could forcefully deal with Sweden.
The British government, believed that the inclusion
of threats in the dmarche would hurt the Allied case.
They pressed Washington to substitute the vague phrase
"serious consideration would be given to all measures at
24Admiral Leahy to H. Stimson, 31 March 1944 letter
NA/OPD R.G. 165 334:82 CS; Stimson to Hull, 11 April 1944
letter NA/OPD R.G. 165 400 TS (10.4.440).
25Stimsonto Hull. W.F. Craven and J.L. Cate (eds.)
The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. II, (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 704.
26Acheson, op. cit., p. 56.
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the disposal of the American government" in place of the
specific threats. 27 On 13th April, Hershell Johnson
delivered the dmarche to Foreign Minister Christian
GUnther, supported by a supplemental British aide-mmoire
presented by Mallet. Both the d&narche and Johnson's oral
remarks referred to Sweden as an accessory to the mass
slaughter of American servicemen because of its continued
ball bearing exports to Germany. 28 The d4marche and Hull's
radio speech angered the Swedish cabinet. Boheman told
Johnson that the démarche had been the worst message that
Sweden had received "from any belligerent during the entire
course of the war.29
On the 19 April, the Swedish Foreign Ministry
disclosed to both chambers of the Riksdag the history of
Sweden's wartime relations with the belligerents. The
government received the unanimous approval for rejecting
the dmarche from all members, including the Communists who
had previously criticized the government's policy towards
Germany. 30 However, Boheman informed Johnson that Ginther
and Prime Minister Hansson believed that the Allies could
achieve their objective if they secured a bargain with
S.K.F. surreptitiously. 31
1944, Vol. IV., pp. 495-7.
28 Ibid., pp. 500-4.
29 Ibid., pp. 506-7.
30 Ibid., p. 512.
31 Ibid., pp. 519-21.
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While awaiting the Swedish response, the Allied
governments considered what action to take in the event of
a Swedish rebuff. The State Department favoured black-
listing SKF and curtailing Sweden's imports from the West.
The British Ministry of Supply and Air Chief Marshal Portal
opposed blacklisting for fear that it might jeopardize
British bearing imports for a new model of fighter currently
in production. On the 17 April, Lord Selborne advised the
Cabinet that the dmarche had generated Swedish intransi-
gence on the ball bearing question which would hinder future
Allied negotiations on the subject. He intimated that in
the event of a Swedish rebuff, Washington would probably
press for British collaboration in punishing Sweden.
Selborne felt that sanctions would violate the War Trade
Agreement, and lead to damaging repercussions against
Britain:
The effect on our relations might be
disastrous. In the economic sphere Sweden
has gone farther to meet our wishes than
any other neutral country. Last year's
agreement under which the Swedish government
agreed to a 30% reduction of their export
trade with the Axis involves considerable
dislocations and possible unemployment in
almost every Swedish industry. The trickle
of supplies which reaches Sweden b no means
compensates for these sacrifices.3
Selborne agreed that Britain's freedom of action towards
Sweden was limited by the need to maintain good relations
with the United States, but warned his cabinet colleagues
32Selborne, 17 April 1944 Anglo-American Differences
Over Blockade Measures, War Cabinet Memorandum W.P. (44)
206, CAB 66/49.
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that Britain could ill afford to be identified with the
American sanctions. On 19, April, the War Cabinet approved
Selborne's proposal that the Allies try to purchase SKF's
entire output for l944.	 The State Department was
reluctant to lose British support. It replied on the 22nd
that it had already abandoned plans to threaten Sweden in
favour of an approach "somewhat similar to that proposed
by Lord Selborne." Washington despatched a mission, headed
by former motion picture executive Stanton Griff is, to
negotiate with the SKF management:34
During the interval between delivery of the Allied
dmarche and Griff is' arrival in Sweden in early May,
Wallenburg conducted preliminary negotiations with SKF
management. He informed the M.E.W. that if the company
were to come to terms with the Allies, it would probably
insist on Allied purchases amounting to 100 million Kr.
(about £6 million). To compensate it for bomb damage to
its German subsidiary's holdings. 35 Wallenburg doubted
that even this compensation would induce the company to
withhold all shipments to Germany. He suggested that the
Allies would be more successful if they were to press for
a drastic reduction rather than for the complete termination
33war Cabinet minute, 19 April 1944, WM(44) 52
CAB 65/49. F.R.U.S. 1944, Vol. IV, pp. 515-17.
34F.R.U.S. 1944, Vol. IV, p. 521.
35Mallet - Foot, 29 April 1944 tel. 402 ARFAR,
FO 371/43452/N273.
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of bearing exports. He advised the Allies that rubber
shipments might be an effective means of inducing
Stockholm to ignore its trade agreement with Berlin.
Sweden depended upon Germany for buna (synthetic rubber)
after Washington had suspended rubber exports in 1942.
Stockholm feared Germany would cut off buna shipments in
retaliation for a bearing embargo. Wallenburg believed
the Swedish government would not only cease its opposition
to an embargo but might also exert pressure on SKF if the
Allies were to supply rubber. He also advised the British
to mount an "unofficial but powerful" press campaign
against SKF (but not against the Swedish government or
36people).
The M.E.W. agreed broadly with Wallenburg's
advice. It was willing to give SKF 100 million Kr. in
return for a total embargo on bearing exports, and
pressed the Treasury to finance part of this bargain.
Although the U.S. government nominally empowered Griff is
to use unlimited funds to reach an agreement with SKF, the
State Department insisted that London share part of the
cost. Sir John Anderson, the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
balked at the prospect of spending a large sum to bribe
SKF. However, he agreed with the arrangement once Lord
Selborne explained that the Roosevelt administration might
be embarrassed if Congress were to learn that it had spent
$80 million to prevent a neutral firm from trading with
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the enemy. 37 Moreover, American "critics of this country"
would find valuable propaganda in the fact that Britain
had proposed a financial bargain with SKF but left
Washington to pay the expenses. Both Selborne and Anderson
hoped the Americans would take into consideration Britain's
past purchases which totalled £2 million.38
Both the M.E.W. and the Foreign Office were wary
of launching an unofficial press campaign against SKF for
fear it would "get out of hand" once the American press
became involved with it. 39 Sensational American press
coverage might attack Sweden in general rather than SKF.
Instead of implementing a press campaign, the M.E.W.
advised Wallenburg to tell SKF that London had restrained
Washington from blacklisting the firm, but would support
sanctions in the future if it did not accommodate the
Allies. The Foreign Office doubted that an offer of
rubber would prompt the Swedish government to accept the
Allied demands, but decided to ask the Americans to release
a rubber consignment from their strategic commodity pool.4°
Griff is and his delegation arrived in Sweden on
9 May. Three days later, SKF accepted the first Allied
demand for a suspension of all shipments of bearings and
37selborne to Anderson, 25 April 1944 letter,
FO 837/914.
38Anderson to Selborne, 1 May 1944 letter,
FO 837/914.
39M.E.W. toMallet, 1 May 1944 tel. 440 ARFAR,
FO 837/914.
40Nutting, 3 May 1944 minute, FO 371/4352/N2739;
Nutting, 7 May 1944 minute, FO 37l/4352/N2898.
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machinery for the duration of the negotiations. This
temporary export stoppage, which lasted until 12 June,
was a de facto embargo similar to that originally demanded
by the Allies. The company did not make even token
deliveries to allay German suspicions. The Swedish
government, however, was concerned over Berlin's possible
reaction, as bearings accumulated in Gothenburg warehouses
(before the embargo 1800 bearings were exported daily) •41
However, the Anglo-American negotiators failed to make
further headway with SKF's management during the fortnight
following this concession. The impasse was partly due to
Griff is' and the U.S. government's abrasive behaviour.
The Americans issued indiscriminate threats and generated
a lurid publicity campaign against Sweden. 42 This activity
transformed what London had intended to be a purely
commercial transaction into an embroiled debate over
Sweden's neutrality.	 Alexandria Kollontai, the Soviet
minister to Sweden, remarked that the ball bearing
negotiations had become "a matter of petty prestige on
both sides." 43 The Swedes were wary of drastically reduc-
ing exports to Germany, Sweden's only important trading
partner, while the duration of hostilities remained
41War History Report of the American Legation at
Stockholm, 20 February 1946, National Archives R.G. 59/124,
586/2-2046.
42 Some publications gave the affair an aura of
glamour and intrigue by dubbing the negotiators as "Allied
agents", "Drama in Stockholm", Newsweek, 22 May 1944, pp.57-8.




The British were disturbed by the Anerican tactics.
The B.B.C.'s political correspondent in Stockholm loudly
ridiculed U.S. diplomats' lack of "finesse" while having
lunch at Stockholm's Canton Hotel with Alfred Oate, the
foreign editor of Svenska Dagbladet. 45 Wallenburg,
Mallet and the M.E.W. had hoped the negotiations with SKF
would be strictly confidential. However, someone in the
U.S. legation regularly "leaked" information to U.S.
journalists, who would cable details to their home
newspapers "within two hours" after the end of each
negotiating session. 46 An unidentified official in the
State Department disclosed significant portions of the
War Trade Agreement. This revelation embarrassed the
Swedish government, which had been anxious to keep the
Agreement secret from Berlin since it did not want the
Germans to think Sweden had reduced exports out of defer-
ence to Allied pressure. Stockholm had refused German
demands for increased trade during the winter of 1943-44
on 'technical' grounds, such as limited productive capacity
and labour shortages. Drew Pearson, the prominent
44 Erik Boheman,P vakt, 1964, Stockholm Norstedts,
pp. 269-70.
45His remark was heard by the U.S. press attache
and by other journalists in the dining room, Gordon Knox to
Christian Randval, Counselor, U.S. Legation, 5 June 1944,
Hershell V. Johnson papers, Harry S. Truman Library,
Independence, Missouri.
46Nutting, 10 May 1944 minute, FO 371/43452/N2931.
250
Washington political columnist, created considerable
resentment in the Swedish government by asserting that
Sweden should recall its minister to Britain, Björn Prytz,
because he had been Managing Director of SKF between 1919-
1937, and was actively undermining the Allied blockade of
Germany. Mallet observed that articles such as Pearson's
were "tending to discredit the whole Allied case and to
convince the public that the Allies are out to pick a
quarrel with Sweden at all costs."47
Griff is' own negotiating methods also contributed
to the impasse. He had no authority to accept a compromise
from the company, and therefore rejected Swedish sugges-
tions for a reduction rather than the termination of
exports. SKF management insisted that only a small
percentage of its exports were 'aircraft bearings,' which
could be classified as war material, and offered to suspend
deliveries of these types. Griffis and Waring asserted
that no specific type of bearing was used exclusively for
aircraft manufacture since larger sizes were also militarily
valuable. They maintained that 95% of SKF's exports should
be classified as war material. 48
 The company argued that
it could not impose a complete embargo without obtaining
approval from the Swedish government. The government
reiterated that it could not break a binding contract with
47Mallet - Selborne, 15 May 1944 despatch 264,
FO 37l/43453/N293.
48Mallet - M.E.W., 22 May 1944 telegram 484 Arfar,
FO 371/43453/N3186.
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Germany. Waring and other British officials felt the
Allies might have to moderate their demands to accept
either an embargo on exports to all belligerents or simply
a sharp reduction in exports to Germany. However, Griff is
reacted to Swedish recalcitrance by threatening to black-
list SKF. Both Mallet and Hamberg admitted privately that
Griffis was an exceptionally poor negotiator who knew
little about ball bearings and who added nothing new to the
negotiations which could help break the impasse. 49 When
talking to Swedes, Griff is repeatedly took a ball bearing
from his pocket - a ball bearing supposedly from a German
fighter - and virtually charged that SKF was an accessory
to the murder of American pilots: "You are selling your
ball bearings to Hitler...We had to pay with one hundred
and sixty eight planes and one thousand, six hundred and
eighty men. That was what your ball bearings cost us."5°
When he failed to stir the company's conscience,
Griff is contemplated other methods of persuasion. He
unsuccessfully attempted to organize a plot with an O.S.S.
officer in Stockholm to infiltrate the SKF works and
Swedish railways with agents who would provoke strikes and
sabotage. Johnson foiled this potentially embarrassing
scheme by threatening to declare the officer persona non
49Sir V. Mallet, memoirs, unpublished manuscript,
Churchill College Library, Cambridge, p. 135; Fritz,
op. cit., p. 21, n.21.
50Kurt Singer, "The Riddle of Sweden's Ball
Bearings," News Background Inc. Newsletter Report No. 12,
6 June 1944.
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51grata in Sweden. Griff is also hoped to intimidate SKF
by asking Washington to sequester remittances from the
firm's American subsidiary. He believed the subsidiary's
earnings amounted to 90% of SKF's profits.52
U.S. pressure tactics did not resolve the impasse
with SKF. Regardless of what profits the company might
have earned from its U.S. subsidiary, it prospered from
its trade with Germany. In May, its shareholders received
a 24% dividend. SKF owned a considerable share of major
firms such as Bofors and Volvo. 53 As of December 1943,
123 million of its 260 million kroner assets consisted of
bank deposits and cash on hand. SKF had become a creditor
to several banks. The firm feared that its European
holdings might be confiscated if all shipments to Germany
and its occupied territories were stopped. Moreover, an
embargo would entail a drastic reduction in production and
revenues since its exports to occupied and satellite
states (8 million Kr.) was greater than its sales within
51R. Harris Smith, O.S.S.: The Secret History of
America's First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1972), p. 200.
Scott, Time, Incorporated, 25 May 1944
despatch, Hershell V. Johnson papers.
53M.E.W. - Mallet, 5 May 1944 tel. 449 Arfar,
FO 837/914. There is no evidence to support Griff is'
contention. Fritz states that the values of the share
capital in the German and U.S. subsidiaries were 26 million
and 28 million Kr. respectively, but does not compare the
profits which the parent company earned from these holdings.
Fritz, op. cit., p. 23. Griffis' figure was probably
exaggerated since SKF owned 54 overseas factories in other
countries, such as Britain, Canada, and the U.S.S.R.
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the Swedish market.54
Griffis' and Washington's bellicose attitude
towards Sweden during the Spring of 1944 strengthened the
Swedish government's unwillingness to expedite an agree-
ment between SKF and the Allies. Stockholm did not fear
postwar sanctions, since the Swedes were confident that
the Allies would be too anxious to resume trade with Sweden
to maintain their blacklists against Swedish firms for
long. 55 However, Swedish officials were apprehensive of
German reaction to a bearing embargo. Boheman informed
Mallet and Johnson that the ball bearing negotiations were
being observed closely by Hitler and Ribbentrop. During
an interview with GUnther, Dr. Hans Thomson, the German
minister, alluded to the Wehrmacht's ordinance maps of
Sweden which had been confiscated in April. 56 Thomson
hinted that a German invasion of Sweden was possible if
the Swedes gave in to the Allies. Johnson reported that
the Swedes believed that
whatever action might be taken by Germany
against Sweden would not be because of the
loss of a given amount of ball bearings but
because such a decision by the Swedes would
be regarded by the Germans as a definite pro-
Allied move and the beginning of a breach of
their northern counter-invasion defences.Sl
54Fritz, op. cit., p. 23.
55Mallet to Selborne, 23 May 1944 despatch,
FO 837/914.
56Mallet to F.O., 28 April 1944 telegram 499, FO 371/
42452/N2604; F.R.U.S., 1944, Vol. IV., op. cit., p. 503.
57F.R.U.S., 1944, Vol. IV, op. cit., p. 540.
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To some extent, Stockholm shared Berlin's fear
that the ball bearing negotiations would lead to Allied
pressure for sweeping diplomatic and military concessions.
Boheman told Mallet that he suspected the Allies would
not be satisfied until Swedish-German relations had been
ruptured completely. He believed that London and
Washington would press Stockholm for air based onced the
ball bearing question had been resolved. 58
 Much of this
Swedish and German speculation about Allied motives was
undoubtedly fostered by Graffham. One American press
account of Griffis' discussions with the SKF clearly
suggested that there was a connexion between the negotia-
tion in Gothenburg and in imminent Allied invasion of
Scandinavia:
The coming third invasion of Europe...will
be decisive in the battle over ball bear-
ings. Allied troops in Finland, Denmark,
or Norway will naturally put an end to the
ball bearing trade, and there is always the
strong chance that a new invasion force may
take a short cut direct to Germany.59
Throughout the negotiations, Madame Kollontai had
advised Mallet, Johnson, and Griffis to compromise with
SKF, and defer pressure for a more sweeping concession




until after the Allies had scored military successes in
Europe. By late May, Griff is was willing to agree to a
temporary reduction of bearing exports. On the 26th,
Griff is and Waring tentatively approved of a proposal from
SKF. Under its terms, the total embargo would remain in
force until 5 June, no aircraft bearings would be exported
to Germany, shipments of other bearings to Germany between
June and December 1944 would be made in instalments
amounting to 1,518,000 Kr. a month, and exports between
June and 31 August would be reduced to half this figure.6°
The undelivered balance from the summer months would be
exported in instalments during the remainder of the year.
Mallet and Waring felt the proposal was the best bargain
that the Allies could secure under the circumstances and
advised London to accept it. Griff is was not empowered to
conclude an agreement for anything less than a total
embargo, and referred the proposal to Washington. Without
consulting their British colleagues, Griff is and Johnson
asked the State Department to approve the company's offer
in principle, but to reserve full approval until the Swedes
had made additional concessions. 61
 Griff is wanted to
extend SKF's partial embargo until the end of September,
and to reduce exports by 80% instead of 50% during this
period. Johnson believed threats and publicity had
hastened SKF's proposal. He maintained the U.S. had to
________ 1944, Vol. IV, op. cit., pp. 554-6.
61Medlicott, op. cit., p. 488.
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secure a more substantial concession from the company to
prevent their diplomacy losing credibility: "If...all we
could show for our efforts were a result so far removed
from complete embargo, then these threats may well lose
force for any future demands that may be made."62
Progress in the ball bearing negotiations was
stalled once the U.S. government began to deliberate SKF's
proposal. The War and Navy Departments wanted to reject
it and impose sanctions against Sweden for SKF's failure
to comply with the original Allied demand. Dingle Foot
travelled to Washington to expedite an agreement with the
company. He hoped to enlighten the Americans by reiterat-
ing the M.E.W. view that excessive Allied pressure would
prompt Sweden to abrogate or fail to enforce the War
Trade Agreement. He stressed that an interim agreement
with the company would not prevent the Allies from
approaching the Swedish government for more substantial
concessions later in the year. Upon his arrival Foot
discovered that his arguments failed to impress the
Americans. Navy Secretary James Forrestal was influenced
strongly by his advisor, Captain Puleston, a biographer
of Admiral Mahan, the naval historian and strategist.
Forrestal believed the British had become incompetent at
exerting economic pressure against neutrals, and
had failed to exploit British sea power effectively.
62FR.U.S., 1944, Vol. IV., op. cit., p. 559.
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During an interdepartmental meeting attended by forty
senior U.S. officials, Foot observed that American reac-
tions were "not logical but emotional." 63 Patterson
interjected that he "had heard somewhere" that SKF was
largely German owned. A Navy Department official charged
that London had informed Washington in 1943 that it had
purchased SKF's entire aircraft bearing output. A repre-
sentative of the Treasury Department felt Sweden should be
punished because "it was intolerable that the Swedish
Government should dare to refuse any request made by the
United States." 64 The State Department's representatives
did not openly contradict their colleagues although they
sympathized privately with Foot's attitude.
On 5 June, Patterson and Navy Secretary Forrestal
held a meeting with Under Secretary of State Stettinius to
press him to invoke sanctions against Sweden. Before the
meeting convened however, Stettinius instructed Griff is to
make a counter proposal to SKF. He did so to demonstrate
to the service departments that the State Department could
secure a more satisfactory arrangement by negotiation than
by extortion. On 8 June, SKF accepted terms which had been
drafted by Waring and Wallenburg. The partial embargo
would be extended to 12 October, during which time monthly
exports would be limited to 470,000 Xr. The British and
- Selborne, 3 June 1944 letter, FO 837/916.
64Ibid
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U.S. governments would compensate the company with orders
totalling 10,272,420 kroner. 65 The War and Navy Depart-
ments were dissatisfied with this arrangement and urged
the State Department to reject it. They demanded Griff is'
recall, and pressed for punitive measures against Sweden
such as impounding Swedish ships in Allied harbours,
freezing Swedish assets in the United States, and stopping
the Gothenburg traffic, 66	However, the State Department
instructed Johnson and Griff is to conclude an agreement
with SKF on 12 June, on the understanding that Washington
was free to issue new demands in the future.67
In retrospect, it would appear that the Allied
effort to curtail Germany's bearing imports did not effect
greatly the outcome of the war. During 1943, German indus-
try produced an average of 2,127 aircraft and 1,005 tanks
per month. In January 1944, these figures were 2,445 and
1,286 respectively. By July, production had risen to
4,219 aircraft and 1,669 tanks. In December, these figures
stood at 3,155 and 1,854 respectively. 68 If the air raids,
the May embargo, and the subsequent export reduction had
65Medlicott, op. cit., p. 491; Hamberg to Griffis
and Waring, 8 June 1944; Griff is and Waring to Hamberg,
9 June 1944, enclosure Mallet - M.E.W., 14 June despatch
162EW, FO 837/916.
66Foot - Selborne, 8 June 1944 letter, FO 837/916;
Foot - Mallet, 30 June 1944 letter, FO 837/916.
67F.R.U.S., 1944, Vol. IV, op. cit., pp. 566-70.
68Fritz, op. cit., p. 34.
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been effective, the Germans would not have been able to
increase fighter production from a monthly average of 978
in 1943 to 3,375 in September 1944. Part of the German
success can be explained by Speer's drastic reorganization
of the German economy, the clandestine reconstruction and
dispersal of ball bearing factories, and the redesigning
of equipment to require fewer bearings. Although bearing
production in greater Germany declined from 9.1 million
bearings in July 1943 to 3.8 million in January 1944, out-
put in October 1944 was 8.8 million, slightly more
than the monthly average for January to June 1943.69
Berlin welcomed Swedish bearings but was concerned mainly
about the political rather than the economic ramifications
of the Anglo-U.S. negotiations with SKF. It suspended buna
deliveries in early July in retaliation for Sweden's
yielding to Allied pressure. The Germans were more
anxious to receive ball bearing steel from SKF. Swedish
exports satisfied 25% of the Schweinfurt factory's steel
requirements in 1943. The Allies did not think ball
bearing steel was particularly important to Germany, and
therefore did not include it in the War Trade Agreement.7°
Thus, SKF was free to increase steel exports to Germany in
1944 without violating its commitments to the Allies.
____ p. 31.
70Stockholm did not record ball bearing steel
separately in its trade statistics. Such exports were
included amongst relatively innocuous ones which the Allies
felt were unimportant to Germany. Ibid., p. 25.
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SKF's total exports to Germany during 1944 were only reduced
by 13%, and not by the nearly 50% as the Allies believed.
The Americans asked for the elimination of steel exports in
the aide-mmoire of 13th April, but did not press the issue
during Griffis' negotiations, concentrating instead on ball
bearing exports. 71 The Americans did not ask for ball
bearing steel statistics until June. They were apparently
satisfied when the Swedes replied that such statistics did
not exist, and that bearing steel shipments were recorded
as part of another export category. The agreement of
12 June did not cover ball bearing steel, and SKF continued
to make substantial steel deliveries in November and
December, in spite of the total embargo placed on bearing
exports on 12 October. The company's total steel exports
for 1944 amounted to 21,000 tons at a value of 15.2 million
kroner. 72
"MAXIMUM EFFORT", JULY - SEPTEMBER 1944
The conclusion of the agreement with SKF prompted
the U.S. government to intensify pressure on Sweden. On
12 July, Griff is told an interdepartmental meeting in
Washington that although the Swedes recognized that the
Allies were winning the war, they would "go on trading
_______	 1944, Vol. IV, op. cit., p. 486.
72Fritz, op. cit., p. 32.
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with Germany and making profits to the end. 	 Most U.S.
officials contended that further negotiations to reduce
Swedish trade were pointless in view of past Swedish
intransigence. The meeting concluded, therefore, that the
Allies should press Stockholm to halt all exports to
Germany immediately.
The Ameicans did not contemplate offering Sweden
a quid pro quo in return for an embargo on Germany, but
intended to apply sanctions if the Swedes refused to
comply. 74 Some officials in the State Department believed
the Swedes were so preoccupied with profits that the mere
threat of a postwar blacklist against Swedish firms would
force Stockholm to yield to Allied demands. The Americans
were no longer willing to take account of Britain's
interests. In their opinion, Britain's lack of assertive-
ness had weakened American bargaining power towards Sweden.
Washington intended to become the prime mover behind
Allied policy towards Sweden and resolved to overcome any
obstacle which the British might put in its way.
London, on the other hand, was reasonably satisfied
with Sweden's behaviour. Foot thought Griff is and Waring
had done "pretty well" in securing a partial bearing
embargo until October. 75 Foot and other members of the
73 u.s. War Department, Policy and Plans Division,
12 July 1944, Memorandum of interdepartmental meeting,
R.G. 165 OPD (12 Jul. 44) 334.8.
________ 1944, Vol. IV, op. cit., p. 579.
75Foot - Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee,
3 July 1944 letter, CAB 122/914.
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M.E.W. believed Sweden had accommodated the Allies as far
as was possible, and could not be expected to grant new
concessions before Germany had suffered major defeats in
the East and West. The Foreign Office appreciated Sweden's
vulnerability to economic reprisals from Berlin. The Swedes
would be obliged to export exclusively with Germany in
order to obtain essential imports as long as the German occu-
pation of Norway prevented trade with the West. Sweden's
isolation and dependence would prevent Stockholm from
imposing a total embargo on Germany. Foot assumed the
Swedes would sever gradually all commercial ties with
Germany as the Allies became more successful in Europe.
During informal discussions with Hgglof in early July,
Foot learned that Stockholm might be willing to prohibit
Swedish ships from sailing to Germany if military action
made the Baltic unsafe for shipping. However, the M.E.W.
expected that Stockholm would refuse a stern demand for
immediate cessation of exports. Therefore, Allied threats
would not prevent Stockholm from rejecting a demand for an
embargo. Once the Swedes had rebuffed the Allies,
Washington would have the choice of imposing sanctions or
losing credibility. The M.E.W. reiterated its fears that
pressure tactics might result in Swedish abrogation of the
War Trade Agreement. It maintained this argument through-
out the summer of 1944, by which time German defeats in
the East and in France made this possibility unlikely.
Although London was satisfied with the outcome of
the bearing question, British officials feared that
Griff is' agreement with SKF would prompt the extremists in
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Washington to propose that the Allies issue more sweeping
demands of Sweden. The Foreign Office and M.E.W. were
disturbed by American behaviour during the negotiations
with SKF, and feared that Washington would be even more
tactless, uncompromising, and unreceptive to British
advice in making future representations to Stockholm.
However, they also believed that the Americans would act
unilaterally against Sweden if London refused to endorse
further U.S. proposals. 76 Therefore, London sought to
encourage the Americans to compromise with Stockholm by
elaborating upon how unyielding pressure to terminate
Swedish-German trade threatened vital Allied interests in
Sweden. 77 British arguments in this context did not
emphasize London's anxiety to initiate negotiations of a
new Anglo-Swedish payments agreement or postwar timber
purchases, but stressed instead Sweden's strategic value to
the Allied war effort. The M.E.W. hoped that a military
rationale for moderation towards Sweden would induce the
State Department, and possibly the War and Navy Departments,
to reconsider U.S. policy.
During a brief visit to Washington, Foot persuaded
U.S. Under Secretary of State Stettinius to agree, on 14 May,
that the State Department would consider Britain's military
interests in Scandinavia before issuing further economic
76 Galsworthy, 9 July 1944 minute, FO 371/43487/
N4288.
77Warner, 7 July 1944 minute, FO 371/43503/
N8207.
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demands on the Swedes. 78
 Foot also advised General Macready
and Sir John Dill, of the Joint Staff Mission in
Washington, to enlighten the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff on
the strategic hazards which were inherent in a harsh policy
towards Sweden. In early June, Foot asked the Joint
Planning Staff to prepare a paper which would elaborate
upon the conflicts between U.S. economic warfare policy and
79Britain s strategic interests. 	 The M.E.W. hoped that a
new American initiative might be delayed while the Anglo-
U.S. Combined Chiefs of Staff debated Sweden's strategic
value.
At the time of Foot's agreement with Stettinius,
Britain's foremost strategic concern in Sweden was the
diplomatic deception, Graffham. Mallet and Group Captain
Maycock also proposed tentatively, during informal meetings
with members of the Swedish air staff, that the Swedes
repatriate interned Allied airmen. Moreover, some members
of the Joint Planning Staff and the Air Staff hoped to
establish 'operational facilities' in Sweden. However, the
Foreign Office treated these issues as matters of secondary
importance. London instructed Mallet to curtail his
legation's Graffham activities in early May. The Foreign
Office ordered Mallet to cease all discussions about repa-
triating aircrews when it learned that Mallet, without
- Selborne, 12 June 1944 letter, FO 837/
916.
79Chiefs of Staff to J.S.M., 27 July 1944 memorandum
COS(44) 604(0), CAB 122/914.
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consulting London, had offered the Swedes, in early July,
Spitfires in exchange for the interned personnel. 8 ° The
approach for operational facilities was postponed in
deference to the American insistance on London's undivided
support for economic warfare.
Foot's contention that a cautious policy towards
Stockholm was vital to the Allied war effort lacked sub-
stance until Sweden became a valuable source of intelli-
gence about German missile experiments in the summer of
1944. A V-2 rocket malfunctioned after launching from
PeenemiThde testing range on the Baltic and landed without
exploding in southern Sweden on 13 June. Britain despatched
technicians to Sweden to examine the missile but the
Swedish Foreign Ministry refused to let the British near
the weapon. Several Swedes attempted to sell the British
legation information about the V-2. In one instance,
Captain Denham, the naval attache, was approached by Major
Peterson, a Swedish intelligence officer, offering
details of Germany's V-3 and V-4 missile research projects,
as well as the V-2, in exchange for the Allied military
plans concerning Norway. 81 The British refused to bargain,
appealing instead to senior Swedish officials' humanitarian
instincts. General Nordinskiold allowed British experts
access to the missile on 17 July. On the following day,
80Chapter Six.
81Denham to Director of Naval Intelligence, 12 July
1944 telegram 0.21737, enclosed in War Cabinet to Foreign
Office, 14 July 1944 memorandum, FO 371/43504/N4807.
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Mallet persuaded Gunther to agree to let the British dis-
mantle and transport the V-2 to Britain for more detailed
evaluation. 82 This gesture, along with data and components
of another missile which were smuggled from Poland, enabled
the 'boffins' at Farnborough to estimate accurately, by
83late August, the V-2 s characteristics and capabilities.
Foot's understanding with Stettinius did not alter
the U.S. government's attitude towards Sweden. On 12 July,
the interdepartmental meeting which had been held to assess
the agreement with SKF accepted a proposal advanced by
Griff is, and supported by Patterson and Forrestal, to
press Sweden for an immediate and total embargo of exports
to Germany. Leo Crowely, the head of the Foreign Economic
Administration, goaded the State Department to endorse the
resolution by stating that "every effort" should be made to
capitalize on Hull's address of 9 April. 84 Griffis told
Patterson that London would cooperate in this initiative
since Mallet and Waring supported him fully after being
initially "lukewarm" at his tactics in Stockholm.85
Patterson insisted that London should be given two weeks
to endorse an American approach to Sweden. At the end of
82Mallet, Memoirs, op. cit., p. 147.
83Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. VI (New
York: Houghton Miff un, 1953; Bantam edition, 1962), p. 44.
84Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition
Warfare 1943-44 (Washington: G.P.O., 1959), p. 506.
85War Department memorandum (12 Jul. 44), op. cit.
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this period, a dmarche would be presented to the Swedes
with or without British concurrence.
Although the State Department accepted this
proposal, some officials privately questioned the need for
such action. In a letter of 10 July to Secretary of War
Stimson, Secretary of State Hull stated that Patterson
underestimated Allied progress by diplomatic means towards
eliminating Germany's imports. He expressed concern that
the action proposed by Patterson would adversely affect
other aspects of American relations with Sweden. Presum-
ably, these were intelligence activities in Sweden, and
the efforts by the American legation in Stockholm to
promote American postwar exports to Sweden. Hull added
that a harsh policy towards Sweden might create friction
with the British government,
You will appreciate I am sure that in the
conduct of economic warfare measures
directed at the neutrals, it is essential
that they be conducted on a basis of a
united front between this country and
Great Britain. Give and take is required
in maintaining such a united front.ö6
On 13 July, Hull requested Britain's full
cooperation in taking "early and drastic steps...to elimi-
nate all Swedish trade with the enemy, using all pressures
at our disposal." 87 The Allies would present Sweden a
86Hull to Stimson, 10 July 1944 letter, R.G. 165,
0PD336 (10, 7, 1944).
1944, Vol. IV, op. cit., pp. 578-9.
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joint dmarche specifically threatening economic reprisals
if Sweden failed to respond to American demands. Hull
added that "this government regards the matter as so
pressing that we may feel compelled to proceed alone if
British concurrence can not be obtained with the very near
future." The War Department prompted Roosevelt to despatch
a personal telegram urging the Prime Minister to "get
behind the matter personally" in overcoming possible
Foreign Office opposition to the American proposals.88
The strident and unyielding nature of the American
attitude disturbed British officials. Washington might
unilaterally issue "an ultimatum" to Stockholm "at any
moment," thereby eroding Britain's influence. 89
 Lord
Selborne therefore advised Eden, to "agree in principle"
with the desirability of achieving Washington's professed
aim, while dissuading the Americans from "placing them-
selves, and ourselves for that matter, in a position from
which they must either accept a rebuff or proceed to
extreme measures." 9 ° Selborne recommended that Eden
should ask Washington to support the policy which the
M.E.W. formulated after Foot's talks with Hggl6f.
The withdrawal of Swedish shipping from the Baltic would
be the first and most important step in this direction.
88Roosevelt to Churchill, 14 July 1944 personal
telegram 7.1447A/4, FO 371/43464/N45l0.
89Warner, 19 July 1944 minute, FO 371/43464/N4509.
90 selborne to Eden, 18 July 1944 letter, FO 371/
43464/N4 509.
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Selborne also advanced Foot's proposal to offer coal
supplies to the Swedes, in order to make the Swedes more
accommodating. He maintained that the Soviets would
have to be consulted because of their interest in establish-
ing trade with Sweden as soon as hostilities in Finland had
ended. The Minister of Economic Warfare felt that it was
"by no means certain" 91 that the Russians would want to
join the Western Allies in imposing sanctions against
Sweden.
On 18 July, the Foreign Office received the Joint
Planning Staff's study. The Joint Planners concluded that
the deception plans and 'operational facilities' would not
affect the outcome of the war greatly. The cessation of
Swedish exports would also be of negligible value to the
Allied war effort. 92 The Joint Planners stated that the
withdrawal of Swedish shipping would be the only conces-
sion which would diminish Germany's strength significantly.
The Chiefs of Staff informed the Foreign Office, that, if
necessary, they would exaggerate the importance of the
deceptions and operational facilities in order to present
a stronger case with their American counterparts.93
92Chiefs of Staff, 18 July 1944 minute COS (44)
239 meeting CAB 122/914; Joint Planning Staff paper, J.P.
(44) 105 (Final), FO 371/43464/N4508.
93Hollis to Eden, 18 July 1944 letter, FO 371/
43464/N4 508.
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The Americans' 'maximum effort' proposal disturbed
other quarters in London who were not concerned directly
with economic warfare. Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir
John Anderson advised Eden to consider the impending
payments negotiations carefully before committing Britain
to a new Allied initiative towards Sweden. 94 The Board of
Trade and Ministry of Supply expressed similar reservations.
Major General Hollis, the Secretary to the Chiefs of Staff
Committee, presented the strongest case for caution towards
Stockholm by stressing Mallet's efforts to secure British
access to the V-2: "it is of the highest importance that
our relations with the Swedes are such that they will co-
operate in giving us full facilities to examine the
mechanism of this missile."95
Eden's reply stressed the strategic reasons for
'understanding' while playing down British economic
interests in Sweden. He argued that Stockholm would be
more accommodating towards a less strident Allied approach.
...if they [the Swedes] were to accede to
our demands they would obviously wish it
were to appear that they had cut trade with
the Axis of their own accord and not because
a pistol had been put to their heads by the
Allies. 96
Eden proposed that the Allies should concentrate on
securing the withdrawal of Swedish shipping from service
94 Anderson to Eden, 19 July 1944 letter, FO 371/
43464/N4 509.
95Hollis, op. cit.,
96 Eden to Winant, 27 July 1944 letter, FO 371/
43472/N4821.
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in the Baltic. The Joint Planning Staff believed Swedish
vessels contributed 360,000 gross tons of the 1,100,000
tons available to Germany, the withdrawal of which would
result in 'disastrous' consequences for the Germans.
Berlin would experience great difficulty in procuring
adequate tonnage to evacuate troops from the eastern Baltic
while continuing trade with Sweden. 97 The M.E.W. was
confident that the Allies would have little difficulty in
securing this concession from Stockholm. Hägglöf had
indicated his government's willingness to accommodate the
Allies on this point. Sweden's commercial agreements with
Germany contained, in the words of Erik Boheman, "an
excellent loophole," which permitted Sweden to withdraw
voluntarily its merchant shipping from waters which were
subject to belligerent naval activities. 98 These agree-
ments recognized that under Swedish law, vessels sailing
to belligerent ports had to be covered by the Swedish
government's war risk insurance. Swedish ships would be
obliged to return and remain in Swedish waters if Stockholm
cancelled their insurance.
Eden also advised the Americans that no drastic
measures should be taken against Sweden without the Soviet
tinion's approval and active support. Although Moscow was
not party to the 1943 Agreement, Eden argued the Russians
97 German Movements in Norway, Finland and the Baltic,
report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, 9 August
1944, J.i.c. (44) 347 (0) (Final), CAB 79/79.
98Joint Planning Staff paper J.P. (44) 105 (Final),
CAB 119/109. Mallet to Foreign Office, 27 July 1944
telegram 839, FO 188/452.
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should be consulted because Soviet forces would soon be
operating in the eastern Baltic, and Sweden was also
mediating a Russo-Finnish armisitice. London felt the
Americans might be induced to refrain from employing
"battering ram" tactics against Sweden out of deference to
Russian opinion, if Moscow was included in future Anglo-
American initiatives.
The State Department reluctantly accepted Eden's
requests to seek Soviet approval for the proposed dmarche,
and delay its delivery until the Swedes had withdrawn
their shipping from the Baltic "provided they don't pro-
crastinate. ,,loo
During late July and early August, British represen-
tatives to the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff lobbyed
Britain's case for moderation towards Sweden with their
American counterparts. The arguments advanced by the
British C.O.S. did not influence their American counterparts.
Admiral King flatly disbelieved that intelligence gathered
in Sweden, even information concerning German rocket bombs,
was of any consequence whatever. The British officers were
able to convince their American colleagues that the with-
drawal of Swedish shipping was the most important economic
objective which the Allies could achieve. However, the
Americans became impatient with the Swedes in the second
99Warner to Foot, 11 July 1944 letter, FO 837/917.
1944, Vol. IV. p. 592.
273
week of August. Stockholm had withdrawn only vessels
sailing to North Sea ports, which had become hazardous due
to Allied bombing and mining of the Kiel Canal and
Brunsbuttel locks, but did not prohibit voyages to Baltic
ports. Although the withdrawal of sailings to North Sea
ports had reduced Swedish ore shipments by approximately
40%, the United States government was indignant over
Stockholm's failure to prohibit immediately all voyages to
enemy ports: "this country expects and hopes to obtain
from Sweden...not action which follows as a consequence of
war developments but action which anticipates and helps to
shape such developments and shorten the war."101
Boheman, GGnther, and Wallenburg, whom the
Foreign Office referred to as, "our friends in Sweden,"
attempted to persuade recalcitrant members of the Swedish
government to withdraw all shipping. They were unsuc-
cessful, since Swedish ships were still safe in such ports
as Stettin. To goad Stockholm, the Chiefs of Staff
endorsed a proposal by Admiral Cunningham which would give
the Swedes a pretext for complying with Allied wishes,
while depriving the Americans of an opportunity to be
"more ruthless in their dealings with Sweden." 102
 On the
night of 16/17 August, the Royal Air Force bombed the port
facilities of Stettin and dropped mines in its adjacent
waters. This attack was succeeded by another raid by the
Eighth Air Force. The Admiralty declared the Baltic a
1011bid., p. 598.
102Cunningham memorandum on Swedish shipping,
12 August 1944, CAB 122/914.
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danger zone to neutral shipping on the following day.
Prime Minister Hansson issued orders cancelling government
war risk insurance for all Swedish shipping in the Baltic
on the afternoon of the 18 August. The Swedish cabinet
authorized this measure officially on the 21st.
Ships currently at sea and in German ports were instructed
to return to their home ports as soon as possible. Berlin
was threatened with retaliation in kind if the Germans
attempted to seize Swedish vessels in Axis harbours.103
Boheman informed Mallet that it would take 24 days for all
ships currently discharging or loading cargoes in Germany
to return home. The Ministry of Economic Warfare hailed
the Swedish action as a "great blow to enemy shipping
resources, depriving the enemy of 465,000 deadweight tons
by a single stroke." 104 G.H. Villiers commented that had
the U.S. Navy achieved a comparable success in the Pacific,
"it would rightly be heralded as a great victory." The
M.E.W. estimated that Germany required 2,660,000 tons to
carry priority economic and military cargoes during the
summer of 1944.105 The shipping shortage drastically
curtailed German iron ore imports. Ore shipments declined
103Martin Fritz, German Steel and Swedish Iron Ore
(Gothenburg: Publication of the Institute of Economic History
of Gothenburg University 29, Kungsbacka, Elanders, l974),p. 125.
104Villiers to Halifax, 20 August 1944 telegram
1918 ARFAR FO 371/43456/N5045.
105Enemy Branch, M.E.W., 31 July 1944, German
Requirements in Northern Waters, FO 935/142.
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from 808,352 tons in July to 551,486 tons in August (in
contrast with 1,101,900 tons in August 1943). By September,
the M.E.W. proclaimed that German-Swedish trade was
"virtually at a standstill," with the exception of exports
via Narvik. Ore exports had fallen to 167,000 tons in
September, and the M.E.W. predicted that future exports
were unlikely to amount to more than 150,000 tons, reducing
Germany's total imports for 1944 to 5 million tons rather
than the 7.5 million permitted under the War Trade
Agreement. 106
The State Department, however, regarded the with-
drawal of shipping as only a "step in the right direction,"
and pressed London to proceed with issuing the joint
dmarche, once Soviet approval was received on 19 August.
Johnson and Mallet visited Gunther on 24 August to deliver
the British-American note and to give separate supplemental
oral messages. Before agreeing to deliver the dmarche,
London stipulated that it redraft the message. The
Foreign Office substituted vaguely worded exhortations for
the specific demands and threats which were contained in
the note's original text. The d gmarche proclaimed that the
Allies expected Sweden to make a "change that is in Sweden's
interests as well as of all other free nations," 107 without
106 Enemy Branch, M.E.W., Notes for Economic Intelli-
gence Meeting for week ending 29 September 1944, FO 935/143.
107Mallet to Selborne, 24 August 1944 despatch
218 EW/P, FO 371/4357/N5253. F.R.U.S., 1944, Vol. IV,
op. cit., pp. 626-7.
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explaining what sort of action Sweden was supposed to
undertake. Johnson orally informed Giinther that the
United States wanted Sweden to "take steps which will have
a decisive effect upon political and military developments
and ultimately upon the outcome of the war itself," before
the pace of events made such actions unnecessary. Johnson
hinted that the Allies could impose a postwar embargo on
Sweden if it failed to comply with their demands; "it's
almost inevitable that any country's claim to materials in
short supply will be considered in the light of its action
during the war." Mallet exhorted Sweden to take an 'open
action' against Germany which would be enacted through a
public declaration rather than by administrative measures.
Madamelcollontai did not join her Western colleagues on the
24th, but visited Gunther the following day. Mallet assumed
that she had undermined the dmarche by giving it only half-
hearted support, while expressing her government's satis-
faction with the outcome of the shipping question and
thanking the Swedes for mediating a Finnish armistice.108
Mallet warned London to keep in step with the Soviets by
not supporting U.S. reprisals, which would probably follow
a Swedish rebuff.
The British government was hardly surprised by
Giinther's formal reply of 4 September which tried to justify
Sweden's neutrality but failed to promise any dramatic
108Mallet to M.E.W., 26 August 1944 telegram 765
ARFAR, FO 371/43457/N5749.
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action to please the Americans. During the previous week
Mallet had advised London to expect a Swedish rebuff.
Recent U.S. radio and press reports, which had falsely
accused Sweden of supplying arms to Germany, had created
widespread indignation towards the Americans. The vague
language of the d'marche, together with Mallet's and
Johnson's rhetoric led some Swedes to suspect that the
"open action" which the Allies desired entailed a
diplomatic as well as economic break with Germany. In
September, the Swedish service chiefs even held a meeting
to consider contingency plans in the event that the
Allies manoeuvered Sweden into the war)° 9 Mallet stated
that Sweden's Social Democratic government did not want
to alienate working class voters before September's general
election by creating unemployment through a prohibition on
exports. Most Swedes believed the war would last until at
least the summer of 1945. They feared Sweden would not
have sufficient supplies on hand to withstand a year of
autarchy which would follow the cessation of trade with
Germany) 10 Lord Halifax informed London that the State
Department was no longer motivated by economic warfare
considerations. Some members of the State Department
admitted privately that Sweden's exports were insignificant
109Mallet - Warner, 21 September 1944 letter (283/
111/44), FO 371/43457/N6074. The question of Swedish
intervention in Norway during the final months of the war
will be examined in Chapter Nine.
°Mallet - M.E.W., 31 August 1944 telegram 780
ARFAR, FO 837/907; Mallet - M.E.W., 2 September 1944
telegram 788 ARFAR, FO 837/913.
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and that Washington was more concerned with the symbolic
rather than material significance of this trade) 11 In
view of the Treasury's and Ministry of Supply's anxiety
to secure postwar concessions from Sweden, Halifax urged
the Foreign Office to proceed immediately with the pay-
ments negotiations. If the United States insisted upon
Britain's cooperation in enforcing sanctions against
Sweden, Halifax advised Eden to ask them whether they
regarded a symbolic gesture from Sweden to be more
important than Britain's long-term interests and the
preservation of the Anglo-American common front. Sir
Orme Sargent rejected Halifax' proposed confrontation
as the "common front" was a "double-edged argument" which
Washington could also use with some justification against
Britain. 112
 Moreover, confrontation could harm other
areas of Anglo-American cooperation. The Foreign Office
decided that if the United States threatened unilateral
action against Sweden, Britain could only express "deep
regret" but little else, "we shall simply have to drop out
of the running and hope that the Americans will not con-
tinue alone." 113
 It was also decided to delay the payments
negotiations, as this action might prompt Washington to
111Halifax to Foreign Office, 5 September 1944
telegram 1880, CAB 122/915.
12Sargent to Foot, 28 August 1944 letter,
FO 37l/43457/N5105.
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take sudden measures against Sweden without informing
London beforehand.
The State Department attempted to circumvent the
Foreign Office when it decided to retaliate against
Stockholm's response to the d gmarche. When Roosevelt and
Churchill met during the first session of the second
conference at Quebec City, on 13 September, the President
casually suggested that Britain support U.S. sanctions
against Sweden. Churchill was swayed easily by Roosevelt's
suggestion, as he was not acquainted fully with the subtle
complexities of Anglo-Swedish relations, and respected
neutrals less than enemy belligerents. 4 Sweden had
"played a selfish part throughout this war and ought to be
made to suffer in the postwar world." 115 The Foreign
Office anticipated Churchill's reaction. He favoured
Roosevelt's proposal for sanctions in July and only
rejected it at the Foreign Office's insistence. Sargent
directed the Washington embassy to prepare a nine page
memorandum for Eden to show Churchill if the Americans
raised the Swedish question at the conference. The memo-
randum was mainly composed of Mallet's most vehement
arguments against sanctions. Some of Mallet's views were
not shared entirely by the Foreign Office, but were employed
to offset Roosevelt's influence over Churchill. The memo-
114Mallet, Memoirs, op. cit., p. 147. See Chapter Seven.
115Churchill to Eden, 13 September 1944 minute,
FO 37l/4346l/N7475.
randum stressed the potential hazards of Soviet encroach-
ment in Sweden and the dangers of the Swedes being drawn
into "the Soviet economic system...which would of course
entail a loss to British export industries of a valuable
market." 116 Churchill withdrew support for Roosevelt's
suggestion after the reading the memorandum. Churchill
also received a telegram from Lord Selborne which
emphasized Sweden's importance as a base for supplying the
Danish resistance. After seeing Selborne's telegram,
Roosevelt accepted Churchill's decision not to support
sanctions, and stated that the Allied difference over
Sweden was "not a fundamental one but one of method" which
could be resolved at a lower level.117
THE SATURNUS SAGA
American behaviour towards Sweden seemed unusually
restrained during the weeks following the Quebec conference.
The U.S. government appeared to have retreated from its
efforts to force Sweden to alter drastically its commercial
policy. The Foreign Office hoped that Roosevelt's failure
to secure Churchill's support might have caused the
Americans to relent in favour of prodding Sweden to grant
piecemeal concessions to the Allies. London was satisfied
116British Embassy to 'OCTAGON', 13 September 1944
memorandum, CAB 122/915.
117Eden to Sargent, 16 September 1944 telegram
187 GUNFIRE, FO 800/413; Selborne to Eden, 12 September
1944 telegram 234 CORDITE, FO 800/412.
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by the discriminatory measures which Sweden sanctioned
against Germany during September and early October 1944.
The last vestiges of Germany's transit privileges to
Finland and Norway were terminated on 4 and 9 September,
respectively. Boheman informed Johnson that Nazi war
criminals and loot would be prohibited from entering
Sweden. On 22 September, the Allies learned that Stockholm
had decided to close all Baltic and Bothnian ports to
foreign shipping, leaving Gothenburg, Malmö, the Narvik
railway, and the Hlsinborg-He1singr ferry the last
entrepats for Swedish exports to Germany and German-
occupied territory. 8
 The closure of Sweden's eastern
ports to German shipping reduced Germany's ore imports
severely. October ore shipments totalled 67,678 tons,
which the M.E.W. regarded as negligible. Virtually all
Swedish ore was exported via Narvik, where the Swedes
refused to allow more than 40,000 tons to be stocked at
any one time, despite German pleas for compensation for
lost trade in the Baltic. The M.E.W. revised its projected
annual ore export total to 4.7 - 4.85 million tons.
Stockholm also suspended timber and plywood exports in mid
October. 119
_______ 1944, Vol. IV, pp. 638-40.
119 Enemy Branch, M.E.W., Notes for Economic Intelli-
gence Meeting, 27 October 1944, FO 935/142. Mitcheson -
M.E.W., 14 November 1944 despatch CC.l350, FO 837/915.
The Swedish press reported that production at the largest
mines in northern Sweden was reduced from 7 to 5 days per
week, because of declining exports. Several major sawmills
and pulp mills were closed indefinitely. Enemy Branch,
M.E.W., Notes..., op. cit.
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The Allies expected another difficult confrontation
with SKF when the Griff is-Waring agreement expired on 12
October. However, Mallet and Johnson discovered, that
the Swedish government had persuaded SKF to cease all
bearing exports to Germany. SKF's lawyers had already
drafted a bogus Allied ultimatum which threatened the
company with postwar blacklisting. The document provided
the company with an excuse to plead force maieure.120
SKF's embargo did not include steel exports but the arrange-
ment satisfied the Allies.' 21 Negotiations regarding
Allied compensation for SKF continued until July 1945. The
M.E.W. hoped the Americans would underwrite most of SKF's
losses, but Washington refused to compensate the company
for trade lost after 12 October 1944. Foot and Selborne
felt "implied commitments" obliged London to indemnify SKF
for at least part of its losses during the closing months
of the war. 122 The Treasury believed such expenditure was
politically inexpedient but eventually agreed to the
proposed transaction after Selborne assured Sir John
Anderson that London could recover some funds by selling
back to SKF bearings which Britain had purchased in 1943.
Nevertheless, both ministries sought to avoid public
embarrassment by concealing the transaction from the press.
120F.R.U.S., 1944, Vol. IV, op. cit., pp. 638-40;
M.E.W.-Halifax, 4 October 1944 telegram 2353, CAB 122/915.
121Mallet - M.E.W., 13 October 1944 despatch,
FO 837/916.
122Selborne - Anderson, 5 December 1944 letter
T13/2/29/Z, FO 371/43509/N7679.
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Under the settlement of 27 July 1945, Britain paid SKF
nearly 12 million Kroner and the United States 6.7 million
Kr. 123
London believed that the Allies would accomplish
little by stopping what was left of Swedish-German trade.
British officials were anxious to attend to Britain's long
term interests. The Foreign Office allowed the Bank of
England to open negotiations with the Riksbank in October.
However, negotiations concerning timber purchases, UNRRA,
and other postwar matters were postponed in deference to
Washington.
The Americans remained dissatisfied with Sweden's
continued trade with Germany. Washington sought British
support in terminating Sweden's remaining exports via Narvik
and west coast Swedish ports which were not covered by
Stockholm's ban on Baltic shipping. London responded that
the closure of Sweden's western ports would undermine the
S.O.E.'s efforts to supply the Danish resistance by fast
motor boats. The U.S. War and Navy Departments discounted
the British argument as having little to do with winning
the war. They urged Roosevelt to order unilateral U.S.
action to terminate all remaining Swedish exports to Germany.
However, the State Department decided it would be easier
r the Allies to secure this objective if they asked the
Swedes to eliminate only those exports which were considered
to be most valuable to the German war effort such as iron
123War History Report. R.G. 59 op. cit.
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ore, and reserve action acainst the more innocuous exports
such as paper for a later date. On Johnson's advice, the
Department was also prepared to allow the Swedes to
terminate these exports without publicity, and in a manner
of their own choosing, in return for "favourable considera-
tion of Sweden's urgent supply needs." 124
 However, the
Department was not prepared to release synthetic rubber,
until the Swedes had promised to terminate all shipments
to Germany.
On 26 October, Boheman informed Johnson and Mallet
that the Swedish Foreign Ministry had succeeded in
persuading Swedish exporters to terminate immediately
shipments of charcoal, pig iron, cobalt slag, electric
machines, motors, and 400 tons of steel. 125
 Other items,
such as 30,000 tons of iron ore, 3600 tons of iron and
steel, 500,000 kroner worth of machine tools, and other
goods which had not been specified could still be exported
during the balance of 1944, in order to keep the Gothenburg
traffic open. Stockholm hoped that the Allies would allow
some commerce with Germany to continue in 1945; otherwise,
the Germans would probably isolate Sweden after Stockholm's
trade agreements with Berlin expired on 1 January 1945.
________ 1944, Vol. IV, op. cit., p. 650.
' 25Mallet to M.E.W., 27 October 1944 telegram 947
ARFAR, FO 371/43493/N6576; these included all exports of
charcoal, pig iron, cobalt slag, electric machines and
motors, and 400 tons of steel.
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Boheman told the Allied ministers that his government had
not made any new trade commitments to Berlin for 1945,
and urged the Americans to load 3665 tons of buna (synthe-
tic rubber) and other tyre accessories on the Saturnus,
which was scheduled to sail on the last safe conduct
voyage of 1944 from New Orleans on 14 November. He said
that Stockholm was prepared to be 'rude' to Berlin, but
could not afford to provoke German action which would
prevent the arrival of the rubber consignment. 126 Without
new tyres, Swedish trucks would be unable to haul wood
from the forests to produce charcoal and other synthetic
fuels. The Swedes would be forced to deplete exportable
stockpiles of sawn timber to meet their energy requirements.
Boheman warned that the Swedish government might not
terminate the remaining exports if the rubber supplies
were not forthcoming.
The British government believed Sweden had a just
claim on American rubber supplies. Moreover, Britain
would be unable to obtain wood products for reconstruction
if the Swedes were to make synthetic fuel out of sawn
timber, the purchase of which had yet to be negotiated.
Negotiations could be difficult if the Swedes were to
press London for larger postwar coal deliveries to offset
wartime deprivations. The U.S. War and Navy Departments
126FRUS, 1944, Vol. IV, p. 655.
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did not share London's concern for Sweden's supply
difficulties. They prompted Roosevelt to issue a Presi-
dential order on 4 November impounding the Saturnus until
Sweden publicly declared a total trade embargo on Germany.
Acting Secretary of State Stettinius tried unsuccessfully
to get the President to rescind his order on 10 November.
To save face, he adopted a stern attitude towards London
and insisted that the U.S. government had acted unilate-
rally because the British "have not always found it
possible for reasons of their own to see eye-to-eye with
us." 127
 Washington also rejected a compromise proposal
by the British which would allow Sweden to receive the
rubber supplies in return for a Swedish embargo on Germany
once the Saturnus arrived in Gothenburg)28
On 15 November, Halifax presented Stettinius with
an aide m&noire protesting the unilateral American action
which represented "a departure from the policy of a united
front which His Majesty's Government greatly deplored" and
127F.R.U.S., 1944, Vol. IV, p. 662; Edward R.
Stettinius, The Diaries of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.,
1943-1946, (New York: New View Points, 1975), p. 164;
Stimson, 4 November 1944 notes of meeting with President,
NA R.G. 165 OPD 336 .009 (SWD) 11, 11, 44.
' 28 The U.S. had shipped a minor quantity of rubber
to Sweden in early 1944, and this was reported in the
U.S. press, creating a "storm of protest in the U.S."
Many people wrote angry letters to their congressmen,
asking why Sweden received rubber "at a time when the
ordinary American citizen was unable to buy tires."
Knox - Johnson, 5 January 1945 note, Hershell V. Johnson
Papers.
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hoped would "not constitute a precedent for similar action
in the future." 29 Dingle Foot told John Winant, the U.S.
ambassador in London, that the British government felt that
Allied pressure on Sweden at this stage in the war was
unwarranted as Sweden's exports had been "reduced to
insignificant quantities of little or no assistance to
the enemy war ef fort." 13 ° The Allies were therefore
obliged to honour their commitments to compensate the
Swedes for their economic sacrifices. In Foot's opinion,
Sweden would probably have terminated its exports when its
agreements with Berlin expired at the end of the year, but
now the Swedes could be provoked into continuing their
shipments into 1945, and possibly revoke earlier commitments
to the Allies as well. In Washington, Lord Halifax
insinuated that the Americans regarded their alliance
with Britain as an arrangement in which Britain's
opinions and vital interests were less important than
Britain's unwavering assistance in achieving American
political aims.
His Majesty's Government cannot ignore the
fact that a decision to withhold tyre making
supplies for Sweden is likely...to prejudice
the trocurement of timber that is desperately
needed in the United Kingdom...negotiations
with the Swedes for the purchase of this
129British embassy to Department of State, 15
November 1944 aide-mmoire, CAB 122/915; Foot to Winant,
16 November 1944 memorandum, FO 37l/43461/N7270.
130Foot, op. cit.
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timber have been held up ever since May, in
compliance with the wishes of the United
States authorities •131
On 22 November, 1944, washington proposed a compromise
along the lines that the British had originally advanced.
On the following day, Boheman informed Mallet and Johnson
that his government accepted the proposal "without
reservation," and would employ "administrative measures"
to restrict shipments to a bare minimum in order to ensure
the Saturnus' safe arrival.132
The Saturnus departed from New Orleans on 6 December
1944 and entered Gothenburg harbour on the morning of
1 January 1945. Before the ship was loaded, the U.S.
supply authorities 'discovered' a rubber shortage, and
consigned to Sweden materiel from stocks allocated to
Britain in the Allied supply pool. Other sundry items
were not immediately available and the Saturnus had to sail
without them, in order to reach Gothenburg by New Year's
Day. These goods were loaded on the tanker, Falsterbohus,
which left New Orleans in the middle of December with a
cargo of aviation fuel. The Swedish government was
anxious to prevent the Germans from closing the safe con-
duct traffic after 1 January. Stockholm failed to
formally proclaim a suspension of trade with Germany
(although ore shipments via Narvik had ceased). Sweden
131British embassy, 15 November 1944 op. cit.
132Mallet toM.E.W., 22 November 1944 telegram
1003 ARFAR, FO 371/4346l/N7400.
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continued a petty barter trade in foodstuffs, forest pro-
ducts, tin, and other goods with Norway and Denmark.
Berlin kept the Gothenburg traffic open during the first
weeks of January 1945, while the situation remained
unclear. In mid-December, the Swedes asked the Allies to
allow a trickle of exports to continue after 1 January.
Foot strongly supported the Swedish request for the sake
of improving Anglo-Swedish relations, as well as of help-
ing to further Swedish relief efforts in Norway and
Denmark. The Foreign Office rejected Foot's proposal in
spite of its endorsement by exiled Norwegian and Danish
officials, on the grounds that it was not "sufficient to
justify a difficult battle with the Americans." 33 The
U.S. government maintained that Sweden's commitment to
sever all trade with Germany included Norway and Denmark
as well. Moreover, Patterson insisted that a complete
embargo was necessary to prevent smuggling. He cited a
report from military intelligence which stated that before
the Wehrmacht withdrew from southern France, Germany had
received nearly 2 tons of wolfram from Spanish smugglers,
in spite of Spain's agreement to stop wolfram exports in
June. 134 washington was incensed to learn of the barter
transactions with Sweden's neighbours, regarding them as a
133Haigh to Thorold (M.E.W.), 24 December 1944
letter, FO 371/43476/N7968.
134Pattersonto Stettinius, letter 30 December 1944,
R.G. 165, OPD 009/EPORT/091. SWD(16,l2,44).
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"flagrant violation of the Saturnus agreement." 135
 The
State Department threatened to impound the Faisterbohus
on the high seas, and that "no guarantee can be given
that mattrs can be withheld from the press."
Several Western newspaper stories about Sweden's de facto
embargo of Germany appeared, which the Foreign Office
believed had been 'leaked' by the State Department. Sweden
formally announced the suspension of exports to Germany on
12 January, and the German navy tightened its blockade of
the Skagerak. For the duration of the war, Sweden
conducted some barter trade with Norway, and made humani-
tarian shipments .
 to Poland and Holland, after each transac-
tion had been approved on an ad hoc basis by the Allies.
Sweden was also able to persuade Germany to allow ten safe
conduct vessels to pass through the blockade between
January and May.
SUMMARY
London and Washington's differences over their
common policy towards Sweden became more pronounced during
1944. The British regarded the 1943 War Trade Agreement,
the Griff is-Waring agreement with SKF, and the withdrawal
of Swedish shipping from trans-Baltic trade in August 1944
as unqualified successes. The M.E.W. maintained that these
undertakings from Stockholm were the best bargains that
the Allies could expect to secure from a Sweden which
135F.R.U.S., 1945, Vol. V, op. cit., p. 738.
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remained isolated from the Allies and dependent upon Germany.
The Americans insisted that the Swedish concessions were
merely 'a step in the right direction' towards a complete
severance of Swedish-German trade.
London questioned the necessity for a general
Swedish embargo of Germany. The M.E.W. had concluded in
March, that Sweden's iron ore exports were immaterial to
the outcome of the war. In the late autumn, Dingle Foot
insisted that what remained of Swedish-German trade
benefitted Sweden more than Germany. Throughout 1944, Lord
Selborne and Foot asserted that Stockholm would not agree
to sever all commercial ties with Germany unless compelled
by drastic Allied sanctions. The M.E.W. along with other
government bodies such as the Treasury and the Chiefs of
Staff feared that an acrimonious confrontation between the
Allies and Sweden would undermine British prestige, impede
negotiations for a new monetary agreement and other post-
war arrangements, and induce the Swedes to withhold the
wreckage of a V-2 missile.
Although most British officials were reluctant to
endorse Washington's proposals, the Foreign Office
maintained that Britain should continue to co-operate with
the Americans in order to exert some influence over US.
policy towards Sweden. Eden and Sargent did not agree
with Halifax's proposal that London oppose unreasonable
U.S. proposals openly, because Britain required U.S.
assistance in other more critical matters such as postwar
economic aid. The Foreign Office and M.E.W. hoped that
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the experience of dealing with recalcitrant Swedish
officials and reasoned British arguments would induce the
Americans to compromise with Stockholm. However, the
Americans grew impatient with Sweden when the Swedes pro-
crastinated in accepting Allied demands. British
arguments only convinced the extremists in the U.S. service
departments that Britian was a weak and irresolute ally.
Eventually the Americans ignored London's views altogether,
and forced Stockholm to suspend all trade with Germany and
German occupied territories by impounding the Saturnus
and its cargo in November 1944.
The Saturnus affair also served to demonstrate
that the United States was the strongest and therefore
senior partner in the Alliance. Britain did not possess
the economic and military power which the Americans
enjoyed. Britain's main strength was its prestige and
diplomatic influence which had been acquired before the
United States became an important factor in Anglo-Swedish
relations. Perhaps the Foreign Office endorsed most
American initiatives in hope that Sweden and other small
nations would assume that Britain was an equal in the
Alliance. Stockholm might be more accommodating in the
payments and timber negotiations if the Swedes believed
that Britain was still a dynamic force within the Alliance.
If Britain wielded considerable influence with Washington,
Stockholm might infer that the Americans implicitly
approved of Britain's postwar demands even if formal U.S.
support was not forthcoming. In spite of London's past
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support for its policy, Washington embarrassed the
British by demonstrating that they had little influence
over Allied economic warfare policy:
We had always complained in private, but
in public we had always largely avoided
any appearance of a rift in Allied unity.
The United States Government now behaved
very differently towards us.136
136 .	 .Sir Liewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy
in the Second World War, Vol. III (London: H.M.S.O., 1971),
p. 463.
CHAPTER SIX
AVIATION, SWEDEN, AND THE COMMON FRONT
JUNE 1944 - MAY 1945
Between 1941 and 1943, London displayed an interest
in Sweden's defences in order to encourage Swedish resist-
ance to German intimidation. Britain allowed Sweden to
import aviation fuel to bolster the Swedes' confidence in
their air force's capabilities. However, the British
government's professed concern for Sweden's defences
stopped short of accommodating the Swedish air staff's
informal request for Spitfires in October 1943, although
the Air Force's lack of modern fighters was Sweden's most
serious military weakness. The Foreign Office did not
want to discourage the Swedish air staff's desire to obtain
Spitfires entirely, but could not consider a request for
Spitfires unless it had been officially approved by the
Swedish government. 1 By stipulating that further approaches
for Spitfires be made on a diplomatic rather than on an
unofficial air staff to air staff basis, the Foreign Office
established that the question of transferring British
aircraft could be linked with other, as yet undefined,
issues during subsequent Anglo-Swedish negotiations. In
Nutting's words, the Foreign Office was prepared in princi-




something in return, such as either that they be used
against Germany or some other really important concession."2
However, the Foreign Office did not establish what quid pro
quo would have sufficient importance to entitle Sweden to
receive Spitfires. The Foreign Office allowed the issue of
supplying Spitfires to Sweden to lapse in the autumn of
1943, deferring further deliberation about possible quid
pro quos until such time as Stockholm raised the matter
again.
However, Allied concern over Sweden's ball bearing
exports prompted the British rather than Swedish government
to revise the question of furnishing Spitfires officially
in March 1944. The Ministry of Economic Warfare learned
of the Swedish Air Force's previous requests for British
fighters after Gunnar Hágglf had mentioned the subject
casually during a conversation with Dingle Foot in late
February. Lord Selborne believed that a British offer to
supply aircraft might induce Stockholm to curtail bearing
exports to Germany. With the Foreign Office's and Air
Ministry's concurrence, Foot informed Higgl6f, on 13 March,
that Britain would be prepared to deliver fighter aircraft
to Sweden if SKF imposed a ball bearing embargo on Germany
during the spring and early summer. 3 Sir Charles Portal,
the Chief of Air Staff, had supported the scheme as an
N/6228.
2Nutting, 16 October 1943 minute, FO 371/37133/
3Chapter Five.
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expedient to resolve the ball bearing question before it
became embroiled in a protracted diplomatic wrangle
between Stockholm and the Allies. However, Portal and the
Air Staff were relieved when the Swedish government
rejected Foot's proposal on 31 March. They were reluctant
to dissipate British fighter strength prior to Overlord
and the new Allied offensive in Italy. 4 The Air Ministry
did not know whether Britain could spare fighters for
delivery to Sweden until July, when an initial consignment
of 25 obsolescent Spitfire Mark V's were expected to be
withdrawn from operations. 5 The Air Staff had not
instructed the Joint Planning Staff to study any technical
questions which might have arisen if the Swedes had
accepted the proposal, such as the procurement of appro-
priate aircraft for Sweden, training Swedish pilots and
ground crews, or the commercial and diplomatic procedures
which would have been required to consummate this transac-
tion. In the wake of the Swedish reply to Foot's proposal,
neither the air authorities nor the Foreign Office
entertained any further hopes of using Spitfires as 'bait'
to entice the Swedes to accommodate Allied wishes on the
ball bearing issue.
While the Foreign Office's and air authorities'
interest in offering Spitfires to Sweden had diminished by
April 1944, informal discussions concerning fighters
4Galsworthy, 20 April 1944 minute, FO 371/43452/
N2661.
5Cavendish-Bentinck, 6 March 1944 minute, FO 371/
43520/N1543.
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between the Swedish air staff and British and U.S. officials
in Stockholm were becoming more frequent and serious.
Swedish approaches to members of the British legation did
not alter London's attitude towards this question, but they
did stimulate the U.S. War Department to initiate further
contacts with the Swedish air officers. The outcome of
these Swedish-American exchanges in November would surprise
the Foreign Office greatly and give British officials cause
to ponder a very different and unexpected aspect of
Washington's attitude towards Sweden.
DECEPTIONS, INTERNEES, ATTACHES, AND SUSPICIONS, APRIL -
JULY 1944
The British legation's and London Controlling
Section's proposals for offering Spitfires to embellish
the Graffham deception was referred to briefly in Chapter
Three. It is now necessary to examine this episode in more
detail in order to understand how U.S. officials developed
contacts with the Swedish air staff and were able to exploit
the latter's desire for modern fighters.
During April, an Air Commodore, H.N. Thornton, who
was temporarily promoted to Air Vice Marshal for Graffham
purposes, visited Stockholm to create the impression that
the Allies were concerned about Sweden's air defences prior
to an assault on Norway. He discussed details of Sweden's
air bases with the Swedish air staff while ostensibly
inspecting the British air attache's office. Thornton had
several cordial meetings with General Nordinskiöld, who
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stated that he was still anxious to obtain Spitfires and
would "welcome even a limited number for training
purposes." 6 Mallet and Major.D. Morley, the L.C.S.
representative in Stockholm, seized upon Nordinski6ld's
remark as a means of improving the Allies' negotiating
position with Sweden, and lending credibility to the decep-
tion plans. They asked London to consider selling the
Swedes twelve Spitfires on the basis of a cash transaction
rather than as a quid pro quo for a Swedish concession. The
London Controlling Section strongly supported this proposal
for Graffham purposes:
If the Allies were in fact contemplating
operations in Scandinavia, they would
obviously be much concerned with Sweden's
capabilities to defend herself in case of
enemy reactions. Her main weakness lies
in lack of modern fighter aircraft and the
Allies would, therefore, if they contemplated
operations, do everything possible to over-
come this weakness.
Colonel Bevan suggested that Thornton or Air Commodore
Maycock, the air attache, should offer General Nordinskild
a squadron of Spitfires, which would be sent immediately to
Sweden pending the Swedish government's approval. The
offer would be made in a manner which would imply as many
as 200 Spitfires might be made available at a later date.
If the offer was accepted, the Air Ministry would arrange
the transfer of these aircraft to Sweden "as a matter of
6Nallet, 26 April 1944 minute, FO 188/446;
Cruikshank, op. cit., pp. 136-7.
7Col. J.H. Bevan, 5 May 1944 paper LCS (44) 12,
CAB 119/109. In one instance, Major Morley suggested that
12 Spitfires should be given to Sweden as a "free gift."
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great urgency." 8
 Dingle Foot stated that the Ministry of
Economic Warfare felt that a "bribe" of 10-12 Spitfires
might serve as an additional means to induce the Swedish
government to "connive at any action" with SKF to curtail
ball bearing exports. 9 Mallet argued that the sale of 200
aircraft would be a more worthwhile Inducement since the
only Swedes who would value twelve Spitfires would be the
Air Force and such a small number would appear "even to
them to be merely a token offer and useful only for training
purposes.
The Air Staff and the Foreign Office were wary of
this proposal. Air Vice Marshal Colyer stressed that if
Britain agreed to furnish twelve Spitflres to Sweden, it
would be under a 'moral obligation' to provide additional
aircraft and might cause the Swedes to hold out for these
in return for future concessions to the Allies. The
Foreign Office maintained that the Swedish government would
be more interested in obtaining scarce commodities, such
as synthetic rubber, rather than aircraft. In view of the
tough American attitude towards Sweden, the Foreign Office
felt that an aircraft sale to Sweden would create friction
9Galsworthy, 30 April 1944 mInute, FO 371/43452/
N2661; Ministry of Economic Warfare to Stockholm, 1 May
1944 telegram 439 ARFAR, FO 371/43520/N2341.
10Mallet to Foot, 1 May 1944 telegram 408 ARFAR,
FO 37l/43520/N2341.
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with Washington. The Foreign Office has also suspected
for several months that the Swedes were really trying to
obtain modern fighters for defence against the Soviet
Union "in the same way as the Turks have wrangled armaments
out of us on the pretext that they required them for
protection against the Germans."	 Mallet was therefore
advised to discourage the Swedish Air Force from making
further requests for fighters, in connexion with the ball
bearing negotiations. The Foreign Office also informed
the U.S. and Soviet governments of what had transpired
between Thornton and Nordinskiöld.
In spite of the Foreign Office's and Air Ministry's
reservations, the British legation in Stockholm continued
its efforts to arrange an Anglo-Swedish aircraft deal
during May and June. Mallet and Maycock sympathized with
the Swedish Air Force's desire to obtain modern fighters,
and on different occasions suggested that Britain would
agree to provide various nunthers of Spitfires to Sweden
during exploratory discussions concerning the repatria-
tion of interned aircrews and the establishment of radar
stations. Mallet subsequently informed the Foreign Office
that the Swedes' attitude obliged Maycock to offer Spitfires
while privately doubting London's willingness to furnish
aircraft. During the air attache's meetings with the
Swedish air staff, Colonel Söderberg, head of the air board
for supplies insisted that in view of the increasingly
11Cavendish-Bentinck, 6 March 1944 minute,
FO 371/43520/N1543.
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uncertain situation in Scandinavia and Finland, Sweden
needed modern fighters more urgently than radar sets. On
13 June, Mallet approached the Swedish Foreign Ministry,
without consulting London and presented a proposal to
provide British aircraft in exchange for interned airmen.
The Swedish government had never backed the Air Force's
requests for Spitfires openly. Gtinther indignantly
rejected the proposal on the grounds that Sweden's neutra-
lity would be compromised if Stockholm accepted fighters
from a belligerent power in exchange for skilled personnel
who would be redeployed in hostile acts against Germany
once they were returned to Britain.
The Foreign Office was bewildered by Mallet's
unathorized and impulsive action, which conflicted with its
attitude towards Sweden. Mallet attempted to justify his
behaviour in a letter to Warner asserting that Nordinski8ld's
persistent requests implied that the government might be
amenable to a compromise with London. "It is the Swedish
Air Force officers who are constantly telling us how badly
they need fighters and I don't blame the poor chaps when
you see what old-fashioned crates they fly around over
Stockholm." 2 In a subsequent letter to Warner, Mallet
elaborated that his approach to the government had also
been motivated by rivalry between the British and U.S. air
attachs. Although the British legation was ostensibly
using aircraft as a negotiating ploy, it also appears that
12Mallet to Warner, 18 July 1944 Top Secret letter
G504, FO 371/43520/N4621.
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Maycock and his staff were anxious to protect Sweden as a
future market for British aircraft, against American compe-
tition. During conversations with Colonel S6derberg and
other Swedish Air Force officers, Maycock learned that the
United States air attache, Colonel Hardison, had also
offered fighters in return for American air crews, and had
raised the question of the establishment of United States
air bases in Sweden. 13 Johnson, and other officials of the
U.S. legation denied that such an approach had been made.
The Americans insisted that it was the Swedes who had
proposed making a fighters-for-aircrew bargain. Mallet
tended to agree with Johnson's argument, but suspected that
Colonel Hardison, "who is inclined to go a bit wild," was
actually responsible for "putting the suggestion to the
Swedes," 14
 and asked Warner for guidance as to whether the
legation ought to continue to cultivate the Swedish interest
in obtaining Spitfires.
London categorically instructed Mallet and Maycock
to desist from encouraging further Swedish approaches for
aircraft. The R.A.F. could not afford to relinquish any
part of its fighter formations which were required to
support operations in Normandy. Moreover, the Foreign
Office and the Air Ministry agreed that it would be
13Mallet to Warner, 23 June 1944 letter,
FO 371/43520/N3936.
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'undesirable' for Sweden to get the impression that the
Allies were prepared to offer fighters in return for a
relatively minor concession, such as the repatriation of
Allied airmen (most of whom were American). Colyer
insisted that offering aircraft merely as a "bonus for good
behaviour" would only diminish the value of aircraft as a
bargaining counter "if the time comes to use them as such."5
Warner and Nutting believed that it would be poor tactics
to go "running after the Swedes and offering them air-
craft," 16 since this would imply that Britain believed that
Sweden was still endangered by Germany - "a thesis which
we have disputed for over a year."17
In his letter to Mallet, Warner stressed that the
Americans would probably oppose any British scheme to
supply Spitfires to Sweden since the U.S. War and Navy
Departments tended to become "almost hysterical at the
least suggestion of a gift or concession being made to the
Swedes." 18 Nutting and Warner shared Mallet's suspicion
that the Swedish request for American aircraft could have
been instigated by Lt.-Colonel Hardison, the U.S. air
attache, or possibly by Hershell Johnson himself, since
"the Yanks in Stockholm are very cagey, especially
Mr. Johnson, who may be lying." 19 Even if this was true
15Colyer to Maycock, 13 July 1944 letter, FO 371/
43420/N4545. Warner, minute 30 June 1944, FO 37l/43420/N3936.
16Nutting, 27 June 1944 minute, FO 371/43420/N3936.
17warner to Mallet, 8 July 1944 letter, FO 371/43420/
N3936.
181b1d
19Nutting, 26 June 1944 minute, FO 37l/43520/N4621.
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however, the Foreign Office believed that the U.S. legation's
initiatives were not officially sanctioned. Warner informed
Mallet that he had recently been told by John Higgs, a
State Department official who was about to assume the post
of Secretary of the legation in Stockholm, that the
American authorities "were literally furious" over the
"Swedish (?) proposal."2°
Mallet was instructed to inform the Swedes that
Britain would only consider supplying Spitfires to Sweden,
"if at all," as a quid pro qo for some "really big
concession" which London specifically demanded. 21 The
Foreign Office also obtained an informal assurance from
the U.S. Emabssy that steps would be taken to "muzzle"
Hardison to prevent further confusion from arising over this
question. 22 In addition, London also revoked its earlier
agreement to furnish radar sets in exchange for the return
of 58 internees after the British learned that the Swedes
were attempting to obtain additional equipment from the
Germans to "get the best of both worlds, as usual."23
20Warner to Mallet, 8 July 1944, op. cit. (The
question mark appears in the original text, The British
suspected that Col. Hardison had offered fighters, but were
obliged to accept Johnson's denial due to lack of evidence.
22Nutting, 27 July 1944 minute, op. cit. Colonel
Charles E. Rayens became air attache in the summer of
but Hardison remained in Stockholm as assistant air attache
until Spring 1945.
23Colyer to Maycock, op. cit.
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SWEDEN AND AMERICA - THE POLITICS OF INTERNMENT,
JUNE - NOVEMBER 1944
As some British officials suspected, the Swedish
request of 6 June 1944 for American fighters had been
inspired by Colonel Hardison during conversations with
officials of the Swedish Defence and Foreign Ministries.
Hardison had not gone "a bit wild", as Mallet supposed, but
had acted in concert with other U.S. legation officials in
an attempt to persuade the Swedish government to release
all American airmen who were interned in Sweden. The
scheme had not been proposed by the War Department which
knew nothing about it at the time, but was sponsored by
General Carl Spaatz, the commander of U.S. Strategic Air
Forces in the European theatre of operations. In early
April 1944, Spaatz privately and unofficially informed
Colonel Bernt Baichen, his representative in Sweden, that
the U.S. Eighth Air Force would be willing to give the
Swedish Air Force any U.S. fighters which had force-landed
in Swedish territory, after accompanying bombers on deep
penetration raids into Germany, provided that the Swedes
allowed the American pilots to return to Britain. 24
 The
Stockholm legation tentatively discussed this question with
24 Johnson-Hull, 21 July 1944 telegram 2705 RG165,
OPD336 SWEDEN (29 Jul. 1944). 041. Major Concadi, the
assistant air attach in Stockholm, was similarly informed
by Eighth Air Force officers when he visited London to
discuss how bomber crews were to be briefed in regard to
forced landings in Sweden.
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the Swedish Foreign Ministry, but neglected to mention the
fact that these aircraft were returning from a hostile
mission over Germany so that the Swedes would not feel that
they were being asked to compromise their neutrality.
Hardison and Christian Ravndal, the counsellor at the U.S.
legation, suggested instead that the United States govern-
ment was prepared to give Sweden aircraft which would be
'delivered' in such a manner as to suggest that they had
been forced to land in Sweden. 25 The price for these air-
craft would be the return of the pilots who had 'delivered'
the fighters, and also the release of a large number of
Allied airmen who were already interned. The Swedish
government responded that this proposal could give the
Germans cause to accuse Sweden of unneutral behaviour.
However, Sven Grafstr6m, the acting director of the Swedish
Foreign Ministry's political affairs department, privately
intimated to Ravndal on 6 June that his government might be
willing to release all interned American and British
aircrews in return for modern fighters such as the P-51
26Mustang.
Some officials at the State Department were
indignant when they first learned of the Swedish suggestion,
26Johnson-Hull, 6 June 1944 telegram #2010, RG165,
0PD336 SWEDEN (13 Jun 1944) 321.19 AAF.
In early June 1944, there were 30 British and 498 American
airmen interned in Sweden, which included 93 pilots, 48
bombardiers, 48 navigators, 48 radio operators, 52 engineers,
209 gunners, and 2 photographers.
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which they interpreted as a Swedish attempt to barter
American lives for modern aircraft. The military authori-
ties, on the other hand, were receptive to this proposal,
which they regarded as a reasonable exchange. In a memo
of 17 June, Colonel John Weckerling, Deputy Assistant Chief
of Staff in the War Department's Intelligence division (G-2),
stated that Army intelligence favoured the proposal,
provided that it did not conflict with the Department's
operational plans and policies: "It is believed the value
of these aviators to the American war effort is far greater
,,27than the planes we would have to furnish to the Swedes..
Whereas the British government treated the potential release
of Allied airmen as a minor concession from Sweden, the
U.S. government felt the question had considerable
relevance to the conduct of the war. Senior American air
force officers sought to exploit Allied air superiority to
its fullest advantage in supporting the Allied armies in
Normandy and the Mediterranean, and in continuing the
strategic offensive against German industrial targets. How-
ever, aircraft were force-landing in Sweden at an alarming
rate during 1944. For example, the number of interned
American airmen in Sweden had risen to 835 by late July.28
By 29 January 1945, 131 U.S. military aircraft had been
interned in Sweden as of 1 January 1945, the majority being
27Colonel weckerling to Major General Clayton Bissell,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 17 June 1944, RG165, 0PD336
SWEDEN, (23 June 1944) 321.19 G-2.
28Johnson-Hull, 21 July 1944, op. cit.
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heavy bombers. 29 Some circles in the Army Air Corps
suspected that many pilots had intentionally flown their
aircraft to Sweden to avoid further combat missions, but a
postwar enquiry concluded that most aircraft had been
forced to land in Sweden as a result of inadequate fuel,
battle damage, and navigational error. 3 ° General Spaatz'
staff believed these aviatqrs were even more valuable than
aircraft, and were anxious to expedite their return to
Britain so that they could be reassigned to combat units
(and perhaps interrogated and court martiald).
The British Air Ministry had first proposed that
the Allies should persuade Sweden to release large numbers
of Allied internees in November 1943. The 'head for head'
exchange basis, established by the Geneva convention, under
which neutrals repatriated belligerent servicemen, was no
longer satisfactory to the Air Ministry, since there were
29F.R.U.S., 1945, Vol. V, p. 756. The first U.S.
aircraft was interned in Sweden on 24 July 1943, when one
out of 300 bombers was damaged by flak during a raid on
German installations in Norway, and was forced to land in
Sweden. The U.S. legation had instructions to destroy any
U.S. aircraft after landing in Sweden. However, the Swedes
assured the legation that the aircraft would be interned
according to international law, and promised not to conf is-
cate or tamper with the aircraft's 'secret' bombsights,
radar, wireless and navigation instruments. The legation
therefore decided, with Washington's approval, to leave U.S.
aircraft intact at various military airfields around Sweden.
War History Report of the American Legation at Stockholm,
Enclosure, Johnson-Stettinius, 20 February 1946, Despatch
6694, RG59/l24.586/2-2046.
30Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (eds.),
The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 3, U.S.A.F.
Historical Division (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1958), p. 307.
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63 Allied but only 4 German internees in Sweden. Turkey had
set a precedent in March 1943 by releasing all belligerent
airmen (47 Allied and 22 Axis). During tentative discus-
sions with Boheman, Mallet discovered that Johnson had
already proposed an arrangement similar to the Turkish
precedent.	 Boheman offered to release 10 Allied aviators,
plus 4 who were covered under the 'head for head' basis,
and would release further large numbers when better trans-
portation became available. The Foreign Office and Air
Ministry were pleased to have "driven the thin end of the
wedge into the Swedes over this question," but felt that it
would be more desirable to repatriate Allied airmen "little
by little" rather than pressing the Swedes for a general
release. 31 If airmen were to be released en masse from
internment, they would still have had to remain in Sweden
indefinitely, because of limited passenger capacity afforded
by the three Mosquitos and one Dakota which B.O.A.C.
employed on its Stockholm to Scotland service. Released
aircrew would be forced to vie for aircraft space with over
3,000 Norwegians awaiting passage to Britain in order to
join the Royal Norwegian forces, SOE personnel, diplomatic
staff and their dependants, commercial travellers, mails,
and ball bearing cargoes. This problem was exacerbated by
British security measures for Overlord which prevented
Aktiebolaget Aerotransport (A.B.A.), the Swedish national
31Nutting, 20 January 1944 minute; R.L. Sykes,
Air Ministry to Nutting, 17 January 1944 letter S.62229/5.4,
FO 371/43479/N368.
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airline, from resuming operations. A.B.A.'s service had
been disrupted after a Messerschmitt had shot a Swedish
aircraft over Norway in May 1943. Boheman insisted that
the principal reason that more Allied servicemen had not
been released was the British delay in approving the
resumption of Swedish safe-conduct flights. 32 The Air
Ministry felt that there was little to be gained by pressing
the Swedes to release additional airmen, and suggested that
the matter should be left to the U.S. air attache in
Stockholm, since the majority of interned flyers were
American.
The U.S. Army Air Corps, believed that it was
necessary to establish an American airline to Sweden in
order to facilitate the departure of Allied personnel from
Sweden. The U.S. legation and the Air Corps authorities
agreed that the existing British and Swedish operations were
inadequate. For example, BOAC refused to accept second
priority freight after two Lockheed Hudson aircraft had been
taken off the Stockholm service in October 1942.
Consequently, any material which the U.S. legation could
not telegraph to Washington, such as newspapers, books,
32Mallet-Warner, 12 February 1944 letter 24,4/44,
FO 371/43470/N958. BOAC was capable of transporting approxi-
mately 50 passengers per month to Britain. The R.A.F. had
also loaned the Royal Norwegian government two Lockheed
Lodestar transports to help reduce the backlog of passengers
waiting in Sweden.	 G. Wiskemann (M.E.W.) to Captain
Herbertson (Air Ministry) 16 February 1944 letter F. 1793/
130/35, FO 37l/42617/W1559.
33 Sykes to Nutting, 22 March 1944 letter S.62229/S.6,
FO 37l/43479/N2641.
311
monthly reports and studies of conditions in occupied
countries, accumulated in the legation's mail room. 34
 The
Americans tried to alleviate the transport shortage by
loaning Sweden two B-17 bombers which were converted into
airliners in 1943, but this did not break the bottleneck
in Sweden because of the suspension of A.B.A.'s flights to
Britain during 1943 and early l944.
	 In late January 1944,
General Spaatz instructed Colonel Balchen to supervise the
establishment and operation of an air transport service,
which subsequently inaugurated service between Stockholm
and Leuchars, Scotland. As was the case with B.O.A.C. and
Lufthansa operations to Sweden, the American Air Transport
Service was ostensibly a civil airline, employing unarmed,
unmarked Liberator bombers which were maintained by U.S.
Army Air Transport Command air and ground crews, who wore
civilian clothes while in Sweden. The Liberators carried
a heavier payload than BOAC's Mosquitos and Dakota. They
enabled the Americans to fulfill requests from the Royal
Norwegian and British governments to transport 2000
Norwegians and 22,777 ball bearings to Britain during the
36spring of 1944.
34Craven and Cate, op. cit., Vol. 7, p. 110. War
History Report of American Legation at Stockholm, op. cit.
35Halifax to Foreign Office, 1 December 1944
telegram 8220, CAB 122/914.
36Warner to C.R. Wheeler, Ministry of Supply: Iron
and Steel Control, 4 July 1944 letter N3937/42, CAB 111I
148. The Americans also transported to Britain components
of the V-2 rocket which the Swedes had turned over to the
R.A.F.
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Once the transport difficulties had been overcome,
the Americans felt that the Swedes no longer had any
excuse to detain the Allied aviators. Johnson believed
that the Swedish Foreign Ministry sincerely wanted to
release all Allied personnel but were restrained from doing
so by the 'neutralist' elements in the government who
wanted to continue the 'head for head' procedure. He
believed, however, that "the legation knows how keenly the
Swedish Air Force wishes to obtain fighters," and that an
offer of a substantial number of aircraft to Sweden "might
help the Swedish government find an excuse to release the
interned airmen." 37 In mid-June, Boheman informed Johnson
that Stockholm and London had recently agreed to exchange
75 airmen for 50 radar sets. 38 He intimated that the
Swedish government was not opposed to making similar
exchanges in the future. Johnson advised Washington that
exploratory discussions with the Swedes should be continued,
"It is believed that a concrete proposal would be made by
the Swedes if we indicated an interest in such an
exchange." 39 Major General C.S. Kutter, Assistant Chief
of Air Staff (Plans), and other officials in the War
Department strongly endorsed Johnson's advice, and directed
37johnson-Hull, 21 July 1944 telegram 2705, op. cit.
38Johnson-Hull, 15 June 1944 telegram 2147, RG165,
0PD336 SWEDEN (23 Jun. 44), 321.19 G-2.
39Johnson-Hull, 15 June 1944 telegram 2161, RG165,
0PD336 SWEDEN (23 Jun 44), 321.19 G-2.
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Lt. Colonel Hardison to reopen talks with the Swedish Air
Force.
Within a week of learning of Grafström's initial
proposal in early June, American staff officers had
initiated detailed planning for the posible transfer of
U.S. aircraft to Sweden. The War Department's intelligence
division stated on 13 June that it did not object to supply-
ing fighters to Sweden because it presumed that examples of
all current U.S. aircraft models had crashed on landed on
German occupied territory, and therefore "it is not believed
that this exchange of fighter planes to Sweden would give
the Germans any technical knowledge which they don't already
possess." 4 ° During the balance of June, discussions took
place between officials of the War Department, the Army
Air Corps and the Army and Navy munitions assignment board
to determine what aircraft, if any, should be furnished to
Sweden in the event that the Swedes were to advance a
definite proposal to release all American internees. On
1 July, Major General Henry Arnold, Commanding General
United States Army Air Forces, informed the War Department
that he was prepared to release 25 P-39 (Airocobra) fighters
for delivery to Sweden as a quid pro quo for the airmen.41
Secretary of War Stimson and Under Secretary Patterson
40Col. Wecklerling (G-2), 13 June 1944 memorandum
M1D907, RG165, 0PD336 SWEDEN (13 Jun 44) 321.19 G-2.
41Arnold-Stimson, 1 July 1944 letter; Major General
T. Handy, Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans
Division (War Department), 1 July 1944 memorandum, RG16S
0PD336 SWEDEN (13 Jun 44) 321.19 G-2.
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concurred with Arnold's recommendations and advised the
State Department to offer the Swedes 25 P-39's, if they
freed all interned American personnel. Patterson had
opposed previous Swedish requests for American materiel
because he felt that the United States "gained nothing"
from such transactions. He was, however, willing to be
more accommodating towards the Swedes if the United
States government obtained a tangible benefit from
Stockholm. For example, in July, he instructed the
Munitions Assignment Board to ship to Sweden 10,000 spark
plugs, and other aircraft parts, which the Swedes had
requested in January, after he learned that the Swedish
government had helped the U.S. legation with "certain
recent information." 42
 Patterson explained his
reasons for approving the sale of aircraft to Sweden in a
letter of 8 July 1944 to Secretary of State Cordell Hull:
Any discussion of a proposal for the exchange
of aircraft for interned American aircrew is
distasteful to the War Department. However,
the release of such a large number of highly
trained and valuable personnel is considered
to be of the utmost importance."43
The War Department regarded a small quantity of P-39s as a
relatively cheap bargaining counter. The Airocobra entered
service in the late 1930's. It had been lend-leased to
Britain and the U.S.S.R. prior to Pearl Harbor, and was
42Lt. Neff (Assistant to Undersecretary of War) to
Colonel Maddux (Plans Division) 27 July 1944; Johnson to
Hull, 26 July 1944 telegram 2795, RG165, 0PD33675 (27 Jul
44). The War Department file does not indicate what secret
information Stockholm furnished.
43Patterson to Hull, 8 July 1944 letter, RG165
0PD336 SWEDEN (13 Jun 44) 45452.1
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deployed by American forces in the Southwest Pacific
during 1942. By 1944, the P-39 was obsolescent, and had
been replaced by the more effective P-47 (Lightning) and
P-51 (Mustang) fighters for ground support and bomber
escort duties. Most Airocobras had been converted into
target-tugs or withdrawn from service and declared as
surplus. 44
 The 25 machines which were to be sold to
Sweden were currently unassembled and crated at an army
storage depot at Casablanca. Once Stockholm had agreed to
the bargain, the Airocobras would be shipped to Britain,
where they would be assembled and transferred to the
Swedish Air Force. Swedish pilots would then fly the air-
craft to Sweden.45
Johnson presented the War Department's exchange
proposal to Giinther on 15 July. In spite of the earlier
suggestions which had been advanced by junior Foreign
Ministry officials, Ginther indignantly responded that it
was "repugnant" for Sweden to even consider the release of
internees on the "basis of material bargaining." Johnson
felt that the Foreign Ministry might yield to Air Force
pressure if the Americans made a more substantial offer.
According to the U.S. air attache, the Swedish Air Force
regarded the P-39 as outmoded and useful only for intercept-
44 Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (eds.),
The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 6, U.S.A.F.
Historical Division, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1955), p. 215.
45Patterson to Hull, 8 July 1944 letter, op. cit.
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ing second-rate aircraft and for strafing. Johnson
suggested that the Swedish Air Force might be more co-
operative if Washington agreed to sell 120 P-39's, which
would be sufficient for two fighter groups, or a lesser
number of more advanced fighters, such as the Mustang.46
In response to Gunther's reply, the War Department
directed Johnson to ascertain if the Swedes would release
the interned airmen in return for a larger number of air-
craft. Without making any commitment, Johnson was to
hint that the United States would sell Sweden sixty P-47's
if the Swedes would release all American airmen who were
currently interned in Sweden. In addition, the Swedes
would be allowed to keep any fighters which might force-
land in Sweden in the future in exchange for the fighter
pilots immediate repatriation. 47 The Swedish Foreign
Ministry continued to be evasive, protesting the alleged
immorality of the proposed scheme, and insisting upon the
'head for head' system. The Swedes were, however,
willing to define what constituted a 'head for head'
exchange loosely, and a substantial number of Allied air-
men were released during August and early September even
though only a handful of Germans were actually interned
in Sweden. On 15 August, 51 U.S. airmen were released
after the Swedes had returned to Germany two training
21 July 1944, op. cit.
47Major General C.S. Kutter, Assistant Chief of
Staff (Plans), 27 July 1944 memorandum for Record, OPDJSW
74575, RG165, 0PD336.091 SWEDEN (29 JUL 44).
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aircraft and a small number of troops who had fled from
advancing Soviet forces in Finland. Washington persuaded
the British to withdraw their refusal to consummate the
agreement made in June to supply radar sets to Sweden. In
return for this equipment, Stockholm released 23 Americans
48
on 20 August, and a further 37 in September.
By the beginning of September, the War Department
and Air Corps staffs had become impatient with what they
regarded as Swedish procrastination in returning American
flyers. Lt. General Giles, the Chief of Air Staff,
proposed that a maximum number of 150 P-47's should be
used as a bargaining ploy and that, in addition, the Swedes
should be asked to return all bombers "now or hereafter"
force-landed in Sweden. 49
 As an additional inducement, the
War Department was willing to loan four interned B-l7
bombers for use as commercial transports by A.B.A.. An Army
Air Corps mission would be despatched to Sweden to instruct
the Swedish Air Force in the operation and maintenance of
American aircraft. The exact number of P-47's to be
offered to the Swedes during negotiations would be left to
Johnson's discretion, and Lt. Colonel Hardison was
instructed to collaborate with Johnson "because of his
48Mallet to Foreign Office, 6 December 1944
telegram 1461, FO 37l/45509/N7663.
59Giles to Patterson, 30 August 1944 memorandum,
RG165/0PD336 SWEDEN (30 Aug 44) 321.18 AAF.
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relationship with the Swedish Air Force."5°
Johnson discussed this latest proposal with
Boheman on 16 September. Although Boheman made no commit-
ments, Johnson was convinced that Bohernan "fully under-
stands implications as well as opportunity for Sweden to
,,51
make a welcome gesture.	 While it appeared to Johnson
that the Swedes would not orocrastinate in repatriating
the Allied airmen, it seemed unlikely that they would
readily agree to return the force-landed bombers. The
Swedes did not feel that it was unneutral to return slow,
unarmed trainers to Germany since these aircraft had no
offensive capability. The return of American bombers, on
the other hand, "would not be possible" since this action
would virtually turn Sweden into "a base of military opera-
tions against Germany." Johnson urged Boheman to examine
every possible means of accommodating the American proposal
and to "not dismiss anything as impossible. 52 Johnson and
the State Department recognized that it might take some
time for the Swedish Foreign Ministry to persuade the
Government to agree to release all interned American
personnel en masse, owing to the rigid concept of neutrality
which was held by some Swedish cabinet ministers, and to the
50 Stimson-Hull, 8 September 1944 letter, OPD JSW
74575, 0PD336 SWEDEN) 40 AUG 44) 321.18 AAF: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1944, Volume IV, Washington:
U.S. Gov't Printing Office, p. 681.
Vol. IV, op. cit., p. 690.
52Ibid
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widespread resentment in Sweden towards U.S. pressure on
economic questions. As an interim expedient, Johnson
sought to find suitable opportunities for pressing the
Swedes to make 'head for head' exchanges. During September,
small numbers of German personnel began to enter Sweden as
a consequence of the Soviet occupation of the Baltic States
and the Russo-Finnish cease-fire of 4 September. Marshal
Mannerheim, the President of Finland, declared that any
German troops who had not left Finnish territory by 15
September 1944 would be interned. 53
 In October, Finnish
forces turned on their former German comrades in an effort
to expel the Wehrmacht from Finnish territory. Berlin had
already decided that the German position in Southern Finland
was untenable, and ordered General Rendulic's XX Mountain
Army to withdraw and make a stand in the Arctic region
along the Finnish-Russian-Norwegian frontier. During the
course of the withdrawal, the German forces were attacked
by hostile Finns, and some German soldiers deserted to
Sweden after their units were attacked by Soviet armoured
formations in the Arctic. The Germans also chartered or
requisitioned Finnish merchant ships to evacuate some
troops to Germany. Stockholm offered all German troops
entering Sweden the choice of internment for the duration
of the war, or immediate repatriation to Germany. The
53c. Leonard Lundin, Finland in the Second World
War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957), p. 237.
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Swedes also accepted an American demand that one Allied
airman would be released from internment for each German
soldier who entered Sweden, regardless of whether the
German in question chose to remain in Sweden or leave.54
On 15 September, a convoy of 15 Finnish ships
carrying equipment and 33 Germans left Finland. Nine
ships left the convoy and made for Sweden when the Finnish
masters and crews received news that German forces had
attacked the Finnish island, H6gland, in order to establish
a last ditch line of defence against the Russians in the
Baltic. Johnson seized upon this incident to press
Boheman into agreeing to release 33 American flyers, once
the Germans on board these ships had landed in Sweden. He
obtained a similar concession from the Swedish government
on 26 September, when 53 German soldiers who had escaped
to Sweden from Tallin (Reval), Estonia, were returned to
Germany. At the end of September, with the War Depart-
ment's full approval, Johnson told the Swedes that the U.S.
was willing to let Sweden return 3 German aircraft (two
trainers and one obsolete seaplane employed on courier
duty) in return for 35 or 40 Americans.55
Johnson's readiness to exploit any opportunity to
release U.S. servicemen from Swedish internment was appre-
ciated in Washington. However, in late September, the War
54F.R.U.S., Vol. IV, op. cit., p. 690.
55 Ibid., pp. 695-7.
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Department grew anxious that British or Soviet interference
might prevent Johnson from making similar ad hoc exchanges
in the future. On 26 and 28 September, the British com-
plained that Johnson did not inform Mallet about the
exchanges until after they had been arranged with the
Swedes. The Foreign Office insisted that future exchanges
should be approved beforehand by London, Washington and
Moscow. 56 The Foreign Office also maintained that since
the Germans who were interned in Sweden had fought on the
Eastern front, the Americans should make a gesture of even-
handedness to Moscow by including 11 Soviet internees in the
next lot of repatriated personnel (even though the Soviets
were reportedly unwilling to return to the U.S.S.R.)57
The Americans resented the Foreign Office's meddling
in what they regarded as essentially an American concern.
U.S. internees outnumbered British by 902 to 52.58 The
State Department rejected the Foreign Office's proposed
trilateral consultations as an unnecessary waste of time.
The War Department instructed Johnson to press the Swedes
56 Ibid., pp. 692, 695-6. FO 371/43479, the file on
Foreign Office policy towards Allied internees in Sweden,
contains no record of this protest.
57 Ibid., p. 697. The Foreign Office advised Mallet
that reports that the Soviet internees feared reprisals in
the U.S.S.R. were "(to judge by experience here) to prove
largely if not wholly unfounded." London's complaints about
Johnson's exchanges were probably related to the War Cabinet's
decision of 4 September to repatriate millions of displaced
Soviets (slave labourers, P.O.W.'s, former members of the
Wehrmacht and refugees) who had been liberated/captured by
Anglo-U.S. forces. Warner was one of the main proponents of
this policy. Nikolai Tolstoy, Victims of Yalta, revised
edition, (London: Corgi Books, 1979), p. 75.
58Hull to Winant, 27 September 1944 telegram 7889,
RG. l65/OPD 336. 091 (27 September 1944)
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into foregoing the niceties of international law and
release all remaining U.S. personnel immediately. He was
authorized to make a new offer of P-47 fighters and was
also instructed to ask the Swedes to release the remain-
ing internees in anticipation of future German arrivals
from Finland.59
By early October, it became evident that the War
Department's fears were groundless. The Soviets had no
objections to the exchanges, Madame Kollontai expressed
"warm approval" of Johnson's enterprising methods for
60
repatriating U.S. airmen. 	 The absence of Soviet objec-
tions and Washington's reaction to the Foreign Office's
protests obliged the British to muffle their complaints
about the exchanges. The Foreign Office raised no further
objections after Stockholm agreed to release 10 Soviet
internees on 8 October. By this time, Johnson had worked
out a new scheme with Boheman which, being based on a more
imaginative interpretation of International Law, would in
practice make the exchanges academic.
Shortly after Johnson asked Boheman to expedite
repatriations on 28 September, the Swedish government
announced that it would release 300 Allied internees 'on
account' against future German arrivals in Sweden.61
59F.R.U.S., Vol. IV, op. cit., p. 694, Arnold-Giles
28 September 1944, memorandum, RG 165/OPD 336 SWEDEN (28
Sept 44) 321.18 AAF.
Vol. IV, op. cit., p. 698.
p. 694.
323
Boheman intimated that more internees would be released
once the 300 had left Sweden. He insisted that this was
a gesture of goodwill and friendship, and that his
government did not expect any quid pro quo from the
United States. However he mentioned later that the
Swedish aircraft industry was interested in obtaining
manufacturing licences for producing aircraft engines
after the war. The State Department was privately satis-
fied with this Swedish action, but was prompted by the
War Department to demand that Stockholm release all
internees in Sweden. The Swedish government made further
exchanges 'on account' during October and November,
although the Swedes felt awkward doing so since the
masses of anticipated German deserters had been slow
to materialize. As of 16 October 1944, only 155 Germans
had arrived in Sweden. The Foreign Ministry was anxious
to oblige the Americans, in the hopes that Washington
might moderate its inflexible attitude. However, when
Boheman raised the internee question with the Cabinet on
26 October, after the Swedes had learned that the Saturnus
had been impounded, Prime Minister Hansson reportedly
remarked that "he didn't see what use there was in trying
to stretch points with the Allies...." 62
 Boheman did,
62 Ibid., p. 700.
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however, persuade Hansson to release 100 airmen, and
unofficially approved the release of an extra 62 men.
Johnson believed that Stockholm would eventually
free all Allied personnel from internment, once a large
number of German troops had escaped to Sweden. On 16
October, he urged Washington to be patient with the
Swedes, who had received two strong German protests over
the 'on account' releases, and who could possibly become
the victims of German reprisals. Johnson praised Stock-
holm's "liberal and extensive cooperation..[withj...certajn
of our agencies in activities not ordinarily the subject
of correspondence." 63
 He also cited that Brigadier
General E.P. Curtis, General Spaatz' Chief of Staff, had
declared on a visit to Sweden that the Swedes had given
better treatment to Allied internees than Switzerland or
any other neutral. 64
 Although the Swedes had refused to
consider aircraft as a quid pro quo, Johnson felt that an
unconditional sale of 60 to 150 P-47's would expedite the
63 Ibid., Presumably this refers to the Swedes
furnishing intelligence to the O.S.S. and the U.S.
Service attaches.
64Ibid., Curtis to Johnson, 16 October 1944
letter, Hershell V. Johnson papers.
325
release of the remaining airmen in Sweden. Colonel
Hardison therefore informed General Nordinskiöld, in the
first week of November, that Washington was prepared to
sell fighters to Sweden, and advised him to make a request
to the U.S. War Department. The General not only acted
on Hardison's advice, but also despatched his son, Captain
Nordinskild, to Washington in late October to assume the
post of air attach.65
Nearly 500 airmen were still interned in Sweden
when the War Department received Nordinskiöld's request
in early November. Although the release of all interned
personnel had been the original condition for the sale of
fighter aircraft, the Department decided that the Swedes
should be given the fighters as a "gesture of goodwill".66
This transaction would be considered on "a basis separate
and apart" from the internee question. The War Department
submitted a proposal to furnish the Swedish Air Force with
60 - 150 P-47's to the Army and Navy munitions assignment
65Mallet to Ministry of Economic Warfare, 24
October 1944, Telegram 1009 ARFAR, FO 371/43509/N6729.
66Stimson to Stettinius, 7 November 1944 letter,
RG 165, 0PD336.91 SWEDEN (7-11-44)
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boards, and other U.S. government agencies, in order to
determine how many aircraft could be supplied to Sweden,
and to work out the technical and legal questions
concerning the transfer of U.S. Army property to a
neutral power during wartime. The War Department informed
the State Department of this decision but did not solicit
the latter's views. Apparently the Americans were
unconcerned with British or Soviet reaction, since London
and Moscow were not informed until late November, when
the proposal was presented to the Anglo-American Combined
Munitions Assignment Board.
The War Department professed that it did not expect
any quid pro quo from Sweden. However it is likely that
the Department hoped that the 'gesture' would encourage
the Swedes to release all remaining internees, and agree
to accommodate the United States' wishes relating to other
aviation questions. The Army Air Corps wanted Sweden to
return all interned heavy bombers. The Swedes adamantly
refused to even discuss the matter with the Americans
although in July 1944, they conceded to a U.S. demand that
U.S. bomber crews be permitted to repair and fly interned
aircraft, under Swedish supervision, in order to prevent
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the bombers from deteriorating. 67
 The Americans did not
press seriously for the release of interned aircraft until
January 1945, when General Giles' staff predicted that a
serious bomber shortage in all combat theatres would
develop by July.68
WASHINGTON AND STOCKHOLM:
NEW HORIZONS IN COMMERCIAL AVIATION
The War Department was also prepared to give the
Swedes transport aircraft in return for allowing expanded
U.S.A.A.F. transport activities in Sweden. Sweden permitted
the existing A.A.T.S. operation between Scotland and
Stockholm, on the condition that it would be terminated
once the last of the American airmen had been flown from
Sweden. General Spaatz' headquarters believed that it was
of "vital importance" to establish a more permanent air
transport service to Sweden which could be extended to
Germany and other points in Europe upon the cessation of
28 July 1944, Stockholm requested 2,000
gallons of grade-120 engine oil to operate interned air-
craft. In contrast to previous British supported Swedish
requests for fuel, Washington's response was prompt. It
took less than an hour for the military and supply
authorities, on 29 July, to authorize the release of the
oil from reserve stocks, so that it could be loaded on a
Swedish tanker, which was scheduled to sail to Gothenburg
on 1st August. H. Neff, Memorandum for Record, RG165,
OPD463.7(29-7-44) .091.
68Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945,
Volume V, pp. 756
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hostilies to airlift supplies to U.S. occupation forces.69
Furthermore, the War Department and senior Air Corps
officers wanted this service •to operate "openly and without
subterfuge" as a military undertaking, and not as a
"pseudo-civilian air line" to respect Sweden's neutrality. 70
The Swedish Foreign Ministry and Air Force were
not opposed in principle to the continuation and expansion
of American air transport operations to Sweden. They hoped
to obtain reciprocal landing rights in the United States
for Sweden's transatlantic airline, Svensk International
Luftrafik A.B. 71 Sweden, Norway, and Denmark formed a
joint committee in 1938 to examine the possibility of
operating a transatlantic air service. In January and
February 1940, this committee conducted negotiations in
Washington with the State Department and the Civil Aero-
nautics Board to establish temporary service between
Scandinavia and the United States for the duration of the
war. On behalf of their partners, the Swedes offered to
give Pan American Airways reciprocal landing rights in
69F.R.U.S., 1944, Vol. IV, op. cit., pp. 683-4.
70 Under existing arrangements, the A.A.T.S. could
not substitute military aircraft on the Stockholm route
if one of its own machines was withdrawn from service,
because it could only employ airliners registered with the
U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board. A.A.T.S. aircrews were
liable to be executed as spies if their aircraft should
force land on German occupied territory, since they did
not wear military uniforms.
consortium formed in 1943 by the Government
owned A.B.A., smaller private airlines, shipping, and
banking concerns.
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return for a number of 'clipper' flying boats. This plan
72
was abandoned after the invasion of Norway and Denmark.
The Swedish legation in Washington and S.I.L.A. made
several requests for a new agreement during 1943 and early
1944, and the State Department and Civil Aeronautics Board
agreed to open negotiations in the autumn of 1944.
The Swedish Cabinet, however, objected to the
proposed U.S. air transport service because its military
character would compromise Sweden's neutrality, and certain
features of the service would infringe upon Sweden's
sovereignty. The Air Transport Command maintained that the
service would require approximately 125 military personnel
to be stationed at Bromma airport (Stockholm), and
insisted that all U.S. air and ground crews in Sweden must
wear military uniform. All A.T.C. aircraft would bear
military insignia. The Americans also demanded that the
Swedes allow the LJ.S.A.A.F. to establish and operate radar,
metereological and communications facilities in Sweden,
and that all weather reports and air traffic instructions
73
be transmitted in secret code.
	 Members of the Swedish
Wallenburg, Per A. Norlin (S.I.L.A.) to Civil
Aeronautics Board, 21 June 1944 letter FO 37l/426l8/Wl2540.
73The British were also pressing for improved
communications and for permission to use secret code. The
Legation in Stockholm could receive weather and operational
signals from Britain by radio. BOAC and ATC messages from
Stockholm were telegraphed by the Swedish Post Office to
Gothenburg for radio transmission to Britain. Lufthansa
was allowed to communicate with Berlin by telephone.
Maycock to Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Intelligence)
18 November 1944 memorandum ADMIN 348/44, AVIA 2/2415.
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government believed that these proposals would virtually
convert Bromma airport into a foreign military base on
Swedish territory. General Count Ehrensvärd, the Chief of
Defence Staff, was disturbed that the ATC would be
transmitting coded messages which the Swedes would be
unable to monitor. 74
 Johnson believed that the Swedes
would ultimately concede most of the demands, especially
if the U.S.A.A.F. were to agree to make the proposed ser-
vice less military in character, and let the Swedes
participate in support activities such as weather reporting.
The War Department and the Air Corps sought to
overcome the Swedish objections by offering aircraft and
promising a favourable outcome to the commercial aviation
negotiations in Washington. The State Department refused
to link the Washington negotiations with the A.T.C.
proposals, since it was unwilling to give S.I.L.A. a
competitive advantage over Norwegian and Danish airlines
in postwar commerce. It also insisted that the Swedes
should not receive transport aircraft such as the C-47,
but should be given a number of interned bombers which
"will not be able to compete successfully with commercial
75
types."	 Secretary of War Stimson attempted to press the
State Department to withdraw its opposition to assisting
S.I.L.A. by informing Stettinius on 7 November that
General Arnold and Major General Harold George, the
________ 1944, Vol. IV, op. cit., p. 687.
75 Ibid., p. 684. Stettinius to Stimson, 20 November
1944 letter, RG165, 0PD336 SWEDEN (20 Nov 44).091.
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Commanding General of the Air Transport Command, had
informally promised S.I.L.A. representatives that Sweden
would receive five C-47's once all American internees had
been released. 76 The State Department did not yield to
this and the War Department decided to temporarily abandon
its proposal to allocate transport aircraft to Sweden,
since it felt that the aircraft might be a useful bargain-
ing counter in future negotiations with the Swedes.
The U.S.A.A.F.'s anxiety to resolve promptly the
question of repatriating interned airmen and aircraft, and
in establishing an A.T.C. service to Sweden did not
mitigate the War Department's harsh economic policy towards
Sweden. While the Department was endorsing General
Nordinskiöld's request for fighters, and promoting Sweden's
case at the civil aviation negotiations during October
and early November 1944, it had also urged President
Roosevelt to impose an embargo on Sweden's rubber imports
to force the termination of Swedish German trade. On
7 November, Stimson stated that the outcome of the civil
aviation negotiations
should not interfere in any way with our
demands on Sweden that she stop all the
war aid which she is still rendering Germany.
There is no reason, in the view of the War
Department, why Sweden should not meet the
desires of the Army Air Forces and the Air
Transport Command and at the same time stop
the vital aid afforded Germany. 7
76 Stimson to Stettinius, 7 November 1944 letter,
RG165, OPD336 SWEDEN (20 Nov 44).091.
77Ibid.
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The War Department's motives transcended immediate
military objectives. Most members of the A.T.C. and
U.S.A.A.F. headquarters staffs were, according to the
U.S.A.A.F.'s official history, "well indoctrinated with
the idea of paving the way in the postwar world for U.S.
aviation." 78 The fighter and transport aircraft which the
War Department offered the Swedes served to establish
Sweden as a future market for aircraft exports. The
American aircraft industry had grown from the fortieth
place on the index of industrial production in 1941 to
first place in l944. 	 The annual rate of aircraft produc-
tion had grown from 25,000 in November, 1941 to almost
110,000 in March 1944. By August 1945, a total of 299,293
80
machines had been produced in the United States. 	 The
Air Corps wanted to retain a substantial aircraft industry
after the war to ensure an adequate war potential, and to
facilitate continued aircraft design and development. To
prevent demand for aircraft from declining sharply after
the war, as it had after World War I when 40 percent of
the United States' aircraft factories were dismantled, the
Air Corps hoped to create new markets by selling wartime
aircraft to smaller Allied and neutral powers.
78Craven and Cate, Vol. 7, op. cit., p. 112.
79Geoffrey Derrett, Days of Sadness, Years of
Triumph: The American People 1939-1945 (Baltimore: Penguin
Books, 1974), p. 392.
8 Qraven and Cate, Vol. 6, op. cit., p. 350.
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The War Department was considering furnishing
training aircraft to Spain. During the autumn of 1944,
an American air force mission remained in Argentina to
promote aircraft sales even though the U.S. Ambassador had
been recalled from Buenos Aires to protest the Argentine
junta's Axis sympathies. 8 -
The connexion between military and commercial
interests was most blatant in the Air Transport Command.
Before the United States entered the war, the Army Air
Corps had turned to the civilian airlines to furnish
expertise in organizing and operating the A.T.C. Many
senior A.T.C. officers had been airline executives and
pilots. During the course of providing logistical support
to U.S. combat and occupation forces, they exploited
their authority and material resources to develop peace-
time opportunities. In October 1944, the North Atlantic
Division of the A.T.C. began detailed planning for a
military air transport service from New York to Moscow,
via Labrador, Iceland, and Stockholm, which would be taken
over by commercial interests after the war.82
BRITAIN AND POSTWAR AVIATION
The British Government was unaware of the U.S. air
attache's and A.T.C. representatives' activities in Sweden
N74l2.
81A. Haigh, 13 November 1944 minute, FO 371/43546/
82
Craven and Cate, Vol. 7, op. cit., p. 112.
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during the summer and early autumn of 1944. London was
concerned by the expansion of American commercial and
A.T.C. operations elsewhere in the world, notably in
Africa and the Middle East, where B.O.A.C. had withdrawn
most of its services during the war. Britain lacked the
experience, equipment, and international commercial
connexions to compete seriously with American interests.
In 1939, Britain's international airlines operated 89
aircraft on Imperial and Western European routes, whereas
their American counterparts flew over 300 machines on an
extensive network spanning Latin America, the Pacific and
Atlantic Oceans. 83 The private British airlines were
absorbed into a publicly owned holding company for the
duration of the war, and many of their aircraft were
appropriated by the R.A.F. for transport training or anti-
submarine duties. In many instances, BO.A.C. was obliged
to borrow demilitarized bombers from the R.A.F. or U.S.A.A.F.
to maintain its remaining services to the neutrals, Russia,
and the U.S.A. American aircraft manufacturers turned
out 23,928 transport aircraft during the war which
represented less than 8 percent of their total output.84
Britain's aircraft industry was devoted almost exclusively
to producing fighters and bombers. The Air Ministry
83 Air Ministry, memorandum, Facilities for Air
Services in British Territory Granted to U.S.A. during the
War, enclosed in W.P. Hildred (Air Ministry) to G.P.
Labouchere, 18, August 1942 letter, FO 371/32393/WH320;
Sir R. Campbell (Washington) 4 July 1942 despatch 474,
FO/371/32393/W9839.
84
Craven and Cate, Vol. 6, op. cit., p. 350, 354.
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recognized the need for a British designed and manufactured
transport aircraft and introduced the Avro York, which was
a variant of the Lancaster bomber, in 1942. However, York
was considered unsuitable for postwar commercial purposes
because it lacked the range and payload of the newest
American transports, the C-54 (Douglas DC-4) and C-69
(Lockheed Constellation) •85
The British government feared that U.S. airlines
would, with Washington's encouragement and assistance,
exploit these considerable advantages to dominate inter-
national air traffic after the war. London recognized that
B.O.A.C., or its successors, would be unable to reclaim
the pre-war Imperial routes or compete successfully with
the Americans on postwar European or transatlantic routes.
British officials believed that the wartime
deployment of air power on an unprecedented scale, for
transport as well as strictly military purposes, would
hasten an economic revolution after war. C.P. Labouchere,
of the Foreign Office's General Department and its
representative in the War Cabinet's Interdepartmental
Committee on Civil Aviation, observed in early 1942 that:
Attlee (Lord Privy Seal) to War Cabinet,
3 December 1943 memorandum W.P. (43) 537, FO 371/36447/
W16931; Eden to Sinclair, 4, December 1942, letter W 16049/
65/802 AIR 19/360.
86E. Boywer, (Ministry of Aircraft Production) to
J.H. LeRougetel (F.O.), 16, December 1943 minute, FO 371/
3644 7/W17 503.
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One of the results of the war has been to
make the inhabitants of all quarters of the
globe...'air conscious' in a way that they
have never been before and it is certain
that...there is likely to be an overwhelming
demand for the harnessing of this powerful
force with the object of converting its
potentialities into the right channels.87
London believed that the institution of an inter-
national organization to supervize civil aviation after
the war would be the only means of preventing American
interests from dominating postwar air transport. 88
 Prior
to the war, international routes were established through
bilateral agreements between the nations and airlines
concerned in accordance with the Paris Convention of 1919.
Labouchere characterized the Convention as "an arrangement
by which the air surrounding a country is clearly owned by
that country as its actual territory, and is made the
object of bargains with other countries who seek to fly
through it." 89
 As the United States possessed the
strongest bargaining power, the Paris convention benefited
American interests. Washington could offer small nations
aircraft to operate reciprocal airline services to the
United States in return for access and landing rights
granted to U.S. airlines. The British government sought
to persuade its allies to replace the convention with an
87Labouchere, 20 January 1942, minute, FO/37l/
323 76/W956.
8Bwar Cabinet, I.C.C.A., 5 January, 1942 Interim
Report AC (42), FO 371/32376/W856. Donald Maclean (General
Dept.) 24 December 1943 minute, FO 371/36447/W17503.
89 Labouchere, op. cit.
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international organization which would regulate postwar
civil aviation, restrict competition, and deny important
and profitable routes to American firms. 9 ° International-
ization of civil aviation found wide support throughout
the British government whose officials regarded U.S.
airlines as the vanguard of an insidious form of 'economic
imperialism.' The strong antiAmerican sentiment behind
London's attitude towards postwar aviation is demonstrated
in a letter to Sir William Jowitt, Chairman of the Inter-
departmental Committee from Lord Finlay, the author of the
Committee's proposals:
It is easy to see that in unscrupulous hands
aviation could become a very powerful weapon
whereby a particular government either openly
or under cover of Big Business could success-
fully conduct a policy of peaceful penetration
in those regions of the world where the local
governments are too weak, too poor, or too
inefficient to supply for themselves the air
services which the stronger nation would be
only too ready to provide...the choice before
the world lies between Americanization and
internationalism. If this is correct, it is
difficult to doubt that it is under the latter
system that British interests will be best
served.9'
In late 1943, London adopted the Committee's
proposal for an international civil aviation system based
on regional blocs. The United States would retain control
over Latin America and the pacific where its interests
already were firmly established. Britain would control
air services in Europe and routes between Europe and the
90 Sir Orme Sargent, 17 February 1942 minute,
FO 371/32376/W856.
91 Finlay to Jowitt, 17 December 1942, Letter
R.P. (42) 48, FO 371/32376/W18127.
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United States. 92
 The British government believed that
Britain was geographically and materially best suited to
93lead a European aviation bloc.
	 Europe was relatively
free from U.S. penetration, and Britain's postwar commer-
cial air power would be stronger than that of European
nations. B.O.A.C. and the European nations would pooi
their resources to form a cartel to operate international
air services. Furthermore, Britain would become the
terminus for transatlantic flights to prevent American
airlines from establishing direct service to Europe and to
encourage European passengers to travel to the United
States on British aircraft.
However, the British required international support
for their proposals before they could 'internationalize'
the world's airways. This support was not forthcoming
when delegations from 22 nations met in Chicago during
November 1944 to determine what system would govern post-
war civil aviation. Prior to the conference, London assumed
that pro-British sentiment and fear of 'Americanization'
would prompt the Dominions and European governments-in-exile
to endorse the 'internationalization' scheme. However,
most delegations at Chicago rejected the British plan in
favour of an American proposal to establish a laisser-faire
92	
Hildred (Director General of Civil Aviation,
Air Ministry), 7 June 1943 minute, AVTA 2/2442.
Sinclair to Eden, 29 January 1943 Letter,
FO 954/22 PT.l.
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system similar to the one which had existed before the
outbreak of the war. 94 The Americans warned the British
delegation that the outcome of the conference would
influence Washington's attitude towards the extension of
lend-lease deliveries after the war. President Roosevelt
informed Churchill candidly that the U.S. Congress would
not be in "a generous mood if it and the people feel that
the United Kingdom has not agreed to a generally beneficial
air agreement." 95 However, the British delegation
continued to press for international aviation controls.
The Chicago convention ended inconclusively. The Americans
then proceeded to negotiate commercial aviation agreements
with European neutrals and allies.
Sweden was not represented at the Chicago confer-
ence, which was restricted to members of the United
Nations. However Stockholm shared most delegations'
opposition to the 'Internationalist' proposals. Many
Swedes insinuated that the British efforts to restrict
competition would harm the interests of small nations. On
1 March 1943, a leading article in the Stockholm newspaper,
94 Adolf A. Berle, Navigating the Rapids, 1918-1971;
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973) pp. 504-11.
M. Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership: Britain
and America 1944-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press
1981), p. 83. Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The
United States, Britain and the War Against Japan 1941-1945.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 512.
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Svenska Dagbladet, proclaimed that
when great powers say that there is no
reason for the small states to operate
their own international airlines, Sweden
must launch a firm protest... Small
states must assert themselves...if they
aren't to be ignored when the Great
Powers decide the world's fate after the
war.96
Per Norlin, the managing director of A.B.A. and S.I.L.A.,
and the Swedish government shared this attitude towards
'internationalized aviation'. Norlints attitude was
supported by the Swedish government. In early 1944, the
Swedes entered discussions with the Free French, Dutch and
Belgian governments to consider instituting reciprocal
postwar air services between Stockholm, Amsterdam, Brussels,
and Paris. A.B.A. was also interested in establishing a
route to Moscow via Leningrad and Helsinki. Stockholm to
New York flights would stop in Iceland, Newfoundland, and
Labrador. The British also discovered through intercepted
letters between a Swedish shipping company and a firm in Van-
couver, Canada that S.I.L.A. was interested in establishing
a route over Canada to the Pacific. 97 Norlin recognized
that a small nation would have difficulty in competing
with U.S. airlines on the North Atlantic route. He there-
fore invited Norwegian and Danish interests to pool their
Transatlantic Route," Svenska Dag1adet,
translation enclosed ih Maycock to Assistant CKief of Air
Staff, 5 March 1943 despatch SWD Z1/43, AVIA 2/2442.
97Ministry of Economic Warfare to Air Ministry,
Postal intercept: Axel Johnson, Jr. to R.E. Borcharevink,
7 September 1943, AVIA 2/2442.
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resources with A.I.L.A. after the war.98
The Air Ministry did not feel especially concerned
about the Swedish efforts to establish European routes
after the war since it assumed that the Europeans would
favour Britain, their ally, over the neutral Sweden. It
was disturbed about the proposed S.I.L.A. service to New
York which would probably result in Stockholm conferring
reciprocal rights to an American airline. If Sweden did
not join the 'Internationalized' system, the United States
would be able to circumvent any 'Internationalized'
barriers designed to prevent U.S. penetration of European
markets. 99
 Under the system which the British proposed,
U.S. transatlantic flights would have to terminate in
Britain and could not proceed to other European countries.
If the Americans were to establish a service to Sweden
however, they could use Stockholm as a base for operating
direct U.S. flights to European cities.10 ° As an interim
measure, to prevent the Swedes from establishing this
service, "at least until the present clouds in the inter-
national sky have been cleared," the Air Ministry and
Foreign Office endeavoured to "place obstacles in the way
98N.T.A. Cheetham (Foreign Office) to W.G. Cribbet
(Air Ministry) 23 August 1944, FO 371/426l8/W12540.
99
Hildred, 3 September 1944 minute, AVIA 2/2415.
l°°W.W. Burkett (Air Ministry) to H.E. Archer,
Domlnions Office, 5 September 1944 letter FO 371/42618/
W13 528.
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of the Scandinavian Air Services."- 0 - The Swedes were
informed in September 1944 that the British Chiefs of
Staff objected to the institution of Swedish transatlantic
flights while the war in Europe continued because Swedish
pilots might inform German U-boats about Allied shipping
movements. The Dominions Office also pressed the Canadian
and Newfoundland governments to refuse, on 'security
grounds', to grant the Swedes landing facilities.
The Air Ministry also feared that the inauguration
of the temporary A.A.T.S. flights to Stockholm in March
1944 would provide the Americans with another opportunity
to secure a bilateral civil aviation agreement. Although
Britain relied upon the service for its own transport
requirements, the Air Ministry was not, in C.F.A. Warner's
words, "keen that the Americans should be encouraged to go
on running between here and Stockholm longer than was
necessary." 102
 When the service lasted longer than
originally expected, some R.A.F. officers tried to hamper
A.A.T.S. operations between Scotland and Sweden during the
autumn of 1944. On 9 November, Johnson reported that the
British authorities at Leuchars 'grounded' U.S. Liberators
while permitting BOAC flights to proceed to Stockholm. In
September, the British legation in Stockholm suddenly with-
held visas to Norwegians leaving Sweden, "ostensibly for
101 Hildred, op. cit.
102 Warner to Wheeler, 4 July 1944 letter,
CAB 111/148.
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security reasons although the effect was to show up
A.A.T.S. for lack of passengers." 103
 The Americans over-
came these obstacles by transferring most of the A.A.T.S.
operations to the U.S.A.A.F. base at Metfield in Suffolk,
and to Iceland in late November.'04
FAIT ACCOMPLI - MUSTANGS FOR SWEDEN:
NOVEMBER 1944 - MAY 1945
The British legation in Stockholm and the Air
Ministry had received several reports indicating that the
Americans and Swedes were 'getting together' in the fields
of military and civil aviation during the early autumn of
1944. However, the Foreign Office dismissed these reports
as rumours which the Swedes had concocted to stimulate
British interest in selling Spitfires. The Foreign Office
believed that the Americans would have informed London if
anything significant had transpired between the Swedish
Air Force and the U.S. air attache. However, the Foreign
Office began to take the reports seriously when they were
confirmed by more substantial evidence of the extent of
the impending Swedish-American collaboration.
In late October, Maycock informed the Air Ministry
that Captain Nordenski31d was travelling to Washington to
103johnson to Stettinius, 9 November 1944 telegram
4593, RG.165, OPD 009.SWD (9,ll,44).091.
104Craven and Cate, Vol. 7, op. cit., p. 110.
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assume the post of air attache. Maycock reported that
Nordenskic5ld would be visiting London where he would be
entertained by the U.S.A.A.F. and would also inspect
American bases in England. Maycock suggested that
Nordenskiöld should be invited to spend a day with the
R.A.F. to see a demonstration of the latest model Spitfire.
On 26 October, Wing Commander Peveler told the Foreign
Office that the Air Ministry believed that the United
States contemplated selling fighters to the Swedes. The
Ministry did not know if the Americans planned to supply
the aircraft during or after the war. Peveler stated that
the R.A.F. would oppose any wartime transaction and would
try to stop it through the Combined Munitions Assignment
Board)05
Washington's intention to base an extensive air
transport operation in Sweden came to light when Svenska
Dagbladet revealed, on 3 November, that the Americans
proposed to establish a military air service between
Stockholm and New York, and had asked the Swedes for
special ground facilities. Maycock reported that the
A.T.C. was already employing some released internees as
ground crew, that Colonel Baichen had rented two large
houses near Bromma airport for use as barracks and that
Swedish contractors were engaged to construct a mess hall
105Peveler - Galsworthy, 26 October 1944 minute,
FO 371/43509/N672.
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in the "quickest construction job carried out in this
106
country."
Mallet informed the Foreign Office on 11 November
that Boheman had recently remarked that although the War
Department was "putting every obstacle in the way of
Sweden receiving essential supplies the 'Air Department'
was doing everything they could to play up to the
Swedes." 107 Boheman added that the Americans had offered
a large number of fighters in order to 'pave the way' for
the establishment of a civil airline before the end of the
war. W. Hayter, of the Foreign Office's American Depart-
ment, found Boheman's revelations "puzzling" since he
believed that "it is unlikely that the Americans would be
in a position to offer anyone fighter aircraft." 08 Other
officials were less surprised by this news since the U.S.
still maintained an air mission in Buenos Aires, and was
known to be offering trainer aircraft to Iraq and Turkey.
Boheman's remarks were reinforced when the Swedish
Air Force disclosed that it considered the Mustang to be
the "best fighter in the world today".' 09 Nordinsk6ild
106Maycock - Assistant Chief Air Staff (Intelligence)
3 November 1944 despatch AA. SWD. 77/44, AVIA 2/2415.
107Mallet to Foreign Office, 11 November 1944
telegram 1342, FO 371/43546/N7412.
108Hayter, 13 November 1944 minute, FO 371/43546/
N7412.
109Mallet to Foreign Office, 14 November 1944
telegram 65 SAVING, FO 37l/43546/N74l3.
346
was pressing the government to accept the American offer
since it seemed unlikely that a similar offer would be
forthcoming from the British. At an Allied attachs'
luncheon, General Ljungdahl told Maycock that the Swedish
government was hesitant about consummating the deal for
fear the Americans might expect some 'unneutral' quid pro
such as the use of Swedish air bases. Ljungdahl then
asked for details about the latest model Spitfire, Typhoon,
and Tempest, adding that the Swedish air staff would prefer
to obtain British aircraft, since American equipment would
commit Sweden to new engines, guns, radios, and maintenance
techniques. Moreover, the United States was a more
distant source of supply than Britain. Maycock later
complained to Mallet that Warner's instructions of July to
refrain from encouraging Swedish interest in British
fighters prevented him from "doing more than whet Ljung-
dahl's appetite" for the Spitfire XIV. He stated that the
U.S.A.F. and U.S. air attache were responsible to the War
Department, whom Warner had earlier described as "hysteri-
cally" opposed to supporting Sweden. Maycock warned, "It
is clearly not to our advantage to allow the Americans to
supply these fighters as it would be the first step to
cutting our lucrative trade in aviation material for a
long time.tUO
The R.A.F. delegation in Washington held informal
discussions with the Aviation Division of the State Depart-
110Ibid.
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ment which denied holding negotiations with the Swedes for
the establishment of a U.S. civil air service to Sweden,
although tentative American-Swedish negotiations concern-
ing postwar civil aviation had been held during the summer.
Assistant Secretary of State, Adolf Berle, the chief U.S.
delegate to the Chicago conference, professed ignorance
of any plans to sell aircraft to Sweden. "The State
Department implied that if anything were afoot it was
entirely in the hands of American military authorities
and no concern of theirs." The British also discovered
that although no aircraft could be sold to Sweden without
the Combined Munitions Assignment Board's approval, the
Board did not have jurisdiction over machines which were
declared as surplus. Mallet pressed Johnson for an
explanation of the U.S. air attache's activities in
Stockholm, but the American minister blandly responded
that the proposed air service was only part of the postwar
occupation forces' logistics service, and did not mention
112fighters.	 When Maycock admitted, with some embarrass-
ment, to Nordinskiöld that the Americans had not informed
him of the fighter deal, the Swede expressed surprise,
since he had assumed that the British and Americans were
working in close collaboration in the matter.
dHalif ax to Foreign Off ic, 19 November 1944
telegram 6212, FO 371/43546/W7414.
ll2Mallet to Foreign Office, 24 November 1944
telegram 1406, FO 371/43546/W75863.
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On 22 November, the R.A.F. delegation learned
that the U.S. actually did plan to sell P-47's or P-51's
to Sweden and that the question was about to be tabled
before the Combined Munitions Assignment Board for approval.
The Air Ministry reproached the Foreign Office for having
prevented it from satisfying the Swedes' desire for
Spitfires, in March 1944 and during 1943, (although on
both occasions, the Air Ministry itself had insisted that
no fighters were available for export). The British
representatives on the C.M.A.B. were directed to obstruct
the proposed sale. They were to argue that the R.A.F.'s
inventory of Mustangs and Lightnings were inadequate, since
the Americans had pressured Britain into reducing its
fighter imports earlier in the year. The Air Ministry
argued that the war had reached the stage where the longer-
range P-51 and P-47 were more valuable to the R.A.F. than
the short-range defensive Spitfire. The Ministry insisted
that Britain and not Sweden should receive any spare
American fighters.
If it is essential for political and economic
reasons to supply fighter type aircraft to
the Swedes, it would be far more advantageous
to the cause of our united war effort to
supply Spitfires in which the Swedes have
already evinced a lively interest rather
than P-47's or
ll3 Air Vice Marshal D. Colyer to Warner, 24
November 1944 letter A.C.A.S.(P)/l54/l30 FO 371/43546/
N74l7. Air Ministry to R.A.F.DEL., 27 November 1944
telegram AIRSIGN 737, CAB 122/916.
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The Foreign Office instructed the Washington embassy
to make similar representations to the State Department.
Whereas the Air Ministry was concerned over the prospects
of American competition, the Foreign Office was primarily
disturbed by American secretiveness. The Northern Depart-
ment regarded the Americans' behaviour as a breach of the
Anglo-American 'common front' since London had always kept
Washington informed of its own discussions with the
Swedes . 114
 The Foreign Office remained reluctant to supply
aircraft to Sweden without receiving a quid pro quo.
London did not associate the proposed transfer with Johnson's
efforts to repatriate U.S. internees. Some officials such as
Warner hoped that neither London nor Washington would
become committed to supplying the Swedish Air Force.
Warner feared that, "the Russians "might think it odd" if
Britain and the U.S. were to build up a neutral's air
power. ,,115
The U.S.A.A.F. countered the British protests by
declaring that the proposed sale was vital to the Allied
war effort. At the C.M.A.B. meeting of 30 November,
General Giles contended that the aircraft were a condition
114 Eden to Halifax, 29 November 1944 telegram
10146, FO 115/4028. Some Foreign Office officials, such
as Richard Law, shared the Air Ministry's attitude, "If
any aircraft are supplied to Sweden, they should be
British and not American." 26 November 1944, FO 371/43546/
N7415.
115Warner, 10 December 1944, Minute, FO 371/
43546/N7720.
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for the release of 1100 U.S. airmen in Sweden, although
Stockholm had insisted that the two issues should be
negotiated separately to avoid the appearance of 'bargain-.
jgll6 Giles explained that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff
believed that "the return of internees was of greater
operational and moral importance than the tying up of 70
fighters, although these are in tight supply." Moreover,
the U.S.A.A.F. had made a definite promise to sell seventy
P-47's or P-5l's. Cues added that Britain's allocation
of 135 P-47's for the first six months of 1945 was
"liberal", and that the R.A.F. did not require additional
machines since short-range fighters could now operate from
European bases. General York (U.S.A.), chairman of the
C.M.A.B., ruled that the assignment of aircraft to Sweden
should be made, subject to British approval. Air Vice
Marshal Courtney, the R.A.F. representative at the Board,
warned London that "I still think the Americans have other
irons in the fire beside return of aircrews and are
determined to obtain a firm foothold in Sweden."17
The Air Ministry and Foreign Office shared
Courtney's suspicions, but were unable to verify them since
there was no evidence to suggest that the fighter and civil
A F DEL to Air Ministry, 30 November 1944
telegram SIGNAIR 626 CAB 122/916.
11 7R.A.F.DEL. to Air Ministry, 30 November 1944,
op. cit.
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aviation questions were connected. Mallet alleged that
the fighters were a quid pro quo for the return of 70
interned bombers but he was unable to get the Swedes or
the U.S. legation to confirm this.' 8 The American
argument, however, was substantiated by the fact that a
majority of U.S. and all British internees had been
released by early December 1944. On 5 December, Wing
Commander Peveler informed Anthony Haigh that the Air
Ministry was considering whether it stood to gain more by
allowing "the Americans to get away with this" in order to
set a precedent which would enable Britain to sell aircraft
to other countries "without having to take the Americans
into consideration. ,,119
On 10 December, the Air Ministry decided to offer
Sweden 20 obsolescent Spitfire IX aircraft in return for
the right to establish a radar station at Malmö which the
air staff believed to be an 'operational necessity' in
directing air raids against Berlin. Mallet had informed
London that the Swedes were more likely to demand radar
sets for the navy as a quid pro quo, but the Air Ministry
was reluctant to consider this alternative since the sale
of radar equipment would require approval of the Combined
Chiefs of Staff. Moreover, It desired to equip the Swedish
118 Mallet to Foreign Office, 6 December 1944
telegram 1461, FO 37l/43509/N7663.
119 Haigh, 5 December 1944 minute, FO 371/43541/
N7586.
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Air Force with Spitfires "in any case....to counter the
American tendency to dominate this potential market for
aircraft." 12 ° The Ministry of Economic Warfare also
indicated that it would strongly support such sales to
Sweden to alleviate London's shortage of Swedish
currency.	 The R.A.F. delegation was instructed to
withdraw its opposition to the sale of American fighters
to Sweden. It was, however, directed to ask the Americans
to delay delivery of these machines if the Swedes refused
to allow the British to establish the radar facilities.
The Americans proposed to give the Swedes 25 P-47's imme-
diately, 25 more in January, and an additional 20 at a
later date on a 'cash-and-carry' basis. 122
 Although the
British were anxious to persuade the Americans to defer
deliveries, pending the outcome of the radar negotiations,
they agreed to permit the delivery of the initial allotment
of aircraft. At the beginning of January 1945, the Foreign
Office had, in the Northern Department's opinion, "dis-
interested ourselves in what the Americans do", and
advised the Air Ministry that there was "nothing more to do"
about the proposed fighter sales. The Swedes resisted
120Colyer to Air Vice Marshal Wilcock (R.A.F.DEL.)
13 December 1944 telegram Webber W.10876, CAB 122/916.
121Colyer to Warner, 10 December 1944 letter
ACAS(P)/1604, FO 371/43546/N7720.
Kielkopf, T.E.H. Birley, Combined
Secretariat, C.M.A.B., 25 November 1944 memorandum M.B.W.
(AIR) 279, CAB 122/916.
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London's entreaties over the radar question. 123
 However,
aircraft deliveries were delayed through late December,
January, and February while the Americans and Swedes
haggled over the price of the machines.
In early February 1945, General Spaatz advised
Washington to sell Sweden 46 P-51 fighters rather than
70 P-47's, which he felt were extremely valuable for
strafing and other ground support missions. Moreover, four
Mustangs had already force-landed in Sweden, and the Swedes
would thus be more familiar with the P-51 maintenance and
operation. The Air Ministry made a final attempt to block
the aircraft sale by insisting that Spaatz' proposal was
"essentially different" from the earlier scheme concerning
P-47's. 124 The Ministry argued that South East Asia
Command's fighter forces would be seriously short of P-Si's
as a consequence of American pressure to forego 180
Mustangs in the early autumn of 1944. It contended that any
available Mustangs should be immediately allocated to
Mountbatten's forces rather than to Sweden. The Air
Ministry did not seriously believe that it could prevent
the Americans from selling fighters to Sweden, but felt that
it might make a 'stronger claim' for obtaining additional
Mustangs if the British registered their opposition to the
Warr, 5 January 1945 minute, FO 371/48024/
N389.
124 Colyer to Dickson, 20 February 1945 telegram
WEBBER W.1627, CAB 122/916.
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Swedish-American deal. 125
 The U.S. Air Force reacted to
the British protest by elaborating on how Sweden was help-
ing the Allied war effort and that Mountbatten's Mustang
requirements were not urgent owing to "the overwhelming
air superiority" in South East Asia. Giles added that
since current P-Si production amounted to 800 aircraft a
month, it was premature to consider South East Asia
Command's fighter requirements for May and june.126 The
R.A.F. delegation relented on 24 February after Giles
intimated that the British would receive favourable consi-
deration on future supply questions if they withdrew their
opposition to providing P-5l's to Sweden. In the middle
of March, the U.S.A.A.F. transferred the Mustangs to the
United States Commercial Corporation which was responsible
for selling government property to neutral governments.
In early April 1945, U.S. pilots flew the first Mustangs
to Bromma airport, where Johnson transferred the fighters
officially to the Swedish Air Force)27
All other outstanding aviation issues in Swedish-
American relations were resolved during the last five months
of the war. Brigadier General Alfred Kessler, who had been
125 1bid • Colyer to Dickson, 24 February 1945
telegram WEBBER W. 1748, FO 371/48024/N2224.
126RAF.DEL to Air Ministry, 20 February 1945
telegram WEBBER W. 1627, FO 371/48024/N909.
l27Brigadier General Kessler to Johnson, 29 March
1945 memorandum, Hershell V. Johnson Papers.
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attached to U.S. 'shuttle bombing' forces in Russia, became
U.S. air attach in Stockholm on 10 January 1945. Mallet
surmised that Kessler was appointed to oversee the release
of the interned aircrews, the bombers, the establishment
of the A.T.C. service, and to lend greater prestige to the
U.S. Army Air Corps in Sweden. By the end of December
1944, the Swedes had interned three thousand Germans, who
were given political re-education courses. 128 At the
beginning of January 1945, 225 Americans were still interned
in Sweden. On 15 January, the Swedish government released
all of these, except 25 who would remain in Sweden under
token internment. The U.S. War Department accepted this
arrangement and decided to keep 100 airmen in Sweden to
maintain interned aircraft and to make preparations for the
129planned A.T.C. operation.
On 16 December 1944, the U.S. and Swedish govern-
Inents concluded a civil aviation agreement which sanctioned
the establishment of reciprocal American and Swedish
commercial flights between Stockholm, New York, and
130	 .Chicago.	 Negotiations concerning the A.T.C. proposals,
however, remained deadlocked due to Swedish objections to
' 28 Gordon Knox, U.S. press attache to Johnson,
22 December 1944, Hershell V. Johnson Papers.
l29captajn R. Robb (USAAF) to Johnson, 15 March
1945, Report of Interned Aircrews on Temporary Duty in
Sweden, Hershell V. Johnson Papers.
'30 For text of agreement, see U.S. Department of
State Bulletin, 17 December 1944, pp. 157-9.
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the 'military' character of the operation. On 27 January,
Hugh Cumming, Chief of the State Department's Division of
Northern European Affairs, was directed to travel to Sweden
to expedite negotiations. The American legation drafted an
agreement in late February which permitted Swedish authori-
ties to scrutinize the A.T.C. ground operations, such as
traffic control; stipulated that U.S. aircrews would change
to civilian clothes when they left Bromma airport; and
granted Swedish ownership of all radar communications and
maintenance facilities once A.T.C. operations were
completed. The Swedish government refused to ratify this
agreement because of what Cumming described as "narrow
concepts of Sweden's position as a neutral" and by
"irritation over various aspects of our policies with
respect to Sweden." 3' Cumrning also suspected that the
British were aware of the American commercial aviation aims,
and "one way or another are trying to throw sand in the
machinery." 132
 After lobbying by the Swedish Foreign
Ministry and civil aviation interests however, the Swedish
government agreed to conclude the agreement on 13 March.
The Air Transport Command initiated flights from Stockholm
in May, and the service was concluded in August 1945,
since the outcome of the Chicago conference enabled
Washington to conclude reciprocal agreements with European
131F.R.U.S., 1945, Vol. V, op. cit., p. 752.
132There is no evidence indicating that the British
attempted openly to induce the Swedes to reject the draft
agreement, but it is possible that the British legation
encouraged some of the 'neutralist' objections to the
A.T.C. proposal.
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nations freely. A Stockholm landing was no longer necessary
in order to circumvent 'internationalist' barriers in
Europe. The Stockholm to New York air service was taken
over by American-Export Airlines.'33 Once the A.T.C.
departed from Sweden, the Swedes acquired a modern airport
and ancillary communications facilities.
The Americans overcame Swedish recalcitrance
towards releasing the interned bombers by furnishing
additional aircraft to Sweden. In February, General Arnold
authorized General Kessler to offer to let Sweden keep up
to twenty bombers if the Swedes released the other 110
aircraft) 4 Johnson believed it would be a mistake to
'bargain' with the Swedes and persuaded Washington to give
the bombers to Sweden as a gift after the Swedes had agreed
to the American demand. Johnson also decided to obtain
support from the Foreign Ministry and Swedish Air Force
before pressing the demand on the Swedish cabinet. General
Nordinskthld was especially anxious to help the Americans,
from whom he had obtained Mustang fighters and who might
provide other forms of assistance in the future. After
lengthy debate within the Swedish government, the Americans
were informed on 7 April 1945 that Sweden would release
all American aircraft which had force-landed prior to
January 1945. In accordance with traditional practice, the
133craven and Cate, op. cit., Vol. 7, p. 112.
134F.R.U.S., 1945, Vol. V, op. cit., pp. 758-9.
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Swedes also released four German fighters. Foreign
Minister Gunther explained that it had been difficult to
overcome the opposition of some 'neutrally minded' cabinet
members, such as Edvin Sköld, the Defence Minister, and
that the token return of the German aircraft served "to
calm their conscience at a breach of technical neutrality.135
As a gesture of gratitude, the U.S. government granted
Sweden seven B-17's, to be converted into civil airliners,
plus two more Fortresses to provide spare parts.136
At the end of World War II, American influence
predominated Sweden's military and civil aviation. Some
quarters in London, notably the Air Ministry, R.A.F., and
General Department of the Foreign Office, resented the
Americans for unilaterally exploiting the war to cultivate
a new postwar market at Britain's expense. It must be
noted, however, that until London had learned of the
American efforts, the British had refused to accommodate
Sweden's desire for Spitfires, which in turn made the
Swedes amenable to the American proposal. Although some
British officials had actively considered postwar
commerce, and a few R.A.F. officers sought to develop
closer ties with the Swedish Air Force, the Northern
1351bid., p. 7,61.
l36tettinius to Stimson, 21 April 1945 letter
R.G.165, 0PD336 SWEDEN 091; Mallet to Foreign Office, 10
April 1945 telegram 605, FO 371/45024/N396l.
Erik Boheman P vakt. Kabinettssekreterare under andra
väldskriget (Stockholm:Norstedts 1964) p. 306.
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Department was concerned primarily with more immediate
issues relating to the war, and believed that aircraft
could only be used to induce Sweden to assist the Allied
war effort. Unlike the Americans, the Department was
anxious to avoid ill feeling between Britain and its
Allies by supplying aircraft to Sweden. Due to the British
aircraft industry's smaller productive capacity, London
could not afford to promote the sale of military aircraft
without undermining the R.A.F.'s strength. Consequently,
Britain was unable to offer Sweden a substantial incentive
in return for complying with its requests for radar and
communications facilities during late 1944 and 1945.
Twenty obsolescent Spitfires were less enticing than fifty
modern Mustangs. Furthermore, the Foreign Office's
insistence upon receiving a quid pro quo for aircraft
virtually ensured that Sweden would not accept the twenty
Spitfires in return for radar bases which would improve
the R.A.F.'S bombing accuracy. B.O.A.C. also sought to
install its own communications and flight control facili-
ties in Sweden during early 1945, but did not offer the
Swedes any reciprocal privileges. Anglo-Swedish negotia-
tions concerning this question did not progress beyond the
initial stages before the war in Europe ended.
In the realm of civil aviation, Britain forfeited
the substance of competitive aircraft sales and airline
services by grasping the shadow of 'internationalism' long
after it had become apparent that the United States,
Sweden, and other nations did not wish to subdue their own
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aspirations and freedoms for the sake of participation
in a supranational bureaucracy. Canada was a strong
supporter of the United States at the Chicago conference,
and by December 1944 the Canadians were no longer willing
to withhold landing rights from S.L.I.A. The British
prevented S.I.L.A. from inaugurating its transatlantic
service, on 'security grounds,' until May 1945, when the
Chiefs of Staff decided that this argument was no longer
valid) 37
 London persisted in advancing its case for
international controls and ignored the necessity of
negotiating bilateral civil aviation arrangements. Until
late 1944, the British had not opened negotiations with
the Swedes for a postwar agreement. Once hostilities
ceased, Britain had yet to conclude a civil aviation agree-
ment which would replace the temporary agreement sanction-
ing the wartime Stockholm to Scotland service. B.O.A.C.
put a York aircraft on this service in late 1944 in hopes
of stimulating Swedish interest in British airlines. The
York did not attract as much interest in Stockholm as two
Douglas DC-4's (C-54, Skymaster) which conveyed Cumming's
delegation to Stockholm in early February 1945. Some
Swedish newspapers proclaimed that the Skymaster was
,,l38Sweden's future Atlantic aircraft.	 Shortly afterwards,
137Chiefs of Staff Committee, 16 May 1945, COS(45)
88 meeting, minute 21, FO 371/50278/W6578.
l38Mallet to Eden, 27 February 1945 despatch
112 (156/6/645) , FO 371/50277/w13476.
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S.L.I.A. announced that it had purchased 10 DC-4's in late
1944, which would be delivered after the cessation of
hostilities. A.B.A. also obtained five DC-3's for its
European services.
Shortly after the war, a British journalist wrote
that he and many other British passengers preferred
travelling between Sweden and Britain on A.B.A. rather than
B.O.A.C. They found the service aboard the converted
B-17's more comfortable and efficient by comparison with
B.O.A.C.'s Yorks. 139
 This instance was analogous with
Britain's overall stature in the world in 1945.
139 Gordon Young, Outposts of Peace (London: Right
Book Club, 1946), p. 130.
CHAPTER SEVEN
SWEDEN AND THE WAR,
SEPTEMBER 1944 - MAY 1945:
CONTEMPTIBLE NEUTRAL OR OPPORTUNISTIC LIBERATOR?
Throughout most of the war, British officials
considered the prospect of Swedish intervention against
Germany as a moot question. The Foreign Office believed
that only a German invasion would goad the Swedes to enter
the war and that Stockholm would not agree to discuss its
defence plans with the Allies until this contingency had
arisen. The chances of Germany attacking Sweden diminished
steadily as German forces became more heavily committed
against the Allies. The British and American Chiefs of
Staff believed that Stalin's proposal to press Stockholm
to concede air bases to the Allies would create more
logistical problems than could be justified by the possible
benefits of these facilities. Furthermore, the British
government believed that Sweden's continued neutrality
suited Allied interests in providing a base for conducting
intelligence and other forms of clandestine warfare.
During late 1944, London began to reassess the
desirability and likelihood of inducing Sweden to enter
the war. By the spring of 1945, the British were pressing
Stockholm for staff talks in preparation for Swedish
intervention against Germany. What accounts for this
volte face in London's attitude and what developments
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prompted London to reconsider this question? How could
Sweden's late entry into war hasten Germany's defeat?
SEPTEMBER 1944: RUMOURS AND SUPPOSITIONS
London began to examine Sweden's role in the war
after the legation in Stockholm reported that some Swedish
diplomatic and military officials had privately stated
that Sweden might intervene to liberate Norway and
Denmark. Operation Graffham, German fears of Allied
landings in Norway during the early summer, and Allied
rhetoric at the time of the démarche of 24 August led
many Swedes to believe that the Allies desired a more
dramatic concession from Sweden than the mere cessation of
trade with Germany.' While making oral remarks to supple-
ment the démarche, Mallet alluded to a speech which
Churchill gave to Parliament after Turkey had severed
relations with Germany on 2 August. Churchill admonished
neutrals not to "daily with the evil" which happened to be
the "Losing side... . Neutrals will find that their position
in the world cannot remain entirely unaffected by the part
they have chosen to play in the crisis of the war." 2
 The
dmarche did not explicitly demand the cessation of Swedish
exports, and Mallet and Johnson repeatedly stated that the
'See Chapter Five.
Churchill, 2 August 1944, "The War Situation,"
speech to House of Commons, The Dawn of Liberation, war
speeches compiled by Charles Eade (London: Cassell & Co.,
1945), p. 163.
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Allies desired an 'open action' and 'steps which would
shorten the war,' without categorically stating what the
Allies expected. In early September, Mallet informed
London that Swedish government advisers believed the
dmarche would be followed by an Allied request to establish
air bases in Sweden.
On 2 September, before Stockholm formally replied
to the démarche, Erik Boheman explained to Mallet and
Johnson that the Swedish public was "wedded" to the concept
of neutrality and that Prime Minister Hansson was unwilling
to publicly reorient Sweden's foreign policy. 3 He
elaborated that the Swedish Cabinet could not discover any
intermediate position between neutrality and belligerence.
However, Mallet was surprised when Boheman declared that
the Swedish Government would "take the action which the
Allies are demanding" if Germany provided a pretext by
0
committing atrocities in Denmark or by occupying the Aland
Islands. 4 Mallet perceived that the Swedes were contemplat-
ing diplomatic rather than economic sanctions, and
suspected that the Swedes had misconstrued the Allied note
as an ultimatum demanding political and military collabora-
tion. On 16 September, Mallet informed the Foreign Office
that Boheman tentatively mentioned a private proposal for
Sweden to ask Germany to withdraw troops from Norway and
3Mallet - M.E.W., 2 September 1944 telegram 788
ARFAR, FO 837/913.
4 lbid.; F.R.U.S., Vol. IV, 1944, op. cit.,
pp. 630-31.
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Denmark. Stockholm would break off relations with Berlin
if the Germans rejected this request. 5 Boheman added that
he hoped Stockholm could avoid forcing a break with
Germany. In his opinion, Sweden could give assistance to
the peoples of occupied Europe if it remained neutral and
exploited its diplomatic influence with Berlin. He cited
that the Germans were anxious that Sweden take custody of
their assets in the U.S.S.R., and he believed Stockholm
could use this bargain for the repatriation of all
Norwegians who were Imprisoned by the Gestapo. Mallet also
reported that it was rumoured that General Ehrensward,
Chief of Defence Staff, had met with the Swedish Cabinet to
discuss possible military actions which might placate the
Allies. 6 Swedish intelligence had learned that Field
Marshal Montgomery was assembling a force for an airborne
assault against an unknown target in northern Europe. The
Swedish military assumed this assault would take place
either in Denmark or the Netherlands. The Swedish armed
forces were placed on alert, and the Swedish service chiefs
were reportedly planning to assist the Danish resistance
to assume political authority if the Allies invaded
Denmark.
5Mallet - Foreign OffIce, 16 Setpember 1944 tel.
1071, CAB 122/915.
6Mallet - Sargent, 16 September 1944 tel. 1972,
CAB 122/915; Mallet - Warner, 21 September 1944 letter
(283/111/44), FO 371/43457/N6074.
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The probability of an Allied operation in Denmark
diminished when Stockholm learned of the battle of Arnhem
17 and 30 September. However Mallet reported that many
Swedes continued to suspect that the Allies wanted Sweden
to intervene in the war. Even Mallet was uncertain as to
what action London expected of Sweden. He believed the
dmarche could be interpreted as a request for Sweden to
join the Allies, or at least to break off relations with
Germany. However, such demands were radically different fron
those which the Allies had presented in the past.
	
More-
over, Mallet could not understand why he had not been fully
informed if London and Washington had altered Allied policy
towards Sweden drastically. "I am of course as much in the
dark as he [Bohernan] as to whether German evacuation [of
Norway and Denmark] would help or hinder our military
operations." 7 Therefore on 21 September, he asked Warner
to clarify London's attitude towards Sweden, and stated
that he would not encourage the Swedes to sever ties with
Germany unless the Allies wanted Sweden to help liberate
Norway and Denmark.
The Swedish reaction to the dmarche surprised the
Foreign Office and Ministry of Economic Warfare. The
M.E.W. was strongly opposed to forcing a rupture of
Swedish-German relations since Sweden would become useless
as a base for S.O.E. and intelligence operations. G.H.
Villiers commented, "We should be extremely unwilling to
7lbid.
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risk losing the substance by grasping at the shadow."8
The Foreign Office was skeptical of Mallet's reports that
Swedish military and political authorities contemplated
an open confrontation with Germany. Warner contemptuously
remarked that the suggestion that Sweden might intervene
if given a pretext was not
very respectable of M. Boheman to suggest
that the sister country, Denmark, should
undergo suffering in order to provide an
excuse for the Swedes to play a decent role.
The Swedish attitude with its quibbles and
excuses is despicable.9
Before the Foreign Office clarified its position to Mallet,
it forwarded his correspondence to the Chiefs of Staff
with a request to consider the benefits which might be
gained from Sweden's intervention. The Chiefs concluded
that Swedish forces would be useful in clearing German
forces from Norway. Luftwaffe and U-boat bases would no
longer threaten the Arctic convoy routes if the Germans
were forced to evacuate Norway. However, Sweden would have
to undertake this action alone since the Allies could not
divert materiel or manpower from Western Europe. The
Chiefs doubted that Sweden would actually enter the war in
the light of Stockholm's past behaviour towards the Allies.
Moreover, they were reluctant to pursue this question
since it would have to be presented to the U.S. Chiefs of
- Washington, 9 September 1944 tel. 2062,
FO 371/43456/N5258.
9Warner, 4 September 1944 minute, FO 371/43457/
N53l7.
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Staff. Washington might employ harsh diplomatic tactics
to force Sweden into the war, and these tactics would
render Stockholm less rather than more willing to join
the Allies)°
In a personal letter to Mallet of 27 September,
Warner denied that London ever intended to force Sweden to
rupture relations with Germany, and added that such a breach
would harm British interests. He mentioned that whenever
the Chiefs of Staff had been asked if they anticipated any
far-reaching military objectives involving Sweden, they
had always replied that they were "unable to think of any."11
He wrote that the Swedes, and apparently the British
legation, had evidently misinterpreted the dmarche of 24th
August. He explained that the confusion was probably
attributable to the note's vague language which London
hoped would convey what Washington wanted to express "with
a flourish of trumpets." Warner suspected that the
rhetoric which Johnson employed in informal conversations
with Gunther and Boheman, before 24 August, had helped to
create the impression that the Allies were seeking more
than a trade embargo.
Mallet did not encourage the Swedes to consider
military or diplomatic action against Germany. After the
uncertainty of late August and September subsided, Prime
Minister Hansson and his Cabinet reiterated their determina-
10Brig. Hollis, Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee,
to Warner, 18 September 1944 letter (C.O.S. 1605/4),
CAB 122/915.
"Warner - Mallet, 27 September 1944 letter,
FO 37l/43539/N8447.
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tion to keep Sweden neutral for the duration of the war.
Some senior Swedish officers, however, were in favour of
mounting what the Foreign Office called a 'face saving
campaign' in Norway. Military developments in Scandinavia
after the Finnish-Soviet armistice created suitable circum-
stances for the Swedes to make such a gesture. The Red
Army had pursued the German XX Mountain Army from Finland
into northern Norway. The Soviets crossed the Norwegian
frontier on 17 October. In late October, the Germans
began to withdraw to a defensive line below Lyngenfjord,
about 200 miles beyond the forward Russian positions on
the Tana River. Hitler ordered the retreating troops to
conduct a scorched earth policy, and the inhabitants of
this wasteland were deported to the south. On 4 November,
Brigadier Sutton-Pratt, the British military attache,
visited Colonel Kempass, Swedish director of military
intelligence, who stated that "Personality No. 34 (Major
General Ehrensward, Chief of Defence Staff) had given the
signal for full cooperation" between Swedish and British
military intelligence agencies, and "flung open his files
for me and gave me what they contained." 12 Sutton-Pratt
inquired if Sweden would intervene in Norway. Kempass
replied that most senior officers, particularly Ehrensward
and Major General Douglas, Chief of Army Staff, were anxious
for such an action, which would enable Swedes to "hold up
' 2 Sutton-Pratt to War Office, 4 November 1944 tel
266111, FO 371/43509/N6897.
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their heads and regain a prominent position in Scandinavia."13
Kernpass added that the Government, the King, and financial
circles opposed intervention, but stated that a strong
press campaign and "serious German excesses in Norway"
would cause public opinion to force the government to
intervene in Norway. Captain Denham, the naval attache,
had similar conversations with Swedish naval officers
during November. By December, the Swedish press was
actively commenting upon the question of intervention, and
some Stockholm newspapers openly stated that a declaration
of war against Germany would strengthen Sweden's position
in the postwar world. 14
London remained uncertain as to Stockholm's willing-
ness to intervene. Some officials within the Foreign
Off ice,such as Nutting and Galsworthy, could not foresee
the "slightest chance" of Sweden entering the war.
Galsworthy noted that although some high ranking officers
favoured intervention, they did not press their views
on the Swedish Government. German atrocities might prompt
Stockholm to mobilize but they would have to be "something
pretty terrifying.... The Swedes have already accepted a
lot with no more than verbal protests, and Swedish anger
is quick to evaporate." 15
 Anthony Haigh thought that
14 Knox - Johnson, 1 December 1944, memorandum,
Hershell V. Johnson Papers.
15Galsworthy, 7 November 1944 minute,
FO 371/43509/N6897.
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Norwegian and Danish pressure might induce the Swedes to
enter the war. Stockholm would then be able to state that
it intervened at the request of fellow Scandinavians and
not "to climb onto the bandwagon," and could enjoy
considerable prestige and influence in Scandinavian affairs
after the war.' 6 Haigh and others in the Foreign Office
hoped the Chiefs of Staff would not want to bring Sweden
into the war because Britain would lose influence over
Norway and Denmark if Sweden became revered as their
liberator. Moreover, the Swedes might exact more favour-
able postwar trade conditiøns from Britain as the price of
their intervention.
During November, the Joint Planning Staff prepared,
"in anticipation of instructions" from the Chiefs of Staff,
a paper concerning the value to the Allies of Sweden's
possible intervention. The Joint Planners admitted that
their study was somewhat problematical since they lacked
sufficient information on the Swedish armed forces'
strength, war plans, and combat effectiveness. They
doubted that the Swedish Air Force and Navy would be of
much help to the Allies owing to these services' relatively
outmoded equipment. They estimated that the Swedish Army
could mobilize 9 divisions in event of war.' 7 At the
beginning of November, the Germans had 18 divisions in
16Haigh, 9 November 1944 minute, FO 371/43509/
N6897.
17War Cabinet, Joint Planning Staff, 30 November
1944, J,P.(44)289(5), (Draft): Sweden, CAB 119/109.
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Norway, although some units were being withdrawn to more
active fronts. The J.P.S. assumed the Swedes would mount
raids against German communication lines rather than
launch a major offensive in Norway. The Swedes would
probably insist upon military assistance from the Western
Allies. But the Western Allies lacked the necessary forces
and access to assist Sweden. The U.S.S.R. could provide
supplies and possibly manpower to the Swedes through
Finland.
The J.P.S. paper reveals that the Joint Planners
felt Norway held the same secondary strategic importance as
it had during the previous winter) 8 The Chiefs of Staff
had stated in September that a German evacuation of Norway
would assist the Allies because it would eliminate the U-
Boat menace. The J.P.S., however, wanted to keep German
forces bottled up in Norway as they were before operation
Overlord. They feared that hostilities in Europe would
continue until the summer of 1945 and therefore sought to
prevent German forces from being transferred to the Western
front. If Sweden did not intervene, the Germans could
adequately protect their naval bases and ensure internal
security in Norway with a minimum of 8 divisions. If
Sweden entered the war, the Germans would need an additional
5 divisions to defend the Norwegian-Swedish border. The
Joint Planners thought that the threat of Swedish interven-
tion might deter Berlin from withdrawing troops from Norway.
18 See Chapter Three.
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The J.P.S. concluded that Sweden should be asked to inter-
vene, but that the request should not be in the form of an
ultimatum. An ultimatum might "risk a flat rejection" from
Stockholm and "fail to contain German divisions in Norway
and might well prejudice our long-term requirements from
Sweden." 19
 They suggested that London consult the Royal
Norwegian government before the Swedes were approached on
this question. They doubted that the Swedes would reject
completely a request to intervene in order to help shorten
the war and alleviate suffering in Norway. Mallet could
hint that a Swedish action could be made in conjunction
with an Allied landing in Norway. If the Swedes' price for
intervention "were pitched too high," the Allies could
protract negotiations with the Swedes over several months.2°
The negotiations would form the basis of a new deception
plan along the lines of Graffharn. The Joint Planners
advised the Foreign Office to approach Boheman unofficially
during his visit to London in early December to discuss
postwar trade questions. The Joint Planners emphasized
that Stockholm might conclude that the Allies did not want
Sweden to enter the war if nothing was said about Sweden's
possible belligerency during Boheman's visit:
Our seeming indifference will necessarily
strengthen the hands of the less venturesome
Swedish Ministers. They will be able to
reply to anyone who urges a bolder course
that the Allies do not wish and have never
284(S) (draft), op. cit.
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seriously suggested that Sweden should
enter the war.21
Sir Orme Sargent pressed Boheman on the question
of Swedish intervention during a luncheon on 17 December.
Boheman remarked that the Swedish public was "most anxious
to do anything" that would help shorten the sufferings of
Norwegians and Danes. 22 Sargent asked how far Stockholm
would go to achieve this aim. Boheman stated that when
the Swedes expected an Allied assault on Denmark, they had
prepared for the despatch of the Danish 'police force'
and had requisitioned shipping and supplies for the Swedish
units which would assist the Danes. He now assumed that
the Allies were concentrating on advancing into Germany and
were not planning a landing on Norway. If the Allies were
contemplating such an action however, Sweden would inter-
vene providing such intervention would be of real benefit
to Norwegians. The Swedish Army was an "excellent defensive
force" but lacked adequate armour and air support for
offensive operations. Sweden would not intervene if the
"necessary conditions would not be present." 23 The Allies
would have to open a sea route to ship fuel and other
supplies to support British aircraft which would support
the Swedish Army. If Swedish/Allied forces did not quickly
overwhelm German units, then Sweden's intervention, accord-
Capel-Dunn (J.C.S.), 27 November 1944
minute, CAB 119/109.
Warner, 17 December 1944 minute,
FO 37l/43500/N7950.
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ing to Boheman, would only "turn the whole of Norway into
a battleground." 24 He said that Sweden would oblige a
Norwegian request for troops to help maintain order upon
the German collapse in Norway. However, he was uncertain
that the Norwegians would want to depend upon Sweden for
their liberation or post-armistice policing. Boheman added
that Stockholm felt it could best help the Norwegians by
providing humanitarian relief. He elaborated that the
Swedes were about to press the Germans to allow displaced
persons from north Norway to take refuge in Sweden.
With Boheman's luncheon remarks, the Foreign Office
was prepared to let the issue of Swedish intervention rest.
The Foreign Office felt this was an academic question since
the Swedes would only act in concert with Allied landings
and Allied assistance, neither of which would be forth-
coming. The Norwegian government-in-exile requested the
British government, in late November, to conduct landings
in the region of Bod$ in order to trap German forces in
Finnmark (north Norway). In December, Eden replied that the
Chiefs of Staff opposed this proposal on the grounds that
Britain lacked sufficient troops who were trained for Arctic
warfare, and that it would take too long to give special
training to other units which might be despatched to Norway.25
25Nils Norten Udgaard, Great Power Politics and
Norwegian Foreign Policy (Oslo: Universitetsfor].aget, 1973),
p. 83.
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Churchill learned of the Norwegian request and
asked Eden to reconsider his reply. He suggested that
Sweden should be pressed to liberate Norway, and that a
small British force should be raised to assist the Swedes.
Eden responded in a letter of 24 December that the Service
Chiefs and the J.P.S. had already decided that, "from a
military standpoint of operations against Germany, it is not
worthwhile pursuing the matter." 26 Although Eden appreciated
the Norwegian's desire to prevent the Germans from laying
their homeland to waste, he doubted that the Norwegians
would accept Sweden's intervention without a simultaneous
Allied landing. In a sudden reversal of the Foreign
Office's past claims that Sweden was strong enough to deter
possible German aggression, Eden argued that Germany might
attack Sweden if it were to intervene. He stated that
neither the Norwegians nor the Swedes would want the
Germans to turn Sweden into a 'battleground' and deprive
Norwegian and Danish refugees of an asylum. He stressed
that he had given an evasive reply to the Norwegian request
because the Chiefs of Staff "are not anxious to disclose
to the Norwegians that we have not the troops to land in
,,27Norway and cannot foresee when we shall have. 	 Eden
felt there would be enough British or U.S. troops to
restore order in Norway after Germany's collapse. He
26Eden - Churchill, 24 December 1944 letter
PM/44/780, PREM 3/4l3/5A.
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presumed that the Norwegians might ask Sweden to assist
in disarming German troops in Norway when hostilities
ended, and concluded that London should not discuss the
issue of Sweden's intervention before the Germans sur-
rendered. Churchill reluctantly accepted Eden's arguments,
stating that he "should be loath to accept the military
view" that Britain could not even despatch a small contin-
gent to "help the population defend themselves against any
German marauders who should be left."28
In early 1945 however, the Chiefs of Staff grew
more attracted to the idea of bringing Sweden into the war
to compensate for Britain's inability to mount an expedi-
tion to Norway. Admiral Cunningham thought Sweden's
intervention would be "welcome" because of its possible
destruction of the U-boat bases. 29 Air Chief Marshal
Portal stated on 22 January that he believed the Swedes
would want to join the Allies in order to gain influence in
the postwar world. Portal suggested that the Russians
should be invited to press Sweden to enter the war since
the U.S.S.R. was the only power which could supply Sweden.
On the Chiefs' instructions, the Joint Planning Staff
submitted a revised study on 25 January 1945 which more
closely harmonized with their views than the earlier paper.
The Joint Planners stated that benefits from Swedish inter-
28Churchill - Eden, 28 December 1944 personal
minute M.l247/4 128, PREM 3/4l3/5A.
29Chiefs of Staff Committee, 22 January 1945
minute COS(45) 22nd meeting, FO 371/48041/N1565.
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vention alone would be minimal, but the Allies could gain
substantial military advantages if they supplied and
supported Sweden. A Swedish-Allied operation in southern
Norway could isolate the German garrisons and naval bases
from Denmark and Germany. Although the J.P.S. estimated
that only 20% of the new type XXI U-boats would be based
in Norway, Allied air and naval bases in Sweden and
southern Norway would enable the Allies to attack submarine
pens and training areas in the Baltic. The Joint Planners
doubted that Stockholm would intervene if Russia was the
only power who could assist Sweden. Moreover, they were
uncertain if the Soviets would be willing to launch such
an operation. The Red Army had not advanced beyond its
position along the Tana River, and was beginning to with-
draw troops from Norway. The J.P.S. felt that the Soviets
might regard the invasion of southern Norway as an
"unprofitable diversion of resources" from their drive to
Berlin. 30
 They concluded that, on political grounds,
"it would not be to our long term advantage to invite the
Russians to extend their influence to Sweden and possibly
thence to Denmark." 31
 The Foreign Office would strongly
oppose any approach to Moscow on this question, and the
Swedes might ultimately resent London's asking the Soviets
to force Sweden into the war.
30Joint Planning Staff, 25 January 1945, Report:
SWEDEN J.P.(45) 27(Final), CAB 119/109.
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The Chiefs of Staff accepted the J.P.S.' conclu-
sions and did not openly insist that the Foreign Office
press Sweden to enter the war. It is possible that they
might have mounted an informal campaign to convince the
Foreign Office that this worthwhile objective might be
less difficult to achieve than the Foreign Office supposed.
On 30 January, the Director of Naval Intelligence replied
to Captain Denham's reports of November 1944 with instruc-
tions to "not discourage Swedish Officers from expressing
their opinions on the desirability of Sweden entering the
war." 32 If the Swedes asked a direct question concerning
London's intentions, Denham was to reply officially through
diplomatic channels. Perhaps the Admiralty hoped the
Foreign Office would reconsider its position if confronted
with continuing evidence of Swedish interest in intervention
Swedish attitudes towards Sweden's place in the
war remained mixed throughout the winter of 1945. F. Bishop,
Consul at Malmö, reported on 28 February 1945,
Generally speaking, the cloak of neutrality
has been dropped with a rapidity roughly in
proportion to the speed of the advance of
the Russians, but ... the general tendency
is to look towards England for contacts and
not the U.S.A. or Russia.33
In March, Edvin Sköld, the Defence Minister, made the first
allusion by a Swedish cabinet minister to the possibility
32DN1 to Denham, 30 January 1945 reference sheet
R/5l4, NID 0051335/44 I/E/179, FO 371/48041/Nl453.
33F. Bishop to G. Labrouchre, British legation,
Stockholm, 28 February 1945 letter 9.5/196/45, FO 371/
48024/N2l33.
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of Sweden intervening. When asked in the Riksdag why
Stockholm had purchased Mustangs from the Americans instead
of waiting until after the war to purchase more modern
British fighters, SkEld replied that "Sweden could not
afford to wait" for aircraft since the Swedes might become
embroiled in the war before summer. 34 When Air Commodore
Maycock pressed General Kellergren of the Swedish Air Force
for more details, the Swede replied that Sköld was thinking
of the situation in Norway which might hasten Swedish-
German hostilities. Kellergren elaborated that Sweden
might despatch an all-volunteer force to Norway, or
regular army units under direct command of the General
Staff. He stated that complete plans for employing either
means to assist Norway or Denmark had been drawn up and
could be put into operation within ten days. Kellergren
stressed that although the press was clamouring for
military action, the Swedish government would defer
sanctioning such operations until, Ci) a real need for
Swedish assistance arose, (ii) Norway or Denmark asked for
Sweden's aid, or (iii) Stockholm had determined that
Swedish intervention would help rather than harm Norwegian
and Danish civilians.35
In srite of Sk6ld's and Xellergren's statements,
comments by other Swedish officials tended to confirm the
34Air Commodore Maycock, 28 March 1945 minute,




Foreign Office's contention that the Swedish government
had no intention of intervening. Hansson and Foreign
Minister Ginther made speeches justifying Sweden's wartime
neutrality, and expressing their desire to keep Sweden out
of alliances with the big powers after the war. On 24
February, Mallet reported that, during an official banquet,
Hansson and Gunther ridiculed Turkey's 'last minute' entry
into the war in order to become a member of the United
Nations. 36 Gunther asserted that Sweden would never act
so opportunistically and had no desire to be represented
at the forthcoming U.N. Conference at San Francisco.
Sweden was only concerned about its neighbours' welfare,
and would only enter the war on their behalf, and not to
gain favour with the Allies. Gunther did not believe the
time was right for Sweden's intervention and doubted that
it ever would be. Although the Foreign Office was somewhat
offended by Stockholm's attitude, it believed Britain
should not press the Swedes to adopt a more aggressive
policy towards Germany since the "disadvantages of bringing
Sweden into the war outweigh the advantages." 37 The coming
months would prove that the Norwegians and General Eisenhower
attached the highest importance to encouraging Sweden's
intervention.
36Mallet - Foreign Office, 24 February 1945,
FO 371/48008/N2009; Churchill minuted, "I hope our
Ambassador will not let them [the Swedes] get away with this
craven bragging," Churchill - Eden, 25 February 1945,
minute PREM 3/413/5A.




The Royal Norwegian government was dissatisfied
with the Foreign Office's prevaricating attitude towards
the liberation of Norway. This government had several
pressing reasons to return home and reassert its authority
before German surrendered. In early 1945, it was anxious
to establish a military and civil administration in the
Arctic to feed and house victims of German pillage who had
evaded deportation. This administration would also restore
Norwegian sovereignty in the area evacuated by the Germans,
and would provide outposts against German raiding parties
and E-boats which were searching for Norwegian refugees.38
The government-in-exile also hoped for an Allied/Norwegian
expedition to liberate southern Norway and thus prevent
the Germans from turning the rest of the country into a
wasteland. The Norwegians wanted Allied troops to augment
their own forces in taking custody of the nearly 400,000
German troops and numerous political officials and civilian
technicians who would be in Norway at the close of
hostilities. 39 The government was also anxious to return
to Oslo because of concern over the Communist party's
efforts to exert greater influence in the political and
military arms of the Resistance. Although the government
did not fear an insurrection after the German surrender,
38General W. Hansteen, C-in-C, Royal Norwegian




it felt that intensified communist propaganda and partisan
activities against the Germans might strengthen the
Communist party's position in postwar Norwegian politics.
Soviet radio stations were encouraging the other Resistance
groups to form a 'popular front' with the Communists, and
admonished the Resistance to launch a guerilla campaign to
help the Red Army at a time when the Communists were best
equipped and organized for such action. 4 ° Moscow's support
for the Communists and the Red Army's presence in the
north gave the government some cause to suspect Russian
intentions. On 11 November 1944, Molotov demanded that the
Norwegians abrogate the Svalbard Treaty of 1920, which had
turned over the formerly Russian Spitsbergen islands and
stipulated the archipelago's demilitarisation. Moscow
insisted that Bear Island should be ceded now to the
U.S.S.R., and called for the establishment of Soviet bases
in Spitsbergen. 41
 The Norwegians reluctantly negotiated a
compromise with the Russians. In March 1945, the Soviets
and Norwegians reached a tentative agreement, subject to
postwar approval by the Norwegian parliament and the
signatory powers of the Svalbard Treaty, which sanctioned
the establishment of Norwegian-Soviet bases in Spitsbergen.
The Royal Norwegian government was particularly
disturbed by the Western Allies' failure to agree with
Russia as to Norway's position in postwar spheres of
40Udgaard, op. cit., p. 70.
41Ibid.
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influence. Eden had assured the Norwegians, in 1941, that
Stalin had informally stated that Moscow considered Norway
to be a British operational area. In 1943, the Norwegians
and British drafted an agreement which would define the
status and authority of Norwegian civil officials in any
portion of Norway which might be liberated and subsequently
administered by Allied forces. The Foreign Office wanted
to present the draft to the Anglo-American Soviet European
Advisory Commission, an organization which was established
in order to secure Soviet approval for Anglo-U.S. policy
in liberated western territories, so that the Russians
would not exclude Britain from influence in Eastern Europe.
Washington insisted that the civil affairs agreement,
together with similar drafts negotiated between the British
and the Dutch and Belgians, were of a military rather than
a political character, and should be submitted to General
Eisenhower's headquarters. The Americans wanted to co-
ordinate the agreements with strategic planning, and felt
that negotiations with Soviet representatives of the E.A.C.
might delay military preparations. 42 In January and
March 1944, the British and Americans submitted their
respective drafts of the agreement for the Soviet govern-
ment's approval. The Norwegians desired a firm undertaking,
rather than Moscow's approval of the Anglo-U.S. civil
affairs agreement, since Soviet troops would probably
pursue German forces retreating into Norway. The Russians
421b1d., p. 60.
385
secured, on 8 May, a similar agreement from Czechoslovakia
on a bilateral basis without reference to the Western
Allies. On 16 May, the Big Three powers concluded separate
but largely identical agreements with the Norwegian
government.
In early 1944, the Norwegians pressed the British
and Americans for a military commitment towards Norway's
liberation. In 1943, Allied staffs had drawn up plans to
despatch a small force to Norway after Berlin had
capitulated. No force had been organized to liberate
Norway prior to the German surrender. The Joint Planning
Staff believed an assault against Norway would necessitate
the postponement of Overlord for 12 months, since such an
operation would require a large armada of transport and
naval ships, including aircraft carriers which the Royal
Navy planned to transfer to the Pacific. 43
 The Chiefs of
Staff concluded that a move against Norway and Overlord
were "mutually exclusive," but directed the J.P.S. to
consider the feasibility of invading south Norway in the
event of Overlord being cancelled.44
In early 1944, General Hansteen and Trygve Lie,
the Norwegian Foreign Minister, asked the Chiefs of Staff
and the Foreign Office to send a British occupation force
43joint Planning Staff, 10 September 1943, Opera-
tions Against Norway, J.P.(43)296(Final), CAB 122/1190.
44 Chiefs of Staff Committee, 13 September 1943,
minutes COS(43)214 meeting (0); Lt. General F.E. Morgan
to Eisenhower, 25 September 1943, COS(43) 578(0),
CAB 122/1190.
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to northern Norway in the event of a German withdrawal
from the area. The Norwegian requests were prompted by an
article in the Sunday Times of 23 January which predicted
that the Red Army would pursue German troops into Norway
once Finland had surrendered. Lie contended that the
Soviets might remain in northern Norway indefinitely if
British troops did not help the Norwegians to reestablish
their sovereignty over the territory. Warner believed he
had reassured Lie that a Soviet invasion was unlikely
owning to the "physical difficulty of such an enterprise."45
Warner had also alluded to Eden's informal understanding
with Stalin, in 1941. Warner's arguments did not reassure
the Norwegians, who remained apprehensive of Moscow's
intentions. Moreover, Moscow had never officially declared
that Norway was within the Anglo-U.S. military theatre.
The Royal Norwegian government therefore sought to secure
an understanding with the Russians which would safeguard
Norwegian sovereignty in Finnmark.
When the Red Army entered Norway on 18 October,
Molotov accepted a proposal, which the Norwegians had made
in March, to send troops to the Arctic once Finland left
the war. However, the Norwegians despatched a token force
of only 271 men from Britain to Finnmark. This was one-
third of the Norwegian Army's effective combat strength in
45warner to Major General L.C. Hollis, 10 March
1944 letter U1367/5/G, Royal Norwegian government aide-
memoirs, 19 February 1944, CAB 122/1190.
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Britain, where the remainder were kept in reserve for
future operations. 46 Moreover, the British Chiefs of
Staff were unwilling to release sufficient shipping to
transport additional supplies and administrative personnel
ostensibly because it was needed urgently elsewhere. The
British and U.S. military authorities did not want to
become actively involved in Finnmark. The Western Allies
had no formal agreement with Moscow to define the status
of Allied officials in Norway. 47 They were anxious to
avoid a confrontation between Soviet and Western liaison
officers similar to that which was experienced by U.S.
'shuttle bombing' personnel in Russia. In late September
and early October, the U.S. and British military missions
to Moscow had attempted to initiate discussions with the
Russians with the object of coordinating Allied policy
after a German withdrawal. The Soviets ignored their
approach but informally told them what Moscow had "no
plans for occupation of Norway and therefore cannot dis-
cuss the matter." 48 Eisenhower and the British decided
that it was better to leave the Norwegians to their own
devices rather than risk a jurisdictional dispute with
the Russians in Finnmark. The Norwegians therefore began
to seek Swedish support.
46 Hoi.lis-Churchill, 27 October 1944 minute, CAB
122/1300.
47joint Staff Mission - Combined Chiefs of Staff,
9 October 1944 memorandum JSM 299; British Chiefs of Staff
to Combined Chiefs of Staff, 22 July 1944 memorandum CCS
628, CAB 122/1300; Udgaard, op. cit., pp. 79, 84-86.
48Coinbined Chiefs of Staff - Eisenhower, 1]. October
1944 telegram 77500, CAB 122/1300.
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In October, Stockholm consented to the departure
of part of the 13,000 Norwegian 'police troops' to Finnmark.
Although nominally a paramilitary force, the Swedes agreed
to provide them with full military equipment. As the
Swedes would not transport the troops beyond the Norwegian
frontier, the Norwegians asked the Americans to furnish
air transport to Kirkenes, where the force from Britain had
established a base. The U.S. Army Air Corps was willing
to provide this service as it would serve to establish the
49foundation for the planned A.T.C. route to Sweden.
Differences with Sweden over the repatriation of interned
airmen and civil aviation delayed its inauguration until
January 1945. Between January and March, approximately
1000 troops and 100,000 kilograms of supplies were air-
lifted to Kirkenes by ten A.A.T.S. C-45's from a Swedish
air base near LuleL50
TO ARMS OR ARBITRATION
At the beginning of 1945, the Norwegian government
had become discouraged by the seeming Allied indifference
to events in their homeland. It resolved that Sweden should
be pressed into taking a more active part in liberating
Norway and insuring an orderly restoration of the pre-
49F.R.U.S. 1944 Vol. IV, op. cit., pp. 701-705;
see also Chapter 6.
50Hans Abrahmson, 5 June 1945, "U.S.A. Aircraft had
Secret War Base in Lule," Aftonbladet, translation,
Hershell V. Johnson papers, Official War History, U.S.
Legation, Stockholm, op. cit.
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occupation government and administration. Without consult-
ing the Allies, Lie notified the Swedes, on 1 February,
that his government might ask Stockholm to threaten inter-
vention in Norway if the Germans continued their scorched
earth policy. 5' Although some circles in Sweden favoured
intervention, the government remained committed to
neutrality and rejected the Norwegian scheme. A drnarche
to Berlin would misrepresent the government's intentions,
and would make it harder to resist possible Allied pressure
for intervention in the future. Boheman therefore was
sent to London in mid-February to inform the Norwegians that
Sweden would intervene if the situation in Norway warranted
such action, but it did not wish to abandon neutrality
until it became obvious that the Germans were unwilling to
negotiate peace terms in Norway. Stockholm believed the
Germans in Norway would surrender once Berlin had fallen if
they were not provoked into a desparate struggle by an
insurrection which would probably accompany a Swedish or
Allied invasion. By remaining neutral, Sweden might be
able to hasten a peaceful conclusion to Norway's occupation
in the manner that it had mediated the Soviet-Finnish
armistice. Hirnmler was anxious to obtain Sweden's good
offices to arrange a separate peace with the Western Allies.
During the early months of 1945, he had permitted and helped
the Swedish Red Cross administer relief and ultimately take
51Udgaard, op. cit., p. 88.
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custody of deported Norwegians and Danes who were interned
near Hamburg.52
The Swedes discerned no strong Allied interest in
forcing Sweden to deviate from its established policy.
Ginther suspected that the Norwegians were mainly sounding
out Sweden's views and did not seriously desire armed
assistance. The Allies had not supported Lie's message,
and the British actually had expressed satisfaction with
Sweden's continued neutrality. Eden assured Boheman in mid-
March that, "so far as Britain is concerned, no Swedish
intervention...is either expected or desired, whether in
Norway or anywhere else." 53 Within a month of having made
this statement however, Eden informed Churchill that the
Foreign Office and Chiefs of Staff were currently examining
the feasibility of asking Sweden to liberate Norway.54
What caused this volte face in British policy?
As German resistance in Germany and Italy rapidly
weakened during March and April 1945, British and American
staffs turned their attention to remaining German strong-
holds in Norway, northwestern Holland, and the Bavarian and
Austrian Alps. The Allies had not previously contemplated
major operations in these regions which would have diverted
Carigren, Swedish Foreign Policy During the
Second World War (English translation), (London: Ernest
Benn, 1977), p. 216.
53 1bid., p. 214.
54 Eden - Churchill, 13 April 1945 minute PM/45/184,
PREM 3/917/4.
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forces from the main thrust towards Berlin. Once Anglo-
American troops had crossed the Rhine, the danger of
prolonged fighting in these isolated pockets became more
immediate. Rumours about German intentions, together
with past combat experience against determined units, such
as the S.S., led Allied commanders to assume that
isolated German formations would continue fighting even
though hostilities in the heart of Germany had ceased. The
British Chiefs of Staff had been concerned since late 1944
over the danger of Norwegian based U-boats continuing the
war at sea after Berlin had surrendered. Eisenhower and
his staff were misled by largely unsubstantiated newspaper
stories into believing that Hitler might transfer his
government to the 'National Redoubt' - a supposedly
elaborate complex of fortifications in the Alps - where the
Nazis could possibly delay the final Allied victory for
over a year. 55 Eisenhower concluded at the end of March
that "Berlin itself is no longer a particularly important
objective." 56 On 27 March, he announced in a telegram to
Stalin that once the Ruhr had been encircled his forces
would not proceed to Berlin but would instead push towards
a central front from Kassel to Dresden where the Western
55Lt.-General Walter Bedell Smith admitted at a
press conference on 4 April 1945: "This so-called National
Redoubt is something we don't know an awful lot about."
Captain Harry Butcher, y Three Years with Eisenhower(New York: Simon and Shuster, 1946), p. 438.
56A1f red D. Chandler (ed.), The Papers of Dwight
David Eisenhower: The War Years, Volume V (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 2561.
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and Soviet troops would "join hands." Once Germany had
been cut in half, his forces would then move against the
'National Redoubt.' Three days later, he added that the
Twenty-first Army Group would move against the Dutch and
German North Sea coasts as a prelude to eventual operations
in Denmark and Norway.
Although the British Chiefs of Staff favoured a
unilateral operation against northern Germany, they and
Churchill protested Eisenhower's decision to forego the
push to Berlin in favour of the central front and the
subsequent diversion to the south. London did not fully
accept his plan until mid-April. The details of this inter-
Allied divergence is beyond the scope of this thesis, but
the subject is mentioned as a contextual reference to the
rapidly changing and uncertain circumstances surrounding
the question of Swedish intervention.
In March, the Chiefs of Staff had begun to recon-
sider their earlier plans for an operation in Norway.
The Admiralty remained concerned about the U-boat threat.
Swedish intervention was essential since Norway could be
invaded in force only through Sweden. The Foreign Office
withdrew its past objections to bringing Sweden into the
war since Sweden could be supplied by the Western Allies
once they had occupied the German ports and Denmark. At
the Chiefs' of Staff request, the Combined Chiefs of Staff
directed Eisenhower on 9 April to prepare an appreciation
of the value of the Swedish Air Force and Swedish bases for
Allied troops in an operation against Norway. Eisenhower
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had not fully considered the advantages of Swedish inter-
vention, and replied on the 11th that he was preparing a
broad general estimate. Three days later, he stated that
Norway would have to be taken before winter when operations
would be "almost impracticable." 57 He stated that Denmark
should be taken "as quickly as possible" but stressed that
fortresses along the German coast might delay this opera-
tion. Eisenhower thought that the Germans in Norway and
Denmark might capitulate once the Redoubt, the supposed
Nazi nerve center, had been taken.
Churchill strongly opposed what he regarded as
Eisenhower's abandonment of Berlin to the Russians. He
argued that the city was still militarily important and
could continue to be a rallying symbol for Germans who
continued to resist the Allies. He was also critical of
the Chiefs' of Staff intention to "clean up matters in
Denmark, Norway, and along the Baltic shore." 58 Churchill
contended that by proposing a northern operation, the
Chiefs were weakening their argument against diverting
forces from an advance against Berlin. On 31 March, he
stated that a large scale renewal of U-boat activity was
"impossible" since the Soviets had recently destroyed a
major submarine base at Danzig. He stated that shipping
losses in March were "satisfactory.... I cannot admit a
57 1b1d., pp. 2609-2610.
Churchill, The Second Wand War, Volume VI
(New York: Bantam Books, 1962), pp. 395-6.
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state of urgency in any way justifying left-handed diver-
sions to clear the Baltic ports, etc., if these diversions
take anything from the speed or weight of the advance of
the Twenty-first Group of Armies."59
Churchill's opinion of the Baltic's military
importance appears to have altered by 12 April, when he
told the War Cabinet that Sweden would be brought into the
war. He was gratified to learn that the Foreign Office's
views were "in harmony" with his, and that the Chiefs of
Staff were already studying the question. On 15 April, he
instructed Eden, who was attending Roosevelt's funeral in
Washington, to persuade President Truman to prepare a joint
note for the Allies to present to Stockholm:
Few questions are more important than bringing
the Swedes into the war to liberate their
Norwegian brother state. In this way Sweden
would assume an honourable position among the
Allies.... This is a matter to finish up as
quickly as possible.6°
In sharp contrast to his minute of 31 March, Churchill
argued that Sweden's intervention was necessary to prevent
German troops and "the very large U-boat force" from
delaying the end of the war for a "long, vexatious and
wasteful month."
Why was Churchill concerned about Norwegian based
U-boats in mid-April after dismissing their significance
59John Ehrman, Grand Strategy, Volume VI (London:
H.M.S.O., 1956), p. 136.
60Churchill-Eden, 15 April 1945 personal telegram
3721, PREM 3/917/4.
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at the end of March? If the German presence in Denmark
was not important enough to warrant a northern diversion,
why had Sweden's intervention become a question which
demanded the novice President's immediate attention?
In spite of this seeming paradox, both of Churchill's
arguments were consistent with his strategy and ideosyn-
cracies. He had always been interested in naval matters
and often advocated military operations in peripheral
regions such as Scandinavia and the Balkans. Although U-
boats no longer terrorized the Atlantic in 1945 on the same
scale as they had between 1940 and 1943, they remained a
hazard to Allied shipping and a nuisance, at the least, to
Allied navies. As long as a fleet of submarines remained
operational in Norway, the Royal Navy could not demobilize
requisitioned trawlers or transfer larger ships to the Far
East, where they could support Mountbatten's troops and
assert British influence in the Pacific. Churchill stated
to the Chiefs of Staff on 19 April:
The continuance of the Germans in Norway is
serious, as the U-boat warfare carried on from
there holds all our naval forces in suspense
to the detriment of many other projects of
war. ...I see in this morning's report that
25,000 tons of shipping have been sunk in one
single day.61
Thus, Churchill did not think that the liberation of Norway
was unimportant, but felt instead that it should be given
a lower priority to the capture of Berlin. The arguments
61Churchill - Chiefs of Staff, 19 April 1945 minute,
PREM 3/417/4.
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in his minute of 31 March were probably to reproach the
C.O.S. for not having presented a stronger case against
Eisenhower's redefinition of Anglo-American objectives.
Churchill's proposal for Swedish intervention
might have sprung from hopes that British troops could be
retained for an assault on Berlin. The Chiefs of Staff
and Eisenhower's tentative plans indicate that they
envisaged a Norwegian invasion undertaken by Allied forces
based in Sweden. Churchill wanted Sweden to participate
actively in this operation which might be augmented with
some Allied troops once Denmark had been liberated. He
expected Sweden to mobilize once it received the Allied
demand for intervention. It is possible that Churchill
was motivated less by practical military considerations
than by a latent desire to convert an opportunistic
neutral into an ally. In October 1942, he telegraphed
Roosevelt, "I feel it is most important that Sweden
should be with us all before the end although the moment
for bringing her in must be wisely chosen." 62 In March
1944, he minuted to Eden: "I am most anxious that Sweden
shall eventually come into the war, which I think there is
quite a chance of her doing. 63 On these occasions, he
never explained the reasons for his anxieties, although he
may have been contemplating a future campaign in Norway.
62Churchill - Roosevelt, 24 October 1942, personal
telegram 174 PREM 3/417/1.
Churchill, The Second World War, Volume VI
(New York: Bantam Books, l62), p. 612.
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Perhaps he wanted to establish Western military and
political influence in Sweden during the war in order to
develop Sweden as a postwar buttress against Soviet en-
croachments in Scandinavia, although there is no record
that he considered this. His minute to the Chiefs on
19 April reveals that he was concerned about Sweden's moral
standing in the postwar order.
I regard this as the last opportunity for
the Swedes to save their name before the
world. Up till a few months ago, they could
plead that they were frightened. Now they
could have no excuse except a calculated
selfishness which has distinguished them in
both wars against Germany.64
Eden broached the subject with Stettinius but did
not pursue it at great length. No American comment was
forthcoming, although the Combined Chiefs of Staff were
currently considering a brief from the British Chiefs of
Staff. On the British Chiefs' advice, Eden deferred the
question until the Combined Chiefs of Staff had received
Eisenhower's yet-to-be-completed appreciation of Sweden's
potential usefulness. The Chiefs and the Foreign Office
both believed careful consideration should be given to the
timing of an approach to Stockholm. Moreover, Eden
thought any diplomatic action should be postponed pending
Sweden's reply to a similar demand which Norway had
recently issued. On 12 April, Lie present Gunther with
an aide memoire urging the Swedes to mobilize "at once"
so that the Germans "would be in no doubt that their
64 Churchill - Chiefs of Staff, op. cit.
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position would be untenable after the collapse in Germany,
and that they will in addition be attacked from Sweden if
they do not collapse." 65 Lie wanted immediate Swedish
mobilization because the Norwegians believed the Swedes
would take two months to complete all preparations.
Gunther maintained that Sweden could be fully mobilized in
one week and could mount offensive action after another.
The Swedes were willing to mobilize if Germany applied a
scorched earth policy to the rest of Norway. However, they
believed the Germans would surrender once Germany had
capitulated, and thought it would be best to "leave the
Germans alone for a few days or even a few weeks after the
final end of the war."66
The Allies first learned of the Norwegian note
when Lie left copies with the British and U.S. legations
following his meeting with Gunther. Mallet fully shared
the Swedish attitude. He told the Foreign Office that
"it seems astounding" that Lie had acted without consulting
Eden in light of Eden's assertion in March that Swedish
intervention was unnecessary. "I trust that you will not
instruct me to press the Swedish government to accede to
the Norwegian request..." 67 Mallet stressed that the
65Quoted in Eden - Churchill, 13 April 1945, op. cit.
66Mallet - Foreign Office, 13 April 1945 telegram
630, FO 371/48041/N4101.
67Mallet - Foreign Office, 14 April 1945 telegram
637, FO 37l/48041/N4101.
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Swedish view was shared by several prominent Norwegians in
Sweden, including August Esmarch, the Norwegian minister,
the Minister of Finance, and the Rector of the University
of Oslo, who had just been released from internment.
Members of the Norwegian resistance had told some of
Mallet's assistants that they believed the Germans had no
intention of continuing the war unless attacked by Sweden
or the Allies. Resistance officials reportedly had been
relieved when Stockholm denied U.S. press stories which
alleged that the Norwegians had demanded that Sweden allow
Soviet troops access to southern Norway.
Both the Swedes and resistance leaders believed
discreet negotiations would persuade the Germans to surren-
der once the fatherland collapsed. Some Norwegians were
already in contact with senior Wehrrnacht officers. General
Boehme and Admiral Syriax, the two German commanders in
Norway, were not anxious to wage an isolated struggle
against the Allies. However, they lacked the resolve to
defy Hitler's orders for a fanatical struggle against the
Allies and therefore deferred to the S.S. and Gestapo, who
although numerically small (3500 men), "seemed determined
to stay in Norway to the end." 68 Most of the 298,000 men
in Norway were second-grade troops who had experienced
relatively little fighting during the war and had grown
accustomed to garrison .routine. There were no large S.S.
concentrations to lead a determined resistance against the
68Mallet, 13 April 1945, op. cit.
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Allies. Many troops were Austrians who were anxious to
return home, and held no strong Nazi convictions. Once
the Allies had occupied Vienna, they would be intimidated
no longer by Nazi threats to hold their families hostage.69
The Norwegian government was unmoved by the Swedish
arguments. On 16 April, Lie asked Sir Orme Sargent for
British support for the aide mmoire. Churchill was also
dissatisfied with the Swedish response:
It is easy for the Swedes to talk of the
matter as if it is not urgent.... Indeed
I think the Swedes should be forced by
Britain and America, under severe pressure,
to begin their mobilization at once and to
concert with General Eisenhower the neces-
sary measures.7°
However, the Joint Staff Mission informed Eden and
Stettinius that the Combined Chiefs of Staff believed
the Allies should not be rushed into making an "injudicious
approach" to Sweden. 71
 After reflecting upon the reply
to the Norwegian note, intelligence reports, and
Eisenhower's preliminary opinions, the C.C.S. considered
that Sweden's assistance would be "desirable" but that the
Swedes were not strong enough to "achieve useful results
on their own." 72
 The Swedish Army was deficient in armour
69Mallet - Foreign Office, 20 April 1945 telegram
658, CAB 120/694.
70Churchill, 19 April 1945, op. cit.
71British Representatives, C.C.S. - Eden and
Stettinius, 21 April 1945 memorandum CCS 836, CAB 122/917.
72Brigadier A.T. Cornwall-Jones, J.S.M., 21 April
1945 memorandum, CAB 122/917.
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and other types of equipment, lacked experience in modern
warfare, and had been reduced during the winter of 1944-45
to two mobile divisions. The C.C.S. therefore did not
want Sweden to declare war or open hostilities prematurely
against the Germans, who had eleven divisions in Norway.
They recommended that the Swedes should be asked to join
in staff talks with the Allies to determine Sweden's
contribution and mobilization plans "at a time to be
decided by Eisenhower."73
The Foreign Office and Churchill were dissatisfied
with the C.C.S. conclusion. By late April, they had
become anxious to force Sweden's intervention because of
vague suspicions concerning Russia's intentions in
Scandinavia. On 14 April, Mallet reported that Madame
Kollontai had told Gunther that the "Soviet government
would not relish Swedish intervention." 74
 Mallet was
unable to verify this statement and the Foreign Office did
not attempt to ascertain the Soviet attitudes behind it.
Lie dismissed Mallet's report, and told Sargent that the
Soviet government had fully approved of and supported the
Norwegian aide-mémoire of 1 February. On 23 April, Sven
Grafström, director of the Department of Political Affairs
at the Swedish Foreign Ministry, confidently told Mallet
that General von Uthmann, the German military attache, had
73Memorandum CCS 836, op. cit.
74cadogan - Churchill, 16 April 1945 minute PM/AC!
45/9, FO 954/23.
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offered to surrender the German forces in Norway to the
Swedish Army. Grafströni did not know how von Uthmann
proposed to facilitate this. Mallet was then informed
that Grafström feared that the Germans might ask the
Russians to take custody of the garrisons in Norway.
Grafström said he regarded the Soviet silence over events
in Norway as "ominous." 75 Grafstr6m thought such a proposal
would appeal to the Soviets, who would earn Norwegian
gratitude and could thus be able "to keep the Swedes in
place as the 'bad boys of Europe'." Mallet's report led
the Foreign Office to conclude that Sweden would not refuse
to intervene in Norway, "without making difficulties."76
Sargent assumed that Stockholm had not complied with Lie's
demand because he had not explained the Norwegian military
plans to the Swedes. Grafström's professed fears about
the Germans inviting the Russians into Norway struck
Sargent as a "rather far-fetched story," presumably because
most Germans were anxious to surrender to British or
American troops to avoid capture by the Russians. However,
Sargent advised that even the remotest chance of Soviet
intervention heightened the need for immediate staff
discussions with the Swedes. Churchill concurred and
telegraphed Eden on 25 April,
75Mallet - Foreign Office, 23 April 1945 telegram
691, PREM 3/417/4.
76 Sargent - Churchill, 24 April 1945 minute
PM/OS/45/50, PREM 3/417/4.
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You will see...[that] the German military
attache in Stockholm has approached the
Swedes, and the Swedes are nervous lest the
Russians come in and do the job. I'm not
impressed by this Swedish story, but even a
bare possibility of Russians being invited
into Norway is an additional reason for
getting staff talks going at the earliest
possible moment. 77
However, Churchill's insistence did not hasten an Anglo-
American initiative to bring Sweden into the war. Eden
was with the British delegation at the San Francisco
conference to establish the United Nations Organization.
He informed Churchill that the Swedish question should be
left to the C.C.S. in Washington since the delegates at
the conference were absorbed with issues relating to post-
war security and Poland.78
The Combined Chiefs of Staff postponed their
approval to send a staff mission to Stockholm until it had
received Eisenhower's recommendations. A memorandum
outlining his broad plan for Scandinavia arrived on 25 April.
He reported that his staff had not yet completed a full plan
for an operation in Norway, but stated that such an action
would be necessary if the Germans in Norway remained
hostile after German had collapsed. Swedish bases were
essential if Norway were to be liberated before December.
Because of Norway's rocky and sinuous coastline, airborne
and amphibious assaults would be isolated actions and could
77churchill - Eden, 25 April 1945 telegram 53,
CAB 120/694.
78 Eden - Churchill, 27 April 1945 telegram 33,
FO 37l/48024/N4765.
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not, in Eisenhower's opinion, ensure Norway's liberation
before December if the Germans resisted. He therefore
planned to launch the invasion from Sweden on as "wide a
front as possible." 79
 Simultaneous thrusts would be made
towards Oslo, Trondheim, and possibly Narvik. Eisenhower
felt that Swedish units, under Allied command, would be
"of help to accelerating operation," especially if the
Swedes were to move against Narvik. He added that he knew
little of the Swedish Army's strength and capabilities,
and the first object of any staff discussions in Stockholm
would be to determine the effectiveness of Sweden's forces.
The Swedes required little encouragement to agree
to the talks. On 28 April, Crown Prince Gustav Adolf
informed Mallet that the government would be willing to
confer with a small Allied delegation. Two days later,
Gunther formally accepted an Anglo-American request to hold
staff talks with Eisenhower's representatives. However,
Mallet doubted that Stockholm would actually open hostili-
ties against the Germans even though it had agreed to co-
operate with the Allies towards such an eventuality. He
reported that during a secret session of 27 April, members
of the Riksdag were even more opposed to taking precipitate
action in Norway than the government had anticipated.8°
79Eisenhower to C.C.S., 25 April 1945 telegram
SCAF 306, PREM 3/917/4.
80Malletto Foreign Office, 28 April 1945 telegram
746, CAB 122/917.
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The staff talks were never held. The prospect of
prolonged German resistance in Norway diminished as the
Nazi regime's control over Germany, its field commanders,
and even some of its leading figures rapidly crumbled.
Although Eisenhower, Churchill, and other British
authorities wanted to establish military collaboration
with Sweden before the end of the war, Americans in
Washington had become preoccupied with Stockholm's efforts
to mediate a peaceful capitulation in Norway during the
last week of April. On 24 April, Mallet and Johnson
learned that Himmler had asked Count Bernadotte to ascertain
if the British and Americans were willing to accept a
separate peace in the West. Bernadotte had met Himmler in
the Swedish consulate at Lübeck on the night of the 23rd
ostensibly to negotiate the release of all Norwegians and
Danes from concentration camps. Himrnler quickly agreed to
transfer these prisoners to Sweden. Himmier explained that
he would shortly assume the leadership of Germany from
Hitler, whose "great life is drawing to a close." 8' He
then asked Bernadotte to convey a message offering to
capitulate on the Western front on the understanding that
German troops could continue to fight Soviet forces else-
where. Bernadotte had been briefed by the Swedish Foreign
Ministry in anticipation of Himmier's proposal, and there-
fore insisted that Gerthan forces in Norway and Denmark be
81Count Folke Bernadotte, The Curtain Falls (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945), p. 114.
406
included in the capitulation. Himmier readily accepted
this condition, adding that he would allow German troops
in these countries to surrender to British, American, or
Swedish forces.
Churchill and Truman flatly rejected Himmler's
proposal when they learned of it on 25 April. They
insisted that Britain and the United States would only
accept an unconditional surrender to all three Allied
powers. The Western leaders immediately informed Stalin
of Bernadotte's message to assure him that his partners
were not conspiring with the Nazis against the U.S.S.R.82
Himmler's offer and the Allied reply were reported by
Reuters and the B.B.C.
Washington however was willing to allow Bernadotte
to continue his meetings with Hiininler and S.S. General
Schellenburg, Hinunler's intermediary, in the hopes that the
Nazi might make a better offer. Johnson's report of the
meeting of 23 April "resulted in the opening of direct
conversations involving direct communications from the
President to the American Minister in Stockholm," 83 who
had cultivated a cordial relationship with the Count. The
Swedish government also desired to continue the talks in
order to shorten the war without necessitating Swedish
intervention. Bernadotte was instructed to privately
82Churchill, Volume VI, op. cit., pp. 457-9.
83War History Report of the American Legation at
Stockholm, RG 59, 124.58612-2046.
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suggest to Schellenburg that the Germans should surrender
in the west in spite of the Allied reply. He stated that
Stockholm would allow German forces from Norway to be
interned in Sweden if they capitulated. Himmier went into
hiding after Hitler learned of his 'betrayal' from the
Allied press on 28 April. However, he allowed Schellenburg
to negotiate the surrender of Norway with the Swedish
government. On 30 April, the same day that Sweden agreed
to hold staff talks with the Allies, Schellenburg and Eric
von Post, of the Swedish Foreign Ministry tentatively
agreed that all Germans in Norway would be interned in
Sweden and would not be turned over to the Allies.
On 5 May, Schellenburg arrived in Stockholm with
written instructions from Admiral Doenitz, Hitler's
successor, giving him authority to negotiate the surrender
of Norway. 84
 The Swedes felt they did not possess the
legal power to accept the German surrender and therefore
asked the Allies to send a mission to negotiate with
Schellenburg. They also asked the Norwegians to despatch
a delegation of Cabinet members to Stockholm "for continued
personal collaboration with the Norwegian government."85
The British Foreign Office was indignant over this Swedish
84 Schellenburg was given full plenipotentiary
powers to overcome any opposition from Reichskorrimissar
Terboven and General Boehme "who were not disposed to
capitulate." Walter Schellenburg The Schellenberg Memoirs,
(ed. and trans. by Louis Hagen) (London, Andre Deutsch
Ltd. 1956) pp. 456-461.
85Collier - Eden, 5 May 1945 telegram 25 SAVING,
CAB 122/917.
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offer which it regarded as a Swedish effort to play off
the Norwegians against the Western Allies by treating the
surrender as a purely Swedish-Norwegian question. Sir
Lawrence Collier, the minister to Norway, advised the
Norwegians that a separate delegation to Sweden was unneces-
sary "from a military point of view since Norway would be
represented at the staff talks" 86 by British officers.
Collier's remarks indicate that London still
viewed the staff discussions as a preliminary to Sweden's
intervention. Washington, however, intended to use the
talks to encourage Swedish mediation. Eisenhower was
instructed to despatch a delegation to arrange the final
details of the surrender with Schellenburg. This mission
was indefinitely postponed, since Doenitz was conducting
his own surrender negotiations with Eisenhower's head-
quarters. On 6 May, Eisenhower asked Mallet and Johnson
to advise the Swedish government "to play for time" and
to take no further action regarding the Norwegian question
pending the outcome of his own negotiations. 87 Churchill
____ Eisenhower also continued to consider the
military aspects of Swedish intervention. On 4 May, the
Chiefs of Staff examined his proposal that the Swedes should
be asked to provide bases for one USAAF fighter group to
provide protection for ATC aircraft flying to Sweden. Sir
Charles Portal thought that the fighters should be based
in Denmark where the Germans had just surrendered to
Montgomery. Chiefs of Staff minute 5 COS(45)1l7 meeting
4 May 1945, CAB 79/33.
87Eisenhower to Combined Chiefs of Staff, 6 May
1945 telegram SCAEF 351, CAB 122/917.
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bluntly advised the Swedes to stop meeting with
Schellenburg. He maintained that the Swedish talks might
detract from Eisenhower's negotiations with Doenitz.
The German surrender to Eisenhower became effec-
tive on all fronts on 8 May. The following day, Stockholm
allowed the 'police troops' to enter Norway. Resistance
forces, who were to assist the 'police troops' in
disarming Germans, obtained weapons from special depots
which the Swedes had set up along the border. A few days
later, Sir Andrew Thorne and a small Allied military
mission arrived in Norway to supervise the Germans' intern-
ment and the restoration of the Norwegian government.
Doenitz' signature at Reims obviated the need for Sweden
to enter the war at the last minute.
CHAPTER EIGHT
EPILOGUE
This thesis has now dealt with the development
and conduct of British policy towards Sweden between 1942
and 1945. It remains to examine the state of Anglo-
Swedish relations in the period immediately following the
cessation of the war to ascertain whether London obtained
postwar economic concessions from Stockholm successfully.
Were the British justified in their fear that support of
American blockade policy would render Sweden less willing
to accept their postwar proposals? Did the Swedes drive
harder bargains for the payments agreement, timber
exports, and collaboration in tJNRRA, as a consequence of
the cessation of Swedish-German trade? Did the Americans
reciprocate Britain's adherence to a 'common front'
against Swedish-German trade by pressing the Swedes to
accept the British programme?
PAYMENTS NEGOTIATION AND OTHER UNFINISHED BUSINESS
By January 1945, Sweden had satisfied Washington's
demands for the cessation of trade with Germany but had
yet to conclude an agreement with London concerning post-
war questions. The State Department agreed to let the
British open negotiations with the Swedes on these matters
in early November 1944 after several months of postponement
by the British in the interests of the 'common front'. The
Bank of England and Riksbank negotiators had produced a
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draft payments agreement in November which eliminated
Britain's liability to pay its debts to Sweden in gold,
placed sterling and the Swedish kroner at par, and provided
for a Swedish loan of £52 millions and a Swedish under-
taking to hold an unlimited amount of sterling in the
Riksbank) The Foreign Office planned to conclude the
agreement, as well as others covering Swedish contributions
to UNRRA and the shipping pool, in mid-December when Erik
Boheman would be in London to conclude a new War Trade
Agreement with the Allies. The War 'Irade Agreement was
intended to sanction Sweden's embargo in return for the
continuation of the basic rations specified in the 1943
agreement for the duration of the war and for 90 days
thereafter. The British sought to incorporate Anglo-
Swedish monetary arrangements, Swedish exports to Britain,
and Sweden's UNRRA and shipping commitments into the new
tripartite agreement. They hoped the Americans would
exert diplomatic pressure and offer economic incentives
to induce the Swedes to accept Britain's terms. However,
the only additional commitments which the United States
government was anxious to include in the War Trade Agree-
ment were Swedish membership in the Allied shipping pool
(which was a less restrictive version of the British
proposals), and an undertaking from the Swedes to prohibit
sanctuary to Nazi war öriminals and loot.
'Draft, Anglo-Swedish monetary Agreement, 27
October 1944, FO 188/466.
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The Agreement did oblige Sweden to give a general
assurance of cooperation with Allied relief and reconstruc-
tion projects by maintaining wartime restrictions on
purchases of some scarce commodities after the war, and
to distribute equitably Swedish reconstruction materials
in Europe, but only if their procurement on a commercial
basis met with difficulty. 2 These conditions were rather
less than what the British had envisioned, but the United
States had begun to take a more benign attitude towards
Sweden once Stockholm satisfied the War and Navy Depart-
ments' desire for a trade embargo. The Americans and
Swedes were prepared to conclude the War Trade Agreement
before Christmas 1944. The Foreign Office, however,
refused to sign the Agreement because Anglo-Swedish payments
and timber negotiations had become deadlocked. The British
government had expected Boheman to ratify the payments
agreement while visiting London to negotiate the new
tripartite agreement. However, Boheman sought to obtain
British assurances of increased sterling exports to Sweden.
Sweden's postwar exports would greatly exceed its imports.
Stockholm hoped that British exports to Sweden would
amount to at least 3/5th of Sweden's exports to Britain
in order to avoid inflation. 3 The Board of Trade rejected
2FRUS, 1944, Vol. IV, p. 671.
3A.E. Welch (Board of Trade), 15 December 1944
minute, BT 11/2333; R. Nowell (Board of Trade) to Hall-
Patch (Foreign Office), 8 December 1944 letter, FO 371/
43494/N7707; Minute of discussion between Boheman and
Selborne, 28 November 1944, FO 371/43494/N7624.
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Boheman's request because Britain would be unable to
export on a major scale for an indefinite period. Boheman
therefore felt obliged to delay signing the payments
agreement.
To the irritation of the United States government,
the British government decided to withhold signing the War
Trade Agreement for 1945 in the belief that Sweden's
anxiety to obtain basic rations under the Agreement would
force the Swedes to accept London's terms. 4 In late
January, Dingle Foot attempted to break the impasse by
reviving his earlier proposal to the War Cabinet that the
Allies provide Sweden with 3 million tons of coal. 5 The
Ministry of Fuel and Power argued that Britain could not
afford to supply Sweden with more than the token 1 million
tons. On the 31 January, the War Cabinet rejected Foot's
proposal, and advised the Ministry of Economic Warfare to
give the Swedes no more than vague assurances about post-
war supplies. The War Cabinet stated that while the
conclusion of the War Trade Agreement would be advantageous
to Britain, as it would "pulverise Sweden and would make
them dependent upon trade with this country," 6 Britain also
had much to gain by using it as a bargaining counter to
4Minute of meeting at Ministry of Economic Warfare,
17 January 1945, BT 11/2333.
5Foot to War Cabinet, 27 January 1945 memorandum
WP(45)67, CAB 66/61.
6War Cabinet, 31 January 1945 minutes of meeting
WM(45)l3th conclusions, CAB 65/49.
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encourage the Swedes to conclude the payments agreement.
Sweden could not afford to indefinitely postpone the
arrangements which would govern its commerce with the
West during the months immediately following Germany's
defeat. Apart from a few limited transactions with Norway
and Finland, Sweden had virtually no foreign trade during
the last months of the war. This enforced isolation
exacerbated other economic and social problems. Wartime
shortages, unemployment, and inflation generated greater
support for the Swedish Communist party and increased
labour unrest. Between February and July 1945, Sweden's
engineering unions imposed a total strike on 730 firms,
including most of Sweden's largest industrial concerns.7
Stockholm was willing to sign the tripartite Agreement in
early February but still insisted upon guaranteed postwar
British exports. Anthony Haigh of the Foreign Office
minuted, "Sweden's bargaining position is not very strong...
We can therefore afford to keep the Swedes waiting in the
hope that they will come to us in a humbler frame of
mind." 8
 A War Cabinet meeting on 19 February 1945
decided that, although the U.S. government might bring
pressure on Britain to sign the War Trade Agreement, the
7Mitcheson to Foreign Office, 17 February 1945
despatch 99, enclosure, confidential series No. 5, 1945,
FO 371/48010/Nl992; Ulf Olsson, The Creation of a Modern
Arms Industry in Sweden, 1939-1974 (Gothenburg: Institute
of Economic History, Gothenburg University, 1977), p. 146.
8A. Haigh, 8 February 1945 minute, FO 371/48816/
Nl212.
415
Foreign Office and Ministry of Economic Warfare must
"stand quite firm" 9 until the Swedes conclude the payments
agreement.
The Swedish government succumbed to British
pressure and signed the payments agreement on 6 March 1945
without obtaining any concrete British supply commitment.
Furthermore, the Swedes accepted another British condition
that Swedish relief shipments to Norway would be paid for
in sterling) 0 Previously, such dealings had been trans-
acted in gold furnished by the British Treasury, or were
barter exchanges between the Swedes and the Norwegians.
British government and financial analysts regarded the
conclusion of the payments agreement as a triumph for
British diplomacy. 	 Sweden's action would encourage other
neutrals to hold large amounts of sterling, leading to the
restoration of sterling as a strong currency. While
sterling was still weak and difficult to convert into
hard currency or gold, the Swedes would be obliged to
purchase overseas imports from sterling bloc regions. For
example, in 1946, the Board of Trade believed the Swedes
could be persuaded to purchase their oil imports from
British controlled areas in the Middle East rather than
9War Cabinet, 19 February minutes of meeting WM(45)
21st conclusions, CAB 65/49; Sir D. Whaley to Sargent,
23 February 1944 letter, FO 371/48016/Nl97l.
10Foreign Office to Mallet, 1 March 1945 telegram
No. 280, BT 11/2333.
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from the United States."
British officials were also confident that Swedish
fuel shortages and Allied economic controls in world
markets would reduce Swedish competitiveness and push
Sweden into closer commercial collaboration with Britain.
Sweden was critically short of coal in 1945. Swedish
industries had consumed most of Sweden's emergency coal
reserves after German deliveries stopped in September 1944.
Although Stockholm had concluded the payments agreement,
London continued to rebuff Swedish approaches for coal
from Britain or the British occupied zone of Germany. Coal
was scarce throughout Europe during the immediate postwar
years because of labour dislocations and war damaged or
deteriorated mines and transport facilities. The Board
of Trade and Foreign Office believed that the coal
shortage would hamper Swedish industrial output and prevent
the Swedes from becoming serious "long-term competitors"12
to Britain. A brief for the President of the Board of
Trade in early 1946 stated that Sweden's fuel shortage
could enable Britain to establish a foothold in Germany
and other European markets which were formerly dominated
by Germany. Allied policies which were intended to prevent
Germany from rebuilding its war industries would also
11Note for Mr. L. Edwards, M.P., Parliamentary
Private Secretary to the President of the Board of Trade,
undated (circa. January-February 1946), BT 2333.
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deprive Sweden of its most important pre-war market. For
example, the Germans were prohibited from importing iron
ore. In another instance, Anthony Haigh minuted enthu-
siastically that the Germans would be,
compelled to export timber (which will compete
with Swedish timber exports)...so Sweden will
be dependent to a considerable degree on the
British market for her exports and almost
entirely on Anglo-American goodwill for her
place in the post war economic set up.'3
However, Sweden's independent trade was not
curtailed greatly by these impediments after the war.
The Swedes circumvented some restrictions by trading with
countries who did not belong to UNRRA, who did not share
London's desire to regulate postwar commerce, and were
anxious to import from Sweden. Consequently, the inter-
national regulatory organizations failed to supervise
trade to the degree desired by Barbara Ward, the Board of
Trade, and the Foreign Office. London and Washington
sought Swedish ships to transport men and supplies in the
Pacific. Swedish shipowners insisted that neutral
merchant vessels could not be engaged on behalf of a
belligerent power in a war zone.' 4
 U.S. naval authorities
therefore decided that much of the Swedish tonnage in the
13A. Haigh, op. cit.
14P.A. Brunt, Ministry of War Transport, 10 Novem-
ber 1944 minute of meeting between Swedish delegation and
representatives M.W.T., BT 11/2333.
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shipping pool was of little value to the war effort
against Japan.
Swedish shipping lines established regular routes
to South America. Stockholm concluded agreements with
Argentina and other Latin American states, exchanging
Swedish capital goods for the agricultural products and
raw materials which London refused to release from the U.N.
supply pool) 5 Swedish industrialists had approached the
Soviet legation and representatives of the Lublin govern-
ment to negotiate the purchase of Silesian coal and coke
in February 1945. On 21 August, Stockholm concluded a
commercial agreement with Warsaw by which Poland would
receive 100 million kroner ($50 million) worth of machinery,
livestock, and reconstruction projects in exchange for
4 million tons of coal. 16 The Swedes also contracted to
repair Gdansk's port facilities and to clear mines from
Polish waters. Sweden extended commercial loans, as well
as gratuitous credits, to neighbouring Nordic states for
the purchase of Swedish goods. In addition to a gift of
150 million kroner, Norway received loans and credits
totalling nearly 800 million kroner between the end of the
war and 1947. To replace Norway's merchant fleet, the
15 "The Swedes are Out to Get the Business,"
Saturday Evening Post, 22 September 1945, p. 45.
16British legation, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 27
August 1945 telegram 33, CAB 110/221; W. Ewart, 29
December 1945 minute, FO 371/4802l/Nl7567.
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Norwegians placed large orders with Swedish shipyards,
which were 25% to 50% cheaper than British builders.17
Although the Swedish traders enjoyed a larger
degree of freedom than London would have liked, Sweden's
economy lacked the strength to become the "dangerous
competitor" which the Foreign Office had feared in August
1944.18 Sweden could not overcome all supply deficiencies
because many commodities remained virtually unobtainable
on world markets as a consequence of disrupted production
and investment as well as Allied controls. Fuel continued
to be Sweden's most critical shortage. In spite of the
agreement with Poland, Sweden received only 1.5 million
tons of coal during 1946. Poland's coal production was
limited to 2.1 million tons per month as a result of war
damage and other dislocations, and most surplus coal was
exported to the U.S.S.R. 19
 It has also been suggested
that Moscow made even the reduced Polish coal deliveries
contingent upon the repatriation of Baltic internees in
20Sweden.
Stockholm also obtained 1.6 million tons of coal
from the United States, but further supply was limited by
scarce Swedish dollar reserves and by competing domestic
requirements within the United States. Apart from these
17Udgaard, op. cit., p. 155.
18Chapter Four.
' 9Minutes of meeting between Ministry of Supply and
Swedish trade mission, 17 December 1945, BT 11/2333.
Tolstoy, Victims of Yalta, (London: Hodder
& Stoughton, 1977; revised Corgi edition 1979) p. 488.
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contracts, Sweden had no other firm prospects of coal
imports. The Swedes approached London for additional
coal, arguing that Sweden's timber exports would be cur-
tailed because wood would have to be consumed as fuel,
thereby undermining Britain's reconstruction effort. The
Ministry of Fuel and Power maintained that Britain would
be in no position to export more than a "very small amount"
before April 1947.21 In addition to fuel shortages, Sweden
was also beset with continuing inflation. Stockholm
revalued the kroner by 15% in July 1946, thereby making
Swedish exports more expensive and less attractive to
countries with weak currencies. Sweden did not gain a
larger portion of Germany's former trade. Britain and the
United States exploited their wartime connexions to promote
exports to their liberated Allies. Other industrial states
also resumed trade in competition with Sweden. For example,
Britain supplied the equivalent of 44% of Norway's prewar
imports from Germany during 1947, while the U.S.A. furnished
28%; France and the Low Countries, 22%; with the remaining
6% coming from all other sources including Sweden. 22
 More-
over, Britain exerted pressure on other European states
holding large sums of sterling to buy British instead of
Swedish merchandise. London refused to let Norway convert
21N. Smith (Ministry of Fuel and Power), 29 December
1945 minute of conversation with Swedish mission, FO 371/
4802l/Nl7567.
22Udgaard, op. cit., p. 169.
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part of its sterling reserves into kroner to finance part
of its shipbuilding programme in Sweden.
Britain did not assume Germany's dominant position
in the Swedish market after the war. British exports to
Sweden during 1946 were slightly higher than in 1939
(339,758,000 Kr. and 325,719,834 Kr. respectively).23
However, Swedish exports to Britain exceeded 500 million
kroner, and Anglo-Swedish trade remained imbalanced in
Sweden's favour. Although the Swedes wanted Britain to
accept a greater variety of Swedish products, British
imports consisted mainly of timber, wood pulp, and iron
ore, because London felt that the expense of purchasing
reconstruction materials precluded importation of other
goods from Sweden. Stockholm had signed the payments
agreement on the understanding that it could liquidate
its sterling balances through purchasing imports from
Britain. However, not only did Swedish exports exceed
imports, but London was obliged to increase purchases from
Sweden in late 1945 as war damage was greater than believed
at the time the payments agreement was concluded. Many
Swedish financiers were uncertain as to Britain's ability
to recover its position as a major industrial and finan-
cial power. The British legation in Stockholm observed
in April 1945 that "The greatest fear [in Sweden] is the
Thyne Henderson (commercial attaché, Stockholm)
- Attlee, 10 June 1947 despatch 175 "E", FO 371/66495/UE5397.
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danger of the devaluation of the pound sterling; and if
our future diplomacy can be directed to allay these fears,
we shall have gained a great deal." 24 Diplomacy alone
could not overcome Britain's competitive weakness in post-
war trade. British industries could not furnish all the
products which the Swedes desired because some factories
were still tooled for producing war material, some were
damaged by bombing, and others could not obtain sufficient
raw materials from overseas. Moreover, Swedish importers
were frustrated by the British government which imposed
conditions on transactions between British and Swedish
firms which the Swedes often found unattractive. London
sought to regulate the distribution of Britain's limited
exports instead of allowing companies to trade freely.25
Moreover, British manufacturers were unable to give
Swedish importers firm prices, or as in the case of
rolled steel producers, quoted prices which the Swedes
considered to be too expensive.26
Swedish businessmen were also dismayed by the
apparent lack of commercial acumen on the part of the
British government's industrial representatives in Sweden.
24H.L. Stetchell to Mallet, 14 April 1945 minute,
FO 188/506.
25H. Ellis-Rees, Treasury, 23 June 1945 minute,
BT 11/2333.
26 StetchelltoWheeler (Ministry of Supply), 31
July 1945 telegram 86 STOW, FO 837/921.
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For example, British purchasing missions rejected large
quantities of ready-sawn lumber which did not fit
London's exact specifications. They refused to purchase
several models of prefabricated houses which contained
minor fixtures, such as built-in cupboards, which were
not included in the Ministry of Housing's plans.27
In August 1945, Claude Bell, a British businessman
in Stockholm, informed the Ministry of Supply that Britain
was losing the Swedish market to the Americans because
both British business and government officials approached
Sweden in a bureaucratic rather than an entrepreneurical
spirit. According to Bell, Swedes thought that:
Britain seems to be tied hand and foot not
only by controls, some of which [they] can
quite understand, but by an attitude of
mind towards trading which they can only
attribute to 'war time isolation'... If we
continue along these lines we are bound to
suffer in prestige in the minds of people
who hitherto have looked upon Britain as an
outstanding example of commercial flexibility
as well as stability.28
The United States' commercial relations with
Sweden were exactly the opposite of Britain's. During
the war, the State Department arranged exchange visits of
Swedish and American businessmen to promote postwar trade.
In 1943 and 1944, the Foreign Office advised the Ministry
of Information that British propaganda in Sweden should
Bell - S. Walton (Ministry of Supply), 24




counter American commercial advertizing and films expound-
ing American strength and ingenuity while ignoring British
achievements. 29
 When hostilities ended, the U.S. enjoyed
a prestige which eluded its ally. A Gallup Poll, published
on 5 July 1945, found that of Swedes who were asked which
power had contributed most to the Allied victory, 42%
replied U.S.A., 32% responded the U.S.S.R., while only
10% believed Britain had played a major role in the war.3°
The establishment of a transatlantic airline, and the sale
of P-51's to Sweden, enhanced the United States' image as
the land of innovative promise. In June 1945, Expressen
and other newspapers urged Johnson to allow a party of
journalists to fly to the U.S.A. on ATC aircraft in order
to prepare articles about American aviation. 3 ' In the
spring of 1945, American businessmen were negotiating the
sale of capital goods such as hydro-electric machinery
and automotive parts. While British firms were vague as
to the availability and price of their merchandise,
American salesmen offered the Swedes competitive prices
and immediate delivery dates. Mallet observed, "the Swedes
seem to be completely sold on U.S.A. equipment and
29Overseas Propaganda Committee, 20 October 1944,
"Plans of Propaganda for Sweden," 1st Revision of Aims
and Objectives paper 544, FO 37l/43490/N7110.
30Dagens Nyheter, 5 July 1945 translation,
FO 37l/48027/N9278.
Nycop (editor, Expressen) - Johnson, 16
June 1945, Private Papers of Hershell V. Johnson.
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organization." 32
 Although Stockholm attempted to limit
American imports because of the Riksbank's small dollar
reserves, Washington persuaded Stockholm to accept a large
volume of luxury and other non-essential goods from the
U.S.A. By 1947, Sweden's dollar and gold holdings had
fallen to the point where the Swedish government was
forced to impose strict import controls and to ration
commodities such as coffee and petrol. 33 Sweden accepted
Marshall Plan aid from the U.S. in 1947. However,
Stockholm continued import restrictions and drew sparingly
from their dollar account.
In 1946, Stockholm extended a credit of one
billion kroner to Moscow and promised the Russians up to
20% of Sweden's annual exports for five years. Minister
of Trade Gunnar Myrdal insisted that extensive trade with
Russia was necessary in order to offset the postwar
depression he had predicted in 1944. Some Swedish firms
balked at committing a large portion of their exports to
the U.S.S.R. The anti-Soviet newspaper, Dagens Nyheter,
asserted that Myrdal had threatened to allow the American
General Electric Company to break A.S.E.A.'s near monopoly
on electrical goods in Sweden if the firm refused to
export to Russia. However, Soviet purchases from Sweden
32Mallet - Chancery, 24 April 1945 minute,
FO 188/506.
33Sir C.B. Jerram (U.K. Ambassador) - Foreign
Office, 7 May 1947 telegram 11 REMAC, FO 37l/66495/N5445.
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in the late 1940's were less than London had expected in
1944. Mallet's fears 34 that Sweden would become a Soviet
client were never realized.
BRITAIN, SWEDEN, AND RUSSIA -. A POSTWAR REALIGNMENT?
Economic issues overshadowed political questions
in Anglo-Swedish relations during the immediate postwar
years. British economic policy was guided by definite
aims: to acquire inexpensive reconstruction materials from
Sweden, to secure agreements with Stockholm which would
help to restore Britain's commercial influence and curtail
Swedish competition, and to increase British exports to
Sweden. However, Britain had no long term political
objective for Sweden after the Swedes stopped trading with
Germany. Apart from the brief attempt to encourage
Swedish intervention in Norway at the end of the war,
London made no effort to draw Stockholm away from neutra-
lity towards closer Anglo-Swedish diplomatic and military
collaboration. Having remained neutral for the duration
of the war, Sweden was ineligible for membership in the
United Nations Organization and therefore isolated from
the mainstream of international politics. Although the
Foreign Office privately disapproved of Swedish proposals
in 1942 for a neutral Nordic bloc, it chose to
ignore the question and instructed Mallet to neither




 Britain could not offer the Swedes, who
were apprehensive of growing Soviet power, a realistic
alternative to continued neutrality after the war because
the Foreign Office had failed to devise a practicable
plan for collective security in Western Europe.
During the war, many leading Swedes, notably
Christian GUnther, the Foreign Minister, criticized the
proposed world organization. They had asserted that the
U.N. would be virtually a private club for the Great
Powers in which small states would enjoy little influence.
The Swedes maintained that the U.N. would prove as ineffec-
tive as its predecessor in preventing another world war.
However in early 1945, Prime Minister Hansson and Defence
Minister Sköld publicly intimated that Sweden would be
prepared to join the U.N.O., and would not attempt to form
a Nordic defence bloc if the world organization proved
successful. 36	 GUnther, however, remained dubious of the
world organization's ability to prevent another war. He
asserted in a speech on 4 May that the mere existence of
the United Nations did not guarantee world peace since
the Great Powers would be unwilling to subordinate their
national interests to the cause of world security.
GUnther believed that a war between Russia and the West
was possible within five years. 37
 He argued that Sweden
35Chapter Four.




should maintain strong postwar defences to "convince every
Great Power that it need never fear an attack by another
Great Power through Swedish territory."38
Uncertainty over Swedish membership in the U.N.
was resolved in July 1945 when Gunther was replaced as
foreign minister by Osten Undn after the Social Democrats
dissolved Sweden's wartime coalition government. Undn
was a strong supporter of the U.N., and as Foreign Minister
during the inter-war period, had been largely responsible
for Sweden's active participation in the League of Nations.
He maintained that there was no reason to assume from the
outset that the world organization was doomed to failure.
Before taking office, Undn stated that Swedish membership
in the U.N. "would bind Sweden much more definitely than
in 1920 to a policy of collective security that was not
reconcilable with neutrality."39
In spite of Undn's comments, the Foreign Office
was convinced that Sweden would participate in the U.N.
only as long as the Great Powers remained on good terms.
Haigh minuted that notwithstanding the U.N., a war between
the U.S.S.R. and the West would prompt Sweden to "try
once again to follow the policy of neutrality which has
served her so well in 1914-18 and in 1939_45.,,40 The
38Mallet - Eden, 29 May 1945 despatch 256,
FO 371/48042/N7l35.
39Labouchere - F.O., 26 July 1945 despatch 369,
FO 371/48042/N9648.
40Haigh, 25 August 1945 minute; A. Hicks, 19
September 1945 minute, FO 371/48042/N9648.
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Foreign Office observed that the new Swedish cabinet was
headed by Hansson and contained many ministers who had
been responsible for wartime government policy. Moreover,
most Swedes approved of Sweden's neutrality during the
war, and favoured the continuation of such a policy after
the war as they were apprehensive of the U.S.S.R. '5
seemingly ominous and unchecked expansion in Eastern
Europe. A majority of Swedes questioned by the Gallup poll
in July responded that Russia would be the most influential
power in postwar Europe. The Foreign Office believed that
the absence of a strong, independent power in Central
Europe exacerbated the Swedes' traditional Russophobia.
Moreover, the Swedes doubted Britain's and the United
States' inclination and ability to take an active role in
Europe. Although Stockholm would seek more intimate
commercial and cultural relations with the West, it would
also endeavour nervously to accommodate the Soviets as it
had once done with Germany. A Foreign Office confidential
print of 10 August commented, "If the Swedish man in the
street is ever going to learn to look eastward with con-
fidence, it is hardly likely that the new outlook will be
acquired during the present generation." 41
 This assessment
was borne out by subsequent official Swedish statements and
actions. Stockholm attempted to cultivate Soviet goodwill
in January 1946, by deporting 165 Balts who had fought
41Research Department, Foreign Office, 10 August
1945 confidential print (17178) , FO 371/48042/N13428.
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alongside the Germans and had fled from the Red Army to
Sweden in May 1945.42 However, the Swedes were not pre-
pared to rely exclusively upon expedient gestures to
ensure Sweden's security. Whereas the United States
demobilized rapidly after the war, Sweden left much of
its military establishment intact. Stockholm increased
the Air Force's procurement budget and subsidized the
development and production of Swedish designed jet fighter
aircraft. In early February 1946, General Jung, the
Commander-in-Chief of Sweden's armed forces told a confer-
ence of military chaplains that it was "growing increasingly
obvious that the term 'Allies' should be used with
quotation marks. The partitioning of the victorious
states into a Western and Eastern bloc is becoming more
evident every day."43
Swedish pessimism about the postwar order did not
impress most Foreign Office officials. The British were
less sanguine in the spring of 1945 about the prospects
for continued Allied cooperation after the war, but did
not believe the Soviet Union would be capable of starting
another war in the near future. The Foreign Office dis-
missed Swedish predictions of an impending conflict between
the U.S.S.R. and the Western Allies as merely another
manifestation of the Swedes' ingrained Russophobia and
op. cit., pp. 486-8.
43Jerram - F.O., 14 February 1946 telegram 8,
FO 371/56963/N218.
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narrow-mindedness. Swedish editorial speculation
concerning this question within weeks of Germany's
surrender prompted Goeffrey Warr of the Northern Depart-
ment to minute on 25 May 1945:
The Swedes appear to be planning on the
assumption of a war in the future between
the Western Allies and Russia, and it's
certainly startling to find them thinking
in these terms so early...but the arguments
are neither convincing nor impressive.44
The Swedish attitude was less far-fetched than the
Foreign Office cared to admit. Most officials desired a
British-led bloc in Western Europe. However, London did
not actively promote such a scheme during the immediate
post-war years largely because of confusion within the
Foreign Office. 45
 Its members could not decide if the
bloc should be a military alliance or merely an association
of sympathetic nations who would give moral and diplomatic
support to such British policies as intervention in Greece,
whether the bloc should be established outside of or under
the auspices of the U.N., whether London should seek appro-
val from Moscow or defer the scheme altogether. Nevertheless
the idea of a British-led bloc gained favour with members
of the Northern Department such as Haigh and Warner. It
is probable that they sought to exploit the Europeans'
unease over Soviet intentions in order to consolidate the
44 G. Warr, 25 May 1945 minute, FO 37l/48042/N7135.
45Discussion about a Western Security bloc during
the war had been so intermittent and inclusive that some
officials were uncertain if the creation of such a bloc
was still an objective of British policy in 1945.
Galsworthy, 25 June 1945 minute, FO 37l/48042/N7135.
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military and political influence which Britain had gained
over its continental allies during the war. However they
feared that if London did not establish a bloc immediately,
British influence in states such as Norway and Denmark
would dissipate "as time passes and the memory of our
joint fight against the Germans grows fainter." 46
 In
July 1945, Haigh warned that the absence of a British-led
bloc in Europe would enable the Swedes to entice Norway
and Denmark into joining a Nordic alliance.
The Swedes are now concerned with remaining
neutral during the next war (which they
believe to be inevitable), and to strengthen
their chances, they hope to draw Norway and
Denmark into their orbit of neutrality. It
seems to me not impossible that they will
succeed unless those two countries are in
the fairly near future brought into some
western security bloc.47
Haigh's worst fears were not realized. Norway and
Denmark did establish closer ties with Sweden, but these
were concerned strictly with economic and cultural matters.
The Norwegians and Danes did not want excessive Swedish
influence over their foreign and defence policies. Both
Norway and Denmark sought to ensure their security through
participation in the U.N. where they espoused a 'bridge-
building' policy of maintaining harmony between East and
West through mediation. 48
 They were anxious to avoid
46Haigh, 22 June 1945 minute, FO 371/48042/N7135.
47Haigh, 3 July 1945 minute, FO 371/48042/N7958.
48Philip M. Burgess, Elite Images and Foreign
Policy Outcomes: A Study of Norway (Columbus: Ohio State
University Press, 1967), pp. 75-83. Geir Lundestad,
America, Scandinavia, and the Cold War, 1945-1949, (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1980), p. 50.
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offending the Soviets who had Finnmark during the last
months of the war and occupied the Danish island of
Bornholm between May 1945 and April 1946. All three
Scandinavian states were aware that Moscow opposed the
idea of a Nordic bloc, since a strong alliance - whether
neutral or al)igned with the West could potentially inter-
fere with the U.S.S.R.'s access to the Atlantic. Soviet
propaganda in 1945 condemned Sweden's wartime conduct and
denounced the idea of a Nordic bloc as a threat "to the
cause of peace and security". 50
 Consequently, Swedish,
Danish and Norwegian officials scrupulously avoided dis-
cussing possible Nordic military and diplomatic collab-
oration when they met at international conferences. In
August 1945, Prime Minister Hansson declared publicly that
Stockholm had never intended to promote anything more than
economic and cultural cooperation between the Nordic
states 51
Nordic cooperation did not undermine British
influence in Norway and Denmark altogether. Britain
equipped a substantial proportion of the Norwegian and
Danish armed forces after the war. By 1946, 230 British
advisors were in Norway while 806 Norwegian troops were
49Henrik S. Nissen (ed.) Scandinavia during the
Second World War, (Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1983);
English ed. trans. by Thomas Munch-Petersen, (Minneapolis,
University of Minnesota Press, 1983), pp. 333-339.
50Udgaard, op. cit., p. 152.
51jerram to F.O., 16 August 1945 despatch 397,
FO 371/48042/N10927.
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training in Britain. 52
 At London's request, Norway and
Denmark contributed military units which served under
British command in the British occupation zone in Germany.
Some Norwegian officers would have preferred to acquire
Swedish weapons which they thought better suited to
Norwegian conditions. However, the Norwegian government
favoured British arms which cadres of Norwegian troops
had become familiar with during the war, because Norway
could afford to buy materiel from Britain but not from
other sources.
Although London actively sought to increase
Anglo-Swedish trade after the war, no serious effort was
made to expand British political influence in Sweden.
The Foreign Office assumed that Sweden would remain
neutral, and nothing short of a Soviet invasion would
alter Stockholm's views. Off-hand comments in the minutes
written during the summer of 1945 indicate that the
Northern Department was more preoccupied with privately
condemning Sweden's "uncooperative" attitude during the
war than in planning ways in which to draw Sweden's post-
war policy into alignment with Britain's. When the
Swedish newspaper, Svenska Dagbladet, condemned the
nuclear bombing of Hiroshima, W.F. Ewart minuted that the
Swedes "have not been very cooperative towards the Allies
until the very end of the war in Europe and are in no
position to condemn the use of the atom bomb." 53
 Mallet
52Udgaard, op. cit., p. 162.
53W.F. Ewart, 20 August 1945 minute, FO 371/48042/
N1032l.
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believed that Sweden could be drawn eventually into closer
alignment with Britain. Before departing from his post in
mid-June 1945, Mallet sent a lengthy despatch to the
Foreign Office describing the strength of British political
prestige in Sweden, in spite of the ominous Soviet presence
in Eastern Europe and aggressive American marketing methods.
He believed that this was largely a manifestation of
Swedish gratitude to Britain for its "methods of fair
dealing which were considered to have been displayed on
the various occasions when Sweden came in for considerable
Allied pressure with a view to obliging her to control her
trade with Germany." 54 He argued that although American
consumer goods were popular in Sweden, the Swedes were
"conscious of the New World crudity of much in American
life and prefer the British." 55 The Foreign Office was
sceptical of Mallet's sanguine appraisal of Swedish atti-
tudes. Many officials shared Haigh's opinion that Mallet
had been "a very sympathetic apologist" for Swedish actions
throughout the war. 56 Nevertheless, the Foreign Office
conceded, from conversations with prominent Swedes and from
Swedish editorials, that considerable pro-British sentiment
existed in Sweden. However, the Foreign Office did not
attempt to exploit this sentiment to strengthen British
54Mallet-Eden,.19 June 1945 despatch 306, FO 371/
48042/N 7958.
55Ibid.
56Haigh, 1 July 1945 minute, FO 371/48042/N7460.
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influence in Sweden. Its only response to Mallet's report
was to circulate copies of his despatch to the Board of
Trade in order to help British businesses formulate
marketing plans.
Unlike the Foreign Office, the service attachs
believed that Sweden could be induced to form closer
diplomatic and military liaison with Britain, and actively
attempted to cultivate ties between the British and
Swedish services. Air Commodore Maycock was an especially
ardent proponent of such a scheme. He was undoubtedly
influenced by the rapport he enjoyed with General
Nordenskiald, who had openly admired the R.A.F. throughout
the war, and had sought to obtain Spitfires from Britain
since 1941. Whenever Maycock learned that an Air Marshal
was about to travel to northern Germany or Norway, he would
urge the Air Ministry to extend the official journey to
include a goodwill visit to Sweden. He maintained that
Sweden might have displayed less deference towards Berlin
during the war if confidence in Britain's military capabil-
ities had been bolstered by British goodwill visits and
other forms of propaganda before the war. He warned that
if Britain neglected the Swedish services after the war,
Sweden would again be drawn towards "the side of the most
powerful neighbour, or neutrality, or possibly dangerous
isolation." 57 At Maycock's insistence, Air Chief Marshals
57Maycock-Air Ministry, 6 June 1945 despatch
A.A. SWD. 52/45, FO 371/48035/N6093.
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Portal, Tedder and Harris visited Sweden during the summer
of 1945.	 Aiterican and Soviet attaches also arranged
similar goodwill gestures by illustrious generals such as
Patton and Zhukov. As a result, Brigadier Sutton-Pratt
and Captain Denham were prompted to press for visits from
Field Marshal Montgomery and Admiral Cunningham.
The Foreign Office was wary of despatching further
military V.I.P.'s to Sweden after the first visits in June
and July. Warner told Air Vice Marshal Dickson that "it
is a bit excessive for so many great men to visit Stockholm
so soon after each other...the Swedes were not even very
good neutrals and we do not want to give the impression
that we are all over them." 58 However, the Foreign Office
came to endorse the attaché's efforts after it learned of
Soviet plans to have Russian warships visit Stockholm in
late August 1945. C.B. Jerram, Mallet's successor, re-
ported on 3 September that the Swedes had accepted the
Soviet request "without relish" and suggested that units
of the Royal Navy visit Sweden before the Russians
arrived. Jerram maintained that the Swedes might be led
to "look to the East or over our heads to the extreme
West." 59 In the face of this and similar arguments from
58Warner-Dickson, 19 July 1945 letter, FO 371/
48035/N8680.
59 Jerram-Foreign Office, 3 September 1945 telegram
1308, FO 37l/48035/Nl1547.
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the Air Ministry, the Foreign Office allowed Maycock to
foster closer ties between the R.A.F. and the Swedish Air
Force. The R.A.F. furnished technical information to
enable the Swedish Air Force to improve ground operations
and reorganize its air-sea rescue service. This liaison
between services eventually led to Sweden's purchase of
50 Spitfires in 1946 and 210 de Haviland Vampire jet
fighters in early 1948.
The British service attaches took a close interest
in the discussions which the Swedish, Norwegian, and
Danish military authorities held in 1947 as a tentative
move towards closer military cooperation between the
Nordic states. The Foreign Office had not been concerned
about possible Soviet expansion into Scandinavia during the
war. When the Red Army invaded Finnmark in the autumn of
1944, the Foreign Office assumed that Moscow would honour
Stalin's assurance to Eden of 1941, that the U.S.S.R. re-
garded Norway as part of Britain's sphere of influence.
However, as relations between Moscow and the West
deteriorated during 1947, Foreign Secretary Bev and the
Chiefs of Staff came to fear that the Soviets would over-
run Scandinavia in a future war. Occupation of this region
would enable the Soviets to control the Baltic, menace
Western shipping in the North Sea and Atlantic, and
possibly attack the British Isles. Therefore, London
concluded that a Nordic defence bloc was essential to
Britain's defence. Although the British would have
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preferred an alliance with close ties to Britain, they
felt that even a non-aligned bloc would deter Soviet
agression if it was well armed and organized.
The British Chiefs of Staff believed such an
alliance would deprive Russia of access to bases and raw
materials, notably uranium, during a future war. If
allied with Britain, such an arrangement would improve
the British early warning system against a Soviet air
attack, and would enable the British to establish bases,
for launching rocket attacks on Soviet communications with
Western Europe and shortening the distances of bombing
raids on Moscow. 6 ° As Britain could not supply sufficient
arms for all three states, the Chiefs suggested that Sweden
should be encouraged to develop "a healthy arms industry"
manufacturing British weapons under licence. 6 ' The Foreign
Office also favoured a Scandinavian defence union, but
believed the three governments would feel too intimidated
by Moscow to cooperate openly in defence matters. The
Chiefs of Staff, therefore, sought to encourage de facto
collaboration between the Scandinavian services: "it is
better to have a covert bloc than no bloc at all." 62 They
believed that the Scandinavian service chiefs could goad
their governments to establish a formal alliance once the
details for military cooperation had been worked out.
60joint Planning Staff, 4 June 1947 report
Scandinavian Defence - Strategic Considerations, J.P. (47)
56 (FINAL) , FO 371/65961/N6750.
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In 1948, the Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish
foreign ministers discussed proposals for Scandinavian
defence. They established a joint Scandinavian Defence
Commission in September, but these steps did not result
in an alliance and only served to reveal the inherent
differences between the three states. The Swecles viewed
a Scandinavian alliance as an extension of their own armed
neutrality to the rest of the region. Although Norway was
willing to participate in a Nordic defence scheme, the
Norwegians recognized that the collective strength of the
three states would not be sufficient to combat a Soviet
invasion of Norway. Oslo wanted to maintain ties with the
West, either in the form of affiliation with the developing
North Atlantic Alliance or by a special arrangement with
the United States and Britain to ensure that Norway would
receive not only arms but armed assistance. Britain and
Canada were prepared to arrange an understanding between
NATO and a Scandinavian alliance. But Washington was
anxious to secure Greenland and Spitzbergen as possible
bases, and therefore desired Norway and Denmark as full
participants in NATO. The Americans assumed that member-
ship in a Scandinavian bloc might lead the Norwegians and
Danes to deny facilities to western forces in the event of
war. Norway and Denmark ultimately joined the Western
Alliance after the U.S. insisted that NATO be given top
priority to receive American weapons.63
63Lundestad, op. cit., p. 221-222.
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In the spring of 1948, an Anglo-French delegation
visited Stockholm in an effort to encourage Swedish
military and diplomatic collaboration with the West. The
Swedish government was also under domestic pressure to
adjust its foreign policy to reflect a growing anti-Soviet
outlook in Swedish public opinion. Several leading gener-
als wanted to standardize Sweden's weapons with those of
the West. However, Moscow countered these trends with a
strident propaganda campaign in which Red Star, Red Fleet,
and Pravda published such articles as "War Psychosis in
Sweden." 64
 These articles contended that Swedish concerns
about Soviet agressiveness were a manifestation of the
same outlook which had permitted the transit traffic and
other Swedish concessions to Germany during the war.
Soviet pressure reinforced Stockholm's neutralist outlook.
The British services' earlier interest in developing a
liaison with Sweden abated once it was apparent that
Stockholm would not follow Oslo and Copenhagen into the
Western Alliance. The R.A.F. was reluctant to sell
Vampire jets, Britain's most advanced fighter to a power
which was determined to remain neutral. However the
aircraft were delivered at the insistence of the Ministry
of Supply, who maintained that such a large transaction
was beneficial to Britain's aircraft industry.
64British embassy, Moscow, to Foreign Office,
30 March 1948 telegram 432, CAB 122/916.
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Sweden became less important strategically to
London after the European order had settled into three
groups: a Western bloc, the Soviet bloc, and the non-
aligned or neutral states. Sweden's primary postwar
significance to Britain was as a trade partner. During
the initial postwar years, Britain did not regard Sweden
as a potential ally against Russia, as Britain had yet to
develop a coherent policy towards the Soviet presence in
Europe. The flurry of activity by the air attache in
Stockholm was derived largely from his wartime efforts to
cultivate General Nordsld's anglophile sentiments in
order to strengthen anti-German opinion in Sweden. Maycock
had supported Nordinsköld's requests for Spitfires since
1943, and he regarded the postwar expansion of the Swedish
Air Force as an opportunity for Britain to sell aircraft.
Aircraft sales to Sweden were negotiated largely for
reasons of prestige and commerce. Although there was some
hope that the military recipients of these exports would
induce the Swedish government to adopt a pro-Western policy,
most Foreign Office officials assumed that Stockholm would
continue to follow the 'middle way' in foreign affairs.
Although the Foreign Office did not want Norway and Denmark
to copy the Swedes, it did little to counter any neutral
tendencies in their foreign policies. London began to con-
sider seriously Sweden's strategic value in 1947, after
Western disputes with the Soviets elsewhere in Europe had
made the prospect of war with Russia seem more likely.
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However, interest in Sweden's participation in an alliance
stemmed mainly from the fact that Sweden was the strongest
of the three Scandinavian states, and was presumed by the
British to possess influence over its neighbours. Geo-
graphically, Norway and Denmark were of greater value to
Western defence. Although Britain would have preferred to
have Sweden's membership in, or association with the
Western alliance, London accepted Sweden's continued
neutrality. London's attitude towards Sweden at the onset
of the Cold War was similar to its wartime policy. The
Foreign Office did not approve of Swedish neutrality but
was prepared to tolerate it because Britain's influence
was weak. Its influence was insufficient to counter the
historical, strategic, economic, and psychological factors




Throughout most of World War II, Britain's overall
economic and military weakness determined the nature of
London's relations with Stockholm. Between the end of the
Norwegian campaign and the United States' entry into the
war, British policy towards Sweden amounted to little more
than a diplomatic 'holding action.' Britain was isolated
from the European continent and incapable of preventing
the Wehrmacht from overrunning small states such as Norway
and Denmark. London could not counter Berlin's over-
whelming economic, diplomatic, and psychological influence
over Stockholm. Fear of possible German reprisals deterred
the Swedes from displaying the same consideration towards
British interests that they showed towards Germany. The
British were thankful that Sweden had not become absorbed
entirely into the Axis orbit, and, for the time being,
aquiesced to Sweden's attitude. British interest in
Swedish exports to Germany which had been keen during the
'Phoney War' dissipated rapidly after the fall of Norway,
and remained academic throughout 1941 and 1942 because
Britain could not interfere with this commerce. During
this period, the Foreign Office and Ministry of Economic
Warfare were concerned primarily with the extent of Sweden's
political concessions to Germany, such as the military
transit traffic. The British did not expect Stockholm to
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reverse this policy. In the face of London's reduced
influence in Sweden, British aspirations were limited to
seeking 'equal treatment,' such as non-interference with
blockade running, which would demonstrate that Sweden was
still a neutral and not a satellite of Germany.
The United States' intervention and subsequent
Allied victories over Axis forces during 1942 and 1943
strengthened, to some extent, Britain's bargaining power
with Sweden. Britain as no longer an isolated and weak
power with no clear prospect of dislodging Axis forces
from their conquered territories, but was instead a member
of a powerful coalition supplied and equipped by the
Western Hemisphere's seemingly inexhaustible resources.
American diplomatic support, along with improving Allied
military fortunes enabled London to resolve the principal
long-standing Anglo-Swedish differences. Intense Allied
diplomatic and economic pressure goaded the Swedish govern-
ment into allowing the Dicto and Lionel to make an abortive
blockade running attempt from Gothenburg in January 1943.
Six months later, Stockholm terminated most of Germany's
military transit privileges. Allied ascendancy also
induced the Swedes to adopt a more accommodating attitude
towards the Norwegian government-in-exile and show less
deference to Berlin.
Although partnership with the United States helped
the British realize their goal of a more 'even handed'
Swedish foreign policy, American intervention also
restricted British options in dealing with Sweden. London
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was the senior partner by virtue of its experience, but
Washington became the 'prime mover' of Allied policy
towards Sweden. By 1944, Britain's role in the 'common
front' was relegated to that of a supporter rather than
that of full partner. The Americans expected the British
to endorse and help implement their economic warfare
proposals, but paid little attention to London's views when
formulating what was supposed to be a joint policy.
Although British officials, such as Dingle Foot, Lord
Selborne, and Lord Halifax were deeply disturbed by
Washington's high-handedness, the Foreign Office never
challenged the Americans openly. Sir Orme Sargent and his
subordinates in the Northern Department believed that in
view of Britain's limited influence in Washington, such a
confrontation with the Americans over Sweden would be an
empty gesture which could damage other more critical areas
of Anglo-U.S. collaboration.
Washington's oredominant influence over Allied
policy towards Sweden stemmed from the United States
government's control over nearly all supplies which Sweden
imported from the Western Hemisohere. All American exports
to European neutrals required approval of the U.S. War and
Navy Deoartments. The War and Navy Under Secretaries,
Patterson and Forrestal, were unwilling to divert supplies
from the American war effort to Sweden as long as the
Swedish economy was tied closely to Germany's war produc-
tion. As fervent advocates of economic warfare, Patterson
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and Forrestal felt the British were too complacent to-
wards Swedish-German trade, and believed that a more
ruthless Allied blockade policy could force Sweden to
stop this commerce entirely. By 1944, the Under Secre-
taries had grown impatient with London's preferred method
of reducing Swedish exports to Germany gradually through
negotiation and pre-emptive commercial transactions. They
believed that the United States should, in Lord Selborne's
words, "cash in" on Allied military successes and press
the Swedes to terminate all trade with Germany.
During the spring of 1944, the M.E.W. sought to
hasten a more reasonable American attitude by confronting
Patterson and Forrestal with statistics and other details
which supported the Ministry's contention that a strident
policy towards Sweden was unnecessary and potentially
harmful to Allied interests. However the Ministry's
arguments merely reinforced the Under Secretaries'
scepticism of British resolve. Moreover, since 1944 was
a presidential election year, Dean Acheson, and other
State Department officials who had accommodated Britain's
views in previous years, adopted a more aggressive att-
itude towards neutral trade so that the American electorate
would recognize that the Department was doing something to
help the war. In July, the War Department persuaded the
State Department to threaten Sweden with economic sanctions
such as stopping the Gotenburg traffic if Stockholm did
not terminate Swedish-German trade immediately. The War
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Department also prompted the State Department to inform
London that Washington would act unilaterally if British
support for this ultimatum was not forthcoming. The
Americans' uncompromising attitude compelled the Foreign
Office to support them officially. However, the British
continued to lobby for a more 'understanding' policy in
Washington, and the Foreign Office deleted the threats
from the joint Anglo-American démarche of 24 August.
Sweden's piecemeal concessions to the Allies during 1944
reduced the volume of Swedish exports considerably by the
autumn, but the remaining vestiges of this trade continued
to disturb Patterson and Forrestal. Therefore, they
prompted Roosevelt to impound the Saturnus and its rubber
cargo in November without consulting the British. This
unilateral action succeeded where other approaches, such
as personal appeals from Roosevelt to Churchill, had
failed: it prodded the British to press wholeheartedly for
a complete Swedish embargo on Germany. The Foreign Office
recognized that the United States was capable of forcing
the cessation of Swedish exports without Britain's support.
London, therefore, endorsed Washington's policy fully in
order to prevent the Swedes and other Europeans from con-
cluding that the 'common front' was merely a facade which
concealed British weakness as well as American power.
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London's reluctance to support U.S. policy whole-
heartedly stemmed from a variety of motives within the
British government. Some objections to the American pro-
posals were made out of concern for matters which were
vital to the Allied war effort, such as obtaining the
wreckage of a V-2 missile and related intelligence from
Sweden. Other objections, such as Dingle Foot's assertions,
in the summer of 1944, that Allied sanctions might prompt
Stockholm to abrogate the War Trade Agreement seem
fatuous in view of the Allied armies' rapid advance
towards Germany. Foot's concern also seems short-sighted
in comparison with Britain's extreme dependence upon U.S.
military and economic assistance and British hopes for
continued American goodwill and cooperation after the
war.
Apart from Sir Victor Mallet, the ardently pro-
Swedish British minister in Stockholm, Foot was the most
determined British critic of U.S. policy, and staunchest
advocate of 'understanding' towards Sweden. If the
Swedes intended to continue trading with Germany
indefinitely by playing London off against Washington,
then Foot willingly, albeit unwittingly, obliged them.
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Allied military successes during 1943 and 1944 did not
encourage Foot to adopt a more assertive attitude towards
Sweden. Instead of seeking to 'cash in' on Germany's
declining fortunes, Foot behaved as if German control
over Europe remained as complete as it had been during
the first three years of the war. Whereas the Americans
exaggerated Allied bargaining power, Foot was preoccupied
with what he felt were the weaknesses in the Allies'
negotiating position. He believed that Allied control
over Sweden's overseas supply sources and the prospects
for ultimate Allied victory were inadequate grounds to
counter Sweden's considerable economic dependence upon
Germany.
The Americans were confident that sufficient
pressure would bring Sweden to heel. Foot was convinced
that such a policy would merely alienate the Swedes and
lead to an impasse in matters such as the negotiations
with S.K.F. He regarded the War Trade Agreement of 1943
as a major accomplishment of Allied diplomacy and a great
economic sacrifice on Sweden's part. He believed that the
Swedes were honouring the spirit, if not always the letter,
of the Agreement. Moreover by March 1944, Foot and
G.H. Villiers, head of the M.E.W.'s Enemy Trade Department,
had concluded that further action to suppress iron ore
exports, the largest aid most valuable element of Swedish-
German trade, would be unnecessary since Swedish ore was
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no longer significant to the outcome of the war. In
Foot's opinion, the Allies would be committing a breach of
faith if they stopped or threatened to stop the Gothenburg
traffic to press Stockholm to grant concessions not covered
under the Agreement. Foot accepted, without reservation,
Swedish assurances of their good intentions and the effec-
tiveness of 'administrative measures' in restricting exports
to Germany. He based his conclusions about Swedish trade
on statistics supplied by the Swedes. He listened care-
fully to Häggl6f, Boheman and Wal1enbrg's objections to
the American terms. Their descriptions of such mitigating
circumstances as fear of possible German retaliation,
supply shortages, economic dependence, etc., reinforced
Foot's conviction that economic warfare against Germany
should be conducted in a manner which would not undermine
Sweden's economic interests greatly. When American
pressure or, as in the case of ball bearings, military
necessity obliged London to press Sweden for major conces-
sions, Foot believed in offering the Swedes valuable
incentives such as Spitfires, Silesian coal or generous
monetary compensation.
Foot and Villiers believed that their policy of
reducing Swedish exports through informal 'gentlemen's
agreements' with Boheman and placing pre-emptive purchases
with S.K.F. was the most effective and realistic means of
resolving outstanding Allied-Swedish differences. They
were exasperated by Washington's unwillingness to share
their view and appreciate the M.E.W.'s accomplishments.
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Villiers was especially proud of his Ministry's role in
prompting Stockholm to withdraw Swedish shipping from the
Baltic, which he heralded as an unqualified success for
British diplomacy and vindication of the M.E.W.'s refusal
to endorse 'battering ram' tactics.
In many respects, the M.E.W.'s policy during 1943
and 1944 represented a success for Swedish diplomacy. It
enabled Sweden to accommodate the Allies gradually. By
persuading Foot to rely on compromise and subterfuge, such
as 'administrative measures' and pre-emptive purchases,
Stockholm could claim officially that it was still honour-
ing its trade commitments to Berlin to the best of its
ability. Although German exports to Sweden diminished
correspondingly with each Swedish concession to the Allies,
the Swedes continued to import until the end of 1944, by
which time Germany became almost incapable of delivering
coal and other commodities to Sweden.
Foreign Office officials, such as Warner, Nutting,
Galsworthy, and Haigh did not share Foot's sympathy for
Sweden. Privately, they viewed the Swedes as selfish
opportunists seeking to profit from the war without taking
risks. They were also more conscious than Foot of the need
to remain on good terms with Washington regardless of how
exasperating they found American 'bull-headedness.'
However, the Foreign Office usually deferred to the M.E.W.
in questions relating to Swedish-German trade, and endorsed
Foot's alternatives to the strident American proposals.
It also encouraged the Chiefs of Staff to present a
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'military' argument supporting the M.E.W.'s attitude to
their American counterparts. When obliged to act in
concert with the Americans, the Foreign Office redraf ted
formal Anglo-U.S. messages to Stockholm, substituting
platitudes and vague admonitions for the American demands
and threats in order to soften the impact on Swedish
sensibilities. However, the Foreign Office was not
reluctant to threaten or impose sanctions on Sweden because
it opposed 'battering ram' tactics as a matter of principle.
It employed similar negotiating methods on two occasions
during the war. In January 1943, London threatened to
stop the Gothenburg traffic if Stockholm did not grant
clearance to the Dicto and Lionel. When the negotiations
for the new Anglo-Swedish payments agreement were dead-
locked, between January and March 1945, the Foreign Office
refused to ratify the extended War Trade Agreement by
which the Americans would continue Sweden's wartime import
quotas for ninety days after the cessation of hostilities.
In both instances, Britain's vital interests were at
stake: the Dicto's and Lionel's ball bearing cargoes in
1943, and the restoration of sterling as a major currency
in 1945.
The Foreign Office withheld full support for
Washington's 'battering ram' proposals throughout most of
1944 because it considered the American tactics unnecessary
and counterproductive. With the exception of ball bearing
exports, the Foreign Office considered Swedish-German
trade as essentially an American concern. Nearly all
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British officials believed that their American counter-
parts exaggerated the importance of this commerce far
beyond its intrinsic value to the German war effort.
Warner, Nutting, and Haigh, who often took a jaundiced
view of Foot's and Mallet's readiness to accept Swedish
arguments without question, agreed that the American
policy of sweeping demands supported by threats would
probably fail to hasten an embargo on all Swedish shipments
to Germany. Believing that they understood Swedish
attitudes better than the Americans, the Northern Depart-
ment assumed that Stockholm had little choice but to
reject American proposals as long as the Swedes remained
isolated from the West, heavily dependent upon German
supplies, uncertain of the war's duration, and fearful of
German retaliation. If the Swedes were to reject their
proposals, the Allies would be forced to either make good
their threats or relent and attempt a different approach.
The first option would generate widespread resentment in
Sweden, and possibly other neutral countries, towards
Britain and the United States. The second would lead the
Swedes and other powers to question Allied resolve and
bargaining ability. It would give German propagandists a
splendid opportunity to ridicule the Allies, bolster
Swedish confidence in Stockholm's ability to resist Allied
pressure, and result in a more inflexible Swedish attitude
towards future Allied proposals. The Foreign Office
believed that either reaction to a Swedish rebuff would
harm Britain's immediate interests, such as obtaining the
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V-2 missile which had crashed in Sweden, and undermine
London's long-term plans. It was therefore to Britain's
advantage to avoid the dilemma altogether by discouraging
the Americans from pressing their demands upon Sweden.
London needed Swedish goodwill and other favourable
bargaining conditions to negotiate far-reaching postwar
economic arrangements with Sweden. Economic questions
were critically important to the British. London would
have to cope with heavy war devastation, indebtedness, and
keen commercial competition from the United States and
some neutrals, such as Sweden, after the war. After the
conclusion of the War Trade Agreement in the autumn of
1943, the Foreign Office, Treasury, Ministry of Supply,
and other interested Departments began to consider how to
revive Anglo-Swedish trade, and en
	 that Sweden
participated fully in postwar relief and reconstruction
schemes. Britain stood to gain more from these arrangements
than did Sweden. Moreover, London could offer Stockholm
few incentives. A strident Allied approach over Swedish
exports to Germany could jeopardise the impending Anglo-
Swedish negotiations. Such action would not only make the
Swedes less willing to accommodate London's postwar
proposals, but also would prompt Stockholm to ask consider-
able compensation for lost trade with Germany as a quid
pro quo for postwar cooperation with Britain.
The Treasury's planned payments agreement with the
Swedish Riksbank was Britain's overriding require-
ment from Sweden during 1944. The agreement would oblige
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the Riksbank to hold 50 million pounds against an equivalent
amount of kroner which the Swedes would advance to the Bank
of England. By making sterling convertible at par with
the krona, the agreement would revive the pound as an
international medium of exchange, even though London had
liquidated the Bank of England's gold and hard currency
reserves to finance the war before American Lend-Lease had
been introduced. Without the payments agreement, the
Ministry of Supply would be unable to import timber, pre-
fabricated houses, and other urgently needed reconstruction
materials. The Treasury was confident that, over the long
term, large sums of sterling would accumulate in the
Riksbank and thereby induce more Swedish imports from
Britain. Furthermore, the Treasury and Foreign Office
hoped that the payments agreement with Stockholm would
encourage other European nations to conclude similar
arrangements with London, leading to a new sterling bloc
and removing awkward financial barriers to postwar British
trade. The Treasury and Ministry of Supply were anxious to
initiate the payments and timber purchase negotiations
during the summer of 1944 so that these questions could
be settled before the cessation of hostilities, thereby
enabling Britain to import from Sweden as soon as direct
transport was feasible. However, the Foreign Office post-
poned these negotiations in deference to the Americans.
The payments negotiations did not begin until after the
Saturnus embargo in November had forced Stockholm to agree
to discontinue all trade with Germany by 1 January 1945.
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By this time, London's chances for concluding the payments
agreement amicably had dissipated and the British were
obliged to resort to their own 'battering ram' tactics.
Various departments of the British government, the
Foreign Office in particular, sought to secure Sweden's
membership in the United Nations' administered relief and
recovery programmes. The British viewed Sweden as a large
.c
reserve of raw materials, 	 goods, and shipping for
UNRRA,the U.N. shipping pool, and other international
relief organizations. Some officials, such as Warner,
resented the fact that Sweden had become a strong
industrial power by remaining neutral and undamaged by the
war. They feared that the Swedes would undermine an orderly
economic recovery in Europe if allowed to trade freely and
exploit Sweden's commercial advantages to procure and hoard
scarce commodities at the expense of UNRRA. Some officials
even regarded Sweden as a potential rival to Britain in
some areas of world trade, such as exnorting capital goods
and ship chartering. Nutting went so far as to say that
Sweden was one of Britain's "most dangerous competitors"
when he criticized Foot's proposal to offer 3-4 million
tons of Polish coal to compensate Sweden for stopping iron
ore exports.
The British outlook towards foreign competition in
any field of postwar commerce was defensive. London
recognized that Britain's only hope for postwar economic
recovery lay in increasing British exports to new markets,
such as Europe, to compensate for the loss of traditional
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overseas markets to American interests during the war.
However, Britain would be unable to establish and consoli-
date any commercial influence in Europe during the initial
years of peace because British industries were damaged
severely by bombing, in bad repair, or tooled fully for
military rather than peacetime export production. British
shipping also would be engaged fully after the end of
hostilities in Europe with such tasks as transferring
troops to the Far East, supplying Britain and British
occupation forces, repatriating refugees and P.O.W.'s, and
transporting relief supplies. Having an inadequate air
transport infrastructure, Britain was unprepared to compete
with American and European interests in the revolutionary
and potentially lucrative field of civil aviation. The
Foreign Office and other concerned departments sought to
prevent foreign encroachment on Britain's future markets
once wartime restrictions and controls ended by establish-
ing international bureaucracies which would regulate
commerce and stifle competition. The proposal for
'internationalizing' civil aviation to prevent American
airlines establishing transatlantic services with Sweden
and other countries on a reciprocal basis was the most
elaborate of these schemes. The Foreign Office believed
that Sweden would be unable to compete aggressively on
world markets if Swedish shipping, surplus commodities,
and other resources were committed fully to the various
United Nations relief agencies.
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However, these international trade restrictions
required international approval in order to be effective.
The countries with the most to gain from the end of war-
time restrictions did not share London's desire to curtail
competition by establishing new trade controls after the
war. The British attracted little support for inter-
nationalized civil aviation. London continued to advocate
this scheme after it had been rejected at the Civil
Aviation Conference in Chicago in November 1944, but most
neutral and liberated European states ignored the British
and concluded bilateral aviation agreements with the
United States. The Foreign Office expected American support
in persuading Stockholm to participate in the U.N. recovery
programmes. The Americans, however, were mainly interested
in securing Swedish membership in the U.N. shipping pooi
which would alleviate U.S. transport shortages in the
Pacific, and in obtaining a Swedish promise not to harbour
Nazi war criminals and loot. Once Stockholm granted
these concessions, London was obliged to drop its other
proposals because of insufficient American support. Sweden
contributed substantial humanitarian aid and relief to
postwar Europe, but not on the scale which the British had
sought. Sweden did not become a serious competitor with
Britain in world trade because Sweden was hampered by the
same endemic fuel and supply shortages which weakened all
European economies, including Britain's, after the war.
It is also possible that Nutting and other British officials
had exaggerated Sweden's competitive potential because they
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envied the neutral Swedes' relative prosperity during
the war.
Strategic and military considerations were largely
peripheral to British policy towards Sweden. Until the
last months of the war, the Foreign Office, Chiefs of
Staff, and the Join Planning Staff did not regard Sweden
as a potential belligerent nor did they have a strong
motive for bringing the Swedes into the war. Churchill
advocated Swedish intervention on several occasions
between 1941 and 1944. Like Hitler, Churchill believed
that a British invasion of Norway would affect the outcome
of the war dramatically. He maintained that the British
would be able to liberate Norway quickly without diverting
large numbers of troops from other fronts if Sweden
entered the war. Moreover, the Prime Minister felt that
intervention would benefit the Swedes since it would
entitle them to join the United Nations, and give them a
chance to do something honourable to atone for remaining
neutral when the Wehrrnacht overran their Scandinavian
neighbours. However, the Chiefs of Staff were unenthusias-
tic about mounting another campaign in Norway where formid-
able natural obstacles would hinder a seaborne assault
against the Germans' well-entrenched positions. They
considered briefly that such an undertaking would be
feasible with Swedish assistance after Boheman intimated
in October 1941 that Swedish forces would capture Trondheim
if Germany invaded Sweden. The Chiefs lost interest in
this scheme once it became apparent that Boheman's approach,
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and a subsequent visit to London by General Nordinski6ld's
emissaries, was unofficial and would not lead to more
serious discussions between the British and Swedish staffs.
London could not plan for possible joint operations with
the Swedes or anticipate how to reinforce Sweden in the
event of an invasion without detailed knowledge of Swedish
defense plans and state of readiness. The Chiefs of Staff
and the Joint Planning Staff treated Swedish intervention
and the liberation of Norway as academic matters and
summarily dismissed subsequent suggestions for action in
Scandinavia. The Foreign Office shared their view,
believing that Swedish intervention, like the prospect of
Germany attacking Sweden, was highly improbable. Warner
and his colleagues in the Northern Department assumed that
Boheman's private proposal and Nordenskiold,s requests for
aircraft in 1941 and 1943 were Swedish attempts to 'curry
favour' with London and ascertain whether the British
intended to invade Norway. Because of the Swedish govern-
ment's determination to remain neutral and recurrent
Swedish invasion fears, the Foreign Office believed that
any British attempt to encourage Sweden's intervention
would complicate unnecessarily Allied relations with Sweden.
In 1944, Sweden assumed a secondary strategic
importance as an unwitting pawn in the Graffham and Royal
Flush deceptions. Although Britain lacked the forces and
inclination to invade Norway, the Chiefs of Staff sought
to convince Berlin that such action was imminent in order
to prevent the Germans from withdrawing their sizeable
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occupation forces to France during the spring and summer.
In order to create the impression that London was anxious
to secure Swedish collaboration in advance of the
Norwegian landings, the British legation made numerous
requests for such concessions as landing rights for
Allied aircraft at Swedish aerodromes. The Foreign Office
instructed Mallet to discontinue most of these approaches
in May because it feared that growing Swedish anxieties
about being drawn into the war were undermining Allied
negotiations with S.K.F. The deception which was main-
tained on a limited basis during the summer of 1944,
together with the Americans' bombastic rhetoric about
Swedish trade, continued to fuel Swedish fears about
renewed hostilities in Scandinavia. By September, the
Foreign Office felt obliged to reassure the Swedes that
London was satisfied with their neutrality and did not
expect den to intervene.
The Foreign Office's attitude on this question
changed radically during the last months of the war. By
March 1945, it shared Churchill's desire to bring Sweden
into the war and in late April, instructed Mallet to ask
the Swedish government to agree to Allied-Swedish staff
talks. This abrupt reversal in formal British policy was
stimulated by Allied concern over possible German resis-
tance in Norway after c.iermany itself had capitulated.
General Eisenhower believed that the Allies would have to
mount an overland assault from Sweden if the German
garrisons in Norway refused to surrender after their
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homeland had fallen.
Swedish intervention in Norway became more attrac-
tive to the Foreign Office in the spring of 1945, because
direct communications with Sweden had become feasible.
Field Marshal Montgomery's advance into northern Germany
would enable the Western Allies to supply and reinforce
Sweden from Danish and north German ports. Moreover,
vague comments which Sköld and a number of Swedish generals
had expressed when the Swedish Air Force began to receive
Mustang fighters led the Foreign Office to infer that
Stockholm would be willing to liberate Norway with Western
assistance.
The Swedish government, however, believed that
last minute intervention in Norway would only provoke the
otherwise demoralized German garrisons into laying the
country to waste. With the support of some prominent
members of the Norwegian resistance and Norwegians exiled
in Sweden, Stockholm rejected the Royal Norwegian govern-
ment's demand for immediate Swedish mobilization. Through-
out the war, the Swedes had sought to influence events
through diplomacy rather than by armed intervention.
Stockholm mediated the Soviet-Finnish armistices of 1940
and 1944, and King Gustav V had offered to arrange peace
negotiations between the British and Hitler in 1940.
Himmler's attempts to arrange a separate peace with the
Western Allies through the Swedish Red Cross gave
Stockholm an opportunity to persuade senior German
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officials to include Norway in any general surrender terms.
The Western Allies rejected Himrnler's proposal out
of hand, but theAmericans encouraged the Swedes to continue
their negotiations with Himmier in the hopes that Norway's
occupation could be ended peacefully. Washington was also
aware of Swedish contacts with the German authorities in
Norway and the Norwegian resistance. The British were less
patient with Stockholm. Far-fetched rumours that the
Germans in Norway would surrender to the Red Army if
intervention was postponed until after the war, prompted
Churchill and some Foreign Office officials such as Sargent
to seek immediate Swedish mobilization. However, U.S.
officials were reluctant to press the intervention question
prematurely. Washington persuaded London that the Allies
should demand only staff talks for the time being. Con-
sultation between the Allied and Swedish staffs would not
commit Sweden to mobilize, but would enable Eisenhower's
headquarters to make adequate plans if a Norwegian expedi-
tion became necessary.
Stockholm agreed to hold staff talks on 30 April,
but did not mobilize. Perhaps the Swedes accepted the
Allied proposal in order to bring additional leverage on
the Germans. The Swedes continued to discuss surrender
terms with Hirnmler's emissary, Walter Schellenburg, during
the first week of May, offering to intern German forces from
Norway in Sweden. However these negotiations became
academic once the German command in Norway ceased resistance
the day after Admiral Doenitz's surrender on 7 May.
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British wartime diplomacy had little bearing on
London's postwar relations with Sweden. Stockholm's
disposition towards the Great Powers in 1945 was determined
by their relative strengths at the end of the war. The
United States was the world's strongest economic nation,
most technically advanced military power, and sole possessor
of atomic weapons. The U.S.S.R. was numerically the world's
most formidable military power, occupying Eastern Europe
and making its influence felt among the weak and divided
states of Western Europe. Britain behaved as if it was a
great power, but British military strength was considerably
weaker than that of the US, or Soviet Union. The British
economy more closely resembled those of the devastated
states of Western Europe rather than that of a great
power. Economic strains forced London to drop many over-
seas military and naval commitments during the two years
following the cessation of hostilities.
The cessation of World War II, and the end of German
predominance in northern Europe did not alter the cautious
style of Swedish diplomacy. The postwar era presented the
Swedes with similar uncertainties which had confronted
Stockholm during the late 1930's and the war. The Swedes
were convinced that the wartime collaboration between the
U.S.S.R. and the Western Allies would not endure once the
'Big Three' powers had achieved their common goal of
defeating Germany. Ostensibly the world was at peace, but
Sweden continued its policy of armed neutrality in a
Europe which would become divided into two armed camps.
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The U.S.S.R. assumed Germany's former role as the dominant
military power in the Baltic. Although Stockholm did not
treat Moscow with the same deference which it had displayed
towards Berlin, the Swedes were anxious to accommodate
Soviet interests, improve Soviet-Swedish trade and re-
affirm Sweden's political and military non-alignment with
the Western powers.
American commercial interests were well established
and expanding their influence in Sweden at the end of the
war, in spite of the War and Navy Departments' ruthless
policy towards Swedish-German trade. The United States did
not assume Germany's position as Sweden's principal market
for raw materials nor did it become Sweden's main coal
supplier as Britain had been during the 1930's. The United
States was chiefly a supplier of consumer goods and of
products and services which incorporated the technologies
developed during the war. Before hostilities ended,
Washington had negotiated a civil aviation agreement with
Stockholm, while the Air Transport Command had established
the infrastructure for a transatlantic civil airline. By
1947, Sweden's imports from the United States had drained
the Riksbank's dollar reserves almost to the point of
exhaustion.
In contrast, Anglo-Swedish trade was balanced
heavily in Sweden's favour, in spite of British efforts to
promote exports and develop closer ties with Sweden. London
and Stockholm concluded the payments agreement in March
1945, after a three month impasse resulting from the
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Foreign Office's refusal to compensate the Swedes for lost
trade with Germany. The Agreement enabled Britain to
import reconstruction materials from Sweden, but it did
not lead to the other economic benefits which the
Treasury and Foreign Office had expected, such as conf i-
dence in sterling, a revived sterling bloc in Europe, or
to a substantial increase in British exports to Sweden.
No amount of British diplomacy or propaganda could conceal
the formidable obstacles to Britain's postwar economic
recovery. Furthermore, the continuation of tight govern-
ment controls over British commerce tended to discourage
Swedish businesses from trading more extensively with
Britain. Moreover British bureaucrats in the Board of
Trade, Ministry of Supply, and Foreign Office lacked the
Americans' marketing and bargaining expertise. London
did not have a civil aviation agreement with Sweden at the
end of the war because the Foreign Office had neglected to
negotiate bilateral treaties in the belief that small
nations would endorse Britian's internationalization
proposal, in spite of the outcome of the 1944 Chicago
conference.
Britain still possessed some influence in inter-
national affairs. As one of the victorious Allies, Britain
occupied part of Germany, was represented on the U.N.
Security Council, and possessed an overseas empire and
extensive trade routes. Britain's armed forces were still
significant, and British weapons incorporated the latest
technical innovations. However, Britain never recovered
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fully as a major power after the German conquest of Western
Europe in the spring of 1940. British prestige in 1945
stemmed largely from Britain's past achievements rather
than from London's ability to influence contemporary events.
British perseverance in the face of overwhelming odds in
1940 was impressive, but Britain's contribution to the
Allied victory in 1945 was outweighed immensely by those
of the United States and the Soviet Union. British weakness,
as well as increasing international instability, obliged the
United States to assume Britain's military commitments in
the Mediterranean and Middle East during 1946. The European
order of the late 1940's did not resemble the post-
Napoleonic Concert of Europe as Eden and Sargent had
anticipated in 1943. By the end of the decade Western
Europe looked to the United States rather than Britain for
economic relief, and for protection against Soviet expansion.
The radical redistribution of international power which
resulted from World War II denied Britain an opportunity to
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